**Dawid Jakimiec**

**MONOGRAPH**

# SECURITY STRATEGY OF CONTEMPORARY JAPAN IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SITUATION IN THE PACIFIC REGION

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The book, "Japan's Contemporary Security Strategy in the Context of the Pacific Region," is addressed to a wide audience interested in international security, geopolitics, international relations, and the contemporary changes taking place in the Asia-Pacific region. Its interdisciplinary subject matter can be used both in the educational process and by those professionally analyzing security issues. In particular, this publication is intended for: students of national and internal security, international relations, political science, administration, defense, geopolitics, Asian studies, and other fields related to security issues; teachers and academic lecturers, who can use the publication as supplementary material in classes on national security, international politics, geopolitics, and contemporary threats; researchers and analysts dealing with international security and the politics of Asia-Pacific countries; public administration employees, security and defense institutions for whom knowledge of the mechanisms shaping the contemporary security environment is important; people interested in Japan and the Indo-Pacific region.

This book can serve as a teaching and supplementary resource, particularly in national and international security education, and security education. Its usefulness stems from its ability to present Japan as an example of a country whose security strategy is shaped by the simultaneous interaction of geopolitical, military, economic, technological, and social factors. Issues of particular relevance to the reader include the shifting balance of power in the Pacific region, Japan's relations with China and the United States, the situation on the Korean Peninsula, maritime security, missile and nuclear threats, cybersecurity, economic security, and the development of new technologies.

Its interdisciplinary nature allows for the analysis of Japan’s security from political, military, economic, technological, and social perspectives, while simultaneously illustrating the impact of the regional situation on the shaping of Japan’s security strategy.

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# PREFACE

A country's security is one of the most crucial elements of its functioning and development. However, the contemporary security environment is undergoing dynamic transformation, and the nature of emerging challenges increasingly transcends the traditional understanding of military threats. Geopolitical changes, technological developments, economic and energy security, cyberspace, maritime security, and the ability of states and societies to respond to crises are gaining particular significance.

The Asia-Pacific region is currently one of the areas of particular importance for the global security system. The political, economic, and military processes taking place there have consequences that transcend the regional dimension. The shifting balance of power, the growing importance of China, the United States' policy towards the region, the situation on the Korean Peninsula, issues related to Taiwan, the security of maritime routes, and the development of new technologies create a complex environment in which individual states must redefine their interests and security priorities. In this context, Japan occupies a special place. Its geographical location, economic and technological potential, importance in international trade, and alliance with the United States ensure that it remains a key participant in the regional security architecture. At the same time, contemporary Japan faces the need to adapt its security policy to changing international conditions, while maintaining the importance of historical, constitutional, and social determinants. This book, "Contemporary Japan's Security Strategy in the Context of the Pacific Rim," attempts to present the most important determinants influencing Japan's perception of security. It focuses on both threats and challenges in the country's immediate environment and broader processes taking place in the Indo-Pacific region and in the international system. A key element of this discussion is Japan's relations with the region's key states. Relations with the United States, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, North Korea, and the Russian Federation are particularly significant. An analysis of these relationships reveals the multidimensional nature of Japan's contemporary security, in which military issues remain intertwined with political, economic, technological, and social determinants.

The development of Japan's defense capabilities also plays a significant role. The evolving Japanese approach to security is a process linked both to changes in the international environment and to the domestic debate regarding the state's role in ensuring security. Of particular importance in this regard are the Japan Self-Defense Forces, allied cooperation, and the development of capabilities in areas such as missile defense, cybersecurity, space, unmanned technologies, and critical infrastructure security.

# INTRODUCTION

For the first time in decades, Japan is increasingly demonstrating its desire to re-emerge as a regional power. On October 21, 2025, Sanae Takaichi became Japan's new prime minister, a historic event in itself, as she became the first female prime minister in Japanese history. But paradoxically, it's something entirely different that most distinguishes her from her predecessors. For years, Japan has been associated with cautious policies, a technocratic style of governance, and an avoidance of abrupt changes in foreign policy. Meanwhile, Takaichi has spent years building an image as a deeply conservative, nationalist politician, and much more assertive on security issues. She is taking a much harsher stance on China, more strongly emphasizing the importance of the army and national security. And here an important question must be asked. *What exactly happened in Asia that caused a country that for decades eschewed militarization to begin to so visibly change its approach?* The answer largely boils down to one country: China. Back in the late 20th century, the balance of power in Asia looked completely different. Back then, Japan was the region's economic giant, one of the world's wealthiest countries, with companies dominating electronics, automotive, and new technologies. Meanwhile, China was a much poorer, much less developed country back then, still trying to catch up with the world's richest economies. And that's precisely why Japan was able to function in a relatively comfortable position for a long time. The problem is that over the past few decades, this pattern has practically completely reversed. China has become the world's second-largest economy, significantly overtaking Japan in terms of scale. It has a population many times larger, vast industrial capabilities, and a growing influence over virtually the entire Asia-Pacific region. But from Japan's perspective, something else is more important. China is rapidly modernizing its armed forces, and the scale of this difference is most evident in its military spending. Japan plans to increase its military budget to around $80 billion annually. Meanwhile, China itself now officially spends around $300 billion annually, and some analysts believe the real spending could be even higher. Beijing understands perfectly well that if it wants to truly compete with the United States in Asia, it must be able to control the seas around its coast and gradually push American influence out of the region. That's why, in recent years, China has begun massively expanding its fleet. New destroyers, frigates, amphibious assault ships, and aircraft carriers are being built. The pace of ship production is so rapid that it's increasingly being called the world's largest navy. According to some estimates, it now possesses over 370 combat ships, and this number continues to grow. By comparison, Japan possesses approximately 50 major combat

ships. And this is a significant change from Japan's perspective. Just a few decades ago, it was one of Asia's main technological and industrial centers. Today, it increasingly has to watch a much larger power emerge alongside it. And the problem doesn't end with the sheer scale of its economy or military. Tensions are also mounting around Taiwan. China is increasingly organizing military exercises, sending ships and aircraft to the island's vicinity, and openly declaring that unification with Taiwan remains one of Beijing's most important goals. And it is precisely here that Japan is beginning to perceive a very real threat, because a potential conflict over Taiwan wouldn't occur far from its borders. It would unfold practically next to Japan, and that would pose a risk to trade routes, American military bases, and the security of the entire region. And that is precisely why Tokyo is increasingly convinced that Japan can no longer assume that peace in Asia is guaranteed. Especially since there is another problem: China and Japan also have their own flashpoints. The most visible symbol of the tensions between Japan and China today are the Senkaku Islands. These are small, uninhabited islands in the East China Sea, which Japan has controlled for decades. The problem, however, is that China also claims rights to them. While at first glance it may seem like it's just a few small islands, the stakes are actually much higher, as such locations often signify control over territorial waters, sea lanes, potential resource deposits, and a strategic military presence in the region. Therefore, the areas around these islands regularly become a point of tension. Chinese ships and aircraft are appearing there with increasing frequency, and these types of situations are beginning to worry Japan. However, from Tokyo's perspective, the Senkaku Islands are likely just one part of a much larger problem, as the real center of tension today is Taiwan. China is increasingly demonstrating that it views Taiwan as one of its most important strategic targets. And it is precisely here that Japan is beginning to perceive a very serious problem. At its narrowest point, the distance between Taiwan and the Japanese islands is less than 120 km, meaning any potential conflict would unfold practically right next to Japan. A good example is Okinawa, home to some of the most important military bases in the entire Asia-Pacific region. And that's precisely why Japan assumes it would be very difficult to remain completely indifferent in the event of a conflict over Taiwan. Even if it weren't directly attacked, American bases on its territory would likely play a key role in any potential military action. From a geopolitical perspective, Japan is located in one of the most important locations in the world. This is the so-called First Island Chain. It's a strip of islands stretching from Japan through Okinawa and Taiwan, all the way to the Philippines. And this chain has held immense strategic significance for decades. Why? Because it effectively creates a natural barrier separating China

from the open Pacific. From Beijing's perspective, this means that the Chinese navy's entry into the vast ocean is largely limited by the countries located within this island belt. This is especially true given that many of these locations have strong ties to the United States. Japan is one of the US's most important allies in Asia, and the Philippines is once again strengthening its military cooperation with Washington. Taiwan itself is a key strategic point for the United States in the region. To ensure greater security in the Pacific, Japan is seeking to build partnerships and conclude agreements with many different countries, including India, as part of the Indo-Pacific concept. The concept aims to expand the playing field to include India, which is perceived as a key partner in countering revisionist tendencies in Chinese policy.

The Indo-Pacific concept is fundamental to Japan's security, as it constitutes a kind of operational philosophy based on the creation of a new superregion where the paths of global powers striving for hegemony intersect. This diverse area encompasses territories stretching from the western coast of the Arabian Peninsula to the chain of Pacific islands located in the east (the Mariana Islands, Guam). This concept reflects the view that counterbalancing China's economic and military power requires cooperation between the United States and other countries in the region. China's aspirations and rivalry with the US clearly apply not only to East Asia and the Pacific but to most of the globe.

Therefore, it has become necessary to develop a new strategic concept – the Indo-Pacific concept. Its goal is to expand cooperation and establish mutual relations, including with India, which is perceived as a crucial partner in building balance and countering revisionist tendencies in China's policy. Another equally important goal is to strengthen further cooperation with other countries within ASEAN. The Pacific region has become an arena of influence competition not only between Japan and China, but also between the United States and China. The governments of these countries recognize the growing economic, commercial, and political importance of the region, and are coordinating mutual efforts to achieve attractive positions in the region and safeguard their respective interests. Therefore, from this point of view, the Indo-Pacific constitutes a specific counterweight to Xi Jinping's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and should be interpreted not only in the category of a political project aimed at creating a new reality, but also as an important initiative aimed at building economic, as well as strategic contacts between the waters of the Pacific and Indian Oceans. For Japan, preventing China from dominating the region's waters is one of the most important conditions for maintaining its current security architecture. Convincing allied states of the United States' readiness to defend its closest partners, and thus ensuring security in the region, is the main bonding factor for both the San Francisco alliance and the North Atlantic Alliance. If this sense of security were to be shaken, for example, as a result of China's takeover of Taiwan, the vast

majority of Asian countries would likely reorient their policies, resulting in the abandonment of alliances with the United States. It should be noted that one of the main tools used to disrupt cooperation between countries in the region is economic cooperation. Therefore, China is firmly articulating its territorial claims, which it defines as vital interests. Beijing's staunchly nationalistic policies and its desire to rebuild its dominant position in Asia demonstrate that a return to peaceful coexistence, balance, and development is practically impossible.

Therefore, one of the key security goals for Japan is to strengthen cooperation with ASEAN countries, which have recently begun to pose a serious threat to China's dominance, not only economically but also in terms of trade, investment, and infrastructure. The entire Pacific region encompasses some of the world's most promising economies (India, Vietnam, Indonesia) and potential superpowers, such as China. World leaders have recognized the economic, demographic, and political importance of Asia, which remains a constant driver of global growth in the 21st century. By 2040, its share of global GDP and consumption is expected to reach 50% and 40%, respectively. The main argument for reevaluating the American strategy and adapting the Indo-Pacific concept remains China, the first country since the Soviet Union to be able to compete with the United States on a global scale. Southeast Asia has become a key arena for the competition for influence between Japan, China, the United States, and India. Leaders of states appreciate the region's economic and political importance and therefore strive to coordinate their efforts and provide an attractive alternative for their countries. The conflicting states of the Pacific region are not yet on the brink of war, and its likelihood remains relatively low. However, it should be emphasized that the risk of armed conflict is constantly increasing. None of these states shows any willingness to soften their stance, yet all are aggressively arming themselves. Incidents continue to occur, both at sea and in the air.

# Chapter I

## Research methodology. Assumptions and goals of the work

### 1.1. Justification for the choice of topic

The Pacific region is currently one of the most significant areas of strategic competition in the 21st century. The growing power of the People's Republic of China, the ongoing work on North Korea's nuclear program, the Russian Federation's military operations in the Far East, and the unpredictability of the United States' international policy necessitate a major redefinition of Japan's new national security strategy.

The thesis covers contemporary Japan's security strategy in the context of the complex situation in the Indo-Pacific region and analyzes the challenges and threats currently facing Japan in international politics. A review of the historical background and key events in the history of the Empire of Japan, from the shogunate and isolationist period through the Meiji period colonial empire, the wars with Russia and China, through World War II, and up to the present day, forms the basis for this work. Furthermore, an in-depth analysis is provided not only of the Japanese government's security policy, with a particular focus on the Indo-Pacific region, but also of the alliances, treaties, and agreements concluded by Japan on a global scale. The evolution of Japan's international policy since the end of the Cold War is also presented, as is the Japanese attitude and commitment to peaceful cooperation with other countries. The work also presents key disputes regarding territorial claims, which strongly influence Japan's relations with other countries in the region, including the Russian Federation, China, South Korea, and North Korea. An important goal was also to demonstrate the military potential and development prospects of the Japan Self-Defense Forces. The alliances and mutual relations between the Empire of Japan and the United States continue to provide a foundation for building a defense policy, which, both regionally and internationally, seeks to systematically increase its international presence.

The outbreak of the war in Ukraine accelerated the ongoing reorientation of Japan's foreign policy and security strategy. Russia's aggressiveness, Japan's unfavorable international environment, and the unique nature of Japan's defense system—which, in theory, is constrained by constitutional provisions, though in practice is subject to interpretation based on external and domestic circumstances—forced Japan to re-enter a geopolitical game in which the stakes lie not only in its own security but also in the entire Southeast Asian region, and more broadly, in the Indo-Pacific. To this end, Japan has embarked on an intensive diplomatic campaign, expanding its bilateral and multilateral alliances, all aimed at countering the growing power

of the People's Republic of China. The change in Japanese foreign and security policy, confirmed in newly adopted strategic documents, was introduced primarily because of China's growing position in the region and Japanese decision-makers' concerns about the possibility of the Chinese "taking inspiration" from Russian aggression against Ukraine in their approach to Taiwan, which would result in war. However, it is doubtful that China will launch a war in Southeast Asia in the coming years, primarily due to its economic ties with the region's countries. Furthermore, Chinese decision-makers are not perceived as unpredictable or unpredictable, despite their efforts to maintain a high profile on the Taiwan issue and frequently demonstrating that they treat "all" of China as a single entity, including Taiwan. North Korea can be accused of unpredictability, as its international activity primarily boils down to a display of force in order to force regional rivals, such as Japan and South Korea, to take it seriously. From the perspective of the European Union and NATO, developing cooperation with Japan and increasing its independence in the field of security in the region may bring mutual benefits in the event of all types of threats coming from Russia or China (although for Europe China does not pose a real military threat, but should rather be perceived as a competitor with a different model of world order). It is worth recalling the words of Jan Kostrzewski here, who notes that "a shared interest creates a solid foundation for the Japanese-European partnership. Provided there is equal, shared commitment to developing the relationship, it has promising prospects."[1]

It should be in the interest of EU and NATO member states to deepen cooperation with Japan and other countries in the Far East to strengthen mutual security, both military and economic, in the event of a potential severance of economic ties between China and Europe in the event of a war in the Far East. An example of this development of mutual military-based relations aimed at enhancing mutual security is the even deeper deepening of the Japan-NATO partnership since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, which is intended to be Japan's response to this conflict and a clear signal to China.[2]

Through cooperation with the West, Japan is seeking to protect East Asia from a war far more devastating than the war in Ukraine. It is using this historic moment to deepen geopolitical

[1] J. Kostrzewski, *Japonia zbroi się i z determinacją szuka partnerów w Europie*, Klub Jagielloński, 6.03.2023, https://klubjagiellonski.pl/2023/03/06/japonia-zbroi-sie-i-z-determinacja-szuka-partnerow-w-europie/ [accessed: 14.03.2023].

[2] Panda, *Tokyo's Power Projection: The NATO Calculus, Japan Forward*, 9.06.2022, https://japan-forward.com/asias-next-page-tokyos-power-projection-the-nato-calculus/ [accessed: 21.03.2023].

ties with Europe and the United States. In the current climate, this is made all the easier by the fact that Japan has become one of the most vocal voices opposing Russian aggression. Moreover, like the West, it is deeply committed to democracy, economic freedom, and a liberal international order. All of these aspects strongly favor increasing cooperation between the EU, the US, and Japan. The West, however, should prioritize this cooperation so as not to miss the moment when East Asia becomes "tomorrow's Ukraine."

The diplomatic conflict with Beijing, which began in November 2025, continues unabated and is becoming increasingly visible on the international stage. China is increasingly vehement in its criticism of Japan, as evidenced by the events at the recent security conference held in Munich on February 13-15, 2026.[3] Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has criticized changes in Japanese security policy, warning against a return to militarism in Japan. Japanese Foreign Minister Motegi Toshimitsu has called these allegations "factually inaccurate" and "baseless." Meanwhile, Takaichi Sanae, Prime Minister of Japan since October 21, 2026, has stated that she will strive to rebuild relations with Beijing. However, recent moves indicate the increasingly confrontational nature of Japan's policy towards China. Bilateral relations are experiencing further tensions. Recent crises include a JSDF member's incursion into the Chinese embassy, Beijing's imposition of sanctions on an advisor to the Japanese Prime Minister, and the passage of Chinese warships near Okinawa[4].

It seems that the Takaichi administration realizes there is no hope for a quick repair of bilateral relations, so it has decided to intensify its confrontational policy on all available fronts. Recent actions worth noting include the visible development of political and trade relations with Taiwan, an attempt to reduce China's share of Japanese trade and investment, and the search for alternative sources of supplies and deposits of critical raw materials. In recent weeks, the Takaichi Sanae administration has approved a number of security policy changes that could herald a further escalation of tensions in the region. In line with its election promises, the Japanese government is focusing on increasing defense spending, which is expected to ultimately exceed 2% of GDP. A significant portion of the planned investments and purchases is intended to prepare Japan for a potential conflict in the region. The Ministry of Defense plans to deploy surface-to-air missile systems on Yonaguni Island (Japan's southwesternmost inhabited island), located just 110 km east of Taiwan[5]. Additionally, the ministry announced the construction of underground shelters to accommodate residents in the event of a crisis in Taiwan or a potential direct attack on Japanese

[3] https://iz.poznan.pl/publikacje/serwis/swiat-w-destrukcji-raport-monachijskiej-konferencji-bezpieczenstwa-2026

[4] https://apnews.com/article/japan-china-embassy-break-681e907aa1ff18862aa29f425d994734

[5] https://www.asianmilitaryreview.com/2025/12/after-koizumis-yonaguni-visit-jsdf-capabilities-shelter-preparedness-and-deterrence-by-denial-nsbt/

territory. The ruling party has established a special commission to develop a new strategy by the end of the year to strengthen Japan's defense capabilities and adapt to new forms of warfare[6]. The first proposals included recommendations to increase the use of artificial intelligence and defense capabilities through the use of unmanned drones.

The Japan Self-Defense Forces will also develop capabilities to strike enemy bases by building submarines equipped with vertical launch systems (VLS) for missile launches. In March 2026, the Takaichi Sanae government approved a bill establishing a National Intelligence Council[7]. The new body aims to strengthen the fragmented intelligence structure and centralize data collection and analysis. The Intelligence Council will consist of 11 ministers led by the Prime Minister, the Chief Cabinet Secretary, and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense. The Council will be responsible for security, counterterrorism, and countering foreign espionage. The idea has been met with criticism from some in the Japanese opposition, who fear government intrusion into citizens' privacy and demand greater parliamentary oversight. In April, the Japanese government made the long-awaited decision to lift existing restrictions on arms exports[8]. Previous law limited arms exports to five categories: rescue, transport, warning, surveillance, and minesweeping. Japan will now be able to sell combat weapons to 17 countries with which it has concluded defense cooperation agreements, including the United States and the United Kingdom.

The government has maintained a ban on arms sales to countries involved in conflicts, but this does not apply to countries that have concluded defense agreements with Japan. The new law allows exports to such countries "under special circumstances." The lifting of export restrictions was criticized by some in the Japanese opposition. Among the most important potential customers are countries involved in the conflict in the South China Sea. Visits to the Philippines and Indonesia are planned for early May, the purpose of which is to present Japan's arms offerings. The Philippines has expressed interest in used Abukuma-class frigates belonging to the Japan Self-Defense Forces. Japan is also interested in building an information processing system and a command and control radar system. In the past, Japan has donated patrol aircraft, boats, and other supplies as symbolic gestures of support to countries involved in the dispute with China. The next step was the signing of strategic cooperation agreements and the launch of the Official Security Assistance (OSA) program. The April lifting of export restrictions represents another step forward. Japan's sale of advanced radar systems and destroyers to Indonesia and the Philippines will further antagonize China and signal a new phase of involvement in the conflict in the South China Sea. Prime Minister

[6] https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/16519452

[7] https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/16419950

[8] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/clyx4vlqy4vo

Takaichi is keen to accelerate work on revising the Japanese constitution[9]. In the last elections, the PLD obtained a qualified majority in the lower house, necessary to independently initiate work on changes to the constitution. In accordance with the coalition agreement, the government, in consultation with the opposition Nippon Ishin party, established a commission to prepare a draft amendment within a year, which will undoubtedly include the pacifist Article Nine and the role of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces. If the amendment to the Constitution is implemented, it will be a key step towards building a "normal state" and allowing Japan to shape its own arms policy.

In addition to the escalating conflict with Beijing, the Japanese government fears a reduction in US involvement. The negative effect of the Trump administration's conflict-driven foreign policy is a significant decline in trust in the president himself, as well as in the security guarantees and future role of the United States in the region. The Japanese side views with deep concern Washington's growing involvement in new fronts (Venezuela, Iran, the escalating conflict with NATO), which distract from events in the Indo-Pacific region. Prime Minister Takaichi's administration is also concerned about the upcoming Trump-Xi summit and its potential consequences, such as the signing of a trade agreement with China and a softening of Washington's policy towards China at the expense of Taiwan. Prime Minister Takaichi herself states that the goal of the new arms export policy is not to make money[10] but to build new regional alliances "with like-minded countries."

During the Tokyo Conference 2026,[11] think-tank representatives emphasized the importance of developing cooperation between middle powers such as Japan and the European Union, which theoretically fits very well with Japan's current strategy of attracting NATO and the EU to key initiatives and events promoted in the Indo-Pacific region (the Taiwan threat, CPTPP, the Free and Open Indo-Pacific initiative, the conflict in the South China Sea). For some time now, Japan has been developing various initiatives and coordination activities with NATO members. This trend was further strengthened by the recent visit of the German Defense Minister to Japan,[12] who announced an increased German presence in Asia. Strengthening cooperation with Japan will include regular security consultations, joint crisis management, and the signing of a Mutual Military Access Agreement (RAA). Unfortunately, during Prime Minister Takaichi's recent visit to Washington,[13] President Donald Trump was heard to be dividing allies into "better and worse," criticizing NATO's actions. Due to the escalating tensions between Trump and NATO, the Japanese government will

[9] https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/16489376

[10] https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/16434504

[11] https://www.genron-npo.net/en/tokyo/

[12] https://defence24.com/geopolitics/new-berlin-tokyo-axis-germany-pushes-deeper-defence-pact

[13] https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/16436504

likely have to refrain from promoting certain initiatives to avoid damaging relations with Washington. Worse still, the decline in trust in the United States within government circles and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is weakening confidence in Washington's security guarantees and assurances. The result is a series of initiatives that are intended to gradually elevate Japan's dependence on the United States, strengthen its defense capabilities, and build a network of new alliances in the region. The events of recent weeks demonstrate that Japan, without the United States' involvement, will develop new and strengthen existing cooperation formats with selected countries in the region and globally. It is worth noting recent events such as the development of energy and defense cooperation with Canada[14] and high-level meetings with the United Kingdom, Italy, France and Poland[15]. In addition to trade and investment, the Japanese government is focusing on developing technological cooperation (AI, semiconductors, the energy sector, rare earth elements) as well as military and arms cooperation. According to the Takaichi administration, the lifting of arms export restrictions and increased defense spending could be an excellent opportunity to strengthen alliances in the Indo-Pacific region. Japan wants to export modern weapons and technologies to countries also trying to counter China's growing influence.

In addition to trying to attract NATO and EU members, Japan is not forgetting its key partners in the Asia-Pacific region. During an April meeting between the Japanese Defense Minister and his Australian counterpart,[16] the allies delivered a clear message about the need to strengthen cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region, fearing the creation of a "security vacuum" caused by US involvement in other areas. The talks focused on strengthening military cooperation and coordinating actions in response to regional and global security challenges. Australia and Japan signed a $7 billion deal[17] to supply warships to Australia, marking Tokyo's largest arms deal since the easing of export restrictions in 2014.

To define the changes taking place in Japanese security policy, it should be noted that the Takaichi Sanae administration is clearly moving toward increasing not only defense but also combat capabilities. Among the steps taken, the most noteworthy are the decision to lift restrictions on arms exports and plans to acquire new weapons technologies. Prime Minister Takaichi assures[18] that "there is absolutely no change in our commitment to upholding the path and fundamental principles that have guided us as a peace-loving nation for over 80 years since the end of the war." These

[14] https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/16404992

[15] https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/16469686

[16] https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2026/04/09/japan/politics/japan-australia-defense-ministers-asia/

[17] https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/japan-australia-seal-14b-warship-deal-to-boost-indo-pacific-defense ties/3910389

[18] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/clyx4vlqy4vo

assurances will certainly not convince the authorities in Beijing, which has been warning of a return to militarism in Asia, even though it has been increasing its own combat capabilities for many years. In addition to Japan's increased combat capabilities, it is also worth noting the enormous diplomatic effort Tokyo has put into strengthening military cooperation and securing declarations of support from allies in the Indo-Pacific region and the EU. The Japanese government plans to strengthen cooperation in all sensitive areas, such as technology, trade, and arms exports. Additionally, changes in Japanese law allow for Japan's stronger involvement in the "containment of China" policy, as exemplified by the conflict in the South China Sea.

Changes in Japanese security policy, the deterioration in bilateral relations and attempts to strengthen alliances will not go unnoticed by China, as exemplified by the recent UN Security Council deliberations.[19] Beijing's representatives condemned statements by Japan and the European Union regarding the situation in the South China Sea and accused Tokyo of provocative actions in the Taiwan Strait and planning military expansion. We can certainly assume that a series of processes are underway aimed at a gradual transformation and transition from a state with defined defensive characteristics to a dynamically operating regional member of the security system. The complex and rapidly evolving situation in the Indo-Pacific region, the nature of these changes and their significance in geopolitics, as well as the high scientific and research relevance of this work, justify addressing this topic. It is worth recalling that Japan is a constitutional monarchy, whose political system was influenced by a socio-cultural environment distinct from that of Europe, as well as by various internal and external factors. Japan's historically conditioned cultural heritage is linked to the principles of Western constitutionalism, identity, but also to a shared set of beliefs, attitudes, and ideas regarding security, as well as potential sources of threats. The area of security is the space in which emotions and attitudes constitute the driving force of ideas that influence the direction of society towards implementing and undertaking specific actions.[20] These actions may mobilize or, on the contrary, discourage society from specific activities.[21] Analyzing the conditions influencing the subjective perception and perception of security by the Japanese society, both internally and externally, we can assume that in virtually every country, including Japan, social acceptance of the level of state security is extremely important.[22]

[19] https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/16531429

[20] D. Keltner, J. Haidt, "Social Functions of Emotions at Four Levels of Analysis," *Cognition and Emotion* 13, no. 5 (1999), p. 513.

[21] See: J. Kozielecki, "Cywilizacja strachu i kultura nadziei", *Nauka*, no. 2 (2007), p. 8; A. Sepkowski, *Człowiek a przyszłość*, Toruń 2005, p. 10.

[22] J. Golinowski, *Lęk jako instrument medialnej wojny informacyjnej*, [in:] *Socjotechnika lęku w polityce*, eds. F. Pierzchalski, J. Golinowski, Bydgoszcz 2016, p. 117.

In the context of building and maintaining an appropriate level of security, it is worth recalling the history and basic statistics of Japan. According to the latest UN data,[23] the country's current population as of July 15, 2026, is 122,425,525, a decrease of 1.367 million compared to 2020. Nearly half of Japan's population lives in the largest metropolitan areas of Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya. Japan's capital city comprises 23 administrative districts, home to approximately 8 million people. It is an island nation located in the Japanese Archipelago in the western Pacific Ocean off the eastern coast of Asia, stretching in an arc along the Asian continent.[24] Japan is a country with a history, culture and customs different from Western countries. Merely learning about the past, customs, or Japanese culture does not guarantee understanding; it is essential to understand the Japanese mentality.

When analyzing contemporary threats and factors and conditions affecting the security of the Land of the Rising Sun in its various dimensions, it is crucial to recall this country's rich past. First, it is important to remember the events surrounding World War II and its conclusion, as well as Japan's role in it. As we know, after World War II, the country was occupied by the United States, which imposed a democratic system legalized by the Japanese Constitution of November 3, 1946. The Americans' primary goal was to change Japan's political system. The Meiji Constitution, a legal act unrelated to democracy, was the basis for the functioning of the Empire of Japan's existing system. Regarding the historical conditions shaping Japan's external security situation, it is worth remembering that the Potsdam Declaration of July 17, 1945, concluded between the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain, formed the basis of the Allied countries' policy towards defeated Japan. This document contained regulations regarding the occupation of the Land of the Rising Sun and defined the principles for introducing fundamental political reforms in Japan. The declaration committed the Japanese government to promoting and building positive attitudes and beliefs among Japanese society toward a new democratic order, promoting freedom of speech and religion, and respecting human rights. Occupation forces were to be withdrawn from Japan once these objectives had been achieved.[25] The countries occupying the Empire of Japan after World War II sought to demilitarize, denazify, and decartelize it, and build democracy,[26] and the new constitution constituted the basis of the empire's democratic system and was intended to combine the demands of the occupying countries with the traditions of the Land of the Rising Sun.

[23] Departament Spraw Gospodarczych i Społecznych ONZ – Wydział Ludności, *World Population Prospects: The 2024 Revision* (average fertility variant).

[24] "Geografia Japonii", *Wikipedia*, accessed September 17, 2022.

[25] *Deklaracja Poczdamska z 26 lipca 1945 roku*, [in:] *Zbiór Dokumentów 1951*, ed. J. Makowski, no. 9−10, pp. 1540−1545.

[26] M. Jansen, *The Making of Modern Japan*, Cambridge 2002, p. 667.

General MacArthur, who oversaw the introduction of reforms and the implementation of democratic processes in Japan, abolished all prohibitions and restrictions on the expression of political opinions, which had been in force until then under the penalty of imprisonment under the Act of 1925.[27] The Americans introduced a ban on the use of the flag featuring the rising sun, a symbol of the Meiji Restoration and the Japanese armed forces.[28] The basis for new, healthy social and political relations, according to the Americans' decision, was to be a new democratic and at the same time liberal constitution, based on the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition.[29] It was decided that the new constitution would replace the existing Meiji Constitution (*Japanese: Dai Nippon Teikoku Kempō*) of 1890, which had many opponents among both the occupation command and the American government. It was considered a hermaphroditic creature,[30] representing a combination of British representative rule and Prussian tyranny. It's also worth recalling that in 1853, it was the United States that forced the Land of the Rising Sun to end its isolation and open itself to international cooperation.

Although the United States extended a protective umbrella over Japan following the end of hostilities, the current international situation, especially in the Indo-Pacific region, is forcing a paradigm shift in thinking about Japan's security. The Japanese government began this shift by redesigning its plan, developing a new security strategy, and increasing military spending. Fumio Kishida, a Japanese politician, member of the House of Representatives and Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Shinzō Abe government from 2012 to 2017, leader of the Liberal Democratic Party, and Prime Minister of Japan from 2021 to 2024, proposed a plan in Tokyo to increase defense spending. The plan's adoption followed months of discussion. The three most important security documents that the Japanese government has amended include:

- The National Security Strategy (NSS).
- The National Defense Strategy (NDS).
- The Defense Buildup Program (DBP).

The United States welcomed Japan's moves, interpreting them as part of the alliance strengthening the U.S. regional cooperation strategy to enhance security in the Pacific region. Blinken emphasized that the plan will thus transform the alliance's current ability to promote peace efforts and protect order in the Indo-Pacific region. The United States has located several military installations in Japan, such as the Yokosuka Naval Base, where the U.S. Navy's 7th Fleet is stationed. It should be emphasized that the Japanese government has taken a firm and uncompromising stance

[27] E. Takemae, *The Allied Occupation of Japan*, New York 2002, p. 386.
[28] H. P. Bix, *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan*, New York 2001, p. 551.
[29] D. MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, New York 1964, p. 302.
[30] *Guide to Japan* (CINPAC-CINPOA Bulletin, no. 209/45, September), Washington 1945, p. 35.

towards China, which is operating near Taiwan, and North Korea, which is threatening nuclear and missile attacks. Russia's armed attack on Ukraine may increase fears that other countries may attempt to follow Russia's example and carry out similar attacks. Japan fears that a Russian invasion of Ukraine could embolden China to attack Taiwan, which in turn would threaten nearby Japanese islands and disrupt both the supply chain for advanced semiconductors and the blocking of oil transport routes from the Middle East. The outbreak of war in Ukraine is a turning point in world politics.[31] This war undoubtedly forced European countries to change their perception of the international reality surrounding them. A similar situation occurred in the case of Japan, which was confirmed by the Ukrainian-Russian war in its previously undertaken changes in its security and foreign policy directions. In this way, Russia's actions, in essence, unintentionally, pushed Japan to even more strongly intensify its international activities in this matter (similarly to the cases of Sweden and Finland), and thrust it back into the geopolitical game.

A serious problem for Japan is the constitutional prohibition on having offensive armed forces and *de facto* waging war (Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan).[32] However, within the Japanese security system, the Japan Self-Defense Forces exist, performing functions almost identical to the standard military. However, a certain handicap within the Japanese (informal) military means that, despite possessing its own military units, Japanese decision-makers must still rely on external security factors due to treaties imposed after World War II. The 1990s marked the collapse of Japan's "American" security policy. With the collapse of the USSR and the Eastern Bloc, and due to the Gulf War, the US began to reduce its military presence around the world, including in Japan. This signaled to the government in Tokyo that it was time to take a new direction in foreign and security policy. Japan thus turned toward multilateralism in international relations, but Japanese diplomats' actions in this regard were largely thwarted by the general reluctance of East Asian states, motivated primarily by historical reasons, namely the fear of renewed Japanese domination.[33] The situation changed again in 2001, following terrorist attacks in the United States and renewed US military engagement globally. Japan immediately extended its support to the Americans. The US began returning to East and South Asia, creating a renewed opportunity for Japan to base its security policy on American capabilities. This was particularly important for Japan given the growing power

[31] J. W. Hornung, "Japan's Long-Awaited Return to Geopolitics," *Foreign Policy*, February 6, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/02/06/japan-china-taiwan-russia-geopolitics-defense-security-strategy/, accessed February 21, 2023.

[32] *Konstytucja Japonii*, trans. and intro. by T. Suzuki, Warszawa 2014, p. 13.

[33] A. Anders, *Japoński model soft power w polityce zagranicznej państw*, [in:] *Polityka zagraniczna. Aktorzy. Potencjały. Strategie*, ed. T. Łoś-Nowak, Warszawa 2011, pp. 203–209.

of China and the unpredictability of North Korea. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mark Milley, expressed his belief that, due to its population, technology, and economy, China currently poses the greatest geopolitical challenge to the United States. Washington maintains that no other country in the world has both the will and the means to change the international order—its rules and regulations. According to the Pentagon report, "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China," it is predicted that in the near future, the Chinese will not launch an armed attack on Taiwan, but will instead employ the so-called salami tactic of slowly, systematically encircling Taiwan, thus increasing military pressure that will become more persistent over time. Currently, we see the United States becoming even more deeply involved in the broader Indo-Pacific. The main reason is the escalating U.S.-China conflict, primarily economic, but also political and military. Despite the war in Ukraine, the United States continues to hold on to Asia because it knows how important this place is geopolitically and how important it will be in the future.[34]

However, despite this increased engagement, Japan is also considering options other than the US. At the end of December 2022, Japan adopted three new strategic documents: the National Security Strategy,[35] the National Defense Strategy,[36] and the Defense Buildup Plan.[37] In the diplomatic arena, Japan launched intensive efforts, initially directed at Australia. On January 6, 2022, the Japanese concluded an agreement with Australia to strengthen defense cooperation and security ties in the region.[38] Next, there was talk of a British-Italian-Japanese project for a next-generation jet fighter that will use artificial intelligence[39], followed by a meeting between the Japanese Prime Minister and British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak.

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[34] P. Sempa, "The Asia-Pacific Is More Important to the US Than the Euro-Atlantic," *The Diplomat*, March 9, 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/03/the-asia-pacific-is-more-important-to-the-us-than-the-euro-atlantic/, accessed March 14, 2023.

[35] *National Security Strategy of Japan*, strona internetowa Sekretariatu Rady Ministrów Japonii, December 16, 2022, https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/221216anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf, accessed February 21, 2023.

[36] *National Defense Strategy*, strona internetowa Ministerstwa Obrony Japonii, December 16, 2022, https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/strategy/pdf/strategy_en.pdf, accessed February 21, 2023.

[37] *Defense Buildup Plan*, strona internetowa Ministerstwa Obrony Japonii, December 16, 2022, https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/plan/pdf/plan.pdf, accessed February 21, 2023.

[38] "Japan, Australia sign defence pact for closer cooperation," *Reuters*, January 6, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/japan-australia-sign-defence-cooperation-pact-2022-01-06/, accessed February 21, 2023.

[39] J. Beale, "UK, Italy and Japan team up for new fighter jet," *BBC News*, December 9, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-63908284, accessed February 21, 2023.

The January 11, 2023, meeting focused on the signing of an agreement facilitating mutual visits between Japanese Self-Defense Forces and British military personnel. Kishida described the agreement as "taking security cooperation between Japan and the UK to a new level."[40].

As the security environment around Japan becomes increasingly unstable, the Japanese government has no choice but to redirect its current policy and security strategy. Doubts have arisen as to whether the Japan Self-Defense Forces, in their current form, will be able to effectively contain threats to the country based on their existing military forces and resources. After conducting in-depth analyses, the government has concluded that the potential of the Japanese defense forces is insufficient in the rapidly changing international environment and considering the potential threats to the Land of the Rising Sun's security. As part of the new strategy, Japan has been systematically increasing defense spending since 2023. These expenditures are expected to ultimately constitute 2% of the country's gross domestic product by 2027. Allocating such significant funds is extremely difficult and requires exceptional discipline and determination. As emphasized by the Japanese media, the Japanese government is determined and aims to overcome resistance and mobilize both the defense and finance ministers to make every effort to secure the defense budget. It should be emphasized that the 2% target included in the National Security Strategy and the amount of planned defense funding specified in the national Defense Program are in line with the NATO standard for defense spending. This significantly exceeds the informal limit of limiting defense spending to a level no higher than 1% of GDP. This 1% limit, established in 1976, was intended to prevent excessive spending growth and thus stem the deterioration of Japan's already fragile finances and mounting public debt. Japan's revised national security strategy assumes close cooperation with the United States and other countries that share similar values. Prime Minister Kishida met with US President Joe Biden in Washington, D.C. During the meeting, the US side reaffirmed its support for Japan's pursuit of an increasingly assertive security policy, and President Biden emphasized that "the United States is fully, completely, and utterly committed to the alliance."[41] The following countries are listed in the NSB: United States; Australia; India; Great Britain; France; Germany; Italy; Canada; New Zealand; South Korea and the nations of Southeast Asia. As outlined in the new National Security Strategy (NSS), Tokyo finds itself in the midst of the most challenging and complex security environment since the end of World War II. The strategy also states that,

[40] "Kishida, Sunak Sign Japan-Britain Security Pact," *Nippon.com*, January 12, 2023, https://www.nippon.com/en/news/yjj2023011100691/, accessed February 21, 2023.

[41] P. Mattingly, "Japanese prime minister's visit highlights cornerstone of Biden foreign policy," *CNN*, January 14, 2023, https://edition.cnn.com/2023/01/14/politics/biden-kishida-japan-foreign-policy/index.html, accessed February 21, 2023.

within the framework of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision, cooperation with allies and like-minded countries to ensure peace and stability in the region is crucial for Japan's security. Since 2007, Japan has operated within the Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue), an alliance of the United States, Japan, India, and Australia. This is one of the important ways in which it strengthens collective security. There are voices within Japanese society that Japan should join yet another alliance – the AUKUS alliance. This suggestion is primarily based on the fact that Japan has been systematically developing bilateral security cooperation with each AUKUS member[42], and these efforts also serve to strengthen the group's collective national security.

Currently, Australia is the country that most strongly supports the idea of Japan joining the alliance.[43] The annual report, known as the Defense White Paper, notes that Russia's aggression against Ukraine is a serious violation of laws prohibiting the use of force, which has shaken the foundations of the international order. The Ministry of Defense expressed great concern over Russia's aggressive actions, which may increasingly use nuclear potential for deterrence. This, in turn, leads to increased activity around Japan, where Russian nuclear submarines operate. After Tokyo supported the sanctions imposed on Moscow, their activity intensified and aims to strengthen and deepen relations with China. According to the report, the strategic threat posed by China is the greatest Japan has ever faced. It emphasized that Beijing has not ruled out the use of force to seize control of Taiwan, and that China currently poses the greatest threat to Taiwan. The report provides a thorough review of the security situation on the island and concludes that since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Taiwan has been making efforts to defend itself against China, which poses a serious security threat that has intensified in recent years.

After many years of discussion and negotiations, the Japanese government decided on a so-called counter-offensive capability, which gives Japan the ability to strike enemy bases and command and control facilities with long-range standoff missiles. This created a powerful regional deterrent for Tokyo. According to the NSB, missile attacks on Japanese territory pose a real threat, and the ability to immediately and effectively counterattack serves as a deterrent to aggressive neighbors like China and North Korea, which are constantly strengthening their military capabilities. Therefore, acquiring the ability to counterattack is essential to deter missile attacks by other

[42] M. Auslin, "Why Japan Should Join AUKUS," *Foreign Policy*, November 15, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/15/japan-aukus-jaukus-security-defense-pact-alliance-china-containment-geopolitics-strategy-indo-pacific/, accessed February 21, 2023.

[43] S. Dziedzic, J. Oaten, "Australia's 'indispensable' partnership with Japan could see it join AUKUS pact as strategic links grow," *ABC News*, December 9, 2022, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-12-09/aukus-australia-japan-richard-marles-pact/101757248, accessed February 21, 2023.

countries. A significant limitation on the development of Japanese military potential is the pacifist constitution, imposed on Japan by the United States after its defeat in World War II. This not only limits its capabilities but also contains provisions prohibiting Japan from waging war and permitting only self-defense. According to the Japanese government, the ability to respond does not violate this constitutional prohibition when an armed attack has occurred or is imminent, there are no other means of preventing a real attack, and the response is intended, for example, to prevent, deter, or otherwise avert a potential attack. The new security strategy assumes the ability to launch an effective counterattack in enemy territory as the absolute minimum of self-defense measures. The goal of the new security strategy was to dispel doubts about whether the ability to counterattack and defend is consistent with the provisions of the Japanese Constitution and international law.

It should be noted that conducting analyses of the Land of the Rising Sun's security based on military, political, sociological, economic, and related disciplines is not easy. When researching the essence of Japanese threat perception and feelings of insecurity, there is no single, universally accepted model of social norms and behaviors.[44] Therefore, analyses conducted in this area must be quantitative in nature, due to the fact that numbers are characterized by absolute rationalism.

### 1.2. Research objectives and research problems

The goals adopted in this work are closely related to the cognitive needs in terms of complementing and deepening the existing analyses and research achievements in the area of security. To thoroughly examine and verify the contemporary factors and conditions of the security environment in the Indo-Pacific region, it is essential to understand the specific mentality, expectations, and perceptions of Japanese society regarding broadly defined security issues, including state security. This work also contributes to the enrichment of scholarly achievements in the study of the security environment in the Pacific and Indo-Pacific regions. The dynamically changing geopolitical security situation and the sense of threat from other countries in the Indo-Pacific region have contributed to Japan revising its current approach to defense-related issues and building an effective military potential resistant to external threats, as well as adopting an appropriate defense strategy. The main objective and specific objectives adopted in the work are closely related to the defined research problem, research subject and research assumptions.

[44] B. Wojciszke, *Psychologia społeczna*, Warszawa 2013, p. 24.

**The main purpose of the work:**

*A comprehensive analysis of Japan's security strategy and an assessment of its effectiveness in the face of dynamic geopolitical changes in the Pacific region.*

**Specific objectives:**

- *identifying threats to Japan's security;*
- *analysis of Japan's National Security Strategy;*
- *assessment of the military potential and defense policy of the state;*
- *analysis of the importance of alliances and strategic partnerships;*

**Main research problem:**

*How is Japan shaping and implementing its security strategy in response to contemporary geopolitical threats and challenges in the Indo-Pacific region?*

### 1.3. Theses, hypotheses and research questions

A research hypothesis is a probable answer to a given research problem, which is subject to verification during the research process.[45] When formulating research hypotheses that point to problems whose causes are not understood, it is obvious that they must be thoroughly analyzed so that they can be explained and understood, and so that the conclusions drawn from the research can be implemented in practice. The state of our knowledge about Japan and the motivation to learn and analyze issues related to this different country from Europe are crucial.

To achieve the aim of the work, the following research thesis and detailed hypotheses were adopted:

**The main thesis of the work:**

*Japan's contemporary security strategy responds to the deteriorating security environment in the Indo-Pacific region and aims to enhance deterrence and strategic autonomy while maintaining the key role of the alliance with the United States.*

**Specific hypotheses:**

*1. The growth of China's military potential is the main factor behind changes in Japanese security policy.*
*2. Japan is moving away from a restrictive interpretation of constitutional pacifism.*
*3. The Indo-Pacific Concept is a tool to strengthen Japan's position as a regional security leader.*

**Research questions:**

*1. What conditions caused Japan to change its approach to national security issues?*

[45] J. Apanowicz, *Metodologia nauk*, Toruń 2002, p. 78.

*2. To what extent does Japan's new security strategy address potential external threats in the Indo-Pacific region?*

*3. Is a revision of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution justified in the current geopolitical circumstances?*

### 1.4. Research methods, techniques and tools

Achieving research goals requires the use of appropriate research methods, techniques and tools.[46] This work utilizes methods that enable a comprehensive and multidimensional analysis of phenomena occurring in the field of security. The research methods used in the work served to exhaustively explore the issues raised and achieve the defined research goal. The formulated research questions and hypotheses require the use of appropriate research approaches and methods. Research methods characteristic of political science will be employed in the work to analyze the socio-cultural background, institutional arrangements, and even political competition. In principle, these methods naturally draw attention to institutionalism. However, it is important to emphasize the need to move beyond its traditional version and toward its contemporary variant – neo-institutionalism.

The author assumes that the application of a neo-institutional approach will mean that institutional-legal analysis will no longer become the sole method for understanding reality. A behavioral approach may also prove valid, based on the assumption that politics, as a social phenomenon, has an individual dimension, and that group behavior can be derived from the way people behave. This approach analyzes the behavior of specific individuals performing specific political functions. This element is crucial because specific behaviors often contradict the findings resulting from the application of the institutional-legal method, which constitutes the institutional basis for the actions of specific entities.[47] The adopted method of analysis justifies the use of a historical method. It is assumed that past experiences are one of the elements determining the shape of Japan's political system. The objectives adopted in this work also imply the use of a legal-dogmatic method, which is helpful in developing legal sources. The comparative method, on the other hand, will be useful in comparing the current legal status with previous regulations. A systemic method will also be used to enable the interpretation of the existing state of dependence of government bodies. Furthermore, selected elements of the decision-making method will be applied in the analysis of legislative decisions.

The basic research method used in the work is the analysis of the subject literature, which will enable the presentation of the theoretical foundations and the current state of knowledge on the

[46] M. Łobocki, Metody i techniki badań pedagogicznych, Kraków 2011, p. 55.
[47] P. Chmielewski, Homo agens. Instytucjonalizm w naukach społecznych, Warszawa 2011, p. 298.

researched issue. Document analysis will encompass reports, studies, and publications from national and international institutions, as well as online sources dealing with this topic. Combining various research methods and techniques will enable us to obtain reliable and scientifically objective results regarding the issue under investigation.–The research material used in this work encompasses a variety of information sources regarding the situation in the Indo-Pacific region and the mutual relations between the countries of this region. Primary sources include academic publications in the fields of sociology, demography, economics, political science, and security studies. A significant group of research materials consists of studies and reports from international institutions and organizations, which provide current data on the scale and nature of international contacts. The work also utilizes statistical data from national and international databases. This data allowed for the presentation of changes occurring in the global security architecture and an assessment of their impact on the social and economic structure of states. Furthermore, legal and strategic documents and expert opinions on security policy were analyzed. This allowed for the identification of how states and international organizations should respond to contemporary challenges and threats at the regional and international levels. The collected research material enabled a comprehensive analysis of the current security conditions in the Indo-Pacific region and the formulation of conclusions that align with the study's objectives and research problems. The adopted research methodology forms the basis for achieving the research objectives of this study. The use of diverse methods, techniques, and research tools allows for a multifaceted analysis of security issues, which constitute one of the most important needs of the contemporary world. The conducted research enabled the verification of the established hypotheses and the provision of answers to the posed research questions, ultimately allowing for the formulation of conclusions regarding the issues under study.

To objectify the results, it is also advisable to use both quantitative and qualitative methods, which will provide more complete data necessary to illustrate a given problem. It is essential to analyze the rhetoric, narratives, stereotypes, and myths prevalent in Japanese society and frequently exploited by its politicians.[48] The research procedure corresponds to the layout and structure of the work, and the research tools and methods used are used to conduct a proper analysis of the problems being investigated. In addition to strictly academic research, the study also relied on reports published by think tanks. Official information presented on the websites of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Japan and other countries was also essential. Regarding the latest events, information was obtained from the websites of state press agencies and news portals. The analyses employed *theoretical methods*, such as:

[48] D. Silverman, *Interpretacja danych jakościowych*, Warszawa 2009, p. 63.

- *systemic analysis;*
- *strategic analysis;*
- *institutional-legal analysis;*
- *comparative analysis;*
- *historical method.*

and *empirical methods*:

- *source document analysis;*
- *content analysis;*
- *statistical and military data analysis.*

The source base was *Japanese documents*:

- *National Security Strategy*
- *National Defense Strategy*
- *Defense Buildup Program*
- *Japanese Ministry of Defense reports (Defense of Japan White Paper).*

*international documents:*

- *ASEAN documents;*
- *International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) reports;*
- *SIPRI reports.*

The academic literature consisted of *monographs, articles, and online sources* on:

- East Asian security;
- Japanese foreign policy;
- Indo-Pacific geopolitics;
- theories of international relations.

### 1.5. The importance of work and research. The structure of the work

The aim of this work is closely linked to the cognitive needs of deepening existing analyses and continuing research achievements in this area. A thorough analysis of security issues in the Indo-Pacific region is worth undertaking, as this research fits into the area of issues related to security architecture not only in Asia but also globally, and at the same time contributes to the process of learning and understanding them.[49]

[49] B. Geddes, "Initiation of New Democratic Institutions in Eastern Europe and Latin America," in *Institutional Design in New Democracies: Eastern Europe and Latin America*, eds. A. Lijphart, C. H. Waisman, Boulder 1996, p. 18.

It is important to note that this work was also created with practical challenges in mind. Several decades after the beginning of the democratic transition in Japan, based on the 1946 Constitution, the debate regarding the most appropriate strategy for defending Japan in the country's surrounding geopolitical reality is still ongoing. Periodically, with varying degrees of intensity, various proposals from Japanese politicians to modify and amend the provisions of the Japanese Constitution emerge. These proposals constitute a response to the challenges of political practice, which both exposes the shortcomings of the formal rules established in the Constitution and provides an excellent platform for the development, testing, and ultimately the enforcement of countless informal rules.

It is also worthwhile to supplement Polish scholarly achievements with a comprehensive study on the changing national security strategy of Japan in the face of the current security architecture in the Indo-Pacific. Furthermore, the contribution and intellectual effort that enrich the broad scholarly discussion on the current geopolitical situation in the Indo-Pacific region are important. The research methods adopted in this work served to exhaustively explore the issues addressed and achieve the defined research objective.

Structure of the work:

The work consists of an introduction, six chapters, a conclusion, a verification of hypotheses, an assessment of the effectiveness of the Japanese security strategy and the expected habilitation contribution. The first chapter of the dissertation, titled *Research methodology. Assumptions and goals of the work*, presents the general assumptions of the work, its subject matter and chronological scope, the state of research and literature on the subject, the significance of the work and the research, the structure of the work, the research hypotheses, the methodology, and the research tools.

The second chapter, titled *Theoretical foundations of state security research*, provides a multidimensional analysis of the term "security" in general, as well as national security and security in international relations, according to selected authors. It also presents various types of security and their importance for the proper functioning and development of the state. Much emphasis was placed on the scope and objectives of security, but also on the role and importance of entities in the context of building the expected level of security in various aspects of the functioning of societies. Due to the unique role security plays in the structure of contemporary international relations, it constitutes a key pillar in external relations between states.[50] The author analyzes the theory of security, based on an analytical approach according to the subjective criterion and indicates, above all, the key components, which are international and national security.

[50] L. Magnusson, J. Ottosson, "Path Dependence: Some Introductory Remarks," in *The Evolution of Path Dependence*, eds. L. Magnusson, J. Ottosson, Cheltenham 2009, pp. 1-18.

The third chapter, titled *The evolution of Japan's security policy after World War II,* describes the transformation of the international order, both globally and regionally, that occurred with the end of the Cold War. This transformation initiated a process of evolution of Japan's security policy in the opposite direction from its previous developments. New conditions and their impact on the security environment, particularly in the context of the alliance with the United States, as well as significant changes related to the political system of the Land of the Rising Sun, led to a gradual shift away from the constitutional formula that drastically limited Japan's defense potential, and toward a redefinition of the armed forces' expansion, allowing them to undertake not only domestic tasks but also participate in international missions.

Chapter four, titled *Japan's contemporary security environment,* examines the significant determinants of the security environment in the Indo-Pacific region and the scale of threats, not only to the American position in the region but also to Japan's security. The growing military capabilities and armed potential of the Chinese People's Liberation Army pose a significant threat to other countries in the region. The military threat posed by the PRC is not solely a function of its growing naval strength. This chapter presents the Chinese missile program, which has achieved significant progress in the last two decades in terms of the number and sophistication of missiles and the platforms capable of delivering them. It is worth noting that the US military is particularly focused on medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles: the DF-21, DF-26, and DF-17, which are among the strengths of the Chinese missile forces and pose a serious threat to US forces stationed in the Indo-Pacific region. Furthermore, the chapter outlines the reform of the defense system and the modernization of the Japanese army, aimed at strengthening its defense capabilities.

Chapter five, titled *Japan's contemporary security environment*, analyzes the provisions of this document, which outlines Japan's new security strategy in the face of geopolitical and regional changes. Two significant changes introduced in this document are noted: the need for a counterstrike in response to a potential attack on Japanese territory and the ending of illusions regarding the possibility of potential cooperation with Russia. An analysis of Japan's National Security Strategy of December 16, 2022, reveals a clear historical shift in Japan's defense policy. A key assumption of the strategy is to build a counterstrike capability, double military spending, and strengthen the alliance with the United States. It should be emphasized that Japan's new security strategy is a historic breakthrough in the country's previously implemented security policy, as it includes a counterstrike on the aggressor's territory. It is also important to remember that this document was drafted at a crucial time, taking into account the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine, escalating tensions in the Taiwan Strait, and the ongoing rivalry between Washington and Beijing. The situation in Asia is unstable, North Korea is pursuing missile and nuclear programs, and China is increasing its military potential in alliance with Russia. All these factors impact the sense

of security in the Indo-Pacific region. The Japanese government's new approach to security is a response to this new reality, in which Japan should be prepared to deter potential aggression, but also to support its main ally, the United States, in the event of an open confrontation in the Indo-Pacific region.

Chapter six, titled *Japan in the Indo-Pacific regional security architecture*, analyzes Japan's vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), which has occupied a prominent position in Japan's foreign policy agenda since 2017. This chapter examines critical junctures in the evolution of the FOIP from 2005 to the present, as they mark a demarcation point for defining the use of the term "Indo-Pacific." The discussion in this chapter aims to answer the question of which critical junctures contributed to the evolution of the FOIP vision and why, and whether the ongoing changes are institutionalized. The results of the analyses suggest that the evolution of Japan's FOIP vision cannot be explained solely by neorealism or liberal institutionalism. Both its maritime strategy and its FOIP vision are susceptible to changes in power projection resulting from the reemergence of a dominant Chinese power in the region and the relative decline of the US. In addition, this chapter discusses the functioning of the Quad. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QSD) is an informal forum for cooperation between the United States, Australia, India, and Japan. Its primary goal is to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific region and to take measures to counter China's growing influence.

The work ends with conclusions that provide a reference to the research hypotheses and a list of sources, a list of tables, graphs and figures, and appendices.

# Chapter II

# Theoretical foundations of state security research

## 2.1. Security and its types. The contemporary dimension of state security

The second chapter provides a multidimensional analysis of the concept of security in general, as well as national security and security in international relations. Particular emphasis is placed on the scope and objectives of security, as well as on the actions of entities aimed at building an acceptable level of security in various aspects of society's functioning. Security plays a significant role in the structure of contemporary international relations, serving as one of the fundamental pillars, both theoretically and practically. Its primary goal is to disseminate and promote institutional measures aimed at maintaining stability, peace, and development at the local, regional, and global levels. This requires a balanced approach, as even the most influential states cannot ensure peace and order in the international context on their own[51].

In the 20th and 21st centuries, seeking lasting peace and security requires taking into account the diverse needs, interests, and goals of a growing number of participants in international relations. On the one hand, we see increasing challenges, threats, tensions, and conflicts in today's global environment, while on the other, we strive for joint efforts in the form of cooperation, alliances, and other international structures that address and overcome emerging challenges. In the area of security, the goal is to identify and anticipate both military and non-military threats. These elements are the foundation for conducting in-depth analyses and planning actions aimed at ensuring an appropriate level of state security. It is crucial to emphasize the broadest possible global dimension of security, which will enable the identification of cause-and-effect relationships, types of challenges and threats, as well as the analysis of the development of technologies and means used by states to maintain it. Such analysis allows for the formulation of theories concerning the security of individual states, as well as the security strategies they implement. In this way, research on the essence of security allows for a better understanding and more effective assurance of an appropriate level of security in a constantly changing international environment.[52] The contemporary understanding of *security* is much more comprehensive than in the past, reflecting the constant evolution of threats. Therefore, security focuses on several key points, encompassing diverse political, economic, technological, ecological, social, and humanitarian aspects. Nowadays, security also encompasses the protection of national identity and the guaranteeing of fundamental civil rights and freedoms.

[51] E. Cziomer, Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe w XXI wieku. Wybrane problemy, Kraków 2010, p. 7.
[52] M. Lasoń, Bezpieczeństwo w stosunkach międzynarodowych, Kraków 2010, p. 9.

Security researchers analyze these diverse dimensions, striving to create holistic models that account for rapidly changing global conditions. Their work aims to identify threats and challenges and develop strategies and policies that enable effective management of security from the local to the global. This is a strategic endeavor that influences the long-term functioning of societies and state apparatuses.[53] Security research analyzes the interactions between various factors that influence the stability and security of states and the international community. Considering historical and contemporary contexts, researchers strive to understand the mechanisms that allow for effective countermeasures to various threats and the promotion of global peace and stability.

The concept of "security" can be analyzed from various theoretical perspectives. The etymology of the word "security" derives from the Latin term securitas, which is a combination of the words sine (without) and cura (concern, worry, fear). The term can be simply defined as a state free from anxiety and fear, synonymous with complete freedom, certainty, and liberty. The interpretation of the concept of security is a constantly evolving area of research and scholarly debate.[54] Generally, security is defined as follows: "In its most literal sense, security is synonymous with safety and means the absence of physical danger or protection from it."[55] It should be noted that security primarily encompasses actions aimed at protecting the standard and quality of life, as well as ensuring independence and stability. A fundamental aspect of security is continuous and comprehensive analysis, taking into account both internal and external threats, striving to understand and neutralize potential dangers through the development of effective protective and preventive strategies. Academic literature also emphasizes that security is closely linked to the concepts of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and human rights. Contemporary security theories seek to integrate diverse approaches, from classical geopolitical theories to modern analyses of human security, to create a comprehensive analytical framework capable of effectively countering threats in a dynamically changing global environment.

The security of the state, including society, depends, among others, on military aspects, hence in this area *the Dictionary of Terms in the Field of National Security* defines the concept of security as "a state achieved as a result of appropriately organized defense and protection against external and internal threats, determined by the ratio of defense potential to the scale of threats."[56] This definition indicates that security is a dynamic state that depends on the effectiveness of defense

[53] Z. Ciekanowski, *Rodzaje i źródła zagrożeń bezpieczeństwa*, Józefów 2010, p. 28.
[54] Z. Ciekanowski, J. Nowicka, H. Wyrębek, *Bezpieczeństwo państwa w obliczu współczesnych zagrożeń*, Siedlce 2016, p. 15.
[55] R. Zięba, *Instytucjonalizacja bezpieczeństwa europejskiego: koncepcje – struktury – funkcjonowanie*, Warszawa 1999, p. 27.
[56] *Słownik terminów z zakresu bezpieczeństwa narodowego*, ed. W. Łepkowski, Warszawa 2002, p. 14.

systems and their ability to neutralize potential threats. Developing comprehensive and integrated plans to protect human life and health and protect national infrastructure is fundamental to shaping national security. Equally crucial is directing efforts toward maximizing the potential of state and local government organizations, as well as commercial security institutions.[57] State security and national security are closely related terms, but not identical. Both refer not only to the defense of territory against military attacks but also to protection against various threats that can have a destructive impact on the sustainable and dynamic development, survival, and existence of the state.[58] Compared to state security, national security also encompasses value systems and individual and group needs.[59] National security can be analyzed across multiple strategic contexts and dimensions. The first context is the state resulting from the development of specific political, military, social, and economic situations. It reflects the country's fundamental values, but also the level of satisfaction of a range of basic existential and functional needs.[60] The second context is essentially the understanding of national security as a situation in which there is no disruption of interests, aspirations or hierarchy of values that could lead to a number of threats, conflicts or destructive phenomena.[61] They can also be successfully defined as a specific process ensuring conditions for the survival and uninterrupted and dynamic development of the state in the face of a wide range of threats to its sovereignty and stability.[62] The concept of internal security in legal terms lacks a clear definition. However, it can be described as the state of a state's political and administrative system, providing citizens with confidence that any potential threats will not disrupt its stable operation. This also encompasses the protection of citizens, the maintenance of social order, ensuring peace, and overseeing the public interest.[63] In fact, a thorough analysis of the concept of "internal security" shows that it is closely linked to issues related to maintaining stability, balance and order in a given territory.[64] Internal security can also be analyzed as a complementary category to public security, which provides an unquestionable foundation for setting key priorities for overall state policy. Consequently, it is the integration of functions and tasks related to public and internal security that determines their collective status. These functions and tasks include, among others:

[57] M. Kopczewski, J. M. Krawczyk, "Wybrane elementy bezpieczeństwa wewnętrznego państwa na podstawie założeń „Strategii bezpieczeństwa narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej”," *Doctrina*, no. 8 (2011), p. 101.

[58] M. Ciszek, "Teoretyczne podstawy bezpieczeństwa państwa," *Prosopon*, no. 2 (2001), pp. 168–170.

[59] K. Dunaj, *Bezpieczeństwo Państwa. Zagadnienia prawne i administracyjne*, Olsztyn 2016, p. 20.

[60] A. D. Rotfeld, "Bezpieczeństwo Polski a bezpieczeństwo Europy," *Sprawy Międzynarodowe*, no. 7 (1984), p. 39.

[61] S. Koziej, F. Wołkowicz, *Podstawowe założenia polityki bezpieczeństwa i strategii obronnej*, Warszawa 1998, p. 7.

[62] C. Rutkowski, *Bezpieczeństwo i obronność: strategie-koncepcje-doktryny*, Warszawa 1995, p. 27.

[63] K. A. Wojtaszczyk, A. Materska-Sosnowska, *Bezpieczeństwo państwa*, Warszawa 2009, p. 58.

[64] Ch. Bay, "Koncepcje bezpieczeństwa indywidualnego, narodowego i zbiorowego," *Studia Nauk Politycznych*, no. 4 (1989), pp. 84–91.

protecting civil liberties and rights, ensuring control over public health and the natural environment, and crisis management in the face of natural disasters or technical failures.[65]

Considerations of the overall state security framework should be supplemented by a thorough systematization of this term. Therefore, state security can essentially be defined as "the state of relations and processes within a state, anchored in the political order, which, while ensuring the effective and harmonious pursuit of the interests of the state and its citizens, simultaneously creates the potential for efficient diagnosis and response to emerging threats that threaten those interests."[66] Internal security institutions are responsible for countering threats to the state and its citizens. Key actors include counterintelligence and civilian and military intelligence agencies, tax authorities, and police authorities.[67] Intelligence consists of units responsible for obtaining, collecting, processing, analyzing, and disseminating information crucial to national security. Counterintelligence, on the other hand, encompasses entities focused on protecting this information from illegal acquisition by foreign intelligence agencies and ensuring its security.[68]

To comprehensively illustrate the dimensions and components of national security, it is necessary to clarify the term "national security system." The dictionary of national security terms defines it as "an internally coordinated set of organizational, human, and material elements aimed at countering all threats to the state, particularly political, economic, psychosocial, ecological, and military threats."[69] For a structure to be considered a system, it must meet the following criteria:

– Precision – the system should be highly detailed and precisely defined in all relevant respects.

– Functionality – this means that the system should be defined by its functions;

– Completeness – the analysis of the system should reflect its actual state at a given moment, taking into account the variability of multiple internal and external factors;

– Stability – the system should remain unchanged for a specified period of time.– Separation – systems and subsystems should be independent of each other and contain no common elements[70].

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[65] W. Kotowicz, *Bezpieczeństwo narodowe*, Olsztyn 2015, pp. 137–138.

[66] W. Fehler, I. Dziubek, *Bezpieczeństwo wewnętrzne współczesnej Polski*, Warszawa 2012, p. 32.

[67] T. Bąk, Z. Ciekanowski, *Bezpieczeństwo państwa*, Jarosław 2014, p. 65.

[68] M. Jakubowska, "Służby specjalne RP w systemie bezpieczeństwa państwa," in *Rola i zadania służb w systemie bezpieczeństwa publicznego*, ed. M. Górka, Koszalin 2013, p. 291.

[69] *Słownik terminów...*, op. cit., p. 139.

[70] M. Mazur, "Pojęcie systemu i rygory jego stosowania," in *Materiały Szkoły Podstaw Inżynierii Systemów*, no. 2, Orzysz 1976, pp. 8–10.

Security policy is implemented by a state operating within a specific domestic context and international environment. A comprehensive security policy system encompasses state actions that are purposeful, organized, and carefully planned, with the overall goal of achieving an appropriate level of security regardless of situations or events.[71] Undoubtedly, the policy should take into account the variability of factors, as well as the possible escalation of various threats, such as: historical factors including cultural heritage, traditions and the course of previous historical events, demographic factors such as the structure of society, population dynamics and demographic trends, systemic factors including the structure of power, as well as the legitimacy and effectiveness of state institutions, geographical factors including the size and characteristics of territories and their geographical location, sociological factors such as social cohesion, the dynamics of relations between social groups and the occurrence of conflicts, economic factors relating to natural resources, the level of economic development and financial stability, psychological factors related to social mentality, the level of trust in institutions and the sense of security of individuals[72].

State security policy measures encompass all tools and resources used by a state to protect its internal values. State security policy methods refer to the practical application of these tools in action.[73] The fundamental attributes protected by the state include the continuation of statehood as an institutional construct and the permanence of the national community, understood as an ethnic collectivity, freedom of action in the international arena, the territorial and political sovereignty of the state, and the well-being of its citizens. Vital interests encompass all activities aimed at strengthening the state's position in the international arena, which is essential to maintaining and expanding its influence and ensuring appropriate representation in global political, economic, and social structures[74]. Contemporary security considerations encompass a wide range of threats, from traditional military threats to new challenges such as cyberthreats, climate change, and terrorism. Achieving security requires continuous monitoring and risk assessment, as well as adaptive responses to changing geopolitical and social conditions. The literature also emphasizes the importance of international cooperation and information exchange between states, which is essential to effectively countering global threats. This approach fosters synergies in defense operations, thus increasing the overall level of global security. Striving for security encompasses the development

[71] W. Fehler, "O pojęciu polityki wewnętrznego bezpieczeństwa państwa," *Studia Prawnoustrojowe*, no. 23 (2014), p. 208.

[72] T. Bąk, Z. Ciekanowski, *Teorie bezpieczeństwa*, Jarosław 2012, p. 56.

[73] J. Zając, "Bezpieczeństwo państwa," in *Bezpieczeństwo państwa*, ed. K. A. Wojtaszczyk, A. Materska-Sosnowska, Warszawa 2009, p. 18.

[74] T. Kaczmarczyk, A. Bogucka, "Współczesne zagrożenia bezpieczeństwa," *Zeszyty Naukowe Pro Publico Bono*, no. 1 (2022), p. 158.

and implementation of protective strategies, public policies, and risk management mechanisms, which are crucial in a dynamically changing global environment. In this way, security becomes not only an individual desire but also a collective goal that determines the stability and development of entire communities[75]. For centuries, security has been considered one of the most cherished values, both in the societal and individual dimensions. Ensuring an adequate level of security within a state is essential for the proper and effective development of individual entities, institutions, and the state as a whole. The fact that security is a constant focus of scholarly attention and interest is evidenced by the numerous and ever-increasing attempts to redefine or deepen its essence. The topic of security is treated very broadly, and the desire to thoroughly explore and exhaust this concept seems almost impossible. Attempts to adopt a holistic approach, or to generate a single, scientifically comprehensive definition of security, may therefore seem questionable. Such attempts, for example, focusing on a single dimension—political, social, or military—would expose the researcher to accusations of an incomplete or, worse still, imprecise approach to the subject at hand[76]. It is worth recalling that the term "security" comes from Latin and means *sine cura* (sine - without; cura - fear, apprehension).[77] This perception indicated primarily the political stability of the *Secretarias*, which defined a state of safety, certainty, security, peace, as well as the absence of threats and, importantly from the point of view of contemporary analyses of the concept, protection against dangers.[78]

It can therefore be noted that security, both in its definitional and colloquial understanding, has long been associated with a state guaranteeing certainty of existence and survival. Today, this view is increasingly questioned by researchers as too narrow or incomplete. In the new approach, it encompasses not only guarantees of the inviolable survival of a specific entity but also the freedom to develop it.[79] The contemporary approach to global security focuses on solving problems in various regions of the world and supporting sustainable human development. Achieving these goals requires coordinated cooperation among all elements of the security system. The dynamics of change in various sectors and the emergence of new challenges force modifications to existing operational principles. Security is perceived as a process that evolves in response to constant changes in the geopolitical and social environment. This perspective confirms the widely accepted thesis that security is not a permanent and unchanging state, but rather dynamic and constantly adapting to new

[75] J. Kaczmarek, *Współczesne bezpieczeństwo*, Warszawa 2008, p. 16.
[76] R. Zięba, "Kategoria bezpieczeństwa w nauce o stosunkach międzynarodowych," in *Bezpieczeństwo narodowe i międzynarodowe u schyłku XX wieku*, ed. D. B. Bobrow, E. Haliżak, R. Zięba, Warszawa 1997, pp. 9–10.
[77] *Słownik łacińsko-polski*, ed. K. Kumaniecki, Warszawa 1981, p. 137.
[78] S. Kaczor, "Bezpieczeństwo w czasach pozornego pokoju i spokoju," in *Bezpieczeństwo i obronność w świetle współczesnych wyzwań i potrzeb: ujęcie naukowe, pedagogiczne i edukacyjne*, ed. J. Kunikowski, Siedlce 2010, p. 49.
[79] P. Majer, "W poszukiwaniu uniwersalnej definicji bezpieczeństwa wewnętrznego," *Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego*, no. 7 (2012), pp. 11–17.

realities.[80] Changes in the global security landscape require continuous analysis and adjustment of strategies, which highlights the importance of flexibility and adaptability in security management.

When examining the theoretical context of security, it is important to note that maintaining it requires continuous effort by individuals, local communities, states, and international organizations to establish and maintain its desired state. It is also worth emphasizing that the essence of security based on guarantees of inviolability and freedom of development is a sense of certainty.[81] When making important analyses and assessments, it is important to take into account the lexical definition: Security is a state that provides a sense of confidence and guarantees its preservation as well as an opportunity for improvement. It is one of the basic human needs, a situation characterized by the absence of the risk of losing something that a person particularly values, for example: health, work, respect, feelings, material goods.[82] It is assumed that a desirable level of security occurs when every risk can be effectively neutralized with an equivalent level of protection. Considerations of the nature of security require emphasizing its dynamic nature, including active intervention aimed at ensuring the ability to survive, develop, and freely pursue interests in specific, sometimes changing, conditions. This process involves seizing opportunities, addressing challenges, minimizing risks, and countering threats.[83] A deeper analysis and comparison of the concept of "security" reveals its heterogeneity. Research conducted in specialized literature often emphasizes that the diversity of security characteristics leads to a blurring of the boundaries of this phenomenon, hindering a precise and comprehensive reflection on its essence.[84] This heterogeneity negatively impacts the adequate interpretation of reality, which in turn complicates its coherent understanding. As a result, the vast scope of security categories becomes extremely difficult, and likely even impossible, to define concisely.[85] It can be assumed that the concept of "security" refers directly to the "awareness spheres of a specific entity" as well as to the acceptable level of risk.

Security can be interpreted as a specific "state of social awareness in which the existing level of threats, thanks to the possessed defensive capabilities, does not arouse fear or anxiety about

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[80] Ł. Roman, "Istota współczesnych wyzwań i zagrożeń bezpieczeństwa," *Journal of Modern Science*, no. 4 (2015), p. 212.

[81] W. Pokruszyński, "Bezpieczeństwo narodowe u progu XXI wieku," *Zeszyty Naukowe AON*, no. 1 (2008), p. 24.

[82] *Słownik terminów z zakresu bezpieczeństwa narodowego*, ed. W. Łepkowski, Warszawa 2002, p. 13.

[83] S. Koziej, *Między piekłem a rajem. Szare bezpieczeństwo na progu XXI wieku*, Toruń 2006, p. 7.

[84] J. Ziarko, "Dylematy metodologiczne bezpieczeństwa jako nauki," in *Bezpieczeństwo. Wymiar współczesny i perspektywy badań*, ed. R. Kwieciński, Kraków 2010, p. 63.

[85] J. Marczak, "Współczesny charakter, potrzeby i organizacja bezpieczeństwa narodowego," in *Wojskowe wsparcie władz cywilnych i społeczeństwa – założenia, przygotowania i użycie*, ed. W. Kitler, A. Skrabacz, Warszawa 2004, p. 20.

maintaining (achieving) recognized values."[86] It is therefore necessary to maintain some kind of balance between the nature and intensity of threats and the ability of the security entity to effectively counteract them.[87] In principle, there is no single precise formula defining security, therefore security can be perceived as a social context and process that strives for continuous improvement of strategies and mechanisms ensuring security.[88]

When analyzing the theoretical aspects of security, several main dimensions can be distinguished.

- the subjective dimension, which focuses on the certainty of existence and survival of individual participants in international relations;
- the objective dimension, focusing on the content of security, measures and strategies for shaping the security of ownership and identity of international participants and their development opportunities;
- a functional dimension that allows for the observation of changes over time, such as the dynamics and evolution of subjective and objective aspects of security, relating to the certainty of existence, state of possessions and development opportunities of participants in international relations.[89]

Generally speaking, security is divided into the following categories based on the division criteria:

1. Subjective criterion (regarding the recipient of protection):

– Individual security, which refers to individual protection, including aspects such as health and privacy protection, as well as physical and mental integrity, which constitute the basis for the functioning of the individual.

– Social and national security focuses on protecting specific social groups, but also the entire nation. This category encompasses a catalogue of threats stemming from social, ethnic, and economic differences.

– State security, understood as the protection of a sovereign political entity, encompasses, above all, the stability and uninterrupted functioning of institutions, the inviolability of borders, but also the protection and safeguarding of international interests.

[86] C. Rutkowski, *Bezpieczeństwo i obronność: strategie, koncepcje, doktryny*, Warszawa 1995, p. 30.
[87] W. Stankiewicz, *Bezpieczeństwo narodowe a walki niezbrojne*, Warszawa 1991, p. 73.
[88] M. Cieślarczyk, "Modele i wymiary bezpieczeństwa," *Zeszyty Naukowe AON*, no. 3(36) (1999), pp. 42–43.
[89] Z. Ciekanowski, J. Nowicka, H. Wyrębek, *Bezpieczeństwo państwa…*, op. cit., p. 18.

2. Objective criterion (according to the field of protection):

– Military security: focusing on issues of protection against military threats, as well as external aggression and all armed conflicts.

– Political security: concerns the foundations of political stability, but also protection against coups d'état, corruption and other forms of political destabilisation that may have an adverse impact on the functioning of the state and have a destructive impact on the state and quality of life of citizens.

– Economic security: essentially, its focus is on protecting the economy, ensuring financial stability, and protecting against economic crises. This is a key factor in determining a country's development. It should be added that economic security is also related to generating income sufficient for individual survival, sustainable development, and maintaining personal dignity. This is where the crucial role of a stable income, job security, and pension insurance becomes apparent.[90]

– Energy security: covering the security of energy supplies, including fuels.

– Social security: refers to ensuring social cohesion, including multifaceted protection against the marginalization of individuals and the phenomenon of social exclusion.[91]

Criterion of relation to the state area (due to the relationship with the state territory):

– External security: refers to protection against threats originating from outside the state's borders, such as military aggression, international terrorism, or human trafficking.

– Internal security: concerns protection against threats within the state, including crime, civil unrest, and domestic terrorist acts.[92]

In addition to external security, one of the key aspects is the internal security of a state, defined as the state of a country's functioning, which guarantees the prevention, elimination, reduction, and minimization of all threats to the constitutional order, internal stability, and public peace. Internal security encompasses a range of activities aimed at safeguarding the integrity of the state through the development and implementation of strategies that provide protection against various threats, including terrorism, organized crime, cybercrime, and natural disasters. Its fundamental function is to ensure security for the public interest of individual communities and individual citizens.[93] Constitutional security refers to protecting the constitutional order of the state,

[90] *Human Development Report 1994*, New York–Oxford 1994, pp. 23–25.
[91] A. Urbanek, *Podstawy bezpieczeństwa państwa. Wymiar społeczno-polityczny*, Słupsk 2013, p. 128.
[92] J. Brokowski et al., *Słownik terminów z zakresu psychologii dowodzenia i zarządzania*, Warszawa 2000, p. 17.
[93] K.A. Wojtaszczyk, "Istota i dylematy bezpieczeństwa wewnętrznego," *Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego*, no. 1 (2009), p. 14.

preventing subversive activity, and maintaining political stability. This is a key element ensuring the continuity of state institutions and their resistance to various forms of destabilization.[94] Social security concerns providing support to those most in need, including the homeless, the unemployed, retirees and pensioners, and combating social exclusion.[95] Internal security not only can, but also should, be analyzed on many levels. It is an interconnected system of many components, ranging from the security of individuals – including both citizens and foreigners – through businesses, population centers, regions, and finally the entire state and nation. Indeed, it is undeniable that various aspects and dimensions must be considered. Attempts to interpret the concept of security are, in fact, a manifestation of the growing interest in this issue.

Experts and analysts who deal with this topic are convinced that this will result in the emergence of a new scientific discipline – securitology,[96] whose area of interest will include research on the sources of threats relating to the existence, development and normal functioning of humans and social organizations. This is currently the case because security sciences have become a separate discipline, which, by regulation of the Minister of Science and Higher Education, has been placed in the field of social sciences.[97] The dynamics of the international environment, as well as ongoing changes in the development of scientific disciplines, have systematically and gradually led to a shift away from the narrow understanding of the term "security." Contemporary researchers generally adopt two approaches to understanding security as their starting point.[98] The narrow approach, also referred to as the negative approach, interprets security as the absence of threats. This reasoning is based on an analysis of the actions an entity takes to protect itself against threats that may pose a real threat to its internal values. Such an approach is doomed to failure from the outset, as under the current conditions and factors influencing the security environment and the current socio-political reality, achieving a state free from any threats is practically impossible. Security defined in this way excludes social, economic, and commercial development. Therefore, it can be considered a kind of "simplification" used to define specific, fragmented situations. The second definitional approach is broad, appropriate for open societies. This definition of security relies primarily on

[94] S. Sulowski, M. Brzeziński, *Bezpieczeństwo wewnętrzne państwa. Wybrane zagadnienia*, Warszawa 2009, p. 40.
[95] H. Kołecki, "Przemiany i perspektywy straży miejskich i gminnych w ochronie porządku i bezpieczeństwa publicznego," in *Materiały konferencyjne, Warszawa 20–21.09.2007 r.*, ed. K. Rajchel, Warszawa 2007, pp. 86–87.
[96] The origin of the term *securitology* should be sought in ancient Rome and the Latin language. Security studies derive their name from the Latin *securitas*, which means security. The suffix *-logos* denotes a science or study; thus, *securit(o)logy* is the science of security or, in the plural, security sciences. Securitology belongs to the practical sciences, which outline perspectives for mitigating threats to the existence, development, and proper functioning of individuals and social organizations. In Poland in 2011, security sciences were recognized as an academic discipline—initially within the humanities and later within the newly established field of social sciences, https://encyklopedia.biolog.pl/index.php?haslo=Securitologia (accessed: May 22, 2021).
[97] *Securitology*, Wikipedia, https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Securitologia (accessed: May 22, 2021).
[98] M. Cieślarczyk, "Bezpieczeństwo i obronność w świadomości współczesnej młodzieży," in *Wychowanie patriotyczno-obronne: tradycje i współczesność*, ed. R. Kalinowski, J. Kunikowski, Siedlce 2004, p. 124.

creating appropriate conditions that enable the achievement of high levels of predicted survival, but also the possession and development of an individual. In this approach, the activity and initiative of the subject are crucial, as well as their individual predispositions related to cooperation with the environment. This definition of security among researchers is also referred to as an active approach, assuming the possibility of applying innovative solutions in the sphere of security, while at the same time somewhat distancing itself from issues inextricably linked to security, such as threats.[99] J. Stańczyk refers to this understanding of security, for whom security has two basic components: "guarantees of the inviolable survival of a given entity, but also the freedom of its development."[100]

When analyzing the evolution of the definition and understanding of the concept of security, it is important to emphasize that researchers consistently agree that there is no single, once-and-for-all definition of security. It is therefore generally accepted that it is a process that changes depending on the variables emerging in society at any given time.[101] Another approach to defining security is presented by W. Pokruszyński, who defines it as the continuous activity of individuals, as well as local communities, states, and international organizations, in creating the desired state of security. In this approach, security is not just a state but, above all, an opportunity for development. The author of this definition further emphasizes that in security analysis, taking into account various dimensions, challenges and threats must be clearly distinguished, as only such a holistic understanding can lead to an objective assessment of the phenomenon.[102] S. Koziej, on the other hand, highlights the considerable dynamism and variability of the security phenomenon, which, in the common understanding, should ensure the ability to survive and develop one's own interests under specific conditions. According to the author, security understood in this way should be viewed as the realization of these interests by addressing challenges, reducing risk, exploiting opportunities, and countering threats. In this approach, the main guideline for a proper understanding of security is the correct definition of the needs and situation of an individual, which is crucial for creating a level of security.

Another researcher, R. Zięba, argues that security encompasses: *meeting the needs of existence, survival, certainty, stability, identity (sameness), independence, and protection of the standard and quality of life. Security, being a primary need of individuals and social groups, is also a fundamental need of states and international systems; its absence generates anxiety and a sense of insecurity*.[103]

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[99] M. Malec, *Percepcja bezpieczeństwa: definicje, wymiary, paradygmaty*, Warszawa 2006, p. 5.
[100] R. Jakubczak, J. Flis, *Bezpieczeństwo narodowe Polski w XXI wieku*, Warszawa 2006, p. 14.
[101] W. Pokruszyński, *Teoretyczne aspekty bezpieczeństwa*, Józefów 2010, pp. 5–9.
[102] W. Pokruszyński, *Teoretyczne aspekty bezpieczeństwa*, Józefów 2010, pp. 5–9.
[103] J. Kunikowski, "Bezpieczeństwo współczesnego człowieka," in *Przygotowanie dzieci i młodzieży do działania w sytuacjach zagrożenia zdrowia i życia*, ed. M. Cieślarczyk, G. Wierzbicki, Siedlce 2008, p. 13.

Security is also a situation characterized by the absence of risk of losing something that is particularly valuable: health, work, material goods, respect, feelings.[104] It is also a state of non-threat, peace, and certainty.[105] This approach emphasizes a broad understanding of security, with particular emphasis on its role in the proper functioning of individuals, the state, and other institutions. This approach draws on Maslow's hierarchy of needs,[106] where ensuring security is one of the fundamental needs that provides the basis for continued effective action and functioning of the individual.[107]

Another important meaning is the understanding of security as the primary need and value of individuals and social groups, as well as the most important purpose of existence. Renowned international affairs scholar R. Kuźniar argued, among other things, that security is a primary, existential need of individuals, social groups, and ultimately the state. This notion is not only about survival, integrity, or independence, but also about development security, which is intended to protect and enrich the identity of individuals and the nation.[108] In a very similar way, security is defined as a psychological or legal state in which an individual feels confident and supported by an efficiently functioning legal system. Security also means freedom from threats, fear, or attack.[109]

It should be noted that this understanding leads researchers to consider security as a state that, based on an analysis of objective or subjective aspects of threat, can take the following forms, according to Swiss political scientist D. Frei:

- a state of insecurity – when a truly significant threat exists and the perception of this threat is accurate;
- a state of obsession occurs when a minor threat is perceived as significant;
- a state of false security occurs when a threat is serious but perceived as minor;
- a state of security occurs when an external threat is minor and the perception of it is accurate.[110]

J. Supińska also defines security through the lens of threats, defining it as freedom from threats, the sources of which can be found in:

1) nature (ecosphere), which is the oldest and simultaneously natural source of threats to human existence;

[104] R. Zięba, *Instytucjonalizacja bezpieczeństwa europejskiego*, Warszawa 1999, p. 28.
[105] K. Olak, A. Olak, "Współczesne rozumienie bezpieczeństwa narodowego," *Acta Scientifica Academiae Ostroviensis. Sectio A, Nauki Humanistyczne, Społeczne i Techniczne*, no. 7 (1) (2016), pp. 467–480.
[106] "Piramida Maslowa," https://mfiles.pl/pl/index.php/Piramida_Maslowa (accessed: May 22, 2021).
[107] A. Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation," *Psychological Review* 50, no. 4 (1943), pp. 370–396.
[108] R. Kuźniar, Z. Lachowski, *Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe czasu przemian*, Warszawa 2003, p. 24.
[109] A. Pieczywok, *Edukacja dla bezpieczeństwa wobec zagrożeń i wyzwań współczesności*, Warszawa 2012, p. 22.
[110] W. Pokruszyński, *Bezpieczeństwo. Teoria i praktyka*, Józefów 2012, p. 63.

2) technology – the technosphere, created by humans who, paradoxically, in trying to tame nature and become independent from it, have become dependent on technology;
3) society, the socio-economic-political system that determines human behavior. In particular, the following should be highlighted:

- organized violence (wars, military conflicts, repression);
- a legal system that restricts individual freedom;
- the so-called social issue, expressed, among other things, in the "struggle for existence" and economic exploitation;
- excessive social demands, e.g., in the form of a cult of beauty;
- excessive interference by various institutions in the private lives of individuals;
- the rapidity of environmental changes, so-called future shock;
- aggression from others – pathological behavior, crimes, hatred, etc.
- the individual themselves, who may become a threat to themselves due to various causes, such as genetic and acquired factors, criminal acts directed against others, self-destructive behavior, and conscious actions that increase benefits but carry risks.[111]

The presented systematic catalogue of threat sources clearly indicates a large number of factors that influence the level of security and the sense of security of individuals, social groups and even entire nations.[112] In this approach, the fundamental scientific category that enables the identification of security threats is the previously indicated social issue, the essence of which can be reduced to the limitation or complete *blocking of the possibility of satisfying basic life needs*.[113] Unmet needs create an obvious, perceptible state of lack, which, as it grows, conditions difficult life situations that threaten an individual's sense of security. At this point, we should focus on defining what this threat is. In the literature on the subject, threat most often refers to the sphere of consciousness of an individual, a social group, or an entire nation. It is defined as a certain state of mind or consciousness caused by the perception of phenomena assessed as unfavorable or dangerous. The way in which a given entity perceives or recognizes threats, and consequently its sense of security, reflects its awareness of an actual or potential threat.[114] When assessing the state of security, it is important to consider the reality in which threats to participants in social life arise, as well as their knowledge and awareness of the context in which these threats are perceived and their sense of security is shaped. In this approach, threat perception is subjective and essentially reflects the feelings

[111] J. Supińska, *Dylematy polityki społecznej*, Warszawa 1991, pp. 83–84.
[112] P. Grzywna, "Istota i wybrane aksjologiczne uwarunkowania bezpieczeństwa społecznego," in *Władza a społeczeństwo*, ed. A. Bryłka, T. Kałuski, M. Korbaś, Katowice 2016, pp. 86–87.
[113] B. Rysz-Kowalczyk, "Teoria kwestii i problemów społecznych," in *Polityka społeczna*, ed. G. Firlit-Fesnak, M. Szylko-Skoczny, Warszawa 2007, p. 182.
[114] See more in: *Zagrożenia bezpieczeństwa w procesach globalizacji*, ed. H. Chałupczak, K. Marzęda-Młynarska, M. Pietraś, R. Suduł, Lublin 2020.

and assessments formed by a given subject in specific threat states. However, these perceptions significantly influence the actions taken by bodies and institutions responsible for security in specific threat states, whose task is to eliminate or reduce their harmfulness once they occur, as well as the psychological impact on society, aimed at properly assessing the situation – most often to prevent panic.[115]

To complement this definition of security, it is also necessary to analyze the catalogue of dangers which, according to an individual, may result in a state of lack of security, i.e. a certain social dysfunction that primarily limits the individual in his or her effective functioning.

According to P. Grzywna, the primary threats in this regard include:

1) human well-being, resulting from unmet physiological needs,
2) housing environment, especially substandard housing,,
3) the housing environment, especially substandard housing, work environment, and occupational health and safety conditions – job insecurity, accidents, and occupational diseases are significant,
4) the natural environment, especially living in a polluted area,
5) health – concerns about health safety and limited access to healthcare services,
6) economic – lack of adequate financial security, living in poverty or scarcity,
7) impeding proper development, including limited access to the education system and low levels of education, and lack of access to sports and cultural facilities.[116]

Another division of threats assumes a criterion that takes into account the source of their occurrence.

In this case, threats can be divided into:

1) natural threats – related to the actions of natural forces, which can cause catastrophes and endanger the life, health, and well-being of individuals;[117]

2) civilization threats – related to human activity, which can also cause catastrophes and technical failures, which can ultimately threaten the functioning of society.[118]

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[115] E. Kołodzińska, *Wprowadzenie do zarządzania bezpieczeństwem*, available at: http://www.uwm.edu.pl/mkzk/download/wprowadzenie.pdf (accessed: May 23, 2021).

[116] P. Grzywna, "Istota i wybrane aksjologiczne…," p. 87.

[117] Natural hazards include: snowmelt, rainfall, storm, ice-jam, and overflow floods; strong winds and hurricanes; prolonged extreme temperatures; atmospheric discharges; seismic shocks; intense precipitation (snow or rain); landslides; droughts; ice phenomena on rivers, lakes, and reservoirs; epidemics of infectious diseases in humans or animals; and mass occurrences of pests, such as rodents, insects, etc., available at: http://www.uwm.edu.pl/mkzk/download/wprowadzenie.pdf (accessed: May 23, 2021).

[118] The second group of security threats consists of man-made and technological hazards (civilizational threats), which are the "side effects" of technical progress in various spheres of human life and activity, such as means

It should therefore be emphasized that civilizational development and globalization processes[119] directly influence the growth of factors that pose security threats. Therefore, individuals, states, organizations, and institutions must take steps to eliminate these threats or their negative effects, in order to quickly return to a state that guarantees effective, safe functioning for society.

In defining the concept of security, an analysis that primarily considers factors that shape and have the greatest impact on the life and functioning of individuals comes to the fore. Thus, such an understanding of security is reduced solely to perceiving it through the lens of the individual and the difficulties (threats) in everyday life that shape their activity and position in society. It should therefore be recognized that social issues clearly constitute a real barrier to achieving individual security, thus setting challenges and tasks for the security policy of the modern state and decision-makers.

Security as a phenomenon should therefore be considered from the perspective of entities, which can be any entity striving to freely pursue its own interests in specific conditions, most often conducive to their realization. These may be individuals, groups, nations, international communities, or institutions. Other definitions refer to various interpretations, for example, according to the Polish Dictionary, security is: *a psychological or legal state in which an individual feels confident, supported by another person or an efficiently functioning legal system; the opposite of threat*.[120] This approach indicates the need to consider and define security in two dimensions. First, in a broad sense, it is perceived as the entirety of social order and systems that protect the state and its citizens from phenomena that threaten legal or public order, thus enabling individuals to pursue their goals under favorable conditions. In a narrower sense, public security is understood as protecting the

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of communication, transport, the automotive industry, households, etc. These threats result in disasters, including: forest and peatland fires, fires of industrial and storage facilities, as well as fires associated with damage to transmission pipelines of liquid and gaseous energy fuels; chemical accidents caused by the release of toxic industrial chemicals located in industrial plants, pipelines, and other facilities, or carried by road and rail transport; disasters and structural failures of buildings, including bridges and viaducts; road and rail accidents and disasters, including those involving vehicles transporting hazardous chemical substances; threats related to the poor technical condition of outdated road infrastructure; threats resulting from the layout of existing railway lines used for the transport of hazardous materials (running through cities and in close proximity to large water reservoirs used as drinking water intakes); failures of hydrotechnical structures; failures of technical infrastructure equipment (including gas, water supply, and sewerage networks, as well as wastewater treatment plants); threats related to the insufficient efficiency of waste storage and disposal systems (both municipal and hazardous); and radiation accidents/incidents—in nuclear power plants and in facilities possessing radioactive substances, available at: http://www.uwm.edu.pl/mkzk/download/wprowadzenie.pdf (accessed: May 23, 2021).

[119] See: S. Wierzbicki, *Rola globalizacji we współczesnym świecie*, Warszawa 2016.

[120] *Słownik współczesnego języka polskiego*, ed. B. Dunaj, PWN, Warszawa 1996, p. 51.

system from attacks on key state institutions, which are supposedly responsible for safeguarding public order.[121]

It should also be emphasized that, in general, public safety and order is a state ensuring the protection of life, health, property and other values against unlawful activities and the protection of the principles of social coexistence and relations regulated by legal norms.[122] In the literature, security is also perceived as:

- a guarantee of the inviolable survival and free development of the security entity;[123]
- a state of peace, certainty, absence of threats, and protection against them;[124]
- preservation of sovereignty and territorial integrity, the free choice of the country's development path, achieving individual well-being and social development;[125]
- an appropriate state of organized defense and protection against military and non-military threats in various areas of state activity.[126]

In this case, the definition of security gradually explores the obvious connections between this phenomenon and the state and the activities of institutions that guarantee the conditions for the functioning of individuals. This definition of security emphasizes the role that the state and institutions play in ensuring and maintaining an appropriate level of security, especially in the area of eliminating threats. As an ambiguous category, security can also, and even should, be interpreted by referring to the consciousness of the subject of security, where, as mentioned above, it is defined as a psychological state, taking into account phenomena perceived as uncomfortable, dangerous, or unfavorable to the individual.[127] Such subjective perceptions of threats are a reflection of potential or real danger (which may not be consistent with the actual state) in the subject's consciousness and stem from a system of needs and values, or a state of obsession. Security, interpreted as states of consciousness in which a person feels free from threats, combines a sense of peace and comfort, and signifies a life free from danger and undisturbed coexistence with other people and the natural environment.[128] Freedom from threats, as a state of functioning in the surrounding reality, does not mean the absence of threats, but only a level of threats accepted by the subject of security that does not cause their "paralysis." The level of threats accepted by an individual does not significantly limit the functioning of this subject of security and allows for the achievement of its basic goals.

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[121] *Ibidem.*
[122] R. Jakubczak, J. Flis, *Bezpieczeństwo narodowe Polski w XXI wieku*, Warszawa 2006, p. 14.
[123] J. Stańczyk, *Współczesne pojmowanie bezpieczeństwa*, Warszawa 1996, pp. 18–19.
[124] R. Zięba, *Instytucjonalizacja bezpieczeństwa europejskiego*, Warszawa 1999, p. 9.
[125] See: J. Czaputowicz, "Kryteria bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego – aspekty teoretyczne," in *Kryteria bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego państwa*, ed. S. Dębski, B. Górska-Winter, Warszawa 2003, p. 13.
[126] See: T. Szubrycht, "Współczesne aspekty bezpieczeństwa państwa," *ZN AMW*, No. 4 (2006), p. 89.
[127] A. Czupryński, *Bezpieczeństwo w ujęciu teoretycznym*, Józefów 2015, p. 16.
[128] See: B. Kwiatkowska, "Problemy bezpieczeństwa w samorządowej kampanii wyborczej," *ZN SGSP*, No. 22 (1999), p. 103.

Following D. Frei, such a state can be considered a correct perception of security, where threats occur at a low level.[129]

Defining security from both a pragmatic and scientific perspective, it must be acknowledged that it is a complex phenomenon and problem. Considering its state, its organization at the individual and state levels, and the process of societal development, it can be observed that these elements are subject to continuous and dynamic changes, which are most often correlated with the degree of development of the security environment, the level of civilizational development, and the cultural level of individual entities. Therefore, the thesis that security does not have a fixed and unchanging value based on its level of organization should be recognized. We can conclude that the level of security organization evolves along with the needs, values, and expectations of the security entity, as well as the objective conditions of its state in a given place, time, and social context.[130] An interesting approach, therefore, is to define security as a specific state that is the evolution of its processes. The security state refers to the situation in which its subject finds itself and typically determines the dimension of security, its level of durability, and its territorial scope.[131]

Another definition refers to security processes, which signify its evolution and determine its proper state. The term "security process" is commonly used in the literature. However, it is more appropriate, as A. Czupryński argues, to use them as "security processes," because the term "process" denotes a cycle of events and their effects within a specific situational range. Consequently, security processes indicate their permanent evolution, i.e., the development of some events, the disappearance of others, while still others remain at the same level. It is reasonable to view security from a process perspective, because security processes activate human needs and, more precisely, reflect the value system of the security subject.

Security therefore means the state of consciousness of the security subject, which influences our perception of reality, and at the same time it is a process of changes taking place under the influence of civilization development, aiming at a specific state of security.[132]

Analyzed from a pragmatic perspective, security is a highly diverse phenomenon. This is due to the constantly growing number of security entities, which are its participants, as well as the elements that participate in and shape the state of security and the individual processes within it. The long list of security entities is primarily made up of individuals, organizations, and institutions, which they create and establish, or in whose functioning they participate to improve their situation. Security itself can therefore be consistently classified as a concept whose semantic scope

[129] A. Czupryński, *Bezpieczeństwo…*, p. 16.
[130] *Ibidem*, p. 16.
[131] *Ibidem*, p. 16.
[132] *Ibidem*, p. 17.

is constantly expanding. Contemporary security studies are characterized by the continuous expansion of the semantic and cognitive dimensions of the concept of security. The subjective nature of security and its perception, thanks to the consideration and application of appropriate criteria, also means that the results of analyses of this concept are considered objective. Appropriately selected scientific methods, research methods, and techniques, in relation to the designated cognitive goal, confirm the objectivity of security.

Currently, the literature on the subject reveals a common feature across definitions of security. Most often (and this is the understanding the author supports), the concept of security is understood as a social process that involves the continuous undertaking and implementation of activities aimed primarily at implementing and managing mechanisms whose primary purpose is to ensure and improve security. From the perspective of scientific analysis, it is crucial to interpret security as a process within the context and taking into account the laws of motion of social systems. The analyzed definitions of security have demonstrated that a comprehensive and valuable analysis is possible by incorporating the dynamism and variability of environmental conditions, civilizational progress, the effects of globalization processes, as well as the scope and scope of the needs and values of individual entities.[133] It should therefore be recognized that security is currently one of the most important areas of state activity. Its level determines the position and agency of both institutions and citizens. One of the fundamental elements in achieving an appropriate/satisfactory level of security is education for security. This is considered the fundamental path in the process of shaping and creating security for individuals and the state. The main tasks of education for security include influencing attitudes, values, and coping skills, for example, in crisis situations or events that directly threaten human life and health. At this point, it is necessary to present a definition of education for security.

In general, education is understood as the process of acquiring knowledge, the components of which include upbringing, training aimed at deepening an individual's knowledge, and developing traits and predispositions. It is also argued that education *encompasses all processes aimed at changing people in accordance with the ideals and educational goals prevailing in a given society*.[134]

When analyzing education for safety, its specific connection to security should be emphasized. The very concept of education for safety can therefore be viewed as a result of constantly evolving terms such as defense training or defense education, the primary goal of which was to educate individuals to counter external threats of a military nature. Due to the changing security environment, individuals and the state had to acquire the capacity to cope with threats

[133] J. Stańczyk, *Współczesne pojmowanie bezpieczeństwa*, Warszawa 1996, pp. 18–19.
[134] S. Zalewski, *Polityka bezpieczeństwa państwa a edukacja obronna*, Warszawa 2001, p. 41.

of a diverse nature, which impact the overall level of security.[135] The specificity of education for safety is clearly demonstrated by the clarification of the concept of defense education, the main task of which was to implement an education system that was to prepare school and university youth to carry out humanitarian tasks that were to minimize the consequences and effects of catastrophes, natural disasters in peacetime, as well as factors of destruction during warfare.[136] Defense education addressed a range of material that addressed only actions in specific situations. In this case, citizen defense was a set of actions in situations we would today call crisis situations.

Education for safety as a concept first emerged in research on the essence of Poland's security system, conducted at the National Defense University between 1993 and 1995. It was during these years that significant changes were made in the understanding and traditional perception of public defense education, resulting in the replacement of the term "defense education" with "education for safety," recognizing it as a more profound concept that better captures the essence of the issue. According to the assumptions and redefinition of defense education, education for safety was intended to bring a new quality to the educational process in the form of instruments and content that foster patriotic, civic, and defense education, thus shaping patriotic and defense-oriented attitudes. As a consequence of the efforts to shape this new dimension of education for safety, the Ministry of National Education adopted the concept of education for safety as a mandatory area of study in the education system.[137]

B. Rudnicki defined education for safety as "all educational and upbringing processes, including education and upbringing as well as broadly understood education, aimed at preparing young people and adults to act in situations that threaten the existence of people and the nation and the functioning of the state."[138] Defining education as a process provides a solid foundation for analyzing the essence of this concept, which takes into account the changes occurring in the security environment and, for example, the constantly evolving catalog of threats. Separating the process into educational and upbringing emphasizes the role of both activities at the teaching level and initiatives implemented to foster specific attitudes within the context of the subject of education for safety.

R. Stępień, on the other hand, defines education for safety as a specific system of didactic and educational activities of the family, school, army, mass media, youth organizations and associations, workplaces and state and local government institutions, aimed at shaping a system

[135] R. Jakubczak, J. Flis, *Bezpieczeństwo narodowe Polski w XXI wieku*, Warszawa 2006, p. 428.
[136] T. Siuda, K. Zaczek-Zaczyński, "Edukacja obronna," in *Współczesne zagadnienia edukacji dla bezpieczeństwa*, ed. R. Stępień, Warszawa 1999, pp. 98–99.
[137] According to the provisions of education law, when establishing the school set of curricula and the educational program, the school principal is required to implement tasks in the field of safety education, in accordance with the applicable core curricula for general education, as well as appropriately to the environment in which the student is raised, taking into account local safety threats.
[138] B. Rudnicki, "Education for Security and Its Interpretation," in *Education for...*, ed. R. Stępień, p. 62.

of values, disseminating knowledge and developing skills important for ensuring national security."[139] This definition clearly emphasizes the role of various institutions in education, broadly defined, as well as its primary goal: developing skills and predispositions that serve to ensure national security. This definition is characterized by a high degree of generality. It can also be argued that it includes elements specific to socialization processes occurring in specific areas of individual development.

Following W. Kitler, we can therefore conclude that education for safety has a multifaceted, multithreaded, and interdisciplinary dimension. From a subjective perspective, it essentially concerns three fundamental aspects:[140]

– the security of a person (an individual), equipped with a characteristic system of values and social norms, which also apply to their imperatives related to individual security;

– the security of a group of people who want to feel safe in various social (interpersonal) situations;

– the security of legally formalized state and international structures, such as a municipality, district, voivodeship, state, or group of states, which, due to their territorial scope, determine local, national, and international security, respectively.

The author, following A. Pieczywok, therefore, assumes that education for security is inextricably linked to national education, and its specific scope should include and include civic, economic, legal, defense, pro-social, health, and ecological education, which constitute a fundamental element shaping national security. It is also an ongoing process that encompasses the following activities:

– imparting knowledge about threats,

– shaping "safe" behaviors and attitudes,

– motivating action to ensure security,

– disseminating the necessary knowledge and skills to counteract threats,

– raising awareness of the scale and type of needs in difficult situations,

– developing a sense of responsibility for taking specific actions,

– developing appropriate habits (behaviors) in threat situations,

– cultivating values related to human life and health.

This approach allows for a more precise definition of education for safety as a process whose primary goal is to shape patriotic and defensive attitudes, as well as to develop skills and habits that, as a result, allow individuals to have a real impact on eliminating potential threats or their

[139] See R. Stępień, ed., *Współczesne zagadnienia...*, p. 11.

[140] Cf. W. Kitler, "Istota bezpieczeństwa narodowego," in *Edukacja obronna społeczeństwa*, eds. B. Wiśniewski, W. Fehler, Białystok 2006, p. 16.

consequences. The overall teaching and educational process within security education aims to ultimately enhance the state's national security.

Capturing the specific nature of security, understood and perceived as a value, a foundation that creates other values essential to humanity, a condition for the development and prosperity of a state, allows for a deeper analysis of the scope and primary objectives of security. Presenting the essence of security, manifested in its scope and objectives, is also possible through an analysis of the traditional divisions of security, primarily into internal and external security, national and international security. Generally speaking, external security refers to the absence of threats to a state from other entities, while internal security refers to its internal stability.[141] It should therefore be recognised that striving to ensure the security of the state involves creating optimal internal conditions for the conflict-free development of essential elements of its system, as well as eliminating its potential external threats by contributing to the formation of a favourable external environment that will support the harmonious development of the state.[142]

Following Z. Nowakowski, internal security should be considered a type of state security whose primary goal is to eliminate and protect the state and its citizens from internal threats. Above all, it is a type of security directly focused on ensuring the stable and sustainable functioning of the state while simultaneously safeguarding the interests of individuals and society. Achieving this state is possible through effectively implemented internal state policy. The author agrees that internal security primarily concerns securing vital interests against threats and dangers arising from processes, activities of organizations, institutions, individuals, and facilities operating within the state or on its territory.[143]

Internal security, defined in this way, refers to the effectiveness of the actions of the state and state institutions, whose primary task is to safeguard the national interest. Therefore, all initiatives undertaken by the state should take into account the catalogue of possible threats and dangers that may arise as a result of specific activities, thus negatively impacting the level of internal security. External security is defined by the same author as a type of security whose primary goal is to protect national interests, values, wealth, and quality of life from threats originating outside a state's borders. Within this definition, the following types of threats can be distinguished:

1) military threats;

[141] Cf. Z. Berent, "Pokój międzynarodowy i bezpieczeństwo – próba definicji," *Sprawy Międzynarodowe* 1988, no. 6, p. 112.

[142] M. Dobrosielski, "Problemy współczesnych stosunków międzynarodowych," *Sprawy Międzynarodowe* 1973, no. 12, p. 14.

[143] Z. Nowakowski, *Bezpieczeństwo państwa w koncepcjach programowych parlamentarnych w Polsce po 1989 roku*, Warszawa 2009, p. 51.

2) threats related to illegal trade or other acts constituting criminal acts, as well as espionage, the influx of foreign cultural and moral patterns, and the dissemination of fake news in the international community.

The core of good external security management is established priorities, principles of international collective security, as well as an active and effective foreign policy in its military, economic, and financial dimensions, which clearly focuses on safeguarding and securing vital national interests in the international arena. In the case of external security defined in this way, it is important to emphasize the state's role in assessing and defining the most crucial national interests, as well as in creating international relations to secure them.

For the purposes of the analysis conducted in this work, the concepts of national and international security will be further defined. In the author's opinion, such systematization is necessary to properly define the state's role in ensuring the security of individuals and society. Following W. Kitler, it must be stated that researchers have an excessively wide-ranging interpretation of the concept of national security. This results in the concept being filled with issues that create a "*bottomless basket*" into which anything can be thrown and anything can be fitted. As W. Kitler rightly notes, such an approach and interpretation is doomed to failure – almost every problem related to any threat to individuals, society, or institutions becomes subject to functioning within the scope and dimension of national security.[144] It can be noted that Kitler, like Nowakowski, recognizes that national security encompasses those contents that indicate and are a decisive condition for the undisturbed existence and development of the nation. Consequently, these are the values that individual people and groups of people recognize as common and jointly strive to realize, as well as those that are of significant importance to the state as a political institution, even despite conflicts with individual interests. In his approach, W. Kitler also points to the crucial issue of historical experiences confirming the evolutionary relationship between the state and security. This relationship illustrates a process whereby the scope of security increasingly encompasses values associated with individuals and social groups that, until recently, were considered distinct from the traditionally understood concept of state security.[145]

For years, authors have vied with each other in identifying the essential components of the canon of values protected by states. Supporters of the realist approach agreed that the state constructs a catalog of values, translating the definition of national interest into specific demands.[146] Their precise catalog varies, constantly evolving, and is most often a barometer of the current political

[144] A. Wejkszner, S. Wojciechowski, *Współczesne bezpieczeństwo Polski. Międzynarodowy wymiar instytucjonalny*, Warszawa 2019, pp. 10–13.
[145] W. Kitler, *Zakres bezpieczeństwa państwa*, file:///C:/Users/user/Downloads/zakresbezp.pastwa.pdf (accessed May 23, 2021).
[146] R. Zięba, "Kategoria bezpieczeństwa w nauce o stosunkach międzynarodowych," in *Bezpieczeństwo narodowe i międzynarodowe u schyłku XX wieku*, eds. D. B. Bobrow, E. Haliżak, R. Zięba, Warszawa 1997, p. 9.

situation, or, more bluntly, dependent on emerging threats or concerns. For a very long time, the protected dimension was identified with two values: territorial integrity and political independence.[147] When analyzing issues related to national security, threats to the state and nation were considered, which for the most part concerned the political and military spheres. This definition and approach is confirmed by the Dictionnaire Diplomatique, published in Paris in the mid-10th century, which translated the term *séqurité* as "a set of circumstances that ensures that a state will not be subject to any attack, or at least that an attack against it will have no chance of success."[148] This definition clearly indicates that threats come from outside, and the only overarching consideration determining a state's actions in the face of open international conflict is the survival of the nation and its organization. A shift in the approach to defining national security, its "demilitarization," began to be observed immediately after the end of World War II. At that time, for most decision-makers, the most important issue became secure, uninterrupted development and, above all, ensuring better living conditions for citizens. Changes in military policy, particularly the development of weapons of mass destruction, did not completely exclude the military element from the scope of security, but the challenge of re-analyzing threats was taken up. R. Ullman advocated the idea of balancing the protection of the national interest with the individual interest (of citizens of smaller communities).[149] In defining national security, immediately after 1989, components such as quality of life, certainty of development and prosperity can be increasingly seen, thus complementing the existing set of protected values.[150]

R. Zięba defined a reconstructed canon of fundamental values, taking into account the needs and circumstances of contemporary socio-political reality. He assumed that these are:

- survival of the state and nation – the existence of values superior to others;
- territorial integrity;
- political independence;
- quality of life – its determinants include the standard of living, the level of socio-economic development, civil rights and freedoms, the cultural system, the national lifestyle, the state of the natural environment, and the possibility and prospects for further development.

This canon/catalogue of values clearly reflects the evolving perception of national security, primarily the consideration of the social dimension and the influence of factors other than military factors, which still significantly influence the shape and perception of national security by individuals, social groups, and the state. Therefore, we should agree with the contemporary

[147] A. Klafkowski, "Podstawy prawne bezpieczeństwa Polski," *Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny* 1985, no. 4, p. 37.
[148] R. Zięba, *Instytucjonalizacja bezpieczeństwa*..., p. 34.
[149] *Ibidem*, p. 14.
[150] M. Pietraś, "Dylematy bezpieczeństwa w postzimnowojennym świecie," *Annales UMCS*, sect. K, vol. 1, 1994, pp. 48–49.

understanding of national security presented by Kitler, who recognized that national security, or rather, state security (democratic), which takes into account the subjective nature of individuals and social groups, encompasses various areas of state activity. Consequently, we can assume that, from a subjective perspective, various types of security can be distinguished. There are many types of security in general, but the key is to find common ground between individual types of security and national security, or, to put it differently, the scope of individual types of security within the overall (overarching) set of national security issues.





Fig. 1. Horizontal relations between various types of security, regardless of the security entity (in the objective approach, without taking into account the relationships between them) and national security – the first approach. Prepared by W. Kitler.

In the contemporary context, the subject-matter criterion allows the types of security identified on its basis to be analyzed and treated as autonomous areas of security. Researchers begin to consider security differently, taking into account the subjective criterion. If it is combined with the state, then security analysis will be limited to values, needs, goals, and interests in the area of national security. It is also recognized that there are areas or types of security which, due to their traditional foundations and established conceptual framework, determine the understanding of state security in its traditional sense. Their combined scope constitutes the broader category of national security. It is also worth emphasizing that national security domains are not isolated sets; if we consider the entity of the state, we are dealing with the phenomenon of communicating vessels. This approach confirms the thesis that national security is a whole composed of various situations, phenomena, and states that mutually determine each other, the analysis of which requires a holistic approach.




Fig. 2. Horizontal relations between various types of security, with respect to the security entity that is the state (in a subjective approach, without taking into account the relationships between them) and national security – the second approach. Prepared by W. Kitler.

Analysis based on such guidelines means that a specific political, economic, social, business and ecological situation must be considered in the context of national security interests and treated as a cause causing specific effects in various dimensions of the functioning of the state.[151] It may, consequently, be a threat understood as a combination of events in internal or international relations, which pose a risk of limiting the safe existence and development of the nation, in various areas of state activity and social activity.





Fig. 3 Istota procesu bezpieczeństwa narodowego. Prepared by W. Kitler.

The analysis of individual types of security in the context of values, needs, goals and, above all, national security interests should take into account the most important problems for the main entity, i.e. the state.

[151] E. Nowak, M. Nowak, *Zarys teorii bezpieczeństwa narodowego*, Warszawa 2015.





Fig. 4. Horizontal relationships between various types of security with respect to the security entity, i.e. the state (in a subjective approach, taking into account the relationship between them) and national security. Prepared by W. Kitler.

Security literature and research point to difficulties in distinguishing individual domains/types of security, their scopes, and their assigned goals. Reasons for this include:[152]

- the creation of definitions that are too narrow or too broad, very general, and consequently often unclear;
- defining individual types of security based on the definition of general security, without linking them to the entity of the state;
- basing the definition on the classic concept of state security, related to political and military threats;
- linking a given type of security to the same type of threat;
- the short "existence" of certain types of security, which until recently did not receive sufficient practical and theoretical attention (e.g., societal security, information security, cybersecurity, health security, ecological security);
- subordination of all types of security exclusively to a single entity – the state – and its goals, often distorted through the ideology of dictatorial systems (this included cultural, public, and political security).
- lack of definitions of specific concepts in the legal system (e.g., universal, public, cultural, social security);[153]

[152] See more in: J.J. Piątek, R. Podgórzańska, S. Stępiński, *Bezpieczeństwo w badaniach i w praktyce*, Toruń 2020.
[153] *Ibidem*.

- the diversity of relationships, strong or weak, between specific types of security, resulting from the relationships between specific areas of state activity and its security.[154]

According to researchers, when defining the scope of national security and specifying its type and domain, the following premises should be considered in the analysis:

- the general concept of designated types of security is broader than the concept of each of them as a type of national security;
- the individual types of national security, considered from the perspective of the entity that is the state (and society), are defined by the scope of national security values, needs, goals, and interests, i.e., the overarching state interest;
- a given type of security in general (general) does not have to, and often does not, constitute a complete element of the set that is national security;
- the basis for perceiving individual types of security is primarily the same type of threats, but due to the interdependencies between them, all challenges, threats, opportunities, strengths, and weaknesses affecting the values, needs, goals, and interests of national security in general should be taken into account;
- the individual types of national security are closely interconnected, and the basis of interdependencies is: the security entity (the state and its institutions, the market, the individual, and society); challenges and threats that have a multifaceted impact on all manifestations of protected values.[155]

It should be acknowledged that current scientific analysis and practice assume that a given type of security is dictated by a specific type of threat. Here, however, we can again agree with W. Kitler that a given type of security is a particular case of national security, not because of the specific type of threat, but because of the existence of threats to national security, which result in a threat to its individual components.[156] Taking this approach into account, individual types of security can be presented and defined. National security, in a societal sense, will constitute a primary need and value for individuals and states, and its functional scope will be determined by the state's mission, which is to achieve overarching goals, such as: protecting and defending national interests against potential and existing threats, and creating conditions, both external and internal, for the effective development of the state and society. In this sense, national security can be understood as the comprehensive organization and preparation of the state for the continuous creation of security in legal and political, strategic and military, civilian and educational, diplomatic and cooperative, social and integrative aspects. This definition defines the scope of national security

[154] E. Haliżak, *Ekonomiczny wymiar bezpieczeństwa narodowego i międzynarodowego*, pp. 77–82. .
[155] W. Kitler, *Zakres bezpieczeństwa*..., p. 9.
[156] *Ibidem*, p. 10.

within the scope of policies pursued at the state level. The broadly understood state interest (most often perceived as a set of recognized values, norms, etc.) determines the model of action of individual state institutions and citizens themselves within the framework of national security. A very short definition defines national security as *a type of security whose subject is a nation organized into a state*.[157] In this definition, it is worth emphasizing the issue of organization, including the role of the institutional dimension of the state in ensuring the security of its citizens in a given area.

A short definition of national security is also provided by the *Dictionary of National Security Terms*, which reads as follows: "National security is a process or state that ensures the functioning of the state in its basic areas, enabling its survival, development and freedom to pursue national interests in a specific security environment by taking up challenges, taking advantage of opportunities, reducing risks and counteracting all kinds of threats to its interests."[158]

In this definition, the scope of activities in the area of national security is defined by a set of values and interests necessary for the functioning of society. It can be implicitly assumed that these interests affect the effective existence of society and state institutions. *The Security Vademecum* analyzes the concept of national security much more precisely, highlighting the long history of this concept, which has not always been defined by this term. Emphasizing the role of evolution, which, along with the recognition of a broader than just military dimension of protection for society, its assets and environment, and the state as a political institution, has led to consideration of many diverse (not just military) threats to national security. Currently, not only armed forces can be used as a tool to influence other participants in international relations. The scope of security issues has expanded to encompass economic, environmental, health, demographic, cultural, social, and other concerns.[159]

According to W.J. Taylor Jr., *national security* is defined as: *not only the protection of the nation and territory against physical attack, but also the protection – by various means – of vital economic and political interests, the loss of which would threaten the viability and fundamental values of the state*.[160] This definition confirms a fundamental issue in defining national security and defining its scope. A subjective analysis emphasizes the role of the state as an organization and nation, whose prosperity is the main guideline for effective state action. In the literature on the

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[157] *(Mini) słownik BBN. Propozycje nowych terminów z dziedziny bezpieczeństwa*, https://www.bbn.gov.pl/pl/bezpieczenstwo-narodowe/minislownik-bbn-propozy/6035,minislownik-bbn-propozycje-nowych-terminow-z-dziedziny-bezpieczenstwa.html (accessed May 30, 2021).
[158] W. Kitler, *Zakres bezpieczeństwa*..., p. 10.
[159] *Vademecum bezpieczeństwa*, https://depot.ceon.pl/bitstream/handle/123456789/16331/Vademecum_bezpieczenstwa.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y (accessed May 23, 2021).
[160] See W. J. Taylor Jr., *American National Security: Policy and Process*, Baltimore 1981, p. 7.

subject, the concept of national security is most often identified and used interchangeably with the concept of state security. These two concepts are commonly used in terminology. The concept of state security reflects a certain focus on the security of the state, understood as an institution. In the case of national security, the analyst points to the key area of protecting the interests of not only the state but, above all, society and all elements that can be considered its components. In many works, the term state security is used adequately to refer to democratic states with a free market economy, where the rights of individuals and social groups are universally respected. However, it should be emphasized that the most important task of the state and nation is (as most definitions state) the security of the nation in terms of its existence, effective development, and sovereign treatment.[161] After analyzing the definition of national security, the author assumes that it is a process understood as the purposeful and organized activity of authorized state bodies, based on a specific concept – a security doctrine – and implemented through mechanisms appropriate to policy measures, most often foreign policy. Considerations of international security occupy an equally important place in analyses of the concept of security. As with national security, the original understanding of this concept focused on political and military aspects. A simplification can be used here and international security can be defined as the implementation of national security in the context of a state's participation in a specific international system, created by international agreements. The result of this understanding of security was the emergence of the so-called "security dilemma," which involved a clash of opposing state interests. Over the years, this understanding has evolved. Z. J. Pietraś noticed that as a result of a certain revaluation in the area of international relations, cooperation becomes the way to satisfy the interests of the opposition.[162]

From the perspective of the analysis conducted in the doctoral dissertation, after defining external, internal, national, and international security, the key issue is to determine the scope of national security in light of the research problem addressed in the dissertation. In the case of a democratic state, the actions of relevant institutions, as well as citizens themselves, come down to establishing a set of national values, which, in the public's opinion, should be protected from threats in order to ensure security. Therefore, the state must adopt appropriate measures, mechanisms, and patterns of conduct to eliminate or neutralize these threats. Depending on the type of threat, the state is tasked with implementing national policy measures of a military, economic, and fiscal nature, restoring balance and optimizing the socio-political system and political stability, as well as actions implemented within its external (international) function.

[161] Z. Sabak, J. Królikowski, *Ocena zagrożeń Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, Warszawa 2002, pp. 34–35.
[162] Z. J. Pietraś, "Interesy narodowe a wspólne interesy ludzkości," in *Interesy narodowe a współistnienie państw*, ed. Z. J. Pietraś, Lublin 1989, pp. 12–13.

*The Security Vademecum* proposes a division of measures for protecting and strengthening national security, dividing them according to subject matter into political, military, economic, scientific-technical, cultural, ideological, and financial. Their scope and selection depend not only on the needs posed by emerging threats (or challenges), but primarily on the perception of these threats by the state's governing bodies and the material and intellectual resources at its disposal, as well as the ability to utilize them effectively.[163] Identifying measures to eliminate threats provides a way to further clarify the scope of national security in terms of individual key values. These values defined as national include (as mentioned earlier) the survival of both the state as a sovereign entity, the nation, i.e. a group distinguished in biological and ethnic terms – which should be considered the primary value, territorial integrity as the basis of security and political independence understood as self-rule and freedom, as well as the quality of life, which consists of specific values such as the standard of living, the level of socio-economic development, the cultural system, and opportunities for further development.[164] The goal of such action is to ensure the survival of the nation, its values, prosperity, and well-being, and to create favorable conditions for current and future generations.[165] The subjective criterion indicates that these needs apply to: every individual, regardless of their age, social standing, financial situation, psychophysical development, and the environment in which they live (civilizational, social, and natural); social groups, both formal (families, social, professional, and political organizations) and informal; an entire group of states – in terms of values shared by the entire society inhabiting a given state; and the international community – in terms of values shared by it.[166]

According to the objective criterion, needs related to the areas of national security concern, among others: state security (mainly military, political and constitutional security) – including in the scope of protection and defence against violations of the state's → sovereignty, its territorial integrity, protection of national identity in the face of globalization processes, maintaining sovereign power, protection of human and civil freedoms and rights, etc.; public security and order – mainly in the scope of increasing detection and enforcement; combating minor offences and crimes against life, health and property, violence in the family, school and social environment; counteracting demoralization and → juvenile delinquency, alcoholism, drug addiction; providing assistance to victims of crimes and offences; improving road traffic safety; guaranteeing the protection of material goods, including critical infrastructure; prevention of → organized crime, → corruption; increasing public participation in active counteracting threats, etc.; public safety – in the area of improving the

[163] *Vademecum bezpieczeństwa…*
[164] *Ibidem.*
[165] See L. Wyszczelski, "Bezpieczeństwo narodowe Polski w XX–XXI wieku na tle wyzwań bezpieczeństwa globalnego," in *Współczesne bezpieczeństwo militarne*, eds. M. Kubiak, A. Turek, Warszawa–Siedlce 2012.
[166] *Ibidem*, pp. 128–129.

quality of rescue services; providing immediate material aid and psychological care, including religious care; guaranteeing temporary shelter, food, medical assistance and other forms of social assistance; supporting the creation of social (non-governmental) forms of → population protection and rescue; improving safety in recreation areas; efficient organization of humanitarian aid, etc.; health protection and sanitary-epidemiological safety – in the scope of creating conditions for efficient health care; increasing access to medical services at the place of residence; reducing the risk of human and animal illness; preventing zoonoses; combating violations of occupational health and safety regulations, technological and nutritional standards, etc.; environmental protection and waste management – in terms of improving the quality of water, soil, water and air; protecting animate and inanimate nature; enforcing, including combating violations, waste management regulations; environmental education of society; protection of cultural heritage and national identity – cultivating national heritage; respect for ideological and ethnic differences; protection of the nation's cultural heritage (spiritual and material), etc.; economic security, lifestyle and quality of life, material well-being; access to social assistance in extreme situations; access to and the possibility of choosing a place of work; decent wages, etc.; education and upbringing – including equal opportunities for children and young people, and even adults; access to public forms of education and upbringing (museums, libraries, cultural centers); access to sports and recreational facilities; shaping knowledge, skills and behavioral habits in difficult situations; psychological and pedagogical assistance; integrating society around joint local initiatives.[167] In the case of national security, it should be emphasized once again that it is related to all areas of the functioning of the state, of course including the security of individuals, social groups and society as a whole.[168]

The primary goal of national security is to effectively counteract all existing and potential threats. National security itself is also the most important need and highest value, the primary goal of state activity as an institution.[169] It can therefore be concluded that in this approach, the state, by conducting external policy in the dimension of international relations, as well as internal policy consisting in the protection and defense of vital interests, values and national needs, determines the scope of this security.[170] The scope of security can also be further specified by taking into account other classifications. J. Stańczyk proposes that security should be examined across four principal dimensions: subject, object, spatial, and purpose. A detailed classification and specification of the scope of security are presented in Table 1 below.

Table 1. Security division according to J. Stańczyk

[167] *Ibidem*.
[168] See more in: M. Kuliczkowski, *Przygotowania obronne w Polsce. Uwarunkowania formalnoprawne, dylematy pojęciowe i próba systematyzacji*, Warszawa 2013.
[169] See more in: J. Stefanowicz, *Rzeczypospolitej pole bezpieczeństwa*, Warszawa 2011.
[170] Z. Sabak, J. Królikowski, *Ocena zagrożeń Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, Warszawa 2002, pp. 34–35.

| Security | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Subject-related | Object-related | Spatial | Purpose |
| 1. Individual | 1. Military | 1. Regional | 1.Negative |
| 2. Local | 2. Political | 2. Local | 2. Positive |
| 3. International | 3. Economic | 3. Subregional | |
| 4. Global | 4. Environmental | 4. Regional | |
| | 5. Cultural | 5. Global | |
| | 6. Social | | |

Source: file:///C:/Users/user/Downloads/Fałdowski_ZNSGSP_66_2_2.pdf, accessed 30.05.2021.

By defining the scope of security and applying this division, it is very easy to refine specific areas, especially by considering subject matter or spatial criteria. Any researcher analyzing one of the selected divisions, such as ecological security, can identify specific needs in that area, such as reducing greenhouse gas emissions or implementing renewable energy technologies. Social security, on the other hand, will be associated with a different scope, in which the dominant role will be played by social protection of citizens or access to education. At this point, it is also important to note the constantly changing scopes/dimensions of security.

In his initial research on security, M. Pietraś identified the following dimensions: political, economic, social, and ecological. In subsequent works, he wrote about: political, economic, military, social or humanitarian (interchangeably), and ecological.[171] Another typology, authored by R. Zięba, divides security according to the following aspects:

- subjective: national security and international security;
- objective: political, military, economic, social, cultural, ideological, ecological, information security, etc.;
- spatial: personal security (concerning individual people), local (state-national), subregional, regional (coalition), supraregional, and global (universal);
- temporal: security status and security process;
- organizational: individual (unilateral) – superpower hegemonism, isolationism, neutrality, non-alignment, alliances (bloc system), cooperative security system, collective security system.[172]

In this classification, the organizational method that defines the state's role and its position in mutual relations, both externally and internally, deserves particular attention. This approach also indicates that states are currently clearly moving away from military security in favor of pursuing

[171] M. Pietraś, "Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe," in *Międzynarodowe stosunki polityczne*, ed. M. Pietraś, Lublin 2006, pp. 333–336.
[172] R. Zięba, *Teoretyczne podstawy*..., pp. 9–10.

vital interests, often based on alliances and international agreements.[173] It should therefore be recognized that the international environment is polyarchic in nature as a whole, possessing its own collective interests. The very fact that each state belongs to the international system, as well as developing interdependencies, leads entities to undertake joint efforts to create norms and mechanisms that are intended to result in a sense of certainty, unthreatened existence, and development. This also contributes to the protection of stability, peace, balance, and cooperation, which can also be called promoting transnational raison d'état or international security.[174]

The scope of international security is therefore much broader than the scope of national security of individual states. The constant development and volatility of international relations is reflected in the state of international security, which is also subject to constant change due to the emergence of new circumstances and new threats – this results in constant redefinition and expansion of the scope of security. Analyzing the scope and importance of national security in general, taking into account the role of education for safety in shaping patriotic and defensive attitudes, it seems necessary to conduct an analysis of the role of national security strategy in influencing the scope of state security. In the case of Poland, this document specifically outlines the challenges, tasks, and problems to be addressed at the state and societal levels. The National Security Strategy[175] recognizes that the contemporary security environment is increasingly complex and uncertain. It also points to the growing political, military, economic, and social interactions on a national, regional, and global scale. According to the Strategy's authors, this significantly impacts both security activities and the main directions of transformation of the national security system. The development and implementation of the new National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland is linked to the need to ensure the state's ability to counter threats and meet challenges

[173] S. Koziej, *Między piekłem a rajem. Szare bezpieczeństwo u progu XXI wieku*, Toruń 2008, p. 10.
[174] M. Pietraś, *Dylematy bezpieczeństwa*…, pp. 12–13.
[175] The document was issued pursuant to Article 4a(1)(1) of the Act of 21 November 1967 on the Universal Obligation to Defend the Republic of Poland (data provided by the Ministry of National Defence). The document contains the fundamental interests and objectives of the Polish state in the field of national security. The security concept presents an approach to the issue of threats and covers not only purely military threats. It is consistent with the objectives of NATO and the European Union, as well as with the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. The individual dimensions of national security include external, military, internal, civic, social, economic, environmental, information and telecommunications security. The document places emphasis on strengthening the sense of national identity among Poles while ensuring equal integration. On 12 May 2020, the President of the Republic of Poland signed a decision approving the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland. In his speech, the President assured that the document takes into account all issues related to national security: The previous National Security Strategy, the document that had been in force until that point, dated back to December 2014. How different our security situation was then, in every respect: military, infrastructure-related, and also in terms of health. This strategy takes into account all the aspects that have occurred between December 2014 and the present day. Literally "the present day," because – for which I would very much like to thank the Prime Minister, the Ministers, the Council of Ministers and all their staff – we worked on this strategy literally until the last day, also taking into account all the issues related to the epidemic threats that we have encountered, particularly in recent times, and which clearly mean that appropriate measures for the future must also be included in this strategy. *Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego podpisana przez prezydenta RP*, https://www.gov.pl/web/kgpsp/nowa-strategia-bezpieczenstwa-narodowego-podpisana-przez-prezydenta-rp, accessed 30 May 2021.

arising from Poland's evolving security environment. The document also envisions capitalizing on opportunities that will improve the security of the state and its citizens, ensure its continued development, and strengthen the Republic of Poland's position in the international arena.[176]

The new Strategy also defines national interests in the area of national security, which include:

1. Protecting independence, territorial integrity, and sovereignty, and ensuring the security of the state and its citizens.
2. Shaping an international order based on solidarity and respect for international law, guaranteeing Poland's safe development.
3. Strengthening national identity and safeguarding national heritage.
4. Ensuring conditions for lasting and sustainable social and economic development, and protecting the natural environment.[177]

In general, national security management is to be achieved through integrated security management, which involves managing national defense and building adaptive capabilities. The second strategic objective within the first pillar is national resilience and common defense. Achieving this objective is to increase the state's resilience to threats by creating a common defense system based on the efforts of the entire nation and fostering understanding for the development of the resilience and defense capabilities of the Republic of Poland. The first pillar also encompasses issues related to the Polish Armed Forces. The primary task for state authorities in addressing issues related to the armed forces is to strengthen the operational capabilities of the Polish Armed Forces to deter and defend against security threats, with particular emphasis on increasing mobility and technological modernization. The Strategy's guidelines also cover cyberspace. Cybersecurity and related activities are to focus on increasing resilience to cyber threats and enhancing information protection in the public, military, and private sectors, as well as promoting knowledge and best practices that enable citizens to better protect their information.[178] Also in the information space, both the state and its citizens must be ensured safe functioning.[179] The second pillar defines the strengthening of the capacity of the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union to ensure security for the entire Euro-Atlantic area, the second: the development of cooperation in a bilateral, regional and global format as an important element of the international security system.[180] The strategy for environmental security emphasizes the need to comply with and enforce

[176] *Ibidem*.
[177] *Ibidem*.
[178] *Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej: bezpieczeństwo państwa i obywateli*, https://www.cb.szczecin.pl/blog-post/strategia-bezpieczenstwa-narodowego-rzeczypospolitej-polskiej-bezpieczenstwo-panstwa-i-obywateli/, accessed May 30, 2021.
[179] *Ibidem*.
[180] *Ibidem*.

environmental protection regulations. A key aspect of this pillar is emphasizing the role of scientific and technological capital through its utilization for the country's economic development.[181]

The Security Strategy also assumes not only the verification of completed tasks but also their updating in the face of the changing national security environment. This type of monitoring would take place as part of strategic reviews in the field of national security.[182] Analyzing the values, interests, and needs within national security, as well as its divisions according to specific criteria adopted by researchers and the National Security Strategy, it should be concluded that the scope of national security primarily concerns those areas that are fundamental to the development and effective functioning of a given state as an institution, nation, and society. Following the Security Strategy, the author states that these areas concern the security of the state and its citizens in general, international relations, national identity and heritage, and social and economic development – these areas define tasks and initiatives intended to increase citizens' sense of security and strengthen the state's security. Education for psychosocial safety is essential in every country, meaning a set of educational and upbringing activities aimed at shaping society's morality and attitudes towards psychosocial threats. Education for ecological safety will be understood as a set of educational and upbringing activities aimed at harmonious coexistence between people and nature, as well as attitudes and behaviors in situations of ecological threats.[183] Also important are individual goals that bring good and happiness to individuals; social goals that enable society to provide conditions for optimal development by shaping desirable attitudes among its citizens and by helping them acquire appropriate professional qualifications.[184]

An important goal in every country's security environment is to educate and develop youth's defense awareness, so that they can not only quickly and accurately anticipate various threats, but also identify them and actively participate in initiatives related to ensuring security in social environments.[185] Its overall task, however, is to address threats in peacetime and prepare children and youth to recognize (detect) threats and cope with the dangers posed by everyday life. The definition of national security clearly states that the state, at its institutional level, should guarantee the protection of its citizens' lives and property, regardless of the situation, and above all, at all times. Society has an inviolable, constitutional right to this, which guarantees universal protection against threats.[186]

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[181] Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego.
[182] R. Zaniewski, *Nowa Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego*, https://fundacjarepublikanska.org/nowa-strategia-bezpieczenstwa-narodowego/, accessed June 4, 2021.
[183] B. Rudnicki, *op. cit.*, p. 63.
[184] W. Okoń, *Wprowadzenie do dydaktyki ogólnej*, Warszawa 1998, pp. 68–69.
[185] T. Siuda, K. Zaczek-Zaczyński, "Edukacja obronna młodzieży szkolnej i akademickiej," in *Współczesne zagadnienia edukacji dla bezpieczeństwa*, ed. R. Stępień, Warszawa 1999, p. 33.
[186] *System bezpieczeństwa narodowego – ogólna charakterystyka*, https://www.zsoiz-czyzew.pl/pliki/2019-2020/korona/1Tia-edukacjadlabezpieczenstwa.pdf, accessed June 2, 2021.

Contemporary researchers strongly believe that we should move away from a narrow understanding of security, understood as a state of absence of threats to the existence and survival of individuals. Therefore, it is important to emphasize the concept of security as a process influenced by factors that determine specific areas of life, the functioning of individuals, as well as state institutions and authorities. Security is a phenomenon characterized by high dynamics and variability. Only in this approach, perceived and analyzed, can it result in proper operation and appropriate activities of entities responsible for its level. Maintaining an appropriate level of security at the state level also results from constant monitoring and analysis of the catalogue of threats characterizing the contemporary international environment. To achieve this, it is also necessary to constantly review the nature of mutual international relations. Based on such actions at the state level, entities responsible for security should create guidelines for specific policies. Entities responsible for security should also define the goals and scope of security within its individual types, i.e., develop a catalog of guidelines that consider key elements in defining external, internal, national, and international security. Defining, for example, the scope of national security is essential for determining and maintaining the national interest and, consequently, for safeguarding the state's position in the international arena. Defining goals also seems crucial in analyzing specific types of security. Therefore, each researcher should, when analyzing a selected type of security, generate a specific list of needs/goals in a given area. Ensuring and maintaining an appropriate level of security at the state level, and thus the effective functioning of individual units, refers to the efficient operation of the state's security system and its individual components, operating within designated security subsystems. In order to achieve the catalog of security goals, the institutions operating within these subsystems should have their competencies defined and assigned in a document such as the National Security Strategy.

The volatility of the security environment means that the effective operation of all elements of the security system is only possible through constructive cooperation. A key task in an efficiently functioning security system also seems to be constant monitoring and maintaining extensive knowledge of potential threats at the state level, and their elimination or mitigation.

### 2.2. Security theories in international relations

International security should be viewed as a constantly changing and evolving process.[187] Rapid changes taking place in the international arena complicate effective countermeasures to emerging threats, as they require innovative, effective legal tools and flexible organizational

[187] B. Balcerowicz, "Procesy międzynarodowe. Tendencje, megatrendy," in *Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe*, eds. R. Kuźniar et al., Warszawa: Scholar, 2012, p. 59.

solutions that will be accepted by states and can be dynamically adapted to changing conditions, especially to previously unknown threats.[188] Today, the discipline of international relations, in addition to political relations between states, also addresses many different aspects, including economic interdependence, human rights, gender discrimination, corporations and international organizations, environmental protection, and state development. It also encompasses the issue of terrorism, a popular issue in the 21st century.[189] Among these determinants, security is an extremely important concept. This phenomenon encompasses several disciplines and academic specialties.[190] The contemporary definition of security assumes a multi-criteria conceptual scope that goes far beyond the military sphere.[191] In the context of the broad spectrum of security, an analytical approach based on the subject-related criterion first and foremost requires identifying its key components, namely international security and national security. Of course, international security has a broader scope and encompasses more aspects than national security.

It is not merely the sum of the security of individual states but also encompasses the concept of collective empowerment.[192] International security can be comprehensively defined as "a set of conditions, norms and international mechanisms as well as influences that provide each state of a given international system or region with greater or lesser certainty of unthreatened existence, survival, state of possessions and development freedoms."[193] In the perspective of scientific literature in the field of security, the concept of international security refers strictly to the process or state in which the international environment (whether at the regional, continental or global level) achieves stability and opportunities for multifaceted development by protecting against various threats.[194] International security focuses on the ability to counter the negative and destructive influence of other actors in the international sphere of security and peace.[195] Based on multifaceted analyses, it can be observed that the following areas are of key importance to the international security environment:

- military security, concerning the balance of states' armed forces;

[188] W. Kostecki, "Bezpieczeństwo Polski a dynamika stosunków międzynarodowych," in *Bezpieczeństwo Polski. Współczesne wyzwania*, eds. S. Wojciechowski, A. Potyrała, Warszawa 2014, pp. 52–59.
[189] R. Jackson, G. Sorensen, *Wprowadzenie do stosunków międzynarodowych. Teorie i kierunki badawcze*, Kraków 2006, p. 34.
[190] W. Pokruszyński, *Teoretyczne aspekty bezpieczeństwa. Podręcznik akademicki*, Józefów 2010, p. 8.
[191] S. Koziej, *Wstęp do teorii i historii bezpieczeństwa* (skrypt internetowy), Warszawa/Ursynów 2010, p. 20.
[192] J. S. Nye, "Problemy badań nad bezpieczeństwem," *Sprawy Międzynarodowe* 1989, no. 6, p. 53.
[193] R. Zięba, "Kategoria bezpieczeństwa w nauce o stosunkach międzynarodowych," in *Bezpieczeństwo narodowe i międzynarodowe u schyłku XX wieku*, eds. D. B. Bobrov, E. Haliżak, Warszawa 1997, p. 23.
[194] W. Pokruszyński, *Bezpieczeństwo. Teoria i praktyka*, Józefów 2012, p. 12.
[195] C. Marcinkowski, "Współczesne środowisko bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego," *Zeszyty Naukowe AON* 2007, no. 2, pp. 59–60.

- political security, related to the institutional stability of states, governance systems, and ideologies that legitimize power;

– economic security, concerning access to resources, capital, and markets essential to maintaining a state's prosperity and power;

– social security, focused on the stability and development of traditional cultural, linguistic, religious, and national patterns;

– ecological security, related to maintaining the biosphere at the local and global levels as the basis for all human activity.[196]

In the theory of international relations, from the classical thought of Thucydides to the present day, numerous schools of thought have emerged defining the concept of security, in various contexts and at various levels. This article presents a description of selected trends in the context of scholarly perspectives encompassed and described in the theory of international relations. Security is one of the most important aspects of everyday life. It could be said that the concept is as old as human history itself.[197] From the biblical paradise to the 21st century, we are faced with the question: what exactly is security? According to the Dictionary of the Polish Language, security is a state of being free from threat, peace, and certainty.[198] This is illustrated by Maslow's hierarchy of needs, in which security, as one of the fundamental human needs, is positioned at the base of the pyramid, immediately after physiological needs. Furthermore, security is not only a state resulting from the absence of threat but also a dynamic process undergoing constant change. Therefore, defining security should address not only the state level but also society, and in particular its smallest unit, the human being. Security is present in every aspect of a person's activity, which contributes to its broad typology. Following R. Zięba's approach, the literature distinguishes security:[199] national, international; political, social, military, ecological, economic, personal, local, subregional, regional, supraregional, and global. These aspects are addressed in numerous theories of international relations. The search for a middle ground means that each theory, in its own particular way, identifies key elements that are essential for maintaining security.

In the field of international relations, a multitude of diverse theories exist, defining fundamental security issues. The main scholarly trends have emerged over many centuries, with

[196] B. Buzan, People, states & fear: The national security problem in international relations, Londyn 1983, p. 4.
[197] S. Koziej, Wstęp do teorii i historii bezpieczeństwa (skrypt internetowy), Warszawa/Ursynów 2010, p. 20.
[198] Słownik języka polskiego (wyd. IX), Warszawa 1994, vol. 1, p. 147.
[199] R. Zięba, Instytucjonalizacja bezpieczeństwa europejskiego: koncepcje – struktury – funkcjonowanie, Warszawa 1999, pp. 30–32.

diverse traditions, which has contributed to the multi-contextual nature of their classification. The diversity of schools of thought in the study of international relations results in their being approached from different perspectives within the academic discipline. In particular, the following approaches can be distinguished: positivism, social constructivism, and post-positivism. Among the many classifications, we can also distinguish so-called mainstream theories, which most often fall into three categories:[200]

- realism (only what actually happened is important, i.e., what is real),
- liberalism (often referred to as "pluralism," which emphasizes the multiplicity of actors in international relations alongside the state, such as international organizations, political parties, industrial corporations, etc.),
- globalism (alongside globalism, structuralism, revolutionism, socialism, and Marxism also appear). The English School of International Relations also uses the term "rationalism," a term coined by Martin Wight.

So-called mainstream theories are positivist because they assume that acquiring scientific knowledge is possible based on the description of existing, observable phenomena. These theories are characterized in particular by empiricism, a division between facts and values, a belief in the unity of science, and the application of a single methodology to multiple fields. Post-positivist theories go beyond these assumptions, rejecting the possibility of objectively examining and explaining phenomena in the social world. They focus instead on attempts to understand processes through the prism of specific features of reality.[201] Between these trends lies social constructivism, which examines the process of identity formation among actors on the international stage. Also situated between positivism and post-positivism is the English school of international relations, which emphasizes the special importance of international legal norms.

### 2.2.1. Security according to the realistic school

Realism is a movement that views people as loyally committed members of a group. There is no mention of separate individuals within society. Realists are primarily concerned with national interest, power, sovereignty, and military strategy. Sovereign states are paramount in international politics. The goal is to maximize military power relative to other states, as this provides greater

[200] J. Czaputowicz, Teorie stosunków międzynarodowych. Krytyka i systematyzacja (wyd. 1), Warszawa 2008, p. 50.
[201] A. Polus, "Połączenie społecznego konstruktywizmu i teorii Governance'u w analizach relacji pomiędzy organizacjami społeczeństwa obywatelskiego i sferą biznesu," Kultura – Historia – Globalizacja 2009, no. 5, p. 98.

security for the stronger state. Based on observations of the international scene over the centuries, realists argued that states "constantly prepare for, participate in, or recover from war."[202] The government is the sole expression of state policy and can use force against its own population when legally justified. The international system is anarchic; it lacks a single decision-making center or world government to regulate relations between states and coordinate international cooperation. This anarchy breeds conflict in international relations and mutual rivalry, contributing to the security of a state that relies on itself (self-help). The tradition of realism dates back to classical thinkers. Its main representatives include Thucydides, Niccolo Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Modern realism emerged in the 1940s and 1950s in response to the idealism of the interwar period. There are many classifications of realism. Robert Jackson and Georg Sorensen distinguish classical realism, neoclassical realism, strategic realism, and neorealism. In matters of security, liberalism focuses primarily on the relationship between state and society. Unlike realist theories, individuals are guaranteed private property and a wide range of individual rights. Domestic policy is central. Harmonization of interests between states is important. In the liberal world, rules are respected, and if a state violates them in its relations with other states, it is obligated to bear the consequences of such violation. The tradition of liberal concepts can be found in idealistic European thought, initially focused on the integration of the Christian community against external threats and the creation of some form of international organization or world government. Liberalism also recognizes the existence of anarchy on the international stage, understood as the lack of institutions regulating relations between other states. However, this anarchy does not necessarily lead to conflict and war. What is extremely important, liberalism is progressive, i.e. international relations evolve towards greater morality, creating conditions for freedom, prosperity, well-being and justice, in other words, the world should move towards a better place.[203] The diversity of liberalism makes its classification ambiguous. Doyle distinguishes three levels of liberalism: human nature—institutional liberalism (Locke, Bentham), states—trade pacifism (Adam Smith, Joseph Schumpeter), and the international system—internationalism (Kant). Liberalism incorporates the so-called collective security theory. A collective security system can mitigate the negative impact of international anarchy. The effectiveness of this system is maintained under the following conditions:

1. The collective security system obliges its participants to oppose an attack on any of its members. It assumes combining forces to achieve military superiority, which deters a potential aggressor.

[202] Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York 1967, p. 36 [in]: J. Czaputowicz, Teorie stosunków międzynarodowych..., op. cit., p. 58.
[203] J. Gray, Liberalism, Minneapolis 1986, p. X [in]: J. Czaputowicz, Teorie..., op. cit., p. 104.

2. The costs, measured in political, economic, reputational, and threat-related terms, must be high enough to outweigh any potential benefits.

3. States must share the same values regarding mutual security, reconcile their own interests with the requirements of international stability, and sometimes even subordinate their immediate national interests to the requirements of the collective security system.

The origins of liberal theory can also be traced back to Wilsonian idealism. An important moment in the history of international relations was the 1918 congress, at which President Woodrow Wilson presented his Fourteen Points program, calling for the rejection of secret diplomacy — agreements should be subject to public scrutiny. Wilson's idealism rested on the belief that through a rational and intelligently conceived international organization, wars could be ended and a more or less lasting peace achieved. Based on these principles, the League of Nations was established at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. Neoliberalism encompasses two trends: liberal institutionalism, which in the academic environment focuses on the obstacles posed by anarchy and seeks institutional solutions aimed at encouraging states to cooperate and fulfill their obligations, and economic liberalism, which in the political environment focuses on the functioning of the market and free trade. A slightly different classification can be found in Jackson R. and Sorensen G., who distinguished four strands of neoliberalism:

- sociological liberalism (increase in cross-border ventures, shared values);
- interdependence (in addition to political relations between governments, there are many other types of relationships between societies; trade ties stimulate cooperation);
- institutionalism (international institutions are established with a high degree of interdependence to solve common problems);
- republican liberalism (liberal democracies consolidate peace by not waging war against each other).

Neoliberals share liberalism's long-standing notions of the possibility of progress and change, but reject its idealism. They strive to harness the power of realism while avoiding its weaknesses. They transcend realism's assumptions primarily by expanding the concept of the state as the primary actor in global politics to include non-governmental entities, such as international organizations; the assumption of actors' rationality should account for situations of incomplete information, limited calculative capacity, and shifting preferences; and the assumption that the goal of state action

is to maximize power and influence over other states should recognize that this can occur in various forms under different systemic conditions. From a neoliberal perspective, security is not paramount in the hierarchy of international relations issues; the well-being of citizens is more crucial. Social and economic issues, not the policy of using military force, come to the fore. There is close interdependence between international actors. However, the degree of interdependence is linked to the power they possess, which has a profound impact on achieving desired goals. Manipulating interdependence is the primary policy instrument of states. On the other hand, close cooperation creates a "prisoner's dilemma," which has a significant impact on economic policy, society, and security.

### 2.2.2. Security in the neorealist perspective

Neorealism is often referred to as structural realism, although it differs from realism in its disinterest in moral considerations in foreign policy. Its main proponent is Kenneth Waltz. Neorealist theories date back to the period before the end of the Cold War, and one of their main assumptions is solving problems unilaterally using force. The international system is anarchic, and a state's security is relative and depends on its power. Neorealists argued that power is more than just the sum of military resources used to control and coerce other states. Here, power is viewed as the aggregate capabilities of a state, and thus a state occupies an appropriate place in the international hierarchy that shapes its behavior.[204] Thus, state behavior is conditioned by external factors. Neorealists reject the existence of any cooperation between states. States motivated by their own interests compete, and there is no cooperation. Focusing on security studies, we can distinguish two versions of neorealism: offensive and defensive realism, which can be perceived as more practical than Waltz's version. Admittedly, offensive neorealists accept many of the concepts of traditional realism; for example, according to John Mearsheimer, relative power is more important than absolute power for state security. A security strategy should weaken potential enemies and increase one's own strength above that of other states. Anarchy is continually fueled by the inability to reconcile the interests of states, which contributes to the emergence of conflicts. Defensive neorealists emphasize that the friendly or hostile attitude of other states is the basis for building our relations with them. Importantly, they reject the resolution of conflict through war, as the costs of using armed forces in conflict largely outweigh the benefits. For this reason, defensive neorealists are compared to neoliberals. Although the neoliberal argument that establishing security institutions (e.g., alliances) that guarantee mutual security for participating entities is preferable to war, most

[204] J. Baylis, S. Smith (eds.), Globalizacja polityki światowej. Wprowadzenie do stosunków międzynarodowych, Kraków 2008, p. 254.

neorealists argue that conflict is inevitable over time. Leaders cannot be certain whether other states' aggression is aimed at expansion or protection of their own state, therefore mutual interests do not constitute a guarantee of security, as this guarantee may be breached. An analysis of the above theories demonstrates the multi-contextual nature of approaches to defining security, as reflected in numerous classifications of the main trends in international relations. Each attempt to define a given theory arose from the emergence of a specific problem at a specific time. Furthermore, there is a clear connection between a given state's position in the system and the theory it espouses. These theories are often mutually exclusive. The development of international relations theory is closely linked to the development of social sciences, particularly sociology and the philosophy of science, resulting in clashes between theories. Confrontations of theories occurred during the so-called great debates on international relations, presenting it as a distinct academic discipline. Throughout history, several debates have taken place, encompassing the themes of the above theories. Realism concerns the selfish assumptions of pursuing state interests through power politics. The social individual is characterized by evil and must submit to the state's ideals. The opposite of these assumptions is the liberalist concept, which focuses primarily on the individual and their role in the state and society. Legal norms are strictly respected here, and their violations carry severe penalties. In neoliberalism, the focus is on society and its well-being, and primary goals can be achieved through the manipulation of economic and social relations. Different assumptions are found in neorealism, where power politics plays a greater role in achieving the set goals. In the "neo-neo" debate, or the intra-paradigmatic debate between realism and neorealism, the primary focus was on the influence of the structure of the international system (neorealism) and institutions (neoliberalism) on state behavior. Focusing on the concept of security, we encounter criticism and an underestimation of the essence of security in state policy, as well as a glorification of the importance of institutions. In response to the assumptions of neoliberalism and neorealism, constructivism emerged as a social construction of security. This movement assumes that security makes sense for people and is implemented within the framework of society's need for a sense of security. It is impossible to classify and present these theories uniformly; nevertheless, the above overview briefly outlines the essential assumptions of each of the aforementioned movements.

### 2.3. Regional security concept

Since 2007, Japan has been operating within the Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue), an alliance of the United States, Japan, India, and Australia. This is one of the forms of collective security in which it participates. However, there are voices suggesting that Japan should join another alliance – the AUKUS agreement. This suggestion is primarily based on the fact that Japan has been

systematically developing bilateral security cooperation with each AUKUS member.[205] Currently, Australia is the strongest supporter of the idea of Japan joining the alliance.[206] All these diplomatic efforts aimed at increasing Japan's sense of security in the region did not come out of nowhere. The shift in Japan's security and foreign policy, more assertive than in its recent history, is motivated by two main factors. According to Jrueffrey H. Hornung, the first is Chinese intimidation of states within Asian regional relations, and the second is Russian aggression in Ukraine. A third factor, North Korea and its military activity in the region, is also worth noting. The first two factors are closely intertwined. Japan has been striving to maintain relatively good relations with Russia due to the Kuril Islands dispute, but this aspect ultimately translates into a much broader issue. Namely, Japan has been trying to prevent the Russian Federation from getting too close to China, as a Russian-Chinese alliance is highly unfavorable for Japan, primarily because Japan has unresolved territorial disputes with both countries (the aforementioned Kuril Islands with Russia and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands with China).[207] Therefore, despite the territorial dispute, the Japanese have invested heavily in the Russian Far East to lure the Russians away from the Chinese.[208] As current developments demonstrate, Japan's efforts have failed, and the Russo-Chinese alliance has deepened significantly, despite the absence of an unequivocal declaration of support for Vladimir Putin by Xi Jinping in the context of the war in Ukraine. Russia's aggression against Ukraine has caused not only European states to become increasingly concerned about their own security, but has also made it impossible for Japan to disregard this threat. The concern is not limited to the possibility of Russian aggression against Japan, or against another sovereign state. The Japanese also perceive a danger in the potential "inspiration" that other states may draw from the conduct of the Russian Federation and in their attempts to implement similar policies within East Asia. Japan, following the lead of Western countries, decided to introduce sanctions against the Russian Federation and gradually expand them as the conflict in Ukraine developed,[209] including

[205] M. Auslin, *Why Japan Should Join AUKUS*, „Foreign Policy", November 15, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/15/japan-aukus-jaukus-security-defense-pact-alliance-china-containment-geopolitics-strategy-indo-pacific/ (accessed: February 21, 2023).

[206] S. Dziedzic, J. Oaten, *Australia's 'indispensable' partnership with Japan could see it join AUKUS pact as strategic links grow*, ABC News, 9 December 2022, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-12-09/aukus-australia-japan-richard-marles-pact/101757248 (accessed: February 21 2023).

[207] P. Kaczmarek, *Archipelag Senkaku. Źródło napięć na Morzu Wschodniochińskim*, "Refleksje", no. 5, spring–summer 2012, pp. 61–73.

[208] M. A. Kuo, *Ukraine War: The Impact on Japan-Russia Relations*, The Diplomat, May 16 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/05/ukraine-war-the-impact-on-japan-russia-relations/ (accessed: February 21 2023).

[209] *Japan tightens Russia sanctions after deadly missile strikes in Ukraine*, Reuters, January 27 2023, https://www.reuters.com/markets/japan-bans-exports-robots-semiconductor-parts-russia-new-sanctions-2023-01-27/ (accessed: February 21 2023).

by joining in the exclusion of Russian banks from the SWIFT system.[210] This is significant because, until now, Japan has sought to maintain proper relations with Russia, primarily due to the ongoing dispute over the Kuril Islands, which Japan refers to as the "Northern Territories," dating back to the Soviet-Japanese War in 1945. The Japanese believe the islands are an integral part of the Japanese state and that Russia is illegally occupying them.

This means that Japan has been unable to fully regulate its relations with the Russian Federation, despite strenuous efforts, particularly during Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's administration.[211] The war in Ukraine makes this even more impossible, and Russia itself has no intention of discussing the matter with Japan. According to Dmitry Peskov, Kremlin spokesman, there is "no prospect" for any talks on the matter.[212] In addition to the political support Japan has provided—and continues to provide—Japan has supported Ukraine by providing items such as drones, bulletproof vests, helmets, combat uniforms, tents, cameras, hygiene products, and food rations. Japan has also provided Ukraine with $600 million in financial support, as well as $700 million in humanitarian aid.[213]

We can therefore assume it is unlikely that the Russians would attack Japan, as they did in the case of Ukraine. Nevertheless, it is not a Russian attack on Japan that concerns Japanese decision-makers, as it is highly unlikely, but the example of genuine aggressiveness in international politics the Russian Federation sets for other states that would also be inclined to resolve disputes through force. Japan fears China above all, which, following Russia's example, might feel bold enough to attack Taiwan. This would irreversibly plunge the East and South Asian region into a state of war, one might assume even more devastating than the one currently raging in Ukraine. If Taiwan were to succeed, it is likely that the next target of the aggressive Chinese dragon would be Japan, or more precisely, the disputed islands. Therefore, it is in Japan's interest to support Ukraine and defeat Russia in order to discourage China from similar actions not only in South and East Asia but also in the Indo-Pacific. Stopping "inspiration from Russia" may be key to maintaining relative security in the region. China, seeing that Russia is unable to prevail against a much weaker Ukraine and that the collective West is providing actual,

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[210] *Japan joins U.S., others in excluding Russia from SWIFT system*, Reuters, February 27 2022, https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/japan-joins-us-others-excluding-russia-swift-system-2022-02-27/ (accessed: February 21 2023).

[211] W. Rodkiewicz, *Rosja–Japonia: nikłe szanse zawarcia traktatu pokojowego*, "Analizy OSW", January 23 2019, https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2019-01-23/rosja-japonia-nikle-szanse-zawarcia-traktatu-pokojowego (accessed: February 21 2023).

[212] N. Pacholczyk, *Rosja. „Pokoju z Japonią nie będzie". „Brak potrzeby" na podpisanie umów kończących II wojnę światową*, Gazeta.pl, 24 January 2023, https://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wiadomosci/7,114881,29389921,rosja-pokoju-z-japonia-nie-bedzie-brak-potrzeby-na-podpisanie.html (accessed: February 21 2023).

[213] *Japan Stands with Ukraine*, Office of the Prime Minister of Japan, January 27 2023, https://japan.kantei.go.jp/ongoingtopics/pdf/jp_stands_with_ukraine_eng.pdf (accessed: February 21 2023).

not just declarative, assistance, will be much less inclined to take more aggressive offensive actions against the region's states. The day after his meeting with President Biden (January 14, 2023), at a press conference, Prime Minister Kishida summarized these concerns in the following sentence, addressing the G7 leaders: "*Ukraine may be the East Asia of tomorrow*." This should be interpreted as a warning that there is a "strong sense of security crisis" in the region caused by China's strengthening position and North Korea's belligerent stance.[214]

The third factor, and one of concern for Japan, is North Korea, mentioned above. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea poses a threat to countries in the region (and beyond) because it possesses a nuclear arsenal that includes—according to SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) estimates—up to 20 warheads, and likely possesses enough fissile material to produce another 45-55 nuclear bombs.[215] Furthermore, the North Korean army, the so-called Korean People's Army, numbers approximately 1.3 million soldiers.[216] According to the 2023 Global Firepower ranking, the North Korean army ranks 34th in terms of strength.[217] For comparison, this ranking places Japan in 8th place for 2023.[218] The argument of nuclear potential and a relatively strong military for such a small country, one might think, can be easily refuted, as China poses a much greater threat to Japan and the region in this context, possessing a much larger nuclear arsenal and a larger military. However, the problem in this case is that North Korea, compared to the People's Republic of China, is a much more unpredictable actor in international relations, primarily due to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.

Recently, it's impossible not to notice North Korea's increased military activity – Japan is particularly affected by this activity, which is becoming a kind of "victim" of the DPRK. Specifically, North Korea is continuously developing its nuclear capabilities,[219] becoming much more aggressive in this area than before – an example of this is the new nuclear doctrine, which assumes, among other things, that in the event of an "imminent" conflict, the DPRK allows for

[214] *Japan PM: East Asia Could Be Next Ukraine*, VOA News, January 14 2023, https://www.voanews.com/a/kishida-says-g7-should-show-strong-will-on-russia-s-ukraine-invasion/6918474.html (accessed: February 28 2023).
[215] *Sipri Yearbook 2022. Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. Summary*, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2022, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2022-06/yb22_summary_en_v3.pdf, p. 14 (accessed: February 28 2023).
[216] M. Szopa, *Armie Świata: Koreańska Armia Ludowa*, Defence24, December 28 2022, https://defence24.pl/sily-zbrojne/armie-swiata-koreanska-armia-ludowa (accessed: February 28 2023).
[217] *2023 North Korea Military Strength*, Global Firepower, January 9 2023, https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.php?country_id=north-korea (accessed: February 28 2023).
[218] *2023 Japan Military Strength*, Global Firepower, January 9 2023, https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.php?country_id=japan (accessed: March 20 2023).
[219] K. Ryncarz, *Korea Północna zaprezentowała zdolności nuklearne i nowe pociski*, Euractiv, February 9 2023, https://www.euractiv.pl/section/bezpieczenstwo-i-obrona/news/korea-polnocna-zaprezentowala-zdolnosci-nuklearne-i-nowe-pociski/ (accessed: February 28 2023).

the preventive use of nuclear weapons or conventional forces against a hostile state.[220] North Korea has long been exploiting the existing tensions between the US, Russia, and China. In the context of current events, it is also exploiting the ongoing war in Ukraine, knowing that the international community's attention is focused on Ukraine. China follows a similar approach, but China, rationally perceiving the international reality, has not demonstrated the same military aggression toward Taiwan as North Korea has toward, among others, Japan, which has been increasingly vulnerable to a show of force by the North Korean dictator since the end of 2022. Evidence of this can be seen, for example, in the ballistic missile launched by North Korea in October 2022, which flew over Japan (the first since 2017).[221] Later, in December of last year, three North Korean missiles landed in the Sea of Japan.[222] In February 2023, North Korea test-fired four long-range cruise missiles, which also landed in the Sea of Japan,[223] while just a month later, the DPRK conducted further ballistic missile tests: first, in response to joint US-South Korean military exercises, among other things.[224] Later, the North Korean missile launch was linked to a visit by South Korean President Yuun Sek-yeol to the Japanese prime minister in Tokyo (the missile was launched several hours before the scheduled meeting).[225]

Moreover, the Japanese, and also other countries in the region, especially the South Koreans, are additionally worried by the new goals for the North Korean army for 2023 announced by Kim Jong Un, which, according to press reports, are likely to involve further expansion of nuclear capabilities, adding multi-warhead missiles to the missile arsenal, as well as the development of advanced military systems such as combat drones and spy satellites, all in order to "strengthen self-sufficient defense capabilities [...] in a multilaterally changing situation" on the international stage.[226]

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[220] O. Pietrewicz, *Korea Północna rozwija siły nuklearne*, "Biuletyn PISM", no. 187, November 30 2022, https://pism.pl/publikacje/korea-polnocna-rozwija-sily-nuklearne.

[221] J. Mackenzie, Y. Tan, R. Wingfield-Hayes, *North Korea fires ballistic missile over Japan*, BBC News, October 4 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-63126534 (accessed: February 28 2023).

[222] *North Korea fires 3 ballistic missiles towards Sea of Japan*, Al Jazeera, December 31 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/12/31/north-korea-fires-ballistic-missiles-towards-sea-of-japan-report (accessed: February 28 2023).

[223] *North Korea fires four cruise missiles into the Sea of Japan*, France 24, February 24 2023, https://www.france24.com/en/asia-pacific/20230224-north-korea-fires-four-cruise-missiles-in-the-sea-of-japan (accessed: February 28 2023).

[224] *Republika Korei i USA ćwiczą razem. Korea Północna znów straszy*, Defence24, March 13 2023, https://defence24.pl/polityka-obronna/republika-korei-i-usa-cwicza-razem-kora-polnocna-znow-straszy (accessed: March 20 2023).

[225] *Korea Północna przeprowadziła test rakiety międzykontynentalnej*, Defence24, March 17 2023, https://defence24.pl/geopolityka/korea-polnocna-przeprowadzila-test-rakiety-miedzykontynentalnej (accessed: March 20 2023).

[226] K. Ryncarz, *Korea Północna: Kim Dzong Un przedstawił cele dla armii na 2023 r.*, Euractiv, December 28 2022, https://www.euractiv.pl/section/bezpieczenstwo-i-obrona/news/korea-polnocna-kim-dzong-un-przedstawil-cele-dla-armii-na-2023-r/ (accessed: February 28 2023).

### 2.4 Geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific region

The geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific currently constitutes the primary arena of global great power competition, encompassing nearly 60% of the world's population and generating over 40% of global GDP. The region has ceased to be treated as two separate bodies of water (the Indian and Pacific Oceans), becoming a coherent, strategic geoeconomic and military space. In the decade 2010-2020, "Indo-Pacific" became one of the dominant concepts in discussions about the US-China rivalry and security in Asia. The term began to appear increasingly frequently in political discourse, referring to a priority area in the policies of countries such as the US,[227] Japan,[228] Australia,[229] and India.[230] It also attracted the interest of ASEAN countries,[231] as Southeast Asia became a new element on the Indo-Pacific strategic map. Until the early 2010s, however, the term remained almost completely unknown, and the term "Asia-Pacific" dominated popular usage, often also associated with *Pax Americana*.[232] So what caused the new concept to displace its predecessor and become the key to defining the dynamics of security in Asia?

China's linear rise represented a tectonic shift that led the United States to pivot to Asia and attempted to reevaluate its strategic priorities. Donald Trump's 2016 election victory gave the concept new impetus and cemented the rivalry with China as a primary focus of US foreign policy.[233] It is also impossible not to mention the changing attitude of the countries in the region, which began to look with increasing concern at the increasingly powerful China, which under Xi Jinping's rule adopted a more ambitious and confrontational course. The promotion of the Quad format concept by the countries[234] reflects the belief that the return of a great and assertive China requires a collective response not only from the United States but from all actors in the region. China's ambitions and the "Great Game" it is playing with the United States extend beyond East Asia and require the development of a new strategic concept. It was crucial to draw a map that would include India, perceived as a rising regional power and one of the main barriers to China's ambitions. It was also crucial to expand the playing field to include ASEAN countries, which have recently begun to gravitate towards China economically, not only in terms of trade but also investment and infrastructure. Southeast Asia has become a key arena for the competition for influence between

[227] U.S. Department of Defense, Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region, 2019, p. 1.
[228] Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Free and Open Indo-Pacific, August 2020.
[229] Australian Government, Defence White Paper 2013: Defending Australia and its National Interests, 2013.
[230] N. Modi, Prime Minister's Keynote Address at Shangri-La Dialogue, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, June 2018.
[231] ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.
[232] F. Heiduk, G. Wacker, From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific: Significance, Implementation and Challenges, SWP Research Paper 9, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, July 9 2020, p. 5.
[233] K. He, H. Feng, The Institutionalization of the Indo-Pacific: Problems and Prospects, "International Affairs", 96, no. 1, p. 151.
[234] Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad/QSD), comprising the United States, Japan, India, and Australia.

China, India, and Japan. Both Tokyo and New Delhi recognize the growing economic and political importance of the region and therefore strive to coordinate their mutual efforts and provide an attractive alternative to its countries. In this sense, the Indo-Pacific is also intended to serve as a counternarrative to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the flagship project of the Xi Jinping administration. The main advocate of the concept remains the United States, which sees it as a banner under which the fight to gain the support of the region's countries in the systemic confrontation with China is to be fought.

Since 2011 and the pivot to Asia announced by the Barack Obama administration,[235] there has been a growing conviction among decision-making circles that the success of the "pivot" would be largely determined by strengthening cooperation with India. The next logical step was to draw a "mental map," as Rory Medcalf calls the Indo-Pacific concept. However, the idea only caught on with the Trump administration, which incorporated the term into all key strategic documents.[236] On May 30, 2018, the US Pacific Command was also renamed the US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM).[237] In 2019, the United States Department of Defense and the State Department issued separate reports on the Indo-Pacific strategy. The American vision of a *Free and Open Indo-Pacific* is officially based on four pillars: (1) respect for the sovereignty and independence of each state; (2) peaceful resolution of disputes; (3) free and fair trade based on open investment, transparent agreements, and transport connectivity; and (4) commitment to international law, including freedom of navigation and flight. In practice, however, it boils down to limiting the influence of China, which is perceived as a threat to these values.

The Indo-Pacific should be considered not only as a political project intended to shape reality, but also as a response to the growing scale of economic and strategic ties between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Globalization processes, manifested in the growing number of investments, increasing trade, and infrastructure contracts, have led to South and Southeast Asia, previously neglected, now seriously entering the United States' agenda. Never before have the two neighboring oceans been so interdependent in terms of security, as evidenced by the growing activity of China, India, Japan, and the United States in these waters and the crucial role of maritime transport.

The Indo-Pacific is a "mental map"[238] creating a new superregion where the paths of global powers striving to maintain or achieve hegemony intersect. It encompasses a diverse area stretching from the shores of the Arabian Peninsula in the West to the second Pacific island chain in the East

[235] *Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament*, Parliament House, Canberra, Australia, November 17 2011, The White House, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament; H. Clinton, *America's Pacific Century*, "Foreign Policy", 2011.
[236] K. He, H. Feng, *The Institutionalization of the Indo-Pacific: Problems and Prospects*, "International Affairs", 96, no. 1, 2020, p. 151.
[237] U.S. Pacific Command, *U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Holds Change of Command Ceremony*, May 30 2018.
[238] R. Medcalf, *Indo-Pacific Empire: China, America and the Contest for the World's Pivotal Region*, 2020, pp. 5–9.

(the Mariana Islands, Guam). Thus, it encompasses countries classified as part of West Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, East Asia, and Australia and Oceania. The waters of the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific Ocean intersect key transportation routes, the lifeblood of the global economy. Maritime transport accounts for approximately 80% of the volume and 70% of the total value of global trade,[239] with Asia serving as its beating heart, home to nine of the world's largest ports. Nothing better symbolizes the ties between maritime trade, economics, and security than the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca. Located off the coasts of Malaysia and Indonesia, the strait is the shortest, most time- and cost-effective route connecting the Middle East and Asia. Annually, more than 16 million barrels of oil per day and 3.2 million barrels of liquefied natural gas (LNG) pass through it.[240] In turn, the role of the South China Sea is increasingly similar to that played by the Mediterranean for the countries of its basin during the Greco-Roman period. The annual value of goods transported through this sea exceeds $3.3 trillion, making control of the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca crucial for the struggle for dominance in Asia.[241]

The region also contains potential flashpoints that could spark regional conflict or another world war. Graham Allison identifies the most important of these: the South China Sea, Taiwan, North Korea, and the East China Sea.[242] This list, however, is not exhaustive, and Outer Manchuria, Eastern Ladakh, and Kashmir should be added as further red dots on the Indo-Pacific map. In all these areas, the interests of China, the United States, India, the Russian Federation, and other regional states clash in various configurations. The above-mentioned circumstances have led the U.S. Department of Defense to clearly state that the Indo-Pacific is a "priority theater of operations" for the United States.[243] The term's entry into the vocabulary of world leaders stems from the recognition of the economic, demographic, and political importance of Asia, which remains a constant driver of global growth in the 21st century. By 2040, its share of global GDP and consumption is expected to reach 50% and 40%, respectively.[244] In 2020, Asia is expected to overtake the rest of the world for the first time in purchasing power parity (PPP), which is the consumption potential of societies taking into account currency and price differences between the countries being compared. The increasing level of economic development in Asian countries will result in a growing middle class. According to calculations by the *Financial Times*,

[239] Review of Maritime Transport 2018, UNCTAD.
[240] U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), World Oil Transit Chokepoints, 2017, pp. 6–7. .
[241] P. Paszak, The Malacca Strait, the South China Sea and the Sino-American Competition in the Indo-Pacific, "Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs", Vol. 7, No. 3, 2020.
[242] G. Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap, 2017.
[243] U.S. Department of Defense, Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region, 2019, p. 1.
[244] O. Tonby, J. Woetzel, W. Choi, J. Seong, P. Wang, Asia's Future Is Now, McKinsey Global Institute, July 2019.

90% of all new beneficiaries of material advancement worldwide (2.4 billion people) in the coming decades will fall in Asia, primarily India and China.

The Indo-Pacific brings together some of the world's most promising economies (Indonesia, Vietnam, Bangladesh), key financial centers (Shanghai, Singapore, Hong Kong, Tokyo, Beijing, Sydney)[245] and potential superpowers and regional powers such as India and China. East Asian countries are also at the center of global production chains (GVCs), mainly the electronics sector.[246] Since the early 1990s, China has gradually established itself as the "world's assembly plant," gradually moving up the value chain. Available research indicates the growing contribution of Chinese companies to the final value of exported goods.[247] The growing level of economic competitiveness has led some companies to vertically integrate various processes, concentrating the entire process solely in China or relocating more labour-intensive branches to Southeast Asia.[248]

The Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) have become symbols of growing cooperation in Asia. Importantly, the United States is not a party to either agreement, following Donald Trump and the US Congress's abandonment of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) project. China also opted not to participate in the CPTPP, but declarations by Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang that they are considering such an option indicate that Beijing may take such a step in the name of building economic influence in the region. The authorities in Beijing are aware of the importance of building economic ties. The interdependence of Indo-Pacific countries and China is the main obstacle to adopting a more decisive policy towards Beijing. The weakening influence of the US and its economic symbiosis with China are presenting many countries with very difficult strategic dilemmas. Dilemmas that, given the current dynamics, will likely be resolved to the US's detriment.

Asia, however, is not only about economic potential but also about related demographic growth trends. The UN forecasts that India will become the world's most populous country by 2027. ASEAN countries will also experience favorable growth, with their population expected to increase from 664 million in 2020 to 741 million in 2035. If China, India, Japan, Korea, and Australia are included in the calculations, the region will be home to 4 billion of the world's total population of 8.85 billion by 2035.[249] It is therefore not surprising that the US State Department strategy concludes that trade flows between the countries of the region and the United States amount to $1.9

[245] The Global Financial Centres Index 27, Financial Centre Futures, 2020.
[246] M. P. Torsekar, J. VerWey, East Asia-Pacific's Participation in the Global Value Chain for Electronic Products, United States International Trade Commission, Journal of International Commerce and Economics, March 2019.
[247] D. Wen, Domestic Value Added in China's Exports to the World and Its Partners, "The Chinese Economy", 51, no. 1, 2020, pp. 45–68, DOI: 10.1080/10971475.2017.1368885; Trade in Value-Added: China, OECD, December 2018.
[248] Global Value Chains and Disruptions in East Asia, Nanyang Center for Emerging Markets, 2020, p. 6.
[249] *ASEAN+6 Population Forecast: Global Share, Aging and Dependency Ratio*, Ministry of Investment, Trade and Industry of Malaysia, www.miti.gov.my.

trillion and that the future of the US and the Indo-Pacific are "inextricably linked."[250] All the attributes of Asia and the Indo-Pacific outlined above are leading to a growing global conviction that the next century will be Asia's century, and that the countries that have previously dictated the terms and principles of economic cooperation are facing an inevitable decline. The future of the United States and the Indo-Pacific is not the only one "inextricably linked."

This also applies increasingly to Europe, which, unless it seriously engages in the competition for technological dominance, will gradually become marginalized. All of the region's attributes outlined above determine the leading role of the Indo-Pacific in US policy, and increasingly, in that of other countries around the world. However, the main argument for reevaluating the American strategy and adapting the Indo-Pacific concept remains China, the first country since the Soviet Union to be able to compete with the US on a global scale. In early December 2020, Intelligence Director John Ratcliff described China as the greatest threat to the United States and global democracy since World War II.[251] He thus concluded that the Soviet Union and the Cold War posed less of a challenge to the United States than China. Such a statement still reflects the "spirit of the age" more than reality, as China, unlike the USSR, did not enslave half of the European continent with the intention of further expansion. Ratcliffe's statement, however, is significant because it reflects the perception of China's role in international politics among a significant portion of the American elite. In the decade 2010-2020, a consensus emerged that the Middle Kingdom posed the primary challenge to the United States. Crucially, this challenge will require significantly greater virtuosity and cooperation with allies from decision-makers than was the case during the Cold War.[252]. Mike Pompeo illustrated this problem well during his August visit to the Czech Republic, pointing out that the current rivalry is more difficult because "the CCP is entangled with our economies, with our politics and with our societies in a way that the Soviet Union never was."[253]

The scale and complexity of the confrontation with China prompted the redrawing of the strategic map, encompassing the grand chessboard in its full glory. The Indo-Pacific concept is, in a sense, a declaration by Washington that the United States cannot address the challenge alone. While US power in Asia has always been significantly dependent on cooperation with partners and allies, this will become even more crucial in the first half of the 21st century. The scale of trade and investment interdependence makes mobilizing allies to implement the Cold War-era *containment* strategy impossible. Even Donald Trump, presenting himself as a down-to-earth figure, has indulged

[250] United Nations, *World Population Prospects 2019: Highlights*, June 2019, https://population.un.org/.
[251] C. Strohm, *U.S. Spy Chief Calls China Biggest Threat Since World War II*, Bloomberg, December 3 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-12-03/u-s-spy-chief-calls-china-greatest-threat-since-world-war-ii
[252] P. Paszak, *China-US: Cold War 2.0?*, *The Warsaw Institute Review*, No. 3/2020, pp. 55–63.
[253] M. Pompeo, *Securing Freedom in the Heart of Europe*, August 12 2020, Wallenstein Palace, Prague, Czech Republic, https://www.state.gov/securing-freedom-in-the-heart-of-europe/.

in a poetic comparison emphasizing the importance and independence of each country. In 2017, in Da Nang, Vietnam, he emphasized that the Indo-Pacific is a beautiful constellation of countries, each a bright star and a satellite of no one.[254] For the American star to continue to shine over Asia, it will need the light of others, including those not perceived as traditional US allies.

[254] Trump. *Remarks by President Trump at APEC Summit*, Da Nang, Vietnam. November 10, 2017b. White House. https:// www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trumpapec- ceo-summit-da-nang-vietnam/.

# Chapter III

# The evolution of Japan's security policy after World War II

## 3.1. Post-war security model

The Imperial Japanese security policy in the post-World War II period has been a continuing focus of interest for both practitioners and scholars of international relations. This stems from two fundamental reasons. The first is the country's traditionally significant position in the international balance of power in the Asian region (whose importance for the global order is constantly growing). Already during the Pax Sinica (conventionally defined as 221 BCE–1842 CE), Japan maintained relative independence and even periodically displayed great-power aspirations.[255]

In the mid-19th century, influenced by the expansion of European powers and the United States, the Empire embarked on an ambitious program of political, social, and economic transformation, which enabled it to become the first Asian industrialized state and a power with a status comparable to that of the colonial powers. At the end of the 19th century, Japan embarked on an aggressive policy of colonial expansion, culminating in an attempt to completely dominate the region within the so-called Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere during World War II. Immediately after the war, it seemed that the defeated and occupied Empire would permanently lose its position as a significant actor in regional security relations. Relatively quickly, however, the new regional hegemon, the United States, recognized the strategic importance of its defeated adversary in the emerging Cold War system. Japan's geopolitical location determines its key role in the regional system of strategic interactions. The Japanese archipelago constitutes the northern end of the chain of islands separating the Western Pacific Basin from the coast of the Asian continent. In the military dimension, this enables not only control over shipping routes, but also the projection of power onto the continent (and, naturally, also blocking the projection of power outwards by continental powers).[256] Thus, Japan's strategic location and highly developed industrial economy made it particularly valuable in the Cold War contest for spheres of influence. Consequently, the occupying power's priorities shifted, and the Empire became a key element of the American alliance system, ensuring the containment of communism in Asia. During this period, another factor emerged that distinguished Japan as a subject of study. As a result of a deliberate development policy, the country quickly became one of the world's leading economic powers, but this was not accompanied by the expected growth in military might and political significance. At the dawn of the Cold War,

[255] Y. Deng, China's Struggle for Status: The Realignment of International Relations, Cambridge, 2008, p. 40.
[256] J. R. Holmes, Japanese Maritime Thought: If Not Mahan, Who?, in: Asia Looks Seaward: Power and Maritime Strategy, eds. T. Yoshihara, J. R. Holmes, Westport, 2008, pp. 147–148.

Japanese leaders adopted a unique foreign and security policy strategy based on the renunciation of instruments of force and limiting defense capabilities to the bare minimum. Legal restrictions, the adoption of the concept of comprehensive security, and strong pacifist and anti-militarist sentiments within the population led the Empire to adopt an international stance as a "pacifist commercial state." This policy contrasted sharply with the actions of other significant actors in the international order at the time. It was also difficult to explain from the perspective of the traditional perspective on international relations (based on political realism), which held that a country's growing economic potential should lead to great-power aspirations and increased armament. However, this strategy brought unexpected success, leading some observers to conclude that the Japanese had found a new formula for state foreign policy, better adapted to a rapidly globalizing world.[257]

It remains intriguing that the fundamental transformation of the international order (both globally and regionally) brought about by the end of the Cold War initiated a process of evolution of Japan's security policy in the opposite direction. A more uncertain security environment, the constraints of the alliance with the United States, and significant changes in the country's political system led to a gradual shift away from a formula of drastically limited defense capabilities and toward the expansion of the armed forces and their fulfillment of an increasingly broad range of missions. Answering the question of the content and scope of these changes, their causes, and their consequences, is crucial for analyzing the current and future shape of the international security environment in Asia.

Immediately after the end of World War II, Japanese leaders faced the necessity of developing a new formula for defining their country's place in the international system. They had to do this amidst economic ruin, the complete disgrace of the pre-war political system, and foreign occupation. Until the signing of the peace treaty and the restoration of sovereignty, the most important decisions were made by the American authorities. However, the fundamental principles of Japanese foreign and security policy were developed by Japanese leaders. In practice, this meant a narrow elite of bureaucrats, who had played a key role in the Japanese political system since the Meiji Restoration, and whose assistance the occupying authorities relied on to administer the state. However, decision-makers had to consider the powerful influence of opposing trends and pressures. On the one hand, the new political system imposed by the occupying forces effectively introduced parliamentary rule, which, combined with the growing civic awareness (and active participation) of the population, prevented the rulers from ignoring public sentiment. Understandably (given the extent of suffering and destruction the war brought), the public displayed strong pacifist and anti-

[257] K. B. Pyle, *Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose*, New York, 2007, pp. 3–6.

militarist sentiments. These political voices were the socialist and communist parties, which enjoyed widespread public support immediately after the war. A key element of their platform was the demand for complete disarmament and strict neutrality in the emerging rivalry between political and military blocs. At the same time, the United States was willing to extend allied security guarantees to Japan, but expected the Empire to shoulder some of the responsibilities (and costs) associated with implementing the strategy of containing communism in Asia. Relatively quickly, the Americans developed ambitious plans for Japan's rearmament and its inclusion in the regional system of military alliances. At the same time, in Japan itself, an influential group of conservative politicians (leading by Ichiro Hatoyama and Nobusuke Kishi) advocated a return to superpower status through the rebuilding of the armed forces and the pursuit of an independent foreign policy. Ultimately, however, it was the group of moderate conservatives, led by Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, who gained the most influence.[258] It was they who formulated the strategy that defined Japan's international position for the next 40 years. It is worth noting that they were guided by the remarkably enduring principles of Japanese strategic culture, which had been shaped during the feudal period and remained vibrant in Imperial policy practically to this day. In his in-depth analysis of Japanese foreign policy, American scholar Kenneth B. Pyle identified six fundamental patterns of conduct characteristic of Japanese foreign policy.[259] Three of these are particularly important for understanding the new postwar strategy: rank and honor, autonomy and regional hegemony, and adaptation and adjustment. Yoshida's supporters had no intention of abandoning Japan's aspirations to become a regional power and a significant global power. However, the method of achieving this goal was to be innovative. From the Meiji Restoration until their final defeat in World War II, the Japanese attempted to impose their dominance on Asia through military force. This strategy ended in complete failure. At its root was the weakness of the economic foundations of Japanese power, particularly evident in the confrontation with the United States. In the new, postwar circumstances, it was clear that the starting point for a return to greatness status must be economic reconstruction. In this situation, it was deemed necessary to introduce a new hierarchy of priorities. Economic development was to be at the top, with military issues at the bottom. The result of this new approach was the so-called Yoshida Doctrine, which can be reduced to three fundamental assumptions:[260]

1) Economic reconstruction must be the highest national priority; achieving this requires political and economic cooperation with the United States;

[258] K. B. Pyle, *op. cit.*, pp. 225–233.
[259] *Ibidem*, pp. 33–36.
[260] *Ibidem*, p. 242.

2) Japan should limit its armaments to the minimum level necessary for self-defense and simultaneously avoid involvement in international political and strategic relations; the goal of this approach is to focus its efforts and resources on promoting economic development and avoid excessive domestic political controversy;
3) To ensure its long-term security, Japan will permit the establishment of American military bases on its territory.

The assumptions underlying this doctrine found ultimate confirmation in the concept of "comprehensive security," formulated in the report of an informal study group convened by Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira (published in 1980).[261] According to this formulation, state security in the modern world should be considered on several levels. Military force, although essential to ensuring national security, is of little use in achieving international political goals and its role is essentially limited to self-defense against aggression. Economic security issues were prioritized. Trade relations and development aid were considered the most important instruments for influencing the international environment. The concept of comprehensive security was, in fact, a formalization of Japan's existing policy practice and remains the basis for thinking about the Empire's national security practically to this day. It is worth remembering, however, that it was a precursor to a new way of thinking about security issues, which became widespread in the doctrines of other states (and in the discipline of strategic studies) only after the end of the Cold War. To summarize the intellectual foundations of Japanese security policy during the Cold War, it is worth exploring Yonosuke Nagai's ideas, expressed in the concept of the "moratorium world" and Japan as a "moratorium state."[262] He assumed that the international system was in a phase of transition from the traditional Westphalian model (in which military power was the most important determinant of a state's position) to a Kantian peaceful world order, in which collective international agreements would guarantee the security of states. According to him, this transition phase is characterized by a nuclear stalemate between the superpowers, which forces a kind of moratorium on the use of armed force in the international system.

Thus, alongside the international hierarchy of states based on military strength, an alternative stratification emerges, based on other criteria, primarily economic ones. Therefore, the best strategy for Japan is to reject the assumption that military potential must be commensurate with its economic performance. Instead, it advocates adopting the stance of a "moratorium state," focusing on developing economic potential based on modern technologies. Characteristics of the political system also constituted significant constraints on the rulers' freedom to shape security policy. This

[261] G. D. Hook, J. Gilson, Ch. W. Hughes, H. Dobson, *Japan's International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security*, 2nd ed., London, 2005, p. 155; E. Heginbotham, R. J. Samuels, *Japan*, in: *Strategic Asia 2002–03: Asian Aftershocks*, eds. R. J. Ellings, A. L. Friedberg, M. Wills, Seattle, 2002, pp. 98–99.
[262] K. B. Pyle, *op. cit.*, pp. 261–262.

manifested itself both at the level of political culture and the structure of the party system itself, as well as the decision-making process within the executive branch.

Influenced by wartime experiences, pacifist and anti-militarist attitudes became widespread in Japanese society, eventually becoming among the most important norms and values shaping the Empire's political culture. Left-wing parties, advocating a program of neutrality, could count on the support of influential opinion-formers and the ability to mobilize broader public opinion in opposition to the government's (in their view) overly ambitious national security initiatives. A perfect illustration of this were the mass protests organized in 1960 by opponents of the new alliance treaty with the United States. These were the largest mass demonstrations in Japan's postwar history, and although the opposition failed to block the treaty's ratification, the political crisis forced the resignation of the revisionist Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi. From then on, it became clear to the ruling elites that pursuing a security policy contrary to public opinion was practically impossible under the new political conditions. It is worth noting, however, that the attitude of society was not always as intransigent as during the 1960 crisis. As researcher Yasuhiro Izumikawa has noted, anti-militarist attitudes in Japanese society stemmed from three factors: pacifism, anti-traditionalism, and fear of entanglement in conflicts waged by the American ally.[263]

In his study, he presents compelling arguments for the thesis that pacifist ideals were only one of the motivations behind anti-militarist sentiments, and not necessarily the most important one. Pacifists achieved political success when they exploited public aversion to the traditional elitist model of governance, which lacked broad public participation in decision-making, and fear of entanglement in US-led wars (e.g., in Vietnam). When the synergy of these three factors was not ensured (as, for example, in the case of closer military cooperation with the US in the second half of the 1970s), the government was able to implement controversial changes without exposing itself to public confrontation. In the postwar period, Japan saw the development of the so-called "1955 system," characterized by the dominance of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which ruled continuously from 1955 to 1993 (and then from 1994 to 2009, in a coalition government). As a result, the Imperial Japanese party system can be described as a 1.5-party system, emphasizing the weakness of the opposition and the privileged position of the ruling party. Two features of this system were crucial for the formulation and implementation of security policy: a bipolar political power structure and a dispersed decision-making system within the ruling party. The balance of power between the main political parties can be considered an internal reflection of the bipolar international order in which Japan operated at the time. The conservative ruling party (supporting the continued alliance with the US and the limited operation of the Self-Defense Forces) maintained

[263] Y. Izumikawa, Explaining Japanese Antimilitarism: Normative and Realist Constraints on Japan's Security Policy, International Security, 2010, No. 2, Vol. 35.

a steady advantage over the left-wing opposition (advocating neutrality and complete disarmament). However, the position of the socialists and communists, both in parliament and through the support of influential opinion-forming circles, was so strong that the government could not ignore their positions, including (perhaps even primarily) in the areas of foreign and security policy. At the same time, the LDP was a deeply diversified party, divided into factions and so-called "political tribes."[264]

The final shape of legislation and current government policy was most often the result of lengthy intra-party consultations and compromise between various factions. Generally speaking, it should be noted that for most of the postwar period, Japan suffered from a lack of strong leadership, essential for an effective foreign and security policy. This stemmed largely from the fact that successive prime ministers were effectively "hostages" to factional politics within the ruling party. The special position and influence of career civil servants was also a significant factor. The position of bureaucratic elites in Japan is significantly stronger than in other developed democracies. Carefully selected bureaucratic personnel have been crucial to the effectiveness of the Japanese state and modernization efforts since the Meiji Revolution. A career in the civil service remains a source of considerable prestige and attracts the most distinguished graduates of Japan's most important universities. The role of professional bureaucracy in formulating and implementing state policy is so significant that some scholars have even described the situation by stating that "the LDP ruled, but the bureaucracy actually governed."[265] Typical of this period was a bottom-up decision-making system within the executive branch. Given the frequent turnover of politicians (it's worth recalling that Japan has had 32 prime ministers since 1945, and ministerial turnover was even more frequent), state policy was formulated primarily by the bureaucracy. The decision-making process typically began at the level of ministries, and only after consultations at the bureaucratic level did it reach the political (party and government) bodies, which most often simply approved the decisions made by officials.[266]

As a result of the conditions cited above, a comprehensive system of restrictions was created, blocking the possibility of pursuing an active defense policy and significantly expanding the armed forces, thus guaranteeing the implementation of the concept of a "pacifist commercial state." It was based on three pillars: constitutional regulations (Article 9 of the Constitution and its official interpretation), additional legal and political constraints imposed on defense policy, and an extensive system of civilian control over the armed forces. The most important foundation of Japan's postwar

[264] Japan's International Relations, op. cit., pp. 58–59.
[265] Ch. Johnson, The State and Japanese Grand Strategy, in: The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy, eds. R. Rosecrance, A. A. Stein, Ithaca, 1993, p. 216, cited in: M. M. Mochizuki, Japan's Long Transition: The Politics of Recalibrating Grand Strategy, in: Strategic Asia 2007–08: Domestic Political Change and Grand Strategy, eds. A. J. Tellis, M. Wills, p. 80.
[266] T. Shinoda, Koizumi Diplomacy: Japan's Kantei Approach to Foreign and Defense Affairs, Seattle, 2007, pp. 21–25.

security policy is Article 9 of the Imperial Constitution of November 3, 1946, according to which: "The Japanese people, sincerely striving for international peace based on justice and order, forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation, as well as the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. In order to achieve the goal set forth in the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, or other means capable of warfare, will never be maintained. The right of the state to wage war is not recognized."[267]

These provisions express the essence of Japan's identity as a pacifist state. However, their interpretation has been controversial almost from the outset. A literal reading of the constitutional provisions leads to the conclusion that the mere possession of armed forces (even those of a purely defensive nature) is illegal. Despite this, in 1954, Japanese leaders decided to establish the Self-Defense Forces, an armed force in all but name. This decision was motivated by a recognition of the need for a minimal defense capability and (largely) pressure from their American ally. The question of the constitutionality of the new formation's existence obviously arose. Since the Supreme Court declined to hear the case, the task of interpreting the provisions of Article 9 was entrusted to the Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB). This institution is considered the most powerful bureaucratic body in Japan. It forms part of the Prime Minister's administration and its primary responsibility is to adjudicate the constitutionality of laws and, more broadly, government policies. Moreover, this review is conducted during the legislative process, not after the fact (as is the practice in constitutional courts in other countries). CLB rulings are treated as the official interpretation of the law applied by the government. Therefore, the interpretation of Article 9 has been, and continues to be, an interpretation of what is permitted in Japanese defense policy. From the outset, however, the CLB's rulings on this matter have been subject to political pressure and manipulation. Prime Minister Yoshida desired an interpretation that would serve his strategic goals, namely, permitting the operation of the Self-Defense Forces, but with limitations on their potential and ability to participate in allied operations. His wishes were met by the Bureau's ruling in 1952, according to which the constitution prohibits the possession of war potential (Japanese: senryoku), i.e.: "[...] forces equipped and organized to conduct modern warfare. Determining what constitutes war potential requires a specific judgment, taking into account the temporal and spatial environment of the state in question. It is unconstitutional neither to maintain capabilities that do not exceed the threshold of war potential nor to use them to defend the nation against direct invasion."[268] As can be seen, defining what constitutes war potential and what "falls short" became a matter of discretion, dependent on specific circumstances and political expediency. In practice, this gradually led to

[267] *Constitution of Japan of November 3, 1946* (translation by Professor Teruji Suzuki), http://www.pl.emb-japan.go.jp/relations/konstytucja.htm (accessed January 27, 2011).
[268] A. Nakamura, *Sengo Seiji ni Yureta Kenpo Kyūjō* [*Article 9 That Shook Postwar Politics*], Tokyo, 2001, p. 99, cited in: R. J. Samuels, *Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia*, New York, 2008, p. 46.

a situation in which virtually any weapon system that could be defined as defensive was permitted (in extreme interpretations, even nuclear weapons). Another legal issue was the admissibility of Japan's participation in collective self-defense (a right guaranteed by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations). Japanese policymakers attempted to circumvent this problem by distinguishing between "collective self-defense" (the use of force in defense of an ally) and "collective security" (a broad range of political, economic, and military actions undertaken within the framework of multilateral cooperation within international organizations), while simultaneously accepting the latter. Ultimately, the CLB ruled that the Charter of the United Nations grants Japan the right to collective self-defense, but that it cannot exercise it under its constitutional provisions. Such a legal construction, if rigorously interpreted, would lead to the bizarre situation in which the Self-Defense Forces would be unable to come to the aid of an American warship attacked while defending Japan.[269] Gradually, additional political constraints, independent of constitutional provisions, were imposed on defense policy. These concerned nuclear armaments, the export of arms and military equipment, the peaceful use of outer space, and the level of defense spending.

In 1967, Prime Minister Eisaku Sato announced the so-called Three Non-Nuclear Principles, stipulating that Japan would not produce, possess, or tolerate nuclear weapons on its territory. These principles remain a cornerstone of Japan's nuclear policy to this day, despite the fact that during the Cold War, the presence of American nuclear weapons on Japanese territory was tolerated under informal agreements. That same year, Prime Minister Eisaku Sato announced a ban on arms exports to three categories of countries: communist, those subject to UN sanctions, and those participating in armed conflicts (or those on the verge of engaging in such conflicts).

In the 1970s, Prime Minister Takeo Miki extended this ban both subjectively (to all countries) and objectively (to all military equipment and components). This ultimately severely limited the development of the Japanese arms industry as an export industry. In 1969, the Diet adopted a resolution on the peaceful use of outer space. Prime Minister Miki's cabinet also formalized an upper limit on defense spending at 1% of GDP. Given the size of Japan's GDP (until recently, the Japanese economy ranked second in the world in terms of nominal GDP), this did not necessarily imply a low nominal level of spending, but it should be remembered that in practice, the actual allocated budgets regularly contained amounts below 1% of GDP.[270] Another significant limitation of security policy is the very strict system of civilian oversight of the armed forces. The prominent role of anti-militaristic norms in the postwar political culture (discussed earlier) and the negative experiences of the pre-war era (when the military dominated the entire political system) contributed to the creation of control mechanisms much more stringent than those found in most democratic

[269] R. J. Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia, op. cit., pp. 45–49.
[270] K. B. Pyle, op. cit., pp. 250–255.

countries. Until 2007, there was no independent Ministry of Defense. This function was performed by the Japan Defense Agency (JDA), part of the Prime Minister's administration. This institution's influence and standing in the context of inter-ministerial disputes and rivalries was very weak, especially compared to the influential Ministries of Finance and Foreign Affairs. This was partly due to the fact that key positions within the Agency were regularly filled by officials seconded from other ministries and government agencies. Consequently, a career in the Defense Agency did not offer an attractive career path for young and ambitious officials. Another characteristic of this system was the almost complete exclusion of the military from the defense planning and programming process. Given that the civilian officials responsible for this process largely had very limited experience and knowledge of military matters, the effectiveness of the entire process was always deeply questionable. This can be seen in the example of arms and military equipment procurement, which was determined more by the interests of the defense industry (in terms of maintaining production and developing technological resources) than by the requirements of military strategy and the operational needs of the armed forces. Given the small size of the Self-Defense Forces and the ban on arms exports, it is not surprising that the unit price of the ordered equipment was very high.

The issue of the chain of command of the armed forces was also exceptionally complex and problematic. It should be noted that until 2003, Japan lacked legal regulations specifying the principles for the functioning of state authority and the armed forces during a crisis. Even in the event of a threat of attack, a standard, peaceful decision-making procedure was to apply, in which the prime minister issues orders for the operational use of troops, which were then transmitted via the director general of the Defense Agency and the heads of the Self-Defense Forces. However, each order required approval by parliament and the National Security Council, which significantly limited the flexibility of the entire decision-making process and the ability to quickly respond to threats. This state of affairs was repeatedly criticized by military commanders. However, publicly expressing such opinions usually resulted in political scandal and the swift dismissal of the officers involved.[271]

The constraints discussed above resulted in a situation in which the peaceful nature of the state's policy was effectively guaranteed, but at the same time, the Empire's ability to effectively defend itself against aggression was highly questionable. Japanese decision-makers were fully aware that in this arrangement, their country had, in a sense, relinquished its ability to fulfill one of its fundamental functions: ensuring defense against external threats. This state of affairs was tolerated because a powerful ally, the United States, assumed the responsibility of ensuring the Empire's security. This alliance remains a key factor in determining Japanese security policy to this day.

[271] R. J. Samuels, *op. cit.*, pp. 49–57.

Forged between bitter enemies shortly after the end of World War II, it was a consequence of the Cold War world order.[272]

Initially, the Americans sought to completely disarm Japan through the occupation, rendering it a weak state that would no longer pose any threat. Simultaneously, an ambitious program of domestic reforms was implemented, intended to reshape the Japanese state, economy, and society along American lines. However, the intensifying Cold War confrontation in the late 1940s prompted the occupiers to rethink their approach. While during the initial period of occupation (1945–1947), US concerns focused on the potential resurgence of Japanese militarism, in the second phase (1948–1951), the primary concern became the Empire's vulnerability to communist influence. Japan played a key role in America's Cold War strategy towards Asia for geopolitical and economic reasons. Having military bases on an archipelago strategically located off the coast of Northeast Asia ensured control of access to the western Pacific basin and the sea lanes leading to the coasts of the two hostile continental powers, the USSR and the People's Republic of China. At the same time, Japan, as the region's only industrialized country at the time, could have been a valuable asset for any of the rival blocs. As George Kennan noted, as long as communist gains in Asia were limited to backward, agricultural economies (such as the People's Republic of China or North Korea), the Eastern Bloc's potential was not significantly strengthened.[273] However, if they had managed to conquer a country with an industrial base, an educated workforce, and relatively modern technologies, the situation would have been radically different. Given all these factors, the US authorities concluded that keeping Japan within their own camp was crucial to the success of their policy of containing communism in Asia.

For the Japanese leaders, an alliance also appeared to be an exceptionally attractive option. Their priority was ensuring national security and favorable conditions for economic reconstruction. Reintegration into the international community served both goals. They were aware that Japan was the target of deep distrust, if not outright hostility, throughout the region, a natural consequence of the events of World War II. The relative normalization of relations, sought by the Imperial government (primarily in terms of trade), was inevitably a lengthy and complex process, and any remilitarization could completely undermine it. Yoshida was well aware of Japan's value to the Americans and ruthlessly exploited this by seeking an agreement on favorable terms. The United States was to shoulder the primary burden of ensuring the archipelago's security, thus allowing the Japanese to keep military spending low. At the same time, through its alliance with the superpower and its inclusion in its network of regional alliances, Japan gained strong support on its path to integration with the new post-war international system. The complementary needs and interests

[272] R. J. Samuels, *op. cit.*, pp. 39–41; K. B. Pyle, *op. cit.*, pp. 221–238.
[273] D. Halberstam, *The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War*, New York, 2007, pp. 195–196.

of both partners quickly resulted in the signing of the Security Treaty (September 8, 1951). Its essence was Japan's commitment to host American military bases on its territory in exchange for security guarantees. It should be noted, however, that the treaty was grossly unequal. It did not contain an explicit US commitment to defend Japan in the event of aggression (however, such a guarantee could be inferred from the preamble and undoubtedly constituted part of the "spirit," if not the "letter," of the treaty). From the outset, it was clear that an important (if not the most important) task of American forces would be "maintaining international peace and security in the Far East." The treaty provisions permitted the use of American troops to quell widespread unrest and internal unrest (at the request of the Japanese government) instigated by external forces. Troops stationed on the archipelago could be sent to fight anywhere in the Far East without any consultation with the host country.[274] Furthermore, Okinawa remained under the authority of the American military administration (Japanese sovereignty over the island was not restored until 1972). The treaty also resulted in an agreement on the status of American troops in Japan, which granted foreign troops extensive privileges (primarily related to extraterritoriality). In 1960, thanks to the efforts of the government of Nobusuke Kishi, the treaty was successfully renegotiated.[275]

That year, a new Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security was signed. The basic provisions remained unchanged (although the U.S. commitment to defending Japan was worded somewhat more clearly), but the provision regarding the use of U.S. troops to suppress internal unrest was eliminated and the possibility of consultations regarding the implementation of the treaty's provisions was introduced (presumably including the participation of troops stationed on the archipelago in operations outside Japanese territory). This treaty remains in force unchanged to this day. Throughout virtually the entire Cold War, the alliance remained strong and served the interests of both partners well. The U.S. could use Japanese bases as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier," and the Japanese economy thrived under the "low-cost protection" of American military power. When analyzing the state of the partnership, it is important to remember that in every alliance, partners share two fundamental concerns: abandonment by the ally or entanglement in its conflicts.[276]

During the Cold War, the Japanese side faced little danger of abandonment. Japan was too valuable and held a privileged position in American regional strategy. The greater danger for Japan was entanglement in US-led wars. The Americans expected their ally to support operations in Korea and Vietnam and, more broadly, contribute more to regional security (as clearly articulated in the so-called Guam Doctrine announced by President Nixon in 1969). However, Japanese leaders

[274] Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan, in: Japan's International Relations, op. cit., pp. 561–562.
[275] Japan's International Relations, op. cit., pp. 148–149; Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States and Japan, in: Japan's International Relations, op. cit., pp. 563–564.
[276] N. Bisley, Securing the "Anchor of Regional Stability"? The Transformation of the US-Japan Alliance and East Asian Security, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 2008, Vol. 30, No. 1, pp. 86–87.

managed to avoid more far-reaching alliance commitments, largely by invoking Article 9 of the Constitution and the strong public opposition to all manifestations of militarism, and even to the alliance itself (as clearly demonstrated by the mass demonstrations opposing the revision of the alliance treaty in 1960). On the US side, the risk of entanglement was virtually nonexistent. Guided by the Yoshida Doctrine, Japan was unwilling to escalate any international conflict to the point of military force. Leaving also seemed unlikely. By deciding to sign alliance treaties, Japan almost entirely relied on its security (and, more broadly, its entire foreign policy) on its alliance with the United States. During the Cold War, there was virtually no other viable alternative. The demands of the alliance's critics were unrealistic. Full independence in defense policy would be extremely costly and would arouse even greater distrust and even hostility in the region, leading to isolation.

Disarmament and neutrality in the Cold War regional system also carried significant risks, given the threats posed by the USSR, North Korea, and the People's Republic of China. However, Japan's reluctance to participate in collective self-defense posed a problem for the US. As Shigeru Yoshida himself stated, "those who believe that the US-Japanese Security Treaty was designed for war are mistaken."[277] Consequently, US troops stationed in Japan could not count on extensive support from the Self-Defense Forces in the event of a crisis. Joint combat operations were essentially out of the question. Unlike other alliances (such as NATO or the alliance with the Republic of Korea), there were no effective mechanisms for operational cooperation between US and Japanese forces. There was no joint crisis planning, exercises, or coordination mechanisms. Therefore, the Self-Defense Forces' usefulness to an ally in the event of war could be limited to logistical support and the provision of bases. Understandably, this led to accusations on the American side of "cheap riding" on American security guarantees and constant calls for a more equal division of responsibilities within the alliance. However, it cannot be ignored that this imbalance was part of the original American concept of the alliance. It was intended to act as a kind of "stopper" preventing Japan from rearmament.[278] This was intended, on the one hand, to eliminate a potential threat from the Empire, and, on the other, to provide regional stability amid widespread distrust of Japan. Proof of this policy's success is the acceptance of its benefits even by the People's Republic of China, against which (among others) the alliance was originally targeted.[279]

In the 1970s and 1980s, however, a slow process of change began in Japanese security policy, leading to greater effectiveness of the Self-Defense Forces and closer cooperation with allied forces. This process was motivated by concerns about weakening American security guarantees stemming from the principles of the Nixon Doctrine and the general weakening of the US position in the 1970s.

[277] S. Yoshida, *Sekai to Nihon* [*The World and Japan*], Tokyo, 1963, p. 165, cited in: R. J. Samuels, *op. cit.*, p. 40.
[278] *Japan's International Relations*, op. cit., p. 145.
[279] K. B. Pyle, *op. cit.*, pp. 321–322.

Later, this policy was aligned with the so-called "Second Cold War" and the associated growing threat from the Soviet Union. This led to the adoption of the first National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) in 1976 and (also for the first time) Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation in 1978. These documents formed the basis for the defense strategy (defining the necessary level of defense capabilities) and military cooperation with the US. The turn of the 1970s and 1980s saw the first joint exercises between the Self-Defense Forces and their American counterparts. Another breakthrough was the decision of the government of Zenko Suzuki that the Maritime Self-Defense Force would patrol sea lanes of communication up to 1,000 nautical miles from the coast of Japan.

The most active proponent of a more proactive security policy during this period was Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone (in office from 1982 to 1987). He belonged to the revisionist wing of the LDP and, as director general of the Defense Agency (1970–1971), had previously promoted the concept of autonomous defense. As prime minister, he sought to weaken the constraints imposed on foreign and defense policy in the postwar period. Nakasone introduced a new style of strong leadership and strongly supported President Ronald Reagan's policy toward the Soviet Union. However, due to domestic political circumstances, he failed to permanently reform Japan's security policy. His achievements in this area were largely limited to bold (and controversial domestic) rhetoric. However, an exception must be made to this assessment in relation to his cabinet's push for closer industrial cooperation with the US in the field of military technologies (manifested, among other things, in the inclusion of Japan in the US missile defense program), which has clearly weakened restrictions on the export of military equipment.[280] The ultimate fundamental orientations of Japan's security policy remained constant until the very end of the Cold War. Its extraordinary economic successes contributed to the emergence of a perception of Japan as a model "superstate," better adapted to the demands of a new era in which the role of force in international relations was expected to steadily decline. It should be remembered, however, that the Empire's development as a "moratorium state" was made possible largely by the protection of US military power and the relative stability of the Cold War order in Asia.

### 3.2. Constitutional Pacifism and Article 9

When analyzing the provisions of the 1946 Constitution of Japan and drawing conclusions regarding its constitutional model and Japan's current socio-political situation, it is impossible to ignore the assumption that after World War II, this country assumed a pacifist obligation, that is, the renunciation of war. These provisions are reflected in the preamble and Article 9 of the Constitution. I would like to outline the differences between the established law and the actual

[280] *Japan's International Relations*, op. cit., pp. 152–156.

operation of this clause. When drafting the new Constitution of Japan in 1946, General McArthur advocated for the inclusion of a clause denying war and pacifism for Japan, believing it would guarantee both freedom and peaceful cooperation between Japan and other countries. The general knew that the national honor of the Japanese people was their highest value and that this very honor would prevent them from violating the established clause. Japan is currently perceived as a highly pacifist country, posing no international threat. Its constitutional renunciation of war and military force may inspire respect and admiration for abandoning one of Japan's methods of implementing foreign policy and playing a role on the international stage. It's worth noting, however, that peace is not inherent in Japan's history. At the turn of the 20th century, the country pursued an imperialist policy, planning to create an Asian Prosperity Zone under its leadership. It fought a victorious war with China, resulting in the seizure of Taiwan, while a war with Russia yielded the territorial gain of Sakhalin. In 1910, Korea was occupied. Japan's pre-World War II Asian conquests, which resulted in the creation of the puppet state of Manchukuo, are sometimes considered the beginning of that war.[281] Tokyo's participation in the war on the side of the Axis powers was a continuation of the practice of territorial conquest. The memory of these events and the awareness of the fact that the Japanese constitution,[282] including Article 9 on the renunciation of war, was created under the influence of the United States,[283] places the pacifist provision in the context of the motives for its creation at that time. The document, based on the American Constitution and developed under American leadership, was created to prevent further imperialist aspirations. In turn, then-Prime Minister Kijūrō Shidehara, in agreeing to the adoption of Article 9, was convinced that relinquishing the right to possess weapons and a military was of little consequence to the Japanese nation after the experiences of war and the atomic attack.[284] Article 9, which renounces war and military capabilities, influences Tokyo's role in international politics and its decision-making. However, as it turns out, Japan maintains its own defensive forces and even deploys them abroad. This is possible within the framework of increasingly flexible interpretational theories, as well as specifically introduced laws that legalize the actions of Japanese forces abroad. Despite the increasingly broad powers granted to the self-defense forces, their operation is not constitutionally regulated. A legal act such as a constitution is a set of principles and rules[285] that determine the functioning of the state. The

[281] C. Totman, *A History of Japan*, 2005, pp. 326–350.
[282] The Japanese Constitution was drafted on 3 November 1946 and has been in force since 3 May 1947, remaining unchanged to this day.
[283] The United States occupied Japan following the signing of its surrender, and U.S. forces guaranteed its security. To this day, American troops are stationed in Japan, and the United States remains a key ally and political partner of Tokyo. Consequently, the United States has a significant influence on Japan's domestic and foreign affairs.
[284] В. С. Несерсянц, *Философия права, норма*, Moscow, 2006, pp. 82–86.
[285] R. Dworkin, *Taking Rights Seriously*, London, 1977.

different rank of specific provisions[286] determines the different treatment of norms of a different nature. The Constitution, as a legal act, contains both mandatory norms, such as the organization of the state, which should be implemented in a single, uniform manner, as well as postulatory norms that can be implemented flexibly. This approach is at work in the application of Article 9. It reads as follows: "The Japanese people, sincerely striving for international peace based on justice and order, forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation, as well as the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. To achieve the purpose set forth in the preceding paragraph, land, sea, or air forces, or any other means capable of serving a wartime purpose, shall never be maintained. The right of the state to wage war is not recognized." From its inception, this provision has been the subject of interpretational disputes, primarily focused on the bolded sections. This stemmed from the state's inherent need to possess self-defense forces, which, strictly speaking, was prohibited. Despite the legitimate grounds for introducing the provision presented in the introduction, it turned out that there was a need to create at least limited national forces. Ensuring national security becomes the overriding interest of every state. It is impossible to ensure this when the only forces guaranteeing security are the forces of a foreign country, even if an ally, in this case the United States. It seems that the provision prohibiting the maintenance of any forces, by its very nature, assumed the impossibility of applying it completely and literally, necessitating a flexible interpretation. Given the real need for national security, a search began for a basis for establishing national defense forces. The right to have self-defense forces was derived from the provision in the UN Charter regarding the right of every state to a sense of security and self-defense.[287] An armed force was introduced, secretly known as the National Police Reserve, established in 1950 with 75,000 personnel and reorganized in 1952 as the National Security Forces, numbering 110,000. The word "secret" here has no negative connotation, but rather merely indicates the government's efforts to defy constitutional constraints. Special terminology was also used—tanks were called "special vehicles." Another step was to introduce a distinction between military potential and force potential. This distinction, created by Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, justified the possession of a limited armed force capable of self-defense but not of waging forbidden war. This interpretation still applies today, as, for example, the air force lacks bombers or air tankers,[288] effectively preventing offensive operations. The newly formed forces, later reorganized into the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in 1954, were and remain a civilian service; there is no separate court or law for its officers; they report to

[286] P. Tuleja, in: *Prawo konstytucyjne RP*, P. Sarnecki (ed.), 5th ed., Warsaw, 2004, p. 117.
[287] "Article 51 of the UN Charter: Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of any Member of the United Nations against which an armed attack occurs to individual or collective self-defence." Available at: http://www.unic.un.org.pl/dokumenty/karta_onz.php#6.9.
[288] H. Nobuaki, *The Long Road to Amending the 1947 Constitution*, *Japan Echo*, August 2005, pp. 28–32.

the prime minister, not to the minister of defense[289] or a military official. It was established that they would not be sent abroad.

Further interpretations focused on the possible meaning of the wording contained in the constitution. For example, it was concluded that since the use of force to resolve international disputes is prohibited, participation in UN peacekeeping operations cannot be prohibited, as this involves participation in peacebuilding, not waging war. This was the basis for establishing the legality of sending SDF forces abroad. This was expanded upon by the concept, advocated by Ichiro Ozawa of the Democratic Party of Japan, that Japan, as a pacifist-oriented country, can implement this postulate and contribute to world peace precisely by participating in missions to establish international order. He articulated his proposals under the slogan of a "normal" country, which called for the introduction of a new interpretation of Article 9 and for Japan to be permitted to maintain military capabilities, including for the purpose of collective self-defense. He also proposed expanding it, including the statement that Japan, as a pacifist country, would implement this postulate by actively engaging in international missions, including military ones.[290]. The first paragraph of Article 9 prohibits the use of armed forces as a "means of resolving international disputes, but the use of force by the United Nations constitutes an act of the international community aimed at restoring law and order when aggressors disrupt it, rather than a means of resolving international disputes. Therefore, the participation of the SDF in UN military operations does not constitute a violation of the Constitution."[291]

The fundamental basis for Japan's international activity after the end of World War II is Article 9 of the Constitution. The provision enshrined in the Constitution regarding the renunciation of war and the possession of military forces was intended to curb Japanese militarism. However, over time, it became a burden not only for the Empire but also for the international community. Since the early 1990s, in the name of fulfilling alliance obligations with the United States and ensuring national security in an era of evolving threats, increasingly broader frameworks for interpreting this provision have been created. Thus, we are dealing with a functioning constitutional provision that, due to its broad interpretation, is effectively a dead letter. Interpretations alone were insufficient to legitimize the SDF's operations abroad. To legitimize them, legislation was introduced to legalize them. In June 1992, the "Law on Participation in Peacekeeping Operations" was introduced, allowing SDF forces to participate in UN operations in medical operations, refugee assistance, logistical support, infrastructure reconstruction, and election supervision. Under this law, SDF forces were sent on

[289] The Ministry of Defense was established in 2006, which raised the status of the Self-Defense Forces and increased the importance of defense policy.
[290] T. U. Berger, M. M. Mochizuki, J. Tsuchiyama (eds.), *Japan in International Politics: The Foreign Policies of an Adaptive State*, 2007, p. 61.
[291] Y. Okamoto, *Japan's Response to War Overseas: How Not to Make the Same Mistake Twice*, *Gaiko Forum*, Winter 2002, pp. 10–20.

a UN mission to Cambodia. Subsequently, they also participated in missions in Mozambique, Zaire, the Golan Heights, Afghanistan, and East Timor. In May 1999, the "Law on Areas Surrounding Japan" was introduced, followed in October 2001 by the "Law on Special Anti-Terrorist Measures," and in August 2003 by the "Law on Special Aid for the Reconstruction of Iraq."

The first SDF group was dispatched on a war mission on November 9, 2001, under the Special Counter-Terrorism Measures Act, which allows for the dispatch of forces to any corner of the world, not just to areas surrounding Japan, and also in support of non-American forces. It's worth noting that the act took less than two months to draft and adopt, which is remarkably rapid, especially considering that previous acts, such as the one in 1999, were debated in parliament for nine months before being enacted.[292] The initiative and rapid pace of adoption were, as with subsequent laws, driven by US influence. All the above-mentioned acts constituted a legal establishment that there are no constitutional barriers to SDF operations in "foreign territories, waters and airspace, in places where no military operations are taking place and no such operations will take place until the operations are completed."[293] The assumption that Japanese forces could participate in operations beyond their borders, provided they concentrated their operations in an area where military operations were not underway, was encapsulated in the term "noncombat zones," introduced in May 1999. Operating in such zones ensured that the Japanese did not need to use force, allowing them to conduct operations that did not involve the use of force. This assumption is the basis for sending SDF units abroad. This creates numerous absurdities and questions that are difficult to answer rationally, even if one wishes to rely on it. What if the front reaches the area where the Japanese are stationed? Should they flee, leaving foreign soldiers without assistance? Furthermore, deprived of the ability to use force, Japanese troops must be protected by foreign forces, as was the case in Iraq, for example. For this reason, the constitutional provision also requires redefinition.

The establishment of these rights does not change the fact that, under a strict interpretation of Article 9, the SDF's actions are unconstitutional. The discrepancy between the provisions of the Basic Law and practice is significant. This stems from the gap between the needs and the possibilities of the actions permitted by the article. To explore the possibilities of change and the basis for them, the Constitution Issues Research Committee (CIRC) was established "in April 2001. Initially established to conduct a general five-year study of the Japanese Constitution, after the September 11 attacks, the Committee shifted its focus to matters related to national defense and security and accelerated its work, publishing a report in 2002."[294] The September 11 attacks triggered significant changes in the approach to the problem. "When the Committee was asked before the attack what the

[292] W. Hirotaka, What US–Europe Relations Suggest for Japan's Security Policy, Japan Echo, April 2002, pp. 23–29.
[293] The Iraq Reconstruction Assistance Special Measures Law, Art. 2(3).
[294] K. Setsuzo, View from the Economic World: Japan's Security Issues, Gaiko Forum, Winter 2003, pp. 40–52.

United States would do if attacked and unable to guarantee its security, it was considered unrealistic." After September 11, the question required serious consideration. "The Committee's general opinion is that while the revised constitution should retain pacifism, it should at the same time allow the use of force within the right of self-defense and, while also promoting international pacifism, allow participation in collective UN missions in cases where the international order is violated."[295] The majority of the Committee members favor retaining the first paragraph, but recognize the need for and support amendments to the second paragraph, allowing the SDF to participate in international missions. Such amendments would bring the Constitution into line with existing practices, as there is no indication that they will adapt to it. Political parties differ in their approach to the issue. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) favors interpreting Article 9 as prohibiting the use of force abroad, but permitting the maintenance of forces for domestic purposes and the deployment of such forces to "non-combat zones." Former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, on the 60th anniversary of the constitution in 2007, expressed his belief in the need for changes to the document to allow Japan to play a greater role in global politics and restore national pride. The Democratic Party of Japan (DPC), the main opposition force, has a divided stance. Ichiro Ozawa, who advocated for fully arming Japan to give it a voice in international affairs, came from its ranks. However, the DPJ includes many former socialists who oppose the revision. In turn, members of the defunct Japanese Socialist Party, some of whom are now active in Mizuho Fukushima's Socialist Party, despite their waning radicalism, support full compliance with the article and thus the demilitarization of the country, just like the PSJ. This sentiment has remained unchanged for years; conservatives still consider Article 9 a limitation on foreign policy, while progressives consider it a fundamental determinant and guiding principle.

Despite the internal need to have at least limited self-defense forces, Japan's decisions regarding its own military capabilities were motivated by the recommendations of the United States – "the government allowed itself to creatively interpret Article 9 of the Constitution in order to fulfill its alliance obligations."[296] When the Constitution was drafted, the Americans aimed to disarm Japan, so that any new imperialist ambitions would be deprived of the tools to implement. They did not anticipate that just three years later, they would be calling for a minimal rearmament. The Communist Party's victory in China and the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949 meant that the United States lost an ally in the war against communism in Asia. Furthermore, the Korean War broke out in 1950, prompting the withdrawal of most American forces from Japan and transfer to the front. Japan was thus left without an army to guarantee its security amidst the spread of communism, which, in the era of the emerging Cold War, posed a real and powerful threat to the

295 N. Osamu, Bringing Article 9 into the Twenty-First Century, Japan Echo, August 2005, pp. 32–37.
296 H. Nobuaki, The Long Road..., op. cit.

democratic world. Consequently, the aforementioned National Police Reserve was established under MacArthur's orders to prevent an unarmed Japan from becoming prey to the communists and to prevent them from feeling too comfortable facing a neighbor unable to defend or attack. In addition to commitments to America, obligations to the UN were an external factor indicating the need to develop its own military capabilities and a legal framework for sending them abroad. In 1957, then-Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi declared "UN-based diplomacy" as one of the three pillars of Japanese foreign policy. The refusal to send SDF forces to Lebanon for arms control purposes, a request made by then-UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold in 1958, contradicted this premise. The term "force capabilities" is deliberate here, to avoid the introduction of the term "military/war capabilities," as this distinction is the basis for interpretation explaining the constitutionality of the self-defense forces, as discussed earlier.

The Gulf War was a turning point in the perception of Article 9 and its role in the implementation of foreign policy. Criticism from the United States demonstrated that "checkbook politics" was not considered a sufficient contribution to the activities of international missions. It indicated that Article 9 could not be an acceptable cover for non-participation in supranational efforts to establish order in conflict areas and that for the harmonious functioning of the alliance with America, there was a need to redefine the meaning of the article and the national approach to maintaining and sending armed forces abroad. Was Japan interested in participating in the Gulf mission, and was Article 9 not a convenient and justified excuse for military inaction, due to its constitutional origins?[297] Or perhaps "Japan could have accomplished a great job, operating within the framework of existing laws, if only the political decision-making instrument had operated more efficiently and been more resolute."[298] Probably so, but at the outbreak of the Gulf War, Japan may not have been aware of the contribution that the United States expected from it, especially since it had itself introduced a ban on having armed forces. However, the financial contribution was deemed unsatisfactory, leading to Japan's omission from Kuwait's list of thanks to countries contributing to the end of the conflict. The purpose of these calls and the reality of the need for Japanese troops may raise questions, as even if they were sent, their numbers would be limited due to the small size of the SDF, and they would not have played a significant role. However, this is not the place to discuss the American motives for pressuring Tokyo. However, as the Japanese side points out, the list of equipment needed on the desert battlefield, prepared by SDF commanders, was lengthy, including tents, vehicles, heat protection equipment, and other items[299] – such contributions were not acknowledged. Although many politicians and the public believed that Japan should play this role, it turned out that this role

[297] J. M. Green, Japan's Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power, New York, p. 12.
[298] Y. Okamoto, Japan's Response..., op. cit., p. 16.
[299] *Ibidem*.

required redefinition and that steps had to be taken to adapt to new conditions. Japan's need to find its footing and be able to respond to new challenges also required taking action to address the issues limiting its military—and therefore, essentially, political—engagement, a need that took precedence over choosing the direction of these changes.

The first and fundamental problem is the regulation itself, its variability and arbitrariness in interpretation. There is a need for a single, binding interpretation, regardless of its direction, and such a solution currently does not exist. Such a regulation would make Japanese foreign policy more decisive in responding to conflicts and crises worldwide, and decisions in this area would be made more quickly, as debate over the legality of planned actions would no longer be required. Given the lack of a unified understanding of the meaning of the terms contained in the article, the broad interpretation possibilities described above exist. This situation seems convenient for a country that does not aspire to play a significant role in international politics. Countries with ambitions to be present on the political scene and have a significant voice in global affairs engage in world politics, among other things, through military missions. Until the 1990s, Japan was a significant player thanks to its powerful economy. Furthermore, the presence of US troops, which guaranteed its security, meant that it had no need to maintain larger military forces or send them abroad. It can be argued that the main driver of the changes in the interpretation of the article was the need to find a basis for adapting to the requirements set by the US. Japan itself did not aim to create military forces nor had any aspirations to send them abroad. The aforementioned criticism of the United States regarding its lack of involvement in the Gulf War was the first evidence indicating that Article 9 requires a new interpretation, and that its foreign policy regarding sending its own forces on supranational missions requires redefinition. This was still an external factor, highlighting the need for change. A redefinition of Article 9 of the constitution is necessary "if Japan aspires to become a significant player, and to achieve this in the 21st century, it will be necessary to participate in peacekeeping operations in other regions of the world. The position of the yen, whether it will remain a strong currency, is also determined by Japan's political position, including participation in such missions. Japan's ability to maintain prosperity without developing international cooperation is also in question."[300]

The 1990s brought changes in this area. Growing nationalist sentiment, China's military spending, and the increasingly unpredictable policies of the People's Republic of Korea were a significant factor. The economic crisis of the 1990s meant that Japan's weakening economic position alone was no longer sufficient to achieve the status of a significant state. It is difficult to determine whether Japan aspires to play a significant role as an international player. Considering its

[300] N. Nobuo, *Japan in the World of Rival Empires*, *Japan Echo*, June 1999, Vol. 26, pp. 9–12.

efforts to secure a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, it seems to value such status. Because it has virtually no allies in the region due to historical circumstances, it is forced to seek partners in other forums to function on the political scene. Although financial commitment to international missions is highly essential, military equipment lacks visible "from Japan" markings and is therefore insufficient for a significant international voice. The Japanese are aware of the importance of participating in supranational missions. The comments regarding the dispatch of five ships, including two tankers and three defense vessels, to the Indian Ocean[301] express pride in the country's involvement in an international mission. They also reflect the belief that, in connection with this assistance, Japan has the right to express opinions and have a say in the mission and the future of Afghanistan.[302] The SDF operated in "non-combat zones" there, and therefore did not participate in military operations. Perhaps deploying Japanese forces beyond the country's borders under such conditions represents a middle ground when it comes to the application of Article 9. On the one hand, it allows Japan to participate in missions, which gives it political weight, and on the other, it helps meet US requirements while ensuring the ability to function within the constitutional framework, albeit broad. As evidenced by the SDF's involvement in missions abroad, sufficiently flexible interpretations have been developed to allow the provision on renunciation of war and military capability to be considered consistent with it. There is also a belief that, when it comes to the SDF, "given its past establishment and public acceptance, everyone should agree that the meaning of Article 9 has changed. Article 9 should not be treated as a legal provision to be interpreted strictly, but as a political guideline emphasizing Japan's pursuit of peace."[303]

Japanese nationalists have no doubts about the importance of military capabilities. They lean toward a realist theory of international relations, emphasizing that each state takes care of itself, hence the need for Tokyo's independence from Washington. They desire Japan to have a heard voice in global affairs. In a period of "return to the beginning, a country that strives solely to specialize in economic affairs while neglecting other, more crucial elements is doomed to lose its voice and presence in international relations."[304] Furthermore, there are so many different interest groups that not all threats are perceived as such by all states, and they respond to international crises based on their own national interests. Therefore, they believe, Japan must rely on itself.

What's worth noting regarding the interpretations being introduced is Japan's pacifist roots, not only in its own but also in international consciousness, as well as the significance and role of public sentiment regarding this fact. Sudden changes among citizens could spark dissatisfaction and even

[301] Y. Okamoto, Across to the Indian Ocean: Japanese Aid to Afghanistan, Gaiko Forum, Vol. 2, No. 3, Fall 2002, pp. 13–21.
[302] Ibidem, p. 42.
[303] N. Osamu, Bringing Article 9 into the Twenty-First Century, Japan Echo, August 2005, p. 32.
[304] Ibidem, p. 50.

opposition to the country's changing image, which is why public dialogue and gradual reforms are crucial. A certain redefinition is needed, perhaps a shift in the mentality, and certainly in the beliefs of the Japanese people. This is neither an easy nor a short-term task. The Japanese are deeply ingrained in the provision, and it would be difficult for them to agree to a change unless it were a result of cultural and ideological transformations. At the time of the American appeal for assistance in 1991, society was not yet ready to provide it. The pacifist provision and citizens' unaccustomedness to the idea of their country participating in international military actions were factors politicians had to consider. This situation implies the perception of potential casualties of military actions on the Japanese side: "The Japanese are more sensitive to the lives of their citizens than other nations. The death of a single Japanese overseas is guaranteed to make headlines. Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa was prepared to resign following the murder of a member of the Cambodian Civil Police in 1993. For Japanese politicians, protecting the lives of citizens comes first, even if it means criticizing other countries."[305] Japanese involvement in transnational activities is illustrated by the example of housing estates, where residents are required to maintain their cleanliness. A Japanese family living in such an estate would acknowledge the residents' work, but would not engage themselves. Therefore, to get involved, they would offer to cover the cost of washing dirty clothes. The family's attitude can be summed up in the words: "If you want to criticize us, do so."[306] While the text dates back to 2002, changes in mentality occur over time, despite greater support for constitutional amendments, so this can be considered a current trend in the perception of the country's involvement in missions abroad. This approach may explain Japan's financial support for the Gulf conflict. However, polls from 2005 indicate a positive attitude among Japanese people toward potential constitutional amendments. A Yomiuri Shimbun opinion poll found that 60.8% of respondents favored constitutional amendments, with 51.2% citing "new circumstances that cannot be dealt with under the current constitution, such as Japan's international obligations," and 33.9% believing that "dealing with problems by interpreting and applying the current constitution on an ad hoc basis creates problems." The Nihon Keizai Shimbun reported that 54% of respondents favored constitutional amendments, with the main reasons being "the need to incorporate new thinking" and the fact that "some sections of the constitution are out of touch with reality." An NHK-Japan Broadcasting Corporation poll found that 48% of respondents favored constitutional amendments, while only 16% saw no need. Of those who supported the changes, 79% cited the fact that "times have changed, and there are issues that cannot be dealt with within the current constitution," while 12% said "revision is necessary to enable Japan to play its role in the

[305] Y. Okamoto, *Japan's Response...*, op. cit.
[306] *Ibidem*.

international community."[307] A 2006 Mainichi Shimbun poll, based on a telephone interview of 1,115 people, found that 62% of respondents believed Japan should stick to the first paragraph of the article, which renounces war. Twenty-one percent believed the second paragraph, which denies the possibility of having armed forces, should be changed. Twenty-seven percent opposed any change.[308] It is clear that society recognizes the need for change, although it is not a majority. A visible trend, however, is a generational shift in the approach to amending the Constitution. Successive younger generations, for whom the horrors of the war and Japan's role in it are increasingly distant, advocate for granting their state the rights of any sovereign nation. Given the tasks assigned to the modern state by the international community, it seems justified to apply an interpretation that allows for the undertaking of tasks in this regard. This is possible thanks to the increasingly frequent use of expansive interpretation and the introduction of detailed regulations that adapt the provisions of the Constitution to current tasks and needs. Article 9, as it exists today, departs far from its precise meaning. In order to ensure a sense of national security, fulfill allied obligations to the United States, and ultimately, to play a role on the international political stage, increasingly broader frameworks for its interpretation have been created.

Although the provision remains unchanged, it cannot be said to be functioning. However, it seems normal for the law to adapt to significantly changing conditions, especially since this process was initiated by the United States, the country that created the Japanese constitution. Tokyo cannot be accused of creating new meanings for the provision solely for its own internal needs. The SDF's participation in international missions, limited solely to "noncombat zones," seems to be a solution tailored to needs and opportunities. It leaves a minimal, albeit minimal, connection to the constitution. The SDF's consent to participate in military operations seems impossible to justify on the basis of the Constitution, but given its existing capacity for constructing meaning, it cannot be assumed that such a procedure is unrealistic. It is difficult to predict whether the constitution will be amended. It is clear that society recognizes the need for change, but it is not a majority. Politicians must take public opinion into account, so they will likely not abandon the provision. It is risky to speculate on the consequences they would have for history.

In conclusion, we can state that the war renunciation clause, despite many political opponents calling for its revision, remains valid. Proponents of amending this clause argue that it is inappropriate for Japan's current geopolitical situation. Threats from international terrorism and the arms race fueled by countries like China and North Korea are forcing the Land of the Rising Sun to reassess its stance and presenting new challenges in terms of national defense.

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[307] N. Osamu, *Bringing Article 9...*, op. cit.

[308] http://www.forbes.com/finance/feeds/afx/2006/03/05/afx2570983.html.

### 3.3. Establishment of the Japan Self-Defense Forces

The Japan Self-Defense Forces were established on July 1, 1954, following the end of the American occupation of the country after World War II. In 2017, the armed forces ranked fifth among the world's most powerful forces. Despite their relatively small size, they possess state-of-the-art combat equipment. The lack of a clear definition of defense has led to an open debate on Article 9 for many years. The issue has resurfaced due to terrorist attacks. The ruling circles within the LDP are calling for stricter defense-related regulations, including a revision of the Constitution. Due to the change in government positions, Japan is increasingly deploying its Self-Defense Forces to assist in military operations around the world, organizing supplies, medical assistance, and so on. After the war, Japan's constitution recognized world peace as a fundamental national asset, which is why it decided not to maintain an armed force within its borders and renounced the right to self-defense.[309]

Following Hashimoto's administration, Junichiro Koizumi became prime minister, advocating for decisive structural reforms. His key priorities included overhauling the banking system, reducing state bureaucracy, withdrawing support for unprofitable sectors of the economy, combating corruption, and introducing elements of competition into political life. In 2001, he secured parliamentary passage of a law authorizing the Self-Defense Forces to participate in peacekeeping operations abroad, and two years later, he allocated 200 billion yen for the construction of an anti-missile defense system. 2003 proved to be a turning point, as the Liberal Democratic Party won 237 seats in the House of Representatives out of a possible 480,[310] and parliament passed several laws crucial to the political system, including authorizing the Self-Defense Forces to defend themselves in the event of an attack on Japan and to participate in military operations abroad.

Beginning in 1950, Japan's pacifist nature was questioned, as evidenced by the creation of the National Police Reserve, which was later transformed into the National Self-Defense Force. In 1954, it was renamed the Self-Defense Force, a name resonating with the United States, as Japan had become its ally in the Cold War. Currently, US troops are deployed on Japanese territory to maintain peace and deter any potential aggressor. This stems from an agreement signed between Japan and the United States and is intended to provide a safeguard against breaches of peace by China or North Korea.

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[309] See more: *The Constitution of Japan*, trans. T. Suzuki, P. Winczorek, Wrocław 1990, pp. 20–24; Y. Noda, *Introduction au droit japonais*, Paris 1966, p. 208 ff.

[310] *Japonia – 2003 rokiem przełomu w polityce wewnętrznej i zagranicznej*, in: *Rocznik Strategiczny 2003*, Warsaw, 2004, pp. 326–328.

However, it is impossible to conclude that the Self-Defense Forces are armed forces maintained by Japan in defiance of the Constitutional provision. This situation perfectly illustrates the two attitudes prevalent in Japanese culture: *honne* and *tatemae*. Furthermore, in 2016, Japan ranked seventh in terms of weaponry according to the Global Firepower ranking, yet, according to its constitution, the country has committed itself not to have its own army. In 2014, Prime Minister Abe announced the initiation of a constitutional review process. It appears that his policy in this regard is currently being slowly but effectively implemented. We can see that the pacifist nature of post-war Japan has become quite firmly entrenched in the Japanese mindset, perhaps a result of the centuries-old respect they have for their ancestors. However, the current arms race presents Japan with new challenges in ensuring the security of its country. The Land of the Rising Sun cannot rely solely on the US for protection, as Americans must face their own problems and the many challenges facing the country. Analyzing the establishment of the Self-Defense Forces, one can conclude that it was not consistent with the spirit of the clause contained in the preamble to the 1946 Showa Constitution, nor with Article 9 itself. From the very beginning after the adoption of the new Constitution, the Japanese government has attempted to skillfully navigate between the adopted clause and the actions taken in this area. However, it must be acknowledged that in the current geopolitical situation, ensuring adequate state protection without a military of its own is no simple task, and currently, the Self-Defense Forces in Japan are its full-fledged equivalent.

In 2014, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who seeks to strengthen Japan's position in the Asia-Pacific region, pushed through changes to the interpretation of the constitution's military provisions. He wants the Japan Self-Defense Forces to have the right to participate in "collective self-defense." As a result of adopting a policy of "reverse pacifism," the ban on arms exports has been lifted, and the Japanese arms industry has taken steps to sell its products abroad.[311] The policy pursued in conjunction with its American ally has a chance of success in the game against Chinese influence and North Korea, which is gradually expanding its nuclear capabilities. As a result of these actions, the Upper House of Parliament passed a law in 2015 expanding the role of the Japan Self-Defense Forces, authorizing—for the first time since the end of World War II—the use of these forces abroad in defense of allies. Under the new interpretation of the constitution, the Japan Self-Defense Forces are permitted to participate in "collective self-defense," meaning they can be sent abroad to assist, for example, American allies, even if Japan is not directly attacked. Japan has been a member of the UN since 1956, and since 1975, a member of the seven most influential countries in the world, the G7, and of countries seeking permanent membership in the UN Security Council, the G4. In 1960, it signed a defense cooperation treaty with the United States, which obliges the United States to

[311] J. Tubielewicz, *Historia Japonii*, Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków 1984.

assist Japan in the event of an attack in exchange for American troops using military bases on the Japanese islands.[312] After the end of World War II, not all territorial issues were resolved in Japan's favor. To this day, Japan remains involved in territorial disputes with Russia over three islands and one small archipelago constituting the southern part of the Kuril Islands; with South Korea over a group of islands in the Sea of Japan consisting of approximately 90 islets and reefs, known as Dokdo, which were occupied by South Korea in 1952; and with China and Taiwan over the Senkaku Islands, a group of small, uninhabited islets located in the East China Sea, approximately 170 km east of Taiwan and 160 km north of the southwestern part of the Ryukyu Islands.

Analyzing the political situation in the region, North Korea has remained the most important direct threat to Japan for years, as it continues to expand its delivery systems and nuclear capabilities. The dispute between Japan and China over the Senkaku Islands is also escalating. China's decision to expand its air defense identification zone in the East China Sea has also been met with strong criticism from Japan. Unresolved disputes with South Korea over the Takeshima Islands (Korean Dokdo) and unresolved World War II issues concerning the Japanese military's use of Korean women are also detrimental to good neighborly relations.

The Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSS) were established following the end of the American occupation of the country after World War II, on July 1, 1954, from the National Reserve Police and the National Security Force. Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution states that "The Japanese people, sincerely pursuing international peace based on justice and order, forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation, as well as the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. In order to achieve the purpose stated in the preceding paragraph, land, sea, or air forces, or other warlike assets, shall never be maintained. The right of a state to wage war is not recognized."[313] Although legally speaking, these forces are not military units and all service members are formally civilians, with legal matters adjudicated by a regular civilian court, the Japan Self-Defense Forces are on par with the world's leading armies in terms of equipment and training. In 2015, they were ranked ninth among the world's most powerful armed forces. The JSS has approximately 250,000 personnel, plus 58,000 in reserve. The Japan Self-Defense Forces consist of:

– Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF),

– Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF),

– Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF).

The military potential of the Japan Self-Defense Forces includes:

[312] Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America of January 19, 1960, https://pl.wikisource.org/wiki/Traktat_o_wzajemnej_wsp%C3%B3%C5%82pracy_i_bezpiecze%C5%84stwie_pomi%C4%99dzy_Japoni%C4%85_a_Stanami_Zjednoczonymi_Ameryki_z_19_stycznia_1960 (accessed April 22, 2017).

[313] Constitution of Japan of November 3, 1946, http://www.pl.emb-japan.go.jp/relations/konstytucja.htm (accessed April 24, 2017).

– 250,000 armed forces personnel,

– 57,900 reserve forces personnel,

– 700 tanks,

– 2,850 armored vehicles,

– 702 artillery pieces,

– 659 general-purpose helicopters,

– 119 attack helicopters,

– 1,594 aircraft, including 575 attack aircraft,

– 131 ships and auxiliary units.[314]

The Japanese government is headed by the Prime Minister, who is appointed by the Emperor after being appointed by Parliament. After receiving a vote of confidence in the House of Representatives, he assumes office. As Chief Cabinet Secretary, he appoints and dismisses state ministers. The Prime Minister holds the greatest authority in defense matters and directs the military operations and activities of the Japanese Armed Forces. He chairs the Security Council of Japan, the highest security body. Depending on the role he plays in defense, the Council is composed of a certain number of members. For example, if the Council is to develop guidelines for the country's foreign affairs and security policy, the Prime Minister meets with the Minister of Defense, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Finance, and the Secretary of the Council. Furthermore, the Prime Minister may invite a special advisor for national security to the Council at any time. The Secretariat of the Council is the body that plans and coordinates key matters concerning foreign and security policy. The Council is the legislative body, while the Prime Minister, together with Parliament, is the executive body. The following persons report directly to the Minister of Defense: the Chief of Staff of the Air Self-Defense Force, the Chief of Staff of the Maritime Self-Defense Force, the Chief of Staff of the Ground Self-Defense Force, and the Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff of the Self-Defense Forces.[315]

The Maritime Self-Defense Force was established after World War II following the dissolution of the Imperial Japanese Naval Force, which operated from 1868 to 1945. It should be noted that by 1920, the Imperial Japanese Naval Force was the third largest force after the navies of Great Britain and the United States. These forces were reinforced by naval aviation stationed on aircraft carriers, which conducted air strikes against selected targets. During World War II, Japanese forces were the main adversary of the Western Allies and the United States naval forces in the Pacific. Following the dissolution of the Imperial Japanese Navy after Japan's defeat in the war, some of the disbanded forces were disarmed, some were transferred to the Allies as war reparations, some were used to

[314] http://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=japan (accessed April 24, 2017).
[315] *Defense of Japan 2015*, Ministry of Defense, Tokyo 2015.

transport Japanese troops from overseas back to Japan, while the minesweeping forces were employed to clear the waters around Japan of wartime remnants, including bombs and other explosive devices.

In 1952, the Maritime Self-Defense Force was established as the Coastal Security Force, whose primary mission was to provide support to American ships during the Korean War. Initially, the vessels were unarmed, as the Yoshida Doctrine stipulated that Japan's security should be handled by US troops.[316] The Japan Self-Defense Forces were established as part of the Japan Self-Defense Forces in 1954, when they were established as an independent branch of the armed forces under the Self-Defense Forces Act. That same year, the Japan Self-Defense Forces received the first American Tacoma-class frigates, two Gleaves-class destroyers, and two Cannon-class destroyer escorts. However, by 1956, Japanese shipyards had begun building their own ships. The first two destroyers, built in Japan after the end of World War II, were named Harukaze and Yukikaze. In 1960, the Oyashio-class submarines entered service.

In the following years, despite limitations in the development and possession of offensive weapons, the Navy underwent numerous transformations, effectively becoming the second largest naval power in the Pacific Basin (after the United States). Japan's Navy fleets outnumber both the Russian Pacific Fleet (excluding nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines) and the People's Republic of China's naval forces in terms of quantity and quality. Currently, the Navy's fleet consists of American- and Japanese-made ships. Despite their pacifist constitution, the Japanese possess aircraft carriers and large, universal landing ships (dock ships) that could carry offensive weapons in the future. The two Izumo aircraft carriers, equipped with seven SH-60K and seven MCH-101 helicopters, are a symbol of the changes taking place in Japanese policy. The MSS commander-in-chief is the MSS Chief of Staff, who oversees the Maritime Self-Defense Force, District Commands (Ominato, Yokosuka, Kure, Sasebo, Maizuru), Air Force Training Command, Supply Command, Communications Command, Training Squadron, and other units. The Maritime Self-Defense Force commander is responsible for the following units: the Escort Fleet, Naval Air Force, Submarine Force, Mine Warfare Force, Naval Force Reconnaissance Command, Oceanographic Command, and Naval Force Research and Development Command. The Escort Fleet commanders are responsible for the following units: four escort flotillas (two squadrons each), five escort squadrons, the 1st Landing Ship Squadron, the 1st Supply Squadron, and the 1st Drone Squadron. The Commander of the Naval Air Forces is responsible for: 7 naval air wings, the 51st Mine Countermeasures

[316] Sz. Niedziela, Japońska polityka bezpieczeństwa i obrony wobec wyzwań doby pozimnowojennej, *Zeszyty Naukowe Wyższej Szkoły Oficerskiej Wojsk Lądowych* 2014, nr 3 (173).

Research Squadron, the 61st Mine Countermeasures Transport Squadron and the 111th Mine Countermeasures Helicopter Squadron.

Submarine Force Commanders are responsible for: two submarine flotillas (OOP), the 1st OOP Training Squadron, and the OOP Training Center. Mine Warfare Force Commanders are responsible for four minesweeper squadrons and the Mine Warfare Support Center. A key link is the Naval Forces Reconnaissance Command, which oversees the Operational Reconnaissance Center, the Tactical Reconnaissance Center, and the Electronic Reconnaissance Center. The main naval bases are: Yokosuka, Kure, Sasebo, Maizuru, and Ominato, while the main air bases are: Ayase, Hachinohe, Iwakuni, Kanoya, Komatsujima, Naha, Ozuki, Oominato, Omura, Shimofusa, Minami-Torishima, Tokushima, Ioujima, and Maizuru. At the end of 2016, the Maritime Self-Defense Force had 45,376 military personnel and 2,993 civilian personnel. Since December 2016, Admiral Yutaka Murakawa has been acting Chief of Staff of the Maritime Self-Defense Force, replacing Admiral Tomohise Takei, who was retiring to the reserve. The organizational structure of the Maritime Self-Defense Force is very similar to that of the Air Force. Currently, the Maritime Self-Defense Force comprises:[317]

– 20 submarines (8 Souryu-class, 11 Oyashio-class, 1 Harushio-class). The Souryu-class and Oyashio-class submarines are classic submarines with a surface displacement of approximately 3,000 tons and are armed with six 533 mm torpedo tubes. The tubes can launch Type 89 torpedoes with a range of 50 km and Type 80 torpedoes, as well as Sub Harpoon anti-surface missiles with a range of 130 km. The submarines are armed with 20 torpedoes and missiles each. The Oyashio-class submarines entered service between 1998 and 2008. The Souryu-class submarines entered service in 2009. Three more ships of this class are under construction and will enter service between 2018 and 2020.

– Four helicopter carriers (two Hyuga-class, two Izumo-class). The Hyuga-class helicopter carriers entered service between 2009 and 2011. They have a full displacement of 18,289 tons, a length of 197 meters, and a beam of 33 meters. They are armed with 1x16 Lockheed Martin Marietta Mk 41 Mod 5 anti-ship missiles, the Sea Sparrow RIM-162 and ASROC systems, as well as 2x20 Vulcan Phalanx Block 1B artillery systems and 6x324 mm torpedo launchers. They can carry 10 SH60 helicopters or 7 MCH-101 helicopters. The Izumo-class helicopter carriers have a full displacement of 24,000 tons. tons, 248 meters long, 38 meters wide, and 7.3 meters draft. They are armed with two Sea RAM RIM-116 missile launchers and 2x20 mm Vulcan Phalanx short-range artillery. They can carry seven SH-60K helicopters and seven MCH-101 helicopters. These are the largest ships in

[317] S. Saunders, *IHS Jane's Fighting Ships 2016–2017: Yearbook*, 119th edition, London 2015.

the MSS, entering service in 2015–2016. The design and size of the ships allow for the future deployment of F35-class aircraft.

– 38 destroyers (two Atago-class, four Kongou-class, four Akizuki-class, two Hatakaze-class, three Hatsuyuki-class, five Takanami-class, eight Asagiri-class, nine Murasame-class, and one Shirane-class). The Maritime Self-Defense Force's main force consists of six destroyers equipped with the American Aegis system (two Atago-class and four Kongou-class), which are capable of countering almost all types of air attack weapons. They are part of the anti-missile defense system. The Atago-class destroyers entered service in 2007–2008. They have a full displacement of 10,160 tons, a length of 164.9 meters, a beam of 21 meters, and a draft of 6.2 meters. They are armed with eight Type 90 SSM-1B anti-ship missiles, 1x64 MK41 anti-aircraft missiles, 1x32 MK41 ASROC anti-submarine missiles, 1x127 mm MK45 gun, 2x6 20 mm Vulcan Phalanx artillery systems, and 2x3 324 mm HOS-302 torpedo launchers. The ship is equipped with an SH-60 J/K helicopter.

During the Cold War, the Maritime Self-Defense Force played a minor role in the region. This changed with the collapse of the USSR, the increased political and military activity of the People's Republic of China, and the unpredictable policies of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Currently, the Maritime Self-Defense Force has intensified its operations and begun actively cooperating for world peace. As early as 1991, Japanese mine countermeasures forces were conducting mine searches and clearing shipping lanes in the Persian Gulf. Two years later, Japanese ships participated in a mission to Cambodia as part of the UN peacekeeping effort. Furthermore, from 2001 to 2008, the Maritime Self-Defense Force participated in peacekeeping missions in the Indian Ocean. Their mission was to control shipping lanes and prevent the transport of illegal weapons, ammunition, and drugs. Additionally, they participated in anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia.

### 3.3.1. Japanese Border Guard – role, tasks and equipment

As mentioned, Japan is an island nation located on a 33,000-kilometer-long chain of islands off the eastern coast of Asia. The four main Japanese islands: Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, and Shikoku, form an arc 2,990 kilometers long, while the Ryukyu Islands form another 1,200 kilometers long arc. The archipelago stretches almost meridionally and is surrounded by the Sea of Okhotsk to the north, the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea to the west, and the Pacific Ocean to the south and east. Japan's coastline is very well developed, and together with numerous islands and peninsulas, it reaches a length of 29,751 kilometers. Its territorial waters cover 12 nautical miles, excluding the Korea Strait, where they cover 3 nautical miles. The area of its territorial waters, including internal waters, is 430,000 square kilometers. The exclusive economic zone (EEZ) extends beyond the territorial sea to 200 nautical miles (370 km). Its area is 4.05 million km², and including

territorial waters, 4.47 million km². Based on the 1986 US-Japan SAR Agreement, Japan's area of responsibility for rescue and relief operations extends from latitude 17° North to meridian 165° East.[318] The area of responsibility is divided into 11 regions, each housing regional commands and agencies. For example, the first region is Hokkaido, and the eleventh is the Ryukyu Islands. Regional commands are located in the following cities: 1) Oraru, 2) Shiogama, 3) Yokohama, 4) Nagoya, 5) Kobe, 6) Hiroshima, 7) Kitakyushu, 8) Maizuru, 9) Niigata, 10) Kagoshima, and 11) Naha. Their primary responsibilities are protection and rescue. In 2016, the Border Guard consisted of 13,422 officers, including 2,630 officers.

**The Japan Coast Guard** was established on May 1, 1848. Its primary responsibilities include maintaining order in surrounding waters, rescue, protecting the marine environment from pollution and enforcing obedience, safeguarding shipping lanes, and cooperating with other maritime agencies. The Coast Guard Headquarters is located in Tokyo, the Coast Guard School is located in Maizuru, and the Academy is located in Kure. In 2016, the Border Guard's equipment included:

– 14 large patrol ships (PLH) with onboard helicopters (2 Shikishima-class, 2 Mizuho-class, 10 Souya-class);

– 54 large patrol ships (PL/PSO) with a deck adapted for helicopter landing (3 Aso-class, 1 Izu-class, 1 Mira-class, 3 Hida-class, 1 Nojima-class, 1 Kojima-class, 7 Shiretoko-class, 7 Ojika-class, 9 Hateruma-class, 2 Kunigami-class, 6 Iwami-class, 13 Taketomi-class);

– 38 medium patrol ships (PM/PBO) (2 Takatori-class, 12 Teshio-class, 4 Amami-class, 20 Tokara-class);

– 27 small patrol vessels (PS/PBF) (2 Takatsuki-class, 19 Mihashi and Raizan-class, 6 Tsurugi-class);

– 239 coastal patrol and rescue boats;

– 42 surveillance patrol vessels;

– 13 hydrographic survey vessels and cutters;

– 4 navigation cutters;

– 6 supply cutters;

– 3 environmental protection cutters.[319]

The Border Guard also includes aviation units. The main patrol aircraft are:

– 9 Beech Super King Air 350 aircraft, with a range of 2,703 km;

– 2 Gulfstream Aerospace G-V aircraft, with a range of 12,040 km;

– 2 Dassault Falcon 900 aircraft, with a range of 7,722 km;

– 4 SAAB 340B aircraft, with a range of 1,056 km;

[318] Japan Coast Guard, http://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/e/english.pdf (accessed May 1, 2017).
[319] S. Saunders, *IHS Jane's Fighting Ships.*

– 9 Bombardier DHC-88-315 aircraft, with a range of 3,020 km.

The main helicopter types include:

– 3 Aerospatiale AS 332L1 Super Puma helicopters, with a range of 926 km;

– 6/5 Bell 212/412 helicopters, with a range of 763 km;

– 3 Sikorsky S-76C, with a range of 1,125 km;

– 3 Bell 206B Jet Rangers, with a range of 682 km;

– 5 Eurocopter EC225s, with a range of 926 km;

– 18 Augusta Westland AW139s, with a range of 568 km.

**The Border Guard** is a uniformed and armed force dedicated to protecting the state border, controlling border traffic, and countering illegal crime. It operates ships and patrol boats, as well as land-based patrol aircraft and helicopters. Its primary tasks include: protecting the state border; controlling border traffic; preventing and countering illegal crime; identifying, analyzing, and combating threats; detecting crimes and offenses and prosecuting perpetrators within territorial waters and the European Economic Area (EEZ); conducting maritime rescue; monitoring and protecting the marine environment; ensuring the security of international communications in surrounding waters; conducting security checks; cooperating with other bodies and services to identify and counter terrorist threats; overseeing the exploitation of maritime areas; and protecting the state border.

The current situation in Southeast Asia is unstable. Aggressive actions by the People's Republic of China, North Korea, and Russia are considered the greatest threat to Japan's sovereignty. Among these countries, however, the most serious threat to the region is China, which pursues a highly militaristic policy, continuing to claim the Senkaku Islands and seeking to impose its dominance on neighboring countries. China's growing military power, its shift in interest toward the Pacific, and its assertive policy regarding disputed maritime territories are causing significant concern and impatience among Japanese policymakers, necessitating the need for Japan to secure its position in the southeast. Threats to Japan, which remains in a territorial dispute with China over the Senkaku Islands, include Chinese ballistic missiles armed with nuclear or conventional warheads, as well as cruise missiles that cover the entire Japanese territory. Besides China, the unpredictable North Korea poses a military threat to Japan. It possesses sufficient forces and resources, including ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads, to strike the entire territory of Japan. The Russian Federation, which claims the Kuril Islands, also remains a threat to Japan. Like the aforementioned China and North Korea, Russia possesses nuclear forces and assets that could pose a threat to Japan should a conflict break out. Although the Russian Navy is preoccupied with military operations in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean and currently displays no major ambitions in East Asia, it remains a significant threat should the political and military situation in the region deteriorate.

Changes in the region have influenced the deployment of the Japan Self-Defense Forces and its armament policy. Modern armaments programs are having a significant impact on rebuilding the country's military power in Asia. Japan continues to modernize and improve its armed forces, investing in highly respected naval forces, as well as an air force equipped with state-of-the-art fifth-generation fighter aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles. The primary goal is to expand its ability to repel an attack on the Japanese mainland, strengthen its missile defense system, and protect Japan's waters and airspace. The vulnerability of the maritime supply routes for the raw materials Japan needs to maintain its economic prosperity is a major concern among Japanese politicians. Most of Japan's energy imports pass through the Strait of Malacca, where acts of piracy occur. Aiming to enhance security along its supply lines, Japan is modernizing its Maritime Self-Defense Force and expanding its role in remote areas. Under its new powers, the Self-Defense Forces sent its newest helicopter carrier, the Izumo, on its first allied forces protection operation, which will be tasked with protecting, assisting and strengthening the operations of American units deployed near the Korean Peninsula.

### 3.4. Japanese-American relations

Cooperation between the United States and Japan is based on a global strategic partnership, anchored by shared security interests in the Indo-Pacific region and deep economic and technological interdependence. This relationship has evolved from a post-war asymmetric arrangement to an equal alliance, with Tokyo playing a key regional leader. Relations between the United States and Japan date back to the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries.[320] The United States' growing interest in the Pacific region and in developing trade links with China also translated into interest in the Japanese islands, isolated from the international community. Attempts to "open up" the Land of the Rising Sun in the first half of the 19th century culminated in Commodore Matthew Perry's show of force and the forced opening of the ports of Shimoda and Hakodate to foreign trade. Japan's rapid modernization, resulting from contact with advanced Western societies in the late 19th century, brought about the development of nationalist sentiment and a shift toward Japanese expansion on the Asian continent. The growing strength of the Japanese army negatively impacted not only relations with the United States but also with other colonial powers. After World War I, peace treaties significantly diminished Japan's position by limiting its naval tonnage relative to the American and British navies. However, it should be emphasized that this was a consequence of Japan's great success on the international stage. Japan was noticed and invited to negotiations, on an equal footing with the Western powers. After two atomic bombings and the signing of the Act

[320] C.M. Drury, Early American Contacts with the Japanese, *The Pacific Northwest Quarterly*, Vol. 36, No. 4, October 1945, pp. 319–324.

of Surrender ending World War II, Japan found itself under American occupation. As a consequence, the United States played a significant role in shaping postwar order in Japan. Along with the occupation, the long-term process of building American-Japanese relations in pursuit of a political and military alliance intensified. On January 19, 1960, the United States and Japan signed the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.[321] It is worth recalling here that there are many definitions of an alliance.[322] Most of them recognize that an alliance unites at least two independent state entities, is a kind of promise of assistance, but also a strongly binding obligation to the other party. Arnold Wolfers provides a simple definition of a political-military alliance: "a pledge (promise) of mutual military assistance between two or more sovereign states." It is important to note that an alliance refers to ongoing cooperation and a willingness to provide assistance to allies, not one-time cooperation or military assistance. As Balcerowicz (cited in the International Military and Defense Encyclopedia) states, "the purpose of an alliance is to unite the capabilities of nation states, essentially (primarily) to maintain, strengthen, or create a strong position in diplomacy or war." Applying this definition to the US-Japan alliance, the creation of a strong diplomatic position by both the United States and Japan clearly comes to the fore. Countries enter into alliances and treaties with each other. Typically, such a step is motivated by the need to ensure the security of their citizens. In international relations, security can be divided into two types: national security and international security. Following the Dictionary of National Security Terms, "national security is intended to protect the internal values of every society and state. (...) it is even identified with the survival of the state and nation, i.e., the protection of territorial integrity and political independence."[323] All countries around the world base their foreign policy on ensuring the security of their state and its citizens. With this in mind, many definitions derive international security from the stability of individual states that safeguard their national security. The handbook International Security After the Cold War, citing the Dictionnaire Diplomatique, points out that: "The concept of international security expresses the desire, inherent in every nation and state, to be protected against aggression and is based on the state's confidence that it will not be attacked or that, in the event of an attack, it will receive immediate and effective assistance from other states."[324] The most effective means of maintaining security and peace is multifaceted international cooperation – whether in the form of bilateral or multilateral alliances or in the form of various international organizations whose goal is to maintain peace worldwide. An example of such cooperation is the U.S.-Japanese alliance and the actions of both parties resulting from its provisions. A specific situation in international relations is a state of military occupation. The Dictionary of National

[321] E. Haliżak, Stosunki międzynarodowe w regionie Azji i Pacyfiku, Warszawa 1999, p. 371.
[322] B. Balcerowicz, Siły zbrojne w państwie i stosunkach międzynarodowych, Warszawa 2006, p. 73.
[323] Słownik terminów z zakresu bezpieczeństwa narodowego, ed. B. Zdrodowski, Warszawa 2008, p. 15.
[324] Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe po zimnej wojnie, ed. R. Zięba, Warszawa 2008, p. 19.

Security Terms defines military occupation as "temporary possession of the occupied territory of another state as a result of military entry"[325] and divides it into wartime and peacetime. The Dictionary of Terms states that such authority is temporary and limited by international law. The scope and limits of occupation are defined by the Hague Convention IV of 1907. According to Article 55 of the Convention, the occupier is "merely the administrator and user of the public property situated in the occupied country,"[326] and does not assume complete authority over the occupied territories. The Convention also obliges the occupier to respect the law in force in the occupied country and grants many important powers necessary for the continuation of the war and the maintenance of public order in the occupied territories.[327] The occupation of Japan by Allied forces from 1945 to 1952 was based on the provisions of the aforementioned Hague Convention IV. It is worth noting that both the United States and the Empire of Japan were among the signatories of the convention.

From the late 1630s, Japan remained closed to contact with the outside world. Japan's independent, unenforced isolation is all the more surprising given the growth of foreign trade in the early 17th century, particularly with East and Southeast Asian countries (Japan established trading posts in the Philippines, Burma, Siam, and Taiwan, among others). However, despite significant economic gains, historians emphasize the presence of Christian missionaries, whose growing activity raised concerns among the shogunate. Due to growing unrest, the first anti-Christian edict was issued in 1587, but it was not strictly enforced. The actual persecution resulted from subsequent edicts issued in the second decade of the 17th century, stemming from conflicts between various groups of foreigners (missionaries from different religious orders, the Spanish, Portuguese, and the Dutch), which impacted Japanese society.[328] The Shimabara Rebellion of 1637-1638 is considered the direct cause of Japan's closure. The rebellion itself was economic in nature – tax increases and famine among the lowest classes. The uprising is considered Christian in nature, in part because the rebels were supported by the Portuguese and fought under Christian banners. Since the suppression of the rebellion, the only foreigners in contact with Japan have been the Chinese and the Dutch. However, their presence was limited to the artificial island of Dejima near Nagasaki, and Japan plunged into isolation for the next 200 years.[329] The 19th century brought growing interest in Japan among Western powers. The Opium Wars and the maintenance and expansion of trade links with

[325] *Słownik terminów...*, ed. B. Zdrodowski, p. 86.
[326] Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, *Journal of Laws* 1927, no. 21, item 161, http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU19270210161 (accessed November 22, 2015).
[327] *Słownik terminów...*, ed. B. Zdrodowski, p. 86.
[328] J. Tubielewicz, *Historia Japonii*, Wrocław 1984, pp. 283–284.
[329] *Ibidem*, pp. 285–286.

China are cited as factors. The "opening of Japan" is credited to Commodore Matthew Perry, whose second expedition to Japan culminated in the signing of the Treaty of Kanagawa in 1854.[330]

Perry wasn't the first American to call at Japanese ports. The early 19th century also saw reports of American shipwrecks and expeditions disguised as Dutch, such as Captain Stewart's in 1797.[331] In 1837, the ship Morrison arrived there, aiming to return Japanese shipwrecked survivors found several years earlier on the American coast to their homeland. In 1848, Ranald MacDonald was arrested. He had befriended Japanese shipwrecked survivors during his school years. In 1845, he decided to go to Japan and signed on to the ship Plymouth, which drifted near the Japanese coast in 1848.[332] Both the failed expedition of the Morrison and MacDonald's stay in Japan indirectly contributed to the success of Commodore Perry's mission. The Japanese firing on the Morrison led to the conclusion that future contacts would require a show of force to achieve their goals. It was concluded that Japanese forces were not militarily advanced enough to effectively repel American ships. Thanks to MacDonald, who initially dreamed of opening Japan to the world on his own, Commodore Perry's expedition encountered no major obstacles in reaching an understanding with the inhabitants of the Land of the Rising Sun. After landing on the shores of Hokkaido, MacDonald briefly visited the Ainu community and was then sent increasingly south. In each subsequent city, he was imprisoned for several weeks, finally arriving in Nagasaki in October 1848. He was forbidden to leave his assigned cell and to teach Christianity. Before being sent home in 1849 with other Americans held captive in Nagasaki, MacDonald taught English to fifteen Japanese, some of whom were translators employed during Commodore Perry's stay in Japan.[333] On November 24, 1852, Commodore Perry set sail for Japan with four ships, carrying letters from President Millard Filmore to the Japanese Emperor. The expedition, aimed at expanding the American sphere of interest into Japan, reached Japan in July 1853.[334] The Japanese tried to deter the newcomers and prevent them from disembarking, but Perry persisted. During the talks, the American side's confident, threatening tone was clearly palpable.[335] The Japanese finally accepted the president's letters, and Commodore Perry departed, announcing he would return for a response the following year. Another expedition in February 1854 included seven ships. This time, the negotiations concluded with the signing of the Treaty of Kanagawa on March 31.[336]

[330] *Historia Stanów Zjednoczonych Ameryki*, vol. 3, eds. A. Bartnicki, D. Critchlow, Warszawa 1995, p. 283.
[331] C.M. Drury, Early American Contacts with the Japanese, *The Pacific Northwest Quarterly*, vol. 36, no. 4, October 1945, pp. 319–324.
[332] *Ibidem*, pp. 5–10.
[333] *Ibidem*, pp. 327–329.
[334] *Historia Stanów Zjednoczonych Ameryki*, vol. 3, eds. A. Bartnicki, D. Critchlow, p. 283.
[335] J. Tubielewicz, *Historia Japonii*, Wrocław 1984, p. 328.
[336] *Historia Stanów Zjednoczonych Ameryki*, vol. 3, eds. A. Bartnicki, D. Critchlow, p. 283.

The most important provisions of the treaty were the opening of two ports to American ships – Shimoda and Hakodate – and the Japanese commitment to supply ships calling at these ports. Cultural differences manifested themselves in differing interpretations of Article XI of the treaty, which granted the American consul the right to reside in Shimoda.[337] When Townsend Harris arrived in Shimoda in 1856, the Japanese encountered credentials for the first time. The Japanese interpretation of Article XI hinged on the word "may": a consulate may be opened, but it is not necessarily required.[338] Despite initial difficulties, Harris succeeded in securing two crucial trade agreements for the United States, in 1857 and 1858. As a result of these treaties, among other things, more ports were opened to trade with the Americans (including Nagasaki), customs tariffs were established, and an exchange of diplomatic missions was planned. By signing these agreements, the United States became a model for other Western powers, which also signed agreements with Japan in subsequent years.[339]

The signing of numerous "unequal treaties" with Western powers led to Japan becoming politically and economically dependent on them. The principle of extraterritoriality meant that crimes committed by foreigners went unpunished or were punished disproportionately.[340] According to Andrew Gordon, Japan's opening up should not be seen as a trampling on national pride and sovereignty. Gordon emphasizes that it was rather the adoption of a submissive attitude towards intrusive barbarians from the early 19th century to the 1960s that created modern Japanese nationalism.[341] The Meiji Restoration, which took place in 1867-1868, brought many changes to both the organization of Japanese society and its domestic and foreign policies. The abolition of samurai privileges and administrative reorganization of the state were followed by further reforms, such as compulsory education for both boys and girls. One of the reforms that clearly indicates the country's shift toward imperialism is the introduction of a conscript army, which was initially met with considerable public criticism. The combination of military reform and well-organized education meant that by the 1890s, Japan's military might allowed it to transcend maintaining domestic order and begin imposing its will on others. The new government leaders undertook numerous trips abroad to familiarize themselves with the societies and governments of Western powers. The social organization of Europe and the United States, the level of education, and the economic development made a profound impression on the Japanese. However, while they

[337] There shall be appointed, by the Government of the United States, Consuls or Agents to reside in Simoda, at any time after the expiration of eighteen months from the date of the signing of this treaty, provided that either of the two Governments deem such arrangement necessary. – *Treaty of Kanagawa*, [in:] https://www.archives.gov/exhibits/featured_documents/treaty_of_kanagawa/treaty_images.html [accessed: November 25, 2015].
[338] J. Tubielewicz, *Historia...*, p. 330.
[339] *Historia Stanów...*, vol. 3, eds. A. Bartnicki, D. Critchlow, p. 283.
[340] A. Gordon, *Nowożytna historia Japonii*, Warszawa 2010, p. 82.
[341] *Ibidem*, p. 82.

appreciated the achievements of Western civilization, as they learned about Western values and ideas, they became increasingly aware that treaties concluded with the great powers favored them.

During Iwakura Tomomi's expedition between 1871 and 1873, several attempts were made to revise the agreements, but the Americans and Europeans imposed a condition on Japan: they must first bring their legal and political systems up to European standards. Attempts to revise the "unequal treaties" in the 1870s failed to produce the desired results. Attempts were made to offer Western powers more ports and trading posts in exchange for changes to the arrangements, but to no avail. In 1886, an international conference was held in Tokyo, intended to reevaluate the treaties and equalize the positions of Japan and Western countries. After a proposal was presented that would return control of customs and ports open to trade to Japan, protests erupted. The Japanese were dissatisfied with the restrictions that Western powers continued to impose on their country. For example, they demanded that the Japanese government submit to the powers new codes of domestic law, which were currently being developed, for their review. Faced with protests, numerous petitions, and critical press articles, the Japanese government abandoned the proposed treaty changes. In 1889, another attempt was made to revise the treaties. The then-Foreign Minister, Ōkuma Shigenobu, managed to negotiate better terms than his predecessor. Unfortunately, this time, the government's actions were once again met with negative reactions from the public and nationalist organizations, resulting in the negotiated changes being abandoned once again.

The Meiji era (1868-1912)[342] was characterized by rapid modernization of all spheres of Japanese life based on European and American models. However, not everything aroused the enthusiasm of the Japanese government. The main fears were the political activation of citizens, progressive democratization, etc., so a "conservative constitution, modeled on the Prussian law," was introduced.[343] Initially, efforts were also made to sideline fears that rapid modernization might lead to foreigners poisoning the soul of the Japanese people, a view that had prevailed even before Commodore Perry's expedition to Japan.[344] Such views fostered the development of nationalist sentiments. In the 1890s, Japan experienced rapid development, both economically and militarily. In addition to successfully improving the country, the unequal treaties of the 1950s were revised. In 1894, the treaty with Great Britain was the first to be amended, followed shortly thereafter by the treaties with the other great powers. The Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) soon broke out, ending in a Japanese victory. Thanks to this victory, Japan gained recognition in the West, the country's modernization process was praised, and the government enjoyed high public support.[345]

[342] Japonia okresu Meiji. Od tradycji ku nowoczesności, ed. B. Kubiak Ho-Chi, Warszawa 2006, p. 9.
[343] A. Gordon, Nowożytna..., p. 159.
[344] Ibidem, p. 159.
[345] *Ibidem*, pp. 168–169.

At the beginning of the 20th century, the Japanese economy developed very intensively, with imports and exports growing twice as fast as the world average between 1880 and 1913.[346] One of the important factors of development was the growing emigration of Japanese, mainly to the United States (in 1907 there were about 60,000 Japanese),[347] China and Korea. Japan's desire to strengthen its position on the Korean Peninsula and Russia's desire to control Manchuria, after protracted negotiations, led to the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in February 1904. Despite numerous successes, the Japanese were unable to completely defeat the Russian army and suffered heavy losses. In May 1905, the decision was made to request mediation in the dispute from then-President of the United States, Theodore Roosevelt. The negotiations resulted in the signing of the Treaty of Porthsmouth on September 5, 1905.[348]

American-Japanese relations deteriorated significantly after the end of the Russo-Japanese War. The growing Japanese navy posed a threat to the US Navy's position in the Pacific. Japanese immigrants began to be viewed with disfavor, resulting in the so-called Gentlemen's Agreement, which limited immigration opportunities to relatives of Japanese people already settled in the United States. Relations were undoubtedly negatively impacted by the Americans' advocacy of an open-door policy towards China, which conflicted with Japan's interests in Manchuria.[349]

The outbreak of World War I opened the door for the Japanese to widespread expansion. Japan, bound by treaty with Great Britain, declared war on Germany in mid-August 1914.[350] By the beginning of 1915, Germany had managed to take over German possessions in China, including the Shantung Peninsula.[351] However, the Japanese were more interested in exploiting China's internal fragmentation and invading the Chinese part of the continent than in taking over German spheres of influence. Their expansionist plans were clearly demonstrated by the presentation of the so-called Twenty-One Demands to the Chinese government on January 18, 1915, which were seen as a prelude to transforming China into a Japanese colony.[352] Japan's aggressive moves provoked resistance not only among the Chinese but also among the Western powers. Following the intervention of the British Home Secretary, some demands were withdrawn, and appropriate agreements were signed with China in May 1915.[353] Over the next two years, secret agreements were also concluded with Great Britain, France, and Russia, ensuring the future support of the Great Powers at the peace conference. The United States long remained opposed to Japanese actions in China.

[346] *Ibidem,* p. 170.
[347] *Ibidem*, p. 171.
[348] J. Tubielewicz, *Historia...*, p. 376.
[349] A. Gordon, *Nowożytna...*, p. 173.
[350] *Ibidem*, p. 241.
[351] J. Tubielewicz, *Historia...*, p. 401.
[352] A. Gordon, *Nowożytna...*, p. 241.
[353] J. Tubielewicz, *Historia...*, p. 402.

In 1917, when the Americans officially entered the war, the Ishii-Lansing Agreement was signed, under which the Japanese agreed to respect China's independence and not to hinder American trade in Chinese territory. In turn, the United States recognized Japan's "special interests" in China, primarily in territories bordering its possessions. The Japanese continued to pursue policies aimed at enslaving China, such as granting government loans disguised as loans from private banks, while also heavily engaging in anti-communist activities in the eastern part of the Soviet Union, sending over 70,000 troops to Siberia.[354] During the deliberations on the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, the Japanese sought recognition of their sovereignty over former German possessions in China and of the agreements signed with the Chinese government in 1915 and 1918.[355] By resorting to various compromises, including the threat of non-admission to the League of Nations, the Japanese delegation secured support for control of former German territories. Two years later, in 1921, representatives of the great powers met again at a peace conference, this time in Washington. Conference participants were concerned about Japan's expansionist policies in Asia and the apparent threat of an arms race in the Pacific.[356] The most important agreements reached in Washington include a naval limitation treaty in the proportion of 5:5:3:1.75:1.75 (USA:UK:Japan:France:Italy), Japan's commitment to withdraw from the Shantung Peninsula, and the 21 Demands on the Chinese government. A certain détente has been observed in international relations since the Washington conference, while in Japan itself, chauvinistic sentiments and militarism have intensified.[357]

Andrew Gordon points out that in the 1920s, Japanese foreign policy did not differ in its basic objectives from that of other imperial powers.[358] Just as Japan emphasized the need to pursue its "special interests" in Asia, the Americans spoke in a similar tone regarding the countries of South and Central America. However, the West slowly began to withdraw from imperialist activities in China, while Japan's expansionist policy developed. In the 1930s, tensions increased both between Japan and China and between Japan, Great Britain, and the United States. The Japanese government proposed changing the ratio of the Japanese fleet to the British and American fleets from 5:5:3 to 10:10:752, which was met with categorical opposition from the Western delegations.

Following the global crisis that began in October 1929,[359] various "slogans for the recovery of Japan" began to gain momentum and nationalism grew stronger.[360] The ongoing expansion in China, which resulted in the proclamation of the puppet state of Manchukuo in March 1932, sparked a wave of enthusiasm among all classes of Japanese society. Japan's actions not only sparked a wave

[354] A. Gordon, *Nowożytna...*, p. 243.
[355] J. Tubielewicz, *Historia...*, p. 404.
[356] A. Gordon, *Nowożytna...*, p. 243.
[357] J. Tubielewicz, *Historia...*, pp. 404-406.
[358] A. Gordon, *Nowożytna...*, p. 250.
[359] *Historia Stanów...*, vol. 4, ed. A. Bartnicki, D. Critchlow, p. 123.
[360] J. Tubielewicz, *Historia...*, p. 410.

of anti-Japanese protests in China but also increased tensions with the United States, which demanded a condemnation of the actions in Manchuria and refused to recognize the existence of the Manchukuo state. After all League of Nations members condemned Japan's actions in Manchuria, Japan withdrew from the League of Nations on March 27, 1933.[361] In December 1934, the Japanese government decided to expand its navy, which amounted to terminating the treaty with Great Britain and the United States that had been renewed in 1930. Preparations for war were also evidenced by the increase in the number of troops for "defense in the north," primarily against the United States, China, and Russia.[362] When World War II broke out in Europe, the Japanese were ready to begin introducing a new order in Asia.[363]

The Marco Polo Bridge Incident of July 7, 1937 led to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War,[364] which ended only with Japan's surrender, ending World War II. On September 3, 1938, Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro announced a plan to establish a new order in East Asia, which envisioned political, economic, and cultural cooperation between Japan, China, and Manchuria. After the outbreak of war in Europe, German successes aroused Japanese enthusiasm and resulted in the signing of the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany, and Italy in 1940, followed by the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact in 1941. Thanks to an agreement with the Vichy government signed in Tokyo on August 30, 1940,[365] Japan was able to direct its expansion southward. Japanese troops entered southern Indochina in mid-July 1941,[366] prompting a sharp reaction from the United States. Japanese assets were frozen, and an embargo was imposed on crude oil and aviation gasoline exports to Japan. The Americans also turned to China, which was fighting the Japanese occupation, offering arms supplies at dumping prices.[367] Attempts at peaceful negotiations ended in failure – the Americans demanded the withdrawal of Japanese troops from both China and Indochina, which was unacceptable to Japan.[368] Due to the lack of agreement, at a meeting in the presence of the Emperor on 1 December 1941, the decision was made to declare war on the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands.[369] The Pacific War began with the attack on the American naval base at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 (December 8, Japan time). On the same day, the Japanese also began their march south, striking British Hong Kong, the American-controlled territories in the Philippines, Guam, and Wake Island, and advancing on Malaya, Singapore, and the Dutch East Indies to ensure

[361] J. Tubielewicz, *Historia...*, pp. 411-412.
[362] A. Gordon, *Nowożytna...*, p. 263.
[363] J. Tubielewicz, *Historia...*, p. 414.
[364] P. Niedbalska-Asano, *Suzuki Kantarō (1867-1948) a zakończenie wojny w Azji i na Pacyfiku*, Warszawa 2005, p. 21.
[365] *South East Asia: Colonial History*, vol. 4, ed. P.H. Kratoska, London 2001, p. 351.
[366] E. Pałasz-Rutkowska, *Polityka Japonii wobec Polski 1918-1941*, Warszawa 1998, p. 153.
[367] A. Gordon, *Nowożytna...*, p. 286.
[368] E. Pałasz-Rutkowska, *Polityka...*, p. 154.
[369] P. Niedbalska-Asano, *Suzuki Kantarō...*, p. 24.

the country's resource self-sufficiency.[370] A series of rapid Japanese victories also led, six months later, to the capture of Burma and forcing General Douglas MacArthur, then commander of Allied forces in the Philippines, to withdraw to Australia.

Japanese propaganda spread slogans of placing the Asian continent under Asian control and condemning Western imperialism.[371] In the first half of 1942, the Japanese planned to block the sea lanes between the United States and Australia, which was to result in a future invasion of Australia.[372] By breaking the Japanese code, the Allies were aware of Japanese plans to move the fleet to the eastern Pacific. Already in May, during the Carrier Battle, Japan suffered a defeat and decided on a coordinated attack on Midway and the Aleutian Islands. The June 1942 defeat at the Battle of Midway, resulting in the loss of four Japanese aircraft carriers, forced the Japanese army to abandon offensive operations and begin defending their existing territories. Following the defeat of the Japanese fleet, offensive operations by the Americans and their allies began. In early 1943, the Japanese withdrew from Guadalcanal, and successful operations on both sides of the Pacific contributed to the capture of Saipan in July 1944. The Japanese islands came within range of American bombers, which their anti-aircraft defenses were unable to cope with. The Americans conducted a successful operation in the Philippines and in early 1945 were preparing for an offensive against the Empire's main islands.[373] On June 22, 1945, the Americans officially announced the end of offensive operations on Okinawa. In preparation for the invasion of the main islands, the frequency of bombing attacks on Japanese cities was increased. Despite realizing that the chances of winning the war were slim, the Japanese ruling elites were unable to reach an agreement on further action. Attempts were made to negotiate with the Soviet Union regarding the possibility of a peaceful settlement to ensure peace on one side of the front, but these efforts were unsuccessful. Under American pressure, the Soviets decided not to renew the mutual neutrality agreement.

Following the Allied meeting at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, Japan was called upon to accept the terms for ending the war. The Potsdam Declaration stipulated Japan's unconditional surrender as the only way to resolve the conflict, but it omitted the issue of the emperor's position in the new democratic Japanese state. The Japanese feared that accepting the declaration would result in the emperor's overthrow, so the government refrained from commenting, waiting for the conclusion of negotiations with the Soviet Union. However, some members of the Japanese ruling elite pressured the prime minister to issue an official communiqué rejecting the terms of the Potsdam Declaration.[374] It was not until the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August

[370] *Historia Stanów...*, vol. 4, ed. A. Bartnicki, D. Critchlow, p. 234.
[371] A. Gordon, *Nowożytna...*, pp. 288-289.
[372] *Historia Stanów...*, vol. 4, ed. A. Bartnicki, D. Critchlow, p. 236.
[373] P. Niedbalska-Asano, *Suzuki Kantarō...*, p. 27.
[374] P. Niedbalska-Asano, *Suzuki Kantarō...*, pp. 86-88.

1945, and the Soviet Union's declaration of war on Japan, that the Emperor ordered the government to adopt the Potsdam Declaration. Faced with a lack of consensus among cabinet members, a meeting was convened in the Emperor's presence on August 10, 1945. Some of those present agreed to surrender only if the Allied occupation and accusations of war crimes were rejected, but the Emperor agreed with the Prime Minister's position: surrender would be conditional on maintaining imperial traditions. In response to the Japanese position, the Americans clarified the terms of surrender and emphasized that the Japanese people would be granted the right to decide the Emperor's fate.[375] At the next meeting, the Emperor issued an order to accept the terms of surrender and prepare an imperial rescript ending the war.[376] On August 15th at 12:00 noon, the surrender was announced over NHK radio. World War II ended with Japan's surrender on September 2nd, 1945. The signing took place in Tokyo Bay on the ship Missouri. Among the signatories was General Douglas MacArthur, who was entrusted with the newly established Supreme Command of the Allied Powers (GHQ). The Japanese Empire was stripped of its territorial gains in Asia and placed under American occupation.

### 3.5. San Francisco System – Security Treaty and Yoshida Doctrine

For many millions of Japanese, August 15, 1945, was the first day they heard the voice of their emperor. They listened in shock to a radio broadcast in which Emperor Hirohito explained why Japan had been defeated. The emperor's statement was far from historical truth—according to Andrew Gordon, it contained some of the most circumspect understatements in history.[377] Phrases that shifted responsibility for the atrocities of the war as far away as possible from the Japanese people prevailed, e.g. the reason for declaring war on America and Great Britain was the desire for self-defense of our empire and stability in East Asia, or the invasion of foreign territories was not in accordance with our will.[378] One of the problems with understanding the Japanese ruler by his subjects was the language he spoke – it was not the Japanese of the second half of the 20th century, but a classical language, used only by the sovereign. Reactions of the Japanese public to the decision to surrender were mixed. Some greeted the news of the war's end with relief, others feared what the future held under the occupier's rule. Suicides of approximately 350 officers were also recorded, considering the act of surrender shameful or seeing no other way to atone for their wartime activities.[379] The war-exhausted population offered no resistance to the new government, and in fact welcomed the occupiers with such discipline and calm that some even wondered if it was a trap.

[375] A. Gordon, *Nowożytna...*, p. 307.
[376] P. Niedbalska-Asano, *Suzuki Kantarō...*, pp. 114–116.
[377] A. Gordon, *Nowożytna...*, p. 311.
[378] E. Pałasz-Rutkowska, K. Starecka, *Japonia*, Warszawa 2004, p. 186.
[379] E. Pałasz-Rutkowska, K. Starecka, *Japonia...*, pp. 186–187.

Famine proved to be a major problem in the first post-war years. Harvest failures and an inefficient system of cultivation and distribution of food rations led to a crisis in the cities in early 1946.[380] The feeling of food shortages intensified when supplies stopped arriving from Korea, Taiwan, and Manchuria. While introducing various reforms and a new system of governance, the occupiers must have been mindful of the fact that losing the war had significantly impacted the morale of the Japanese. They were no longer an invincible nation; their "faith in divine superiority" had been shaken, accompanied by disappointment, sometimes even anger, directed at their leaders, who were responsible for the war's defeat. There were also negative thoughts among the public directed at Emperor Hirohito, but these were not linked to a rejection of obedience to the imperial court. After World War II, Japanese society was deprived of the idea of an invincible, divine nation. Forced to confront economic, social, cultural, and political problems, it found itself under US occupation, which, according to General Douglas MacArthur, was supposed to be "a second chance to create a democratic state."

Japan's signing of the peace treaty at the San Francisco Conference in September 1951 and the security treaty with the United States gave rise to the so-called San Francisco System, the origins of which date back to the period of the American occupation.[381] This system allowed Japan to focus on economic development, relying on the United States to ensure the security of the Japanese islands under the agreement.[382] The acceptance of the new system in Japan was primarily driven by the memory of wartime events, unconditional surrender, and the growing popularity of pacifist ideas among Japanese society. From 1948 to 1954, Yoshida Shigeru served as Prime Minister of Japan. Prime Minister Yoshida belonged to a group of moderately conservative politicians. Recognizing Japan's economic weakness during the expansion, they prioritized economic development, placing military issues at the bottom of the hierarchy. With these goals in mind, a strategy was developed that defined Japan's international position for the next 40 years, known as the Yoshida Doctrine.[383] According to the Yoshida Doctrine, Japan's economic recovery became paramount, and close economic cooperation with the United States and Western countries was to be instrumental in achieving this. This approach became evident after Japan joined the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and Prime Minister Yoshida's 1954 trip to France, Great Britain, the United States, and Canada.[384] A key element of the doctrine was that Japan's international engagement was

[380] A. Gordon, *Nowożytna...*, p. 313.
[381] S. Kubas, *Konsolidacja demokracji w systemie politycznym. Przykład powojennej Japonii (1945–2010)*, Katowice 2011, p. 181.
[382] M. Grabowski, *Wiek Pacyfiku: Polityka Stanów Zjednoczonych wobec regionu Azji i Pacyfiku po roku 1989*, Kraków 2012, p. 132.
[383] R. Wiśniewski, *Ewolucja polityki bezpieczeństwa Japonii po zimnej wojnie. Od „państwa moratorium" do strategicznej „normalności"*, [in:] *Przegląd Strategiczny* 2011, no. 2, Poznań 2011, p. 135.
[384] E. Haliżak, *Stosunki międzynarodowe w regionie Azji i Pacyfiku*, Warszawa 1999, p. 151.

limited to economic participation, with a clear omission of political and military involvement. This allowed for the consolidation of resources for economic development, allocating only 1% of GDP to military spending. Given the negative attitude toward Japan's militaristic power in East Asia, this allowed for the gradual rebuilding of relations with neighboring countries. It is also worth mentioning the important assumption for the development of the American-Japanese alliance, according to which "in order to ensure its long-term security, Japan will allow the establishment of American military bases on its territory."[385] Therefore, security guarantees from the United States were accepted, in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 treaty, renouncing the country's independent self-defense and confirming the Americans' right to maintain bases in the Japanese archipelago. One of the conditions for granting the security guarantee was Japan's active participation in the American strategy of containing communism in Asia. Military bases were a significant focus of interest for the United States, primarily due to Japan's geographical location. The archipelago constitutes an excellent base, primarily for controlling access to the western Pacific basin, but also, in the postwar period, its significant importance was its ability to control sea routes to countries such as the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.[386] Also important was Japan's high level of industrialization, which contrasted with the predominantly agricultural communist states in the region, such as North Korea and the People's Republic of China.

Recognizing Japan's location in the region was crucial to American goals, Prime Minister Yoshida sought to conclude an agreement on favorable terms for Japan. By transferring responsibility for the country's security to an American ally, it became possible to reduce defense spending to a bare minimum and gradually integrate Japan into the international community. From the very beginning of the agreement, the United States sought to enhance Japan's role, including by insisting that the ally develop its own self-defense forces. American attempts to persuade the Japanese to increase military spending were rejected by Prime Minister Yoshida, who invoked Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, according to which Japan renounces the right to wage war and undertakes not to maintain forces capable of war.[387]

The conclusion of an agreement regulating the principles of stationing American troops in Japan on February 28, 1952, initiated a series of subsequent agreements, concluded between 1952 and 1962, specifying the relations between the two countries.[388] With the 1953 armistice between North and South Korea, the People's Republic of China became a threat to the security of the United States, particularly in East Asia. A strategic goal of President Dwight Eisenhower's administration was to contain Chinese and Soviet influence in the region. From 1952 onward, a more active policy

[385] R. Wiśniewski, *Ewolucja...*, p. 136.
[386] *Ibidem*, p. 142.
[387] *Understanding East Asia's Economic Miracles*, Michigan 2009, p. 7.
[388] *Konstytucja Japonii*, tłum. T. Suzuki, Warszawa 2004, p. 59.

of containing communism in Asia emerged, not only thanks to Eisenhower's presidential term but also to John Dulles's appointment as Secretary of State.[389] The Japanese were increasingly concerned about the precarious state of their economy, given its downward trend since 1952. After the outbreak of the Korean War, the United States imposed a complete embargo on exports to China.

Under American influence, on September 5, 1952, Japan concluded an agreement with the United States limiting its exports to China to 0.05% of the total value of Japanese exports. Trade restrictions with China led to the need to import raw materials from the United States and South American countries, which also led to increased import costs. Problems also arose with the export of goods. Japan found it increasingly difficult to compete in the global market. As the cost of importing raw materials rose, so did the cost of producing goods, and consequently, the prices of Japanese products continued to rise. Compared to the previous year, 1953 also saw a decline in the value of special American orders by approximately $40 million. Fearing that the Japanese economy might fall into a deep recession, they began to consider participating in the US Mutual Security Assistance program (MSA).[390] The program came into effect after being approved by the U.S. Congress in October 1951, and its primary goal was to rebuild the military potential of European and Asian allies out of fear of the Soviet Union and China. Prime Minister Yoshida's domestic political problems also contributed to Japan's decision to propose joining the MSA, including the decline in seats for the Liberal Party in both houses (elections in 1952 and 1953) and the consequent need to build friendly relations with other conservative groups. The Progressive Party and the Liberal Party, led by Hatoyama Ichirō, advocated rapid rearmament and disagreed with Yoshida's interpretation of the Constitution, which held that the country could not develop any independent military forces. The Socialists, on the other hand, took a completely opposite stance, opposing rearmament and an alliance with the United States as the basis of Japanese foreign policy. Prime Minister Yoshida argued that the Cold War conflict had significantly strengthened Japan's value, implying that the United States would make numerous economic concessions during the MSA negotiations. He was convinced that Japan's security and development depended on close political, economic, and military ties with the Americans, and joining the MSA program was intended to strengthen and promote Japanese business in the Southeast Asian region.[391]

Yoshida staunchly opposed Japan's rapid rearmament, citing economic considerations—his priority was economic recovery. Another major reason for the Prime Minister's skepticism toward American proposals to increase military potential was the fear of militarism returning to power. In September 1952, Yoshida rejected an American proposal to increase the National Police Reserve

[389] K. Iwanaga, Images, Decisions and Consequences in Japan's Foreign Policy, Lund 1993, pp. 75–76.
[390] Ibidem, pp. 77-78.
[391] Ibidem, pp. 81-88.

to 325,000 (from 110,000) by the end of 1955. Given the nature of the mutual aid program, the American government did not relent in pressing for Japan's military development. As early as April 1953, President Eisenhower stated that there was no future for Japan unless access to the markets and raw materials of Manchuria and North China was provided.[392]

The National Security Council followed the president's lead and issued an opinion in late April stating that the stability of the Japanese economy was important to American interests in the region.[393] In May 1953, Secretary of State Dulles, during a speech to Congress, stated that the American security assistance program included funds for weapons for Japan to ensure the best possible territorial defense and maintain internal security. This statement was met with incomprehension by the Japanese public. The Japanese were confused as to why the American government would want to provide funds when the Japanese government had not sought them. They feared, above all, that concluding an agreement would mean the possibility of sending Japanese armed forces abroad to fight in American-led wars. The Japanese public's lack of knowledge about the aid program stemmed from Prime Minister Yoshida's commitment to secrecy during the negotiations.[394] Official negotiations on Japan's accession to the MSA program lasted from July 1953 to March 1954. The main problem was the differing understanding of assistance under the program by the parties to the agreement. Japan saw the MSA primarily as economic assistance, while Washington emphasized the development of military capabilities and a security structure. These differences are most noticeable when analyzing the composition of the Japanese delegation to Washington in October 1953: it consisted solely of politicians, economists, and financiers, with no military specialists. Former Finance Minister Ikeda Hayato, who led the Japanese delegation, emphasized that rearmament on the scale demanded by the Americans would require a lengthy process of re-educating the public, which largely supported the country's pacifist direction of development.[395] As a result of negotiations between Ikeda and Walter S. Robertson, head of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs at the State Department, Japan committed to rearmament, but on terms it determined. There was also a mutual agreement to increase the capabilities of the self-defense forces to protect Japan from possible aggression and to reduce the involvement of American forces in the defense of the islands. The Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement was signed on March 8, 1954. In addition to the aforementioned document, an agreement was also reached regarding the purchase by Japan (in yen) of surplus American agricultural goods, an agreement on investment

[392] Memorandum of Discussion at the 139th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, April 8, 1953, [in:] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan (in two parts): Volume XIV, part 2 (available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v14p2/d642, accessed: May 2, 2016).
[393] Editorial Note, [in:] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan (in two parts): Volume XIV, part 2 (available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v14p2/d646, accessed: May 2, 2016).
[394] K. Iwanaga, Images..., pp. 101–102.
[395] Ibidem, pp. 108-118.

guarantees, and arrangements regarding economic stability as a key element of the mutual relationship between the United States and Japan. Committed to limited rearmament, the Japanese government approved two new laws on March 9, 1954: the Defense Agency Establishment Law and the Self-Defense Forces Law, enabling the transformation of the National Security Forces (formerly the National Police Reserve) into the Self-Defense Forces in July 1954.[396]

The conclusion of these four agreements laid the foundation for the development of new U.S.-Japanese military relations and confirmed Japan's affiliation with the Western bloc. It also facilitated the flow of technology from the United States to Japan. Between 1954 and 1962, Japan received $738 million in grants for military equipment and supplies.[397] Despite numerous economic benefits, the government's actions were met with sharp criticism and resistance from the socialists, which contributed to the consolidation and unification among the conservatives, resulting in the formation of the Liberal Democratic Party in 1955.[398]

### 3.5.1. Reasons for revising the 1951 treaty

In the years following the end of the occupation, anti-American sentiment gradually grew. Approximately 260,000 American soldiers were still stationed at bases on the Japanese islands. The Japanese public appreciated their commitment in the face of various natural disasters and their assistance during rescue operations at sea. However, negative opinions about the American presence in Japan abounded. Among the most frequently complained about issues were the deteriorating environmental conditions around military bases and the numerous crimes committed by soldiers stationed there. Between 1953 and 1957, approximately 20,000 crimes were recorded, the most frequent of which were theft, fighting, rape, and violations of traffic laws.[399] In the following years, anti-American demonstrations grew in number, and the opposition Socialist Party of Japan primarily attempted to exploit negative sentiment. The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958, among other things, served as the backdrop for the debate on revising the 1951 treaty. The American threat to use nuclear weapons against China was met with a response from the USSR, which pledged to support China with nuclear weapons if necessary. Japan grew concerned that an alliance with the United States could drag the country into another war. The Japanese felt that the Americans could use their troops and bases in Japan without any consultation with the Japanese government. Therefore, a new treaty should be negotiated, guaranteeing Japan's participation in the decision-making process related to American military operations in East Asia.[400]

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[396] K.G. Henshall, *Historia...*, p. 185.
[397] K. Iwanaga, *Images...*, p. 129.
[398] E. Pałasz-Rutkowska, K. Starecka, *Japonia...*, pp. 232–233.
[399] J. Masumi, *The 1955 System in Japan and Its Subsequent Development*, [in:] *Asian Survey*, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Mar., 1988), p. 287.
[400] K. Iwanaga, *Images...*, pp. 184–185.

In the second half of the 1950s, Japan gradually strengthened its position in the international system: in 1956, it was admitted to the UN and then elected to the Security Council for 1958-1959. From the Japanese perspective, certain elements of the 1951 treaty were considered particularly unequal. In particular, the lack of restrictions on the use of American troops in Japan, the authorization to use American forces to combat internal disturbances, and the indefinite duration of the agreement raised doubts. The United States was also aware of the treaty's one-sided nature. A strong economic momentum (in 1956, Japan overtook Great Britain as the largest shipbuilding giant) and its strengthening international position contributed to the growth of nationalist sentiment among the Japanese. From the spring of 1957, pressure from public opinion and academic circles for a revision of the 1951 treaty grew. The presence of American bases and troops was a constant source of controversy and tension between Japanese and American soldiers. Public opinion was divided, as evidenced by subsequent movements to support a complete overthrow or a revision of the treaty.[401]

The central figure in the process of revising the 1951 decisions was Kishi Nobusuke, who took office as Prime Minister in February 1957.[402] The Prime Minister's strong negative constituency stemmed from his wartime activities – Kishi had served as a minister in General Tōjō's cabinet. Kishi's Minister of Foreign Affairs was Fujiyama Aiichirō, whose business experience taught him the need for compromise but also the art of tough negotiation. Both men viewed the 1951 treaty as a legacy of the occupation that needed immediate revision. Among Prime Minister Kishi's primary actions upon taking office was seeking to attract as many supporters as possible to build sufficient political power. He also strove vigorously to unite conservatives to form a strong government, which he believed was necessary to ultimately achieve complete independence. Kishi believed the Constitution should be revised to eliminate arms restrictions so that Japan could regain full sovereignty. The presence of American troops on Japanese soil was intended to serve as an embarrassing reminder of Japan's dependence on the United States, negatively impacting the Japanese public's psyche.[403] The Prime Minister also emphasized the importance of maintaining peace in Asia and developing friendly relations, primarily with Southeast Asian countries, through, among other things, promoting economic development and regional integration. He saw Japan as playing a central role in the anti-communist system in East Asia. He viewed Japan's leadership in the region as a necessity for revising the security treaty. Kishi believed that only by revising the treaty would he be able to raise Japanese awareness of the country's defense and security requirements in the Cold War era. He felt the need to stimulate public debate on the country's security

[401] *Ibidem*, pp. 189-190.
[402] E. Pałasz-Rutkowska, K. Starecka, *Japonia*..., p. 249.
[403] K. Iwanaga, *Images*..., pp. 192–196.

and hoped that such a debate would contribute to future acceptance of his plans for constitutional revision.[404]

Ideas for revising the treaty had been floated since February 1952. An official delegation to Washington, led by then-Minister of Foreign Affairs Shigemistu Mamoru, submitted the first proposal for treaty revision in 1955. Secretary of State John Dulles rejected the Japanese proposals. He believed that Japan was unable to share responsibility for regional security at that time, primarily due to the limitations imposed by the Constitution. The Washington meeting resulted in concerns from both political camps that Japan would be forced to assume an increased military role in the Western Pacific in exchange for an American promise to revise the provisions of the 1951 treaty. In February 1957, Prime Minister Kishi clearly emphasized that Japan's defense forces would be needed to begin efforts to revise the treaty. Anticipating possible problems with ratification of the new agreement, the US Senate attempted to push for the idea of bilateral agreements to the existing treaty, which would not require additional ratification.

On April 19, 1957, Kishi publicly emphasized the need for a revision of the treaty for the first time. Two months later, the National Defense Council and the government approved the First Defense Buildup Plan for 1958-1960. Under this plan, the strength of the Ground Self-Defense Forces was to be increased to 180,000. The primary purpose of adopting the Defense Buildup Plan was to convince the Americans of Japan's progress in rearmament before Prime Minister Kishi's planned visit to Washington on June 19. The Prime Minister visited the United States from June 19 to 21, 1957. He was met with significantly greater understanding by President Eisenhower's administration than the Shigemistu delegation had been in 1955. With the support of the American ambassador to Japan, Douglas MacArthur,[405] Kishi met with both the president (June 19) and Dulles (June 20). Dulles was critical of the slow pace of development of the Self-Defense Forces. While he supported the idea of revising the treaty in principle, he believed further consultation with military experts was necessary. Eisenhower and Dulles did not agree to begin negotiations on a revision of the treaty, but they recognized the provisional nature of the 1951 provisions and the need to adapt the agreement to new realities.[406] On June 21, a joint statement by Kishi and Eisenhower was issued, announcing the dawn of a "new era" in U.S.-Japanese relations. One of the key points of the statement was the promise to withdraw U.S. ground forces from the main islands of the Japanese archipelago within a year. This was not a major concession on the American side, considering that by then they already possessed long-range missiles and were able to provide sufficient security even

[404] *Ibidem*, pp. 199-201.
[405] Douglas MacArthur II – United States Ambassador to Japan from 1957 to 1961, nephew of General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) during the American occupation of Japan (available at: http://www.macarthurmemorial.org/180/Douglas-MacArthur-II-Papers, accessed: May 20, 2016).
[406] *Ibidem*, pp. 216-219.

without a physical presence on the main islands.[407] Less than two months after the Prime Minister's visit to the United States, on August 6, 1957, the Joint Japanese-American Committee on Security was established. Its purpose, however, was not to negotiate a revision of the treaty, but rather to conduct intergovernmental consultations to determine what actions could be taken within the framework of the existing agreements so that the Japanese would not feel that the treaty was entirely one-sided.[408] The general parliamentary elections of May 22, 1958, strengthened the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and the Prime Minister's position. As a result, Kishi decided to take serious steps toward revising the treaty. Ambassador MacArthur played a significant role in persuading Washington to initiate talks. On June 5, he issued a recommendation requesting a positive response to Kishi's efforts to revise the treaty. MacArthur emphasized that a refusal could discredit Kishi and his supporters, which would ultimately negatively impact security relations with Japan. He strongly supported the conclusion of a new, more equal treaty.[409] Prime Minister Kishi and Minister Fujiyama believed the likelihood of obtaining US consent to a new treaty was low and focused on proposals for supplements to the existing one. Among the drafts prepared, the most important changes included proposals to introduce a US commitment to act jointly with the Self-Defense Forces in the event of external aggression and a commitment to consult with the Japanese government before undertaking operational operations from bases in Japan or directed outside its territory. During secret meetings between MacArthur and Kishi in the summer of 1958, the ambassador hinted that the possibility of concluding a new treaty was not as improbable as Japanese diplomats initially believed.[410]

During official meetings between the ambassador and Minister Fujiyama, and later in the presence of Prime Minister Kishi, in July and August 1958, MacArthur clearly signaled that the United States was ready to begin negotiations on a revised treaty that would be consistent with the limitations of the Japanese Constitution, if such solutions were desired by the Japanese side. On September 11, 1958, Fujiyama met with Secretary of State Dulles in New York, where, in addition to the aforementioned proposals for introducing American defense commitments, Fujiyama proposed introducing a limited duration for the new treaty. Dulles agreed to the need for a revision of the treaty, and official negotiations on the new agreement began in October 1958. Official negotiations to revise the 1951 treaty lasted from October 1958 to December 1959. The delays were largely due to the Japanese side, stemming more from internal political problems than disagreements between the parties to the agreement. Interestingly, the Japanese allowed the Americans to take the lead in the negotiations from the outset. The main reason was the difficulty they had in adapting

[407] E. Pałasz-Rutkowska, K. Starecka, *Japonia...*, p. 256.
[408] K. Iwanaga, *Images...*, p. 220.
[409] *Ibidem*, pp. 220-222.
[410] *Ibidem*, pp. 222-223.

their proposals to the Japanese Constitution. It was the Americans, therefore, who presented the first draft of the new treaty. During the negotiations, disagreement arose on both sides over two concepts included in the American-proposed treaty text: "collective defense" and "the Pacific area" as the territory covered by the treaty. The Japanese argued that the concept of collective defense was inconsistent with the Constitution, which prohibited the Self-Defense Forces from operating abroad. They offered the same explanation for the concept of the "Pacific area" as a region of joint military responsibility. MacArthur convinced the Washington administration to drop the term "Pacific area," but Okinawa and the Bonin Islands were retained as territories subject to joint responsibility for defense. This move sparked massive opposition in Japan, not only among the opposition but also within the Liberal Democratic Party itself. The Prime Minister's opponents argued that Japan could only assume responsibility for the defense of Okinawa and the Bonin Islands once they were returned to its administration. Ambassador MacArthur once again persuaded Washington to limit joint military responsibility to territories under Japanese administration. On December 3, Prime Minister Kishi officially announced that Okinawa and the Bonin Islands would not be covered by the treaty.[411] Fearing an intensification of protests against the new treaty with the United States as negotiations neared their conclusion, Prime Minister Kishi attempted to amend the Police Duties Law governing the control of public demonstrations. Despite a parliamentary majority, the amendments failed to pass, and representatives of the Socialist Party of Japan even barricaded selected premises.[412] In the face of mass protests across the country, the proposed changes were withdrawn. The dispute resulted in strong opposition to the Prime Minister within the LDP, as well as a four-month postponement of U.S.-Japanese negotiations.[413] The socialists opposed the government's efforts to negotiate a new treaty with the United States, receiving support from the PRC in their opposition to “American imperialism.” During a visit to Beijing in 1959, one of the SPJ leaders in a speech identified the United States as the common enemy of China and Japan. This became one of the reasons for the split in the socialist camp and the formation of the Democratic Socialist Party in January 1960.[414]

American-Japanese negotiations officially resumed on April 23, 1959. In his May 25 speech, Prime Minister Kishi highlighted the most important points of the proposed treaty, to which the Japanese government paid particular attention. These included the treaty's compliance with the Charter of the United Nations, American-Japanese cooperation not only in the military but also in the political and economic sectors, and the agreement's 10-year validity period with the possibility of extension for another decade.[415] On January 6, 1960, negotiations led to a new agreement

[411] *Ibidem*, pp. 227-229.
[412] E. Pałasz-Rutkowska, K. Starecka, *Japonia...*, p. 257.
[413] K. Iwanaga, *Images...*, p. 230.
[414] E. Pałasz-Rutkowska, K. Starecka, *Japonia...*, pp. 257–258.
[415] K. Iwanaga, *Images...*, p. 232.

regulating the sharing of military bases and the presence of American troops in Japan. After nearly two years of negotiations, on January 19, 1960, Prime Minister Kishi and Secretary of State Christian Herter signed a new Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America at the White House.[416]

The new treaty did not include the stipulation that the United States had to consent to the stationing of foreign troops in Japan. The right to use American troops to suppress internal rebellions and dangerous disturbances was also abolished. It also emphasized that, in accordance with the UN Charter, if involved in international disputes, both countries would, to the extent possible, seek to resolve them peacefully.[417] The treaty's ratification process took six months, largely due to opposition resistance and mass demonstrations. Public opinion, however, was divided. While some accepted its provisions, others feared a disruption in trade with China due to the deterioration in Japanese-Soviet and Japanese-Chinese relations following the treaty. Anti-government protests, both mass and in parliament, took place, with the opposition leading the way.[418] Prime Minister Kishi sought to secure ratification of the treaty before President Eisenhower's planned visit on June 19, 1960. On May 20, members of the SPJ sought to prevent the extension of the parliamentary session and barricaded the entrance to the chamber. When the Speaker of the House of Representatives' appeals for calm had no effect and he was physically assaulted by the protesters, police officers were called in. Shortly after midnight, the treaty was approved. A total of 233 LDP members voted in favor of ratification, while 27 members of the Diet, including Yoshida, abstained. These were the only members present in the chamber at the time.[419] This situation led to an escalation of public protests. The Japanese demanded the resignation of the Prime Minister, who was accused of violating the principles of parliamentary democracy. Their demands also included the dissolution of Parliament and the calling of new elections. Despite the growing wave of protests that had already swept the country, the cancellation of the American president's visit was held back until the last minute. On June 19, 1960, the treaty was automatically ratified by the upper house of the Japanese parliament, and three days later by the US Senate. On July 15, Prime Minister Kishi resigned, dissolving the government. This turbulent period of mass demonstrations was not without casualties – socialist Kawakami Jōtaro and Prime Minister Kishi himself were injured. In October, the chairman of the SPJ, Asanuma Inejirō, was stabbed to death.[420] The situation in Japan began to calm after the treaty entered into force, and despite all the controversy surrounding it, it remained in force

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[416] *Ibidem*, p. 232.
[417] *Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America*, [in:] http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.html (accessed: May 26, 2015).
[418] E. Pałasz-Rutkowska, K. Starecka, *Japonia*, pp. 261–262.
[419] *Ibidem*, p. 262.
[420] *Ibidem*, p. 266

until 1970, when debate over the nature of U.S.-Japanese relations reignited. The long-term development of U.S.-Japanese relations intensified with the end of World War II and the beginning of the American occupation of Japan. American interest in the Land of the Rising Sun from the early 19th century was reflected in friendly relations in the second half of the 20th century. The strengthening of ties between the two countries resulted in the conclusion of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security in 1960.[421]

The issues presented here, related to political and military relations, do not exhaustively address the U.S.-Japanese alliance due to its multifaceted nature. In seeking answers to the question of how U.S.-Japanese relations developed after World War II, the period of the American occupation and the outbreak of the Korean War were used as a reference point for considering the development of relations between Japan and the United States. After an intensive period of demilitarization and democratization of the Japanese state, the escalation of the conflict on the Korean Peninsula led to a "change of course" in the reforms implemented and a focus on economic reconstruction. The stabilization of the Japanese economy as a consequence of the Korean conflict highlighted the need to negotiate an agreement ending the American occupation. An analysis of the available literature and source texts clearly indicates that the development of the Cold War increased Japan's importance as an ally of the United States in the region. The rapid growth of exports, and in the longer term also investment potential and imports, as a consequence of the Korean War, had a decisively positive impact on the development of U.S.-Japanese relations. Some of the reforms introduced by the occupiers, aimed at democratizing Japan, were indeed revised, but this does not change the fact that American actions during this period left their mark on the state's activities in almost all its aspects.

An analysis of the collected materials also made it possible to determine how Japan's attempts to assert greater independence in the 1950s influenced the final wording of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. Consistent adherence to the tenets of the Yoshida Doctrine, shifting the burden of responsibility for Japan's security to the American ally, and consolidating resources for economic development helped combat stagnation and improve the quality of life for citizens. Despite the significant economic improvement, some sections of society remained dissatisfied with the unequal relations between the United States and Japan resulting from the 1951 Security Treaty. Growing anti-American sentiment forced Japanese politicians to take decisive steps to revise the unequal agreement. High support for the Liberal Democratic Party and the appointment of Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke contributed to strengthening relations between the United States and Japan, while the mutual security assistance agreements concluded during his term reaffirmed Japan's affiliation with the Western bloc. The final formulation of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation

[421] E. Haliżak, *Stosunki...*, p. 371.

and Security was influenced not only by the reshuffle in Japan's political scene but also by the growing pressure from society and the opposition. A detailed analysis of the issue indicates that the changes compared to the 1951 agreement were not very significant, but overall, they were beneficial for Japan. Attempts to become more independent and maintain an equal position in relations with the United States would have required a major revision of the Constitution, something the Japanese were not prepared to undertake. Significant concessions on the American side, including Japan's failure to commit to participating in strategic activities in the Asia-Pacific region, limiting them solely to its own territory, indicate that the new treaty can also be understood as unequal. Summarizing the above considerations, the development of relations between the two countries after World War II was not an easy one. The long road from the occupation through the Treaty of San Francisco, to the signing of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security in 1960, was fraught with disputes, misunderstandings, and protests by the societies of both countries. Even after the ratification of the 1960 treaty, mass demonstrations by opponents of the U.S.-Japan alliance were not without their impact. The situation calmed down quickly, as just a decade later, discussions began anew about the future nature of relations between Japan and the United States. It is important to remember, however, that despite all the adversities, the alliance between the two countries endured and continues to this day.

### 3.6. Security reforms after the Cold War

At the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, the environment in which Japanese security policy (both international and domestic) was shaped and implemented underwent a rapid transformation. A radical restructuring of the international order (both globally and regionally), combined with significant changes within the Empire's political system, created conditions in which reform (or complete abandonment) of the Yoshida Doctrine became not only possible but also desirable. In the first half of the 1990s, Japanese decision-makers were confronted with the need to respond to two serious international crises, which can be considered the embodiment of new challenges to their country's security in the new post-Cold War international environment. The first resulted from Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and the second concerned North Korea's nuclear program (the First Korean Nuclear Crisis of 1993–1994). Attempts to address the new situation based on traditional patterns of behavior rooted in the Yoshida Doctrine proved unsuccessful. Thus, both crises provided a powerful impetus for the evolutionary processes of change in the Empire's security policy, which over the next two decades yielded truly revolutionary results. It is worth first explaining the nature of this process, and then explaining its causes and consequences. When the United States was building an international coalition aimed at liberating Kuwait from Iraqi occupation, strong expectations were expressed regarding Japan's contribution to this endeavor. It was assumed that

one of the world's most economically developed countries, whose energy security depended on oil supplies from the Persian Gulf, would acknowledge its shared responsibility for ensuring international peace and security. However, it turned out that Japanese elites, hampered by constitutional constraints and (to a much greater extent) a lack of political will to change a policy successfully pursued for some 40 years, were completely unprepared to respond quickly to the crisis. Proposals for the Self-Defense Forces to participate in the actions undertaken by the international coalition in the Persian Gulf were effectively blocked by legal interpretations of Article 9 and inter-ministerial disputes.

According to many foreign and domestic observers, the Japanese government found itself in a state of decision-making paralysis, unable (despite ambitious declarations) to enforce its decision to engage in the UN-mandated operation. Ultimately, Japan made a significant financial contribution ($13 billion), and after the combat operations concluded, Maritime Self-Defense Force vessels participated in the mine-clearing of the Persian Gulf. However, foreign partners (especially the United States) failed to appreciate these gestures and widely criticized Japan for enjoying the benefits of international peace and security without contributing to their maintenance. A virtually identical pattern repeated itself in 1993–1994, when the North Korean nuclear crisis temporarily deemed the threat of war on the Korean Peninsula a real possibility. It turned out that in such a scenario, Japan would be unable to provide even the most basic support to American forces operating from its territory. This sparked understandable frustration and outrage in the United States.[422] These events made Japanese leaders aware of the need to adapt their security strategy to the new reality and that ensuring national security in the new reality requires a much more active policy.[423]

The first significant innovation was the adoption of the International Peace Cooperation Act in 1992, which allowed the Self-Defense Forces to participate in UN peacekeeping operations. This challenged the prohibition on armed forces participating in operations outside their home territory, which stemmed from the previous official interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution. The first peacekeeping mission in which the Self-Defense Forces participated under the new regulations was the UN operation in Cambodia. The participation of Japanese forces in this undertaking was considered a significant success. Since then, Japanese soldiers have participated in several UN operations. Another important step was the expansion of the framework of allied cooperation with the United States. The negative experiences of the Korean crisis and the growing tensions in the regional security environment (related, among other things, to the escalation of tensions between the People's Republic of China and Taiwan) led the allies to conclude that it was necessary to renew and

[422] K.B. Pyle, *op. cit.*, pp. 290–296.
[423] R.J. Samuels, *op. cit.*, pp. 87–107.

strengthen commitments and adapt the alliance formula to the new conditions. The result of these efforts was the Joint Declaration on Security: An Alliance for the 21st Century, adopted by President W. Clinton and Prime Minister R. Hashimoto in April 1996, and the new Guidelines for Defense Cooperation based on its provisions, adopted in 1997. Their most important consequence was the recognition of the Empire's role in ensuring security in the "areas surrounding Japan," as well as entrusting the Self-Defense Forces with the function of providing rear support to American forces in the event of a crisis.

The most far-reaching reforms, however, were introduced between 2001 and 2003 as part of the so-called "war on terrorism." Wanting to provide the expected support to its ally and avoid the mistakes of the previous decade, the Junichiro Koizumi government took unprecedented steps. Back in 2001, the decision was made to send a team of Maritime Self-Defense Force ships to the Indian Ocean to provide logistical support to the international coalition forces intervening in Afghanistan. This constituted a clear violation of the previous interpretation of constitutional provisions, but under pressure from the Prime Minister, the Maritime Self-Defense Force issued an opinion on the constitutionality of the Special Counter-Terrorism Measures Act (which provided the legal basis for the dispatch of the ships). It was concluded that as long as Self-Defense Force units were outside the immediate combat zone and not participating in combat operations, such activity was permissible. An even more significant step was the participation of the Ground Self-Defense Forces in the stabilization mission in Iraq. Although this decision was highly controversial, Prime Minister Koizumi ultimately achieved his goal this time. From 2003 to 2004, several hundred Japanese soldiers were stationed in the Iraqi province of Smawah, where they participated in strictly non-combat humanitarian operations, with strict restrictions on the use of force. In 2003, a package of laws regulating the functioning of the state administration and armed forces in crisis situations was also adopted, finally creating (almost 50 years after the establishment of the Self-Defense Forces) an effective legal basis for effectively countering aggression. Over the past decade, an ambitious program to develop a missile defense system (implemented in close cooperation with the United States) has also been launched, as has closer cooperation with other regional allies of the United States (a prime example of which is the military cooperation agreement with Australia signed in 2007).

The evolution of Japanese security policy after the Cold War is the result of the synergy of three factors: the new international security environment, allied pressures, and changes in the imperial political system. Although all three elements undoubtedly had an impact during the Cold War, its end significantly altered their character. Japan's Cold War security environment was relatively stable and predictable. The real threat of attack from the People's Republic of China, North Korea, and the Soviet Union was relatively low and was perceived as such in Japan. American

security guarantees provided sufficient protection against all likely threats. The end of the Cold War, which brought stability and an increased sense of security in Europe, for example, shattered the relatively stable structure of the regional order in Asia and introduced new factors of uncertainty and potential instability.

From Japan's perspective, the most significant challenges are North Korea's aggressive policies and the rapid rise of China's power. North Korea's stance has had the greatest impact on threat perception in Japan, both among elites and the broader public. The 1998 test of the Taepodong ballistic missile, which flew over Japanese territory, and the North Korean authorities' official confirmation of the abduction and imprisonment of Japanese citizens (they were supposed to train North Korean intelligence agents to best blend into Japanese society), made a particularly strong impression on public opinion. For the North Korean ruling regime, the fight against the Japanese occupation is one of its key founding myths. Hence, the North Korean regime frequently uses harsh rhetoric and unrefined threats against the Empire. North Korean spy ships have also frequently operated in Japanese territorial waters. In 2001, the Japanese Coast Guard sank one of these vessels after a long chase (this was the first use of military force by Japanese forces since 1945).Currently, North Korea's aggressive policies and its developing nuclear and missile programs are considered the most serious threats to Japan's national security. However, some commentators believe that these threats have become a useful pretext for those among Japanese leaders who have long advocated for a more active security policy. It cannot be denied that the perceived real threat from North Korea (materialized in the form of ballistic missiles flying over Japanese territory and the presence of North Korean espionage units in Japanese territorial waters) significantly contributed to public acceptance of the expanded missions and powers of the Self-Defense Forces and increasingly closer military cooperation with the United States. In this context, it is worth remembering that the Korean Peninsula has traditionally been an area of particular geopolitical significance for Japan's security interests. Due to its geographical proximity, control of this area would enable a potential adversary to launch an attack on the Japanese archipelago. Of course, this mechanism works both ways – gaining a foothold on the peninsula allowed Japan to begin its expansion into the continent. Hence, Korea has traditionally been the subject of geopolitical rivalry between China and Japan. This dynamic has not completely disappeared in modern times. It's arguable that, from the perspective of both regional powers, the division of the peninsula into two states, one of which is an ally of China and the other at least not a threat to Japan, contributes to the stabilization of this regional system. Although North Korea currently poses the most serious and real challenge to Japan's foreign and security policy, the most important long-term problem is defining the relationship with the largest regional power, the People's Republic of China. Relations between the two countries are currently complex and ambiguous. Dynamically developing trade

leads to growing economic interdependence, facilitated by the complementary nature of both economies (Japan finds the Chinese market and manufacturing potential attractive, while the People's Republic of China benefits from Japanese capital and technology). However, political and security relations remain characterized by a high level of distrust and remain vulnerable to rapid deterioration as a result of various incidents (such as the recent controversy surrounding the Japanese Coast Guard's detention of Chinese fishermen near the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands). The significant potential for conflict inherent in Sino-Japanese relations stems from several sources:

- Rivalry for regional leadership – this was already present during the Pax Sinica, although China's primacy was not challenged at the time. Since the Meiji Restoration, thanks to a radical and effective modernization program, Japan has gained an advantage over the crisis-ridden Imperial China. Although Japan's superpower position was shattered by defeat in World War II, the post-war "economic miracle" allowed the Japanese to economically dominate Asia. Currently, this position is being assumed by the People's Republic of China. Suffice it to say that it has overtaken Japan's position as the world's second-largest economy (based on nominal GDP).
- Territorial disputes – these concern the Senakaku/Diaoyutai Islands and the delimitation of exclusive economic zones in the East China Sea. Although the disputed territories are not without strategic value (primarily due to the natural resource deposits located there), control over them can hardly be considered a priority national interest for either country. In the calculations of Chinese leaders, the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands issue does not have the same significance as other territorial disputes, such as Taiwan (which is a special case) or the South China Sea. The agreement on joint exploitation of natural gas deposits in the disputed part of the East China Sea (the implementation of which is currently suspended) indicates that compromise is possible. It seems that the dispute is fueled to a greater extent by issues of national consciousness and nationalist sentiment, which exist on both sides, but manifest themselves more strongly in the PRC. For many citizens of both the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China on Taiwan, the Japanese "occupation" of the Diaoyutai Islands is a symbolic remnant of the "century of humiliation" when China was under the control of external powers. It is worth noting that incidents related to the islands' status are most often provoked by Chinese non-governmental groups, and the authorities feel compelled to respond given the expected pressure from nationalist public opinion. The situation is different in the East China Sea, where the Chinese government's policy is much more active. This is motivated by more clearly defined interests in the area, concerning energy resources and the desire for naval freedom of maneuver in open ocean waters.
- Competition for access to energy resources and shipping routes – both China and Japan are major importers of energy resources (primarily crude oil), and therefore the smooth functioning of their economies depends on reliable supplies from distant production regions (primarily the Persian Gulf).

With steadily growing demand and limited production growth, the danger of intensified competition for access to supply sources looms. China is often accused of viewing energy security policy as a "zero-sum game." A clear manifestation of the Sino-Japanese rivalry for access to energy resources is the history of the pipeline project running from Russian oil fields near Angarsk. The original plans called for the pipeline to the Chinese city of Daqing. In such a case, China would effectively become the only possible recipient of Siberian oil. The Japanese government has been lobbying hard in Russia for an alternative project, under which the oil would flow to the port of Nakhodka on the Sea of Japan, from where it could be exported by sea to a larger number of customers. Ultimately, however, following a opaque (and seemingly chaotic) decision-making process, a compromise solution was adopted. It assumes that the pipeline will ultimately run to the coast, but a branch will be built to China.[424] For now, thanks to Chinese loans, the most intensive work is being carried out in the Chinese section. Equally important in this context is the security of the shipping routes through which energy resources are delivered to East Asia. Given the expansion and modernization of both China's and Japan's naval forces, both countries are fearful that the other could, in a crisis, use this potential to cut off the other's maritime transport. One reason why the possibility of Taiwan joining the PRC raises significant concerns in Japan is the island's strategic location relative to shipping routes leading to Japan.

- Disputes over the interpretation of history and deeply rooted hostility – both societies harbor deeply rooted prejudices and attitudes of distrust (or even outright hostility) towards each other. This stems largely from the circumstances in which the modern national consciousness of the Chinese and Japanese was formed. In the case of Japan, it was built on pride in the achievements of Meiji modernization and belonging to the developed world, manifested in a denial of belonging to Asia and a sense of superiority vis-à-vis other nations inhabiting it. In contrast, the identity of the People's Republic of China was built on the foundation of the fight against the domination of foreign powers over China. The memory of Japanese aggression and the resistance to it is an inextricable element of this legacy. Patriotic education campaigns conducted by the Chinese authorities perpetuated a negative image of Japan in the minds of successive generations of Chinese. On the other hand, the lack of a clear-cut reconciliation with Japan's wartime past poses a significant obstacle to the development of friendly relations between Japan and the rest of the region. The difficulties in mutual understanding and reconciliation between the two nations were symbolized by the controversy and mass public protests sparked by the Japanese Prime Minister's visits to Yasukuni Shrine and the approval of history textbooks deemed "revisionist" and distorting history for use in some Japanese schools. It is important to remember that differing perceptions of history

[424] L. Goldstein, V. Kozyrev, *China, Japan and the Scramble for Siberia*, „Survival" 2006, Vol. 48, No. 1.

or traditional hostility are not in themselves sources of dispute and conflict in Sino-Japanese relations, but they significantly contribute to the escalation of tensions stemming from very contemporary circumstances and hinder their compromise resolution. It is worth remembering that since the Meiji Restoration, Japan has dealt with China as a significantly weaker partner, while the PRC's power currently equals or even surpasses Japan's. The rapid rise of China's influence over the past two decades has had an impact on Japan's position in the region. Economically, China, thanks in part to its much greater market openness compared to Japan, is effectively taking over the regional leadership position. The rapid modernization of China's naval and air capabilities is raising growing concerns in Japan, especially given the increasingly frequent incidents of Chinese vessels violating airspace and territorial waters.

Even in the post-Cold War period, the alliance with the United States remained one of the most important factors determining the direction of Japan's foreign and security policy. The new international environment changed the balance of benefits and losses resulting from mutual cooperation. Japan felt increasingly threatened by both abandonment and entanglement. The American ally began to increasingly insist on Japan's greater participation in protecting common security interests, not only in the Asia-Pacific region but also on a global scale. This trend was already evident in the first half of the 1990s (in connection with the Gulf War of 1990–1991 and the first Korean nuclear crisis of 1993–1994). The new expectations of the American side were epitomized by the Nye-Armitag Commission report, which envisioned Japan as the "Great Britain of the Far East."[425] Hence, the influence of so-called baiatsu (a Japanese term for pressure exerted by an American ally, considered a policy-shaping factor) as a catalyst for security policy reforms steadily grew. This trend culminated in Japan's participation in the global war on terrorism and the involvement of the Self-Defense Forces in operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. It cannot be denied, however, that "revisionist" leaders (especially Prime Minister Koizumi) used baiatsu as a useful argument for their preferred solutions. Questions inevitably arose about whether participation in American military operations truly served Japan's national interests. Undoubtedly, during the Bush Jr. presidency, concerns about the possibility of Japan becoming entangled in American preventive wars reached a peak. On the other hand, the almost unconditional support for American policy at that time served as a safeguard against the possibility of the ally abandoning important regional issues.

Japan is currently highly sensitive to the threat posed by North Korea (primarily its nuclear and missile arsenal). During the ongoing (and yet another) nuclear crisis, Japanese decision-makers have expressed the opinion that the United States has essentially accepted North Korea's possession

[425] D. Asher, *Could Japan become the „Great Britain of the Far East?"*, „Asia-Pacific Review" 2001, Vol. 8, No. 2; J.J. Przystup, P.C. Saunders, *Visions of Order: Japan and China in U.S. Strategy*, „Strategic Forum" 2006, No. 220.

of nuclear weapons and that its primary concern is preventing their further proliferation. Meanwhile, for the Empire, the most important goal is the denuclearization of the peninsula.[426] Japanese elites also view the ever-tightening US-PRC cooperation with distrust. The increasingly significant (and positive) role China plays in US regional (and global) strategy leads to concerns about the possibility of an "alliance reversal." Under this scenario, a dynamically developing China, with its growing influence in the region, could potentially be a more attractive partner than a stagnant and isolated Japan. Risks and concerns on the American side have also increased. These concerns include the possibility of unwanted entanglement in Japanese conflicts with North Korea, or especially with the PRC (due to the territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyou Islands). Simultaneously, criticism of the ally's reluctance to develop the operational dimension of the alliance intensified. It was becoming increasingly clear that, in the event of a crisis, Japan could not be relied upon to provide tangible military support. Moreover, the Empire demonstrated that, in matters of vital national interests, it was ready to pursue policies that were independent, even at odds with those of the United States. A perfect example is the history of the contract for the exploitation of oil fields in Azadegan, Iran, by Japanese companies.[427]

The post-Cold War period was also characterized by significant changes in Japan's domestic politics, which created favorable conditions for reforms in the field of security policy. The "1955 System" gradually disintegrated. Most significant from the perspective of the subject under discussion was the decline of the Socialist Party as the main opposition force. After Socialist leader Tomichi Murayama led a coalition government with the LDP, his party lost the trust of most traditional voters.[428] This stemmed from the fact that the price of participating in government was the negation of the pillars of the left's entire postwar political program, such as recognizing the legality of the Self-Defense Forces and the validity of the alliance with the US. The marginalization of political forces advocating pacifism and antimilitarism significantly facilitated the overcoming of the constraints imposed on postwar security policy. Furthermore, a shift in the balance of power also occurred within the LDP. At the beginning of the 21st century, "revisionists" seized power within the party, advocating a gradual abandonment of the Yoshida Doctrine. In the past decade, three politicians associated with this ideology served as prime minister (Junichiro Koizumi, Shinzo Abe, and Taro Aso). A major facilitation in implementing their program was the strengthening of the prime minister's position, resulting from the administrative reforms implemented under Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto. These included the expansion and strengthening of administrative

[426] C.H. Hughes, Not quite the „Great Britain of the Far East": Japan's security, the US–Japan alliance and the „war on terror" in East Asia, „Cambridge Review of International Affairs" 2007, Vol. 20, No. 2; N. Bisley, op. cit., p. 89.
[427] M.H. Armacost, Japan Tilting Closer to Washington, [in:] Strategic Asia 2003–04: Fragility and Crisis, eds. R.J. Ellings, A.L. Friedberg, M. Wills, Seattle 2003, p. 94.
[428] K.B. Pyle, op. cit., pp. 298–299.

bodies directly subordinate to the head of government, commonly known as the Kantei (after the name of the prime minister's official residence). They began to play a significant role in the formulation and execution of foreign policy. There is even talk of so-called "Kantei diplomacy," a situation in which the Cabinet Secretariat actively supports the prime minister in making political decisions and coordinates their implementation. This has led to a gradual evolution from the traditional "bottom-up" system of decision-making (through a complex process of party and bureaucratic consultations) towards a more centralized model in which the prime minister, supported by the Kantei, imposes policy decisions from above.[429]

Considering the trends outlined above, it can be assumed that the evolution of Japanese security policy toward so-called "strategic normality" will continue. However, the pace and ultimate outcome of this process remain uncertain. Japan's international security environment is unlikely to allow for a return to a limited policy embodied in the Yoshida Doctrine. Although the situation in Asia remains dynamic, developments on the Korean Peninsula and the increasing assertiveness of the Chinese government in the international arena suggest a deepening uncertainty in the region, which in turn will provide a strong incentive for an active security policy. Furthermore, over the past two decades, two pillars of Japan's Cold War security policy have weakened: the US position in the region and the strength of the economic instruments at the Japanese government's disposal.

The United States remains the largest military power globally and regionally, but its position (particularly in the economic and diplomatic spheres) is threatened by the rise of so-called "emerging powers" (especially the People's Republic of China). With the changing balance of power, the US's ability and willingness (especially given its costly involvement in the Middle East) to ensure Japan's security may be questioned. At the same time, the stagnation in which the Japanese economy has been mired for two decades and the growing economic power of other countries in the region (especially the People's Republic of China) mean that the economic means of influence supporting foreign policy are significantly weaker and therefore less effective than, for example, in the late 1980s. It is also important to remember that the outlines of a consensus have emerged in Japanese politics regarding maintaining the current security policy direction. After taking power in the August 2009 House of Representatives elections, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) did not implement any radical changes in this area (except for the termination of the Maritime Self-Defense Force mission in the Indian Ocean). However, significant factors limiting the further "normalization" of Japanese security policy must not be overlooked. One of the most serious is the crisis of political leadership (which affects the entirety of state policy) and the lack of a coherent vision for the country's political and economic future. Since Junichiro Koizumi stepped down as Prime Minister

[429] T. Shinoda, *op. cit.*, pp. 63–85.

in 2006, Japan has had five prime ministers. Despite its decisive victory in the recent elections, the DPJ remains internally divided and struggles to formulate a comprehensive vision for the reforms it wishes to undertake. In the area of security policy, this indecision was symbolized by the handling of Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama's government's handling of the relocation of the US Marine Corps Futenma Air Base on Okinawa. During the election campaign, the future prime minister personally promised the island's residents that the base would be permanently removed. Later, however, due to the crisis that this issue caused in relations with the ally, he sought a compromise solution, until ultimately the existing plans to relocate the base within Okinawa were retained, which led to the Prime Minister's resignation.

An equally important issue, as T. Yoshihara and J. R. Holmes[430] aptly noted, is ensuring the financial foundation for the further expansion of the Self-Defense Forces' mission spectrum and capacity. Currently, Japanese leaders demand that the Self-Defense Forces carry out an increasing number of missions with an unchanged budget. A complete "normalization" of defense policy would require significantly higher financial outlays. The difficult situation of public finances (Japan currently has the highest level of public debt relative to GDP among developed countries) makes such a scenario unlikely. A shortage of human resources may also pose a problem. According to a forecast by the National Institute for Population and Social Security Research, by 2050 the Empire will have only 95 million inhabitants, two-fifths of whom will be elderly (of post-working age).[431] Since its inception, the Self-Defense Forces have faced significant difficulties in achieving their target personnel levels. These challenges will undoubtedly intensify as unfavorable demographic trends continue. However, the Defense White Paper published by the Ministry of Defense in 2010 emphasizes that replacing manpower with modern technologies could be a solution to this problem.[432] However, it should be remembered that technology cannot fully replace people and is, of course, very expensive in itself.

The analysis by K. B. Pyle and E. Heginbotham from the beginning of the century, outlining five possible scenarios for Japan's strategy in the 21st century, remains relevant.[433] The first scenario envisions a bilateral pro-American strategy, implying further strengthening of the alliance and treating it as an instrument for strengthening regional, and even global, security. The second scenario – a regional Asian strategy – would lead to loosening ties with the United States (but without severing the alliance) and deeper integration (primarily economic) with other East and Southeast

[430] T. Yoshihara, J.R. Holmes, *Japan's Emerging Maritime Strategy: Out of Sync or Out of Reach?*, „Comparative Strategy" 2008, No. 27.
[431] *Japanese immigration. Don't bring me your huddled masses*, „The Economist", January 3, 2009, http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id=E1_TNRGSPNR (accessed: November 22, 2009).
[432] *Defence of Japan 2010*, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2010.html (accessed: October 25, 2010).
[433] K.B. Pyle, E. Heginbotham, *Japan*, [in:] *Strategic Asia 2001–02: Power and Purpose*, eds. R.J. Ellings, A.L. Friedberg, *op. cit.*, pp. 82–92.

Asian countries. The global institutional strategy, as the third possible scenario, sees a strong commitment to global multilateral institutions (e.g., the UN) as a path to great power status and ensuring the country's security. The fourth scenario is a continuation of the existing comprehensive security strategy, while the fifth – a unilateral (Gaullist) strategy – implies remilitarization, the dissolution of the alliance with the United States, and attempts to ensure security through domestic means. It is highly probable that the actual shape of Imperial policy will not directly correspond to any of these theoretical models. Rather, one can expect mutual interpenetration and complementation of individual orientations.

The comprehensive security model continues to strongly influence the views of Japan's strategic elites. Recent LDP governments (primarily those of J. Koizumi, S. Abe, and T. Aso) attempted to pursue a bilateral strategy with the support of the George W. Bush Jr. administration. The current DPJ government, at least in its declarations, envisions a more regionally oriented policy. A unilateral strategy has never had many significant political supporters. Not only would it be extremely costly (due to assuming full responsibility for security and defense), but it would also trigger a wave of strong concerns and even hostility in the region. It is worth emphasizing once again that the concept of comprehensive security places equal importance on military and economic security. In this context, current Japanese policy can be viewed as a "bifurcated" strategy based on two pillars. In the economic sphere, Japan is increasingly linked to the region, but in the strategic and military sphere, it still relies on its alliance with the United States. Within this approach, it can be assumed that Japan will strive to deepen economic integration with Asia (e.g., through institutions such as ASEAN+3 or the EAS). However, there are too great differences of interest, layers of distrust, and potential rivalry between Japan and other countries in the region (especially China) to allow integration to be transferred to the political sphere in the foreseeable future. Hence, the second pillar of Japan's strategy will likely be maintaining a close political and military alliance with the United States as a pillar of military security and protection against potential threats emanating from the continent. Japanese policy over the last decade has been moving in this direction. Conservative governments have favored closer cooperation with the US, but have also sought to develop regional economic cooperation. The new Democratic government, on the other hand, places greater emphasis on the Asian dimension of foreign policy, but is also committed to maintaining the alliance. Neither option rules out increased involvement in multilateral international forums. Supporters of elements of the global strategy can be found on both sides of the Japanese political spectrum (i.e., in both the LDP and the DPJ). However, it is doubtful that it will become the primary determinant of national strategy. This is supported by the inability of international organizations to address significant international issues (especially security issues), particularly in recent years. It is also important to remember that broad global engagement is costly,

perhaps prohibitively so for the long-term struggling Japanese economy. While a bifurcation strategy (basing military security on the alliance and economic prosperity on regional integration) could prove highly beneficial for Japan, it is uncertain whether it could be sustained in the long term. If the overall state of relations in the region is friendly, meaning primarily if the US and China are oriented more towards cooperation than competition, the "decoupling" strategy could prove effective. However, if a significant conflict of interests were to arise, Japan would have to choose between its main economic partner (China) and its strategic partner (the US).

The Japanese can be considered pioneers of the contemporary so-called "broad" understanding of national security. This was exemplified by the concept of "comprehensive security," formulated in the early 1980s, although it had been present in Japanese security policy practice for much longer. It should be remembered, however, that the pursuit of a "demilitarized" security policy was made possible largely by the traditional military security provided by the American ally. In the post-Cold War period, when it seemed that the "new" approach would become universally accepted, changes in the security environment forced Japan to shift toward a more traditional policy. This leads to the conclusion that the assumptions of "comprehensive security" have not become completely obsolete, but the traditional military component remains an indispensable and fundamental element of any national security policy.

The Imperial Japanese security policy in the post-World War II period has been a continuing source of intense interest among both practitioners and scholars of international relations. This stems from two fundamental premises. The first is the country's traditionally significant position in the international balance of power in the Asian region (whose importance for the global order is constantly growing). The second stems from the fact that, at the dawn of the Cold War, Japanese leaders adopted a unique foreign and security policy strategy based on the renunciation of instruments of force and the reduction of defense potential to the bare minimum. It was also difficult to explain from the perspective of the traditional perspective on international relations (based on political realism), according to which a state's growing economic potential should lead to great-power aspirations and increased armament. It is particularly intriguing that the fundamental transformation of the international order (both global and regional) brought about by the end of the Cold War initiated a process of evolution of Japanese security policy in the opposite direction from its previous course. A more uncertain security environment, the constraints of the alliance with the US, and significant changes in the country's political system have led to a gradual shift away from a formula of drastically limited defense capabilities and toward the expansion of armed forces and their fulfillment of an increasingly broader range of missions. Answering the question of the content and scope of these changes, their causes, and consequences, is crucial for analyzing the current and future shape of the international security environment in Asia.

# Chapter IV

# Japan's contemporary security environment

## 4.1. China as a Security Challenge – American Security Strategy in the Indo-Pacific Context

The primary threat not only to America's position in the Indo-Pacific region but also to Japan's security comes from the growing defensive and offensive capabilities of the People's Liberation Army. Aaron Friedberg argues that "pushing" the United States out of Asia is a fundamental requirement for China to pursue its hegemonic interests. Friedberg sees the American alliance system in East Asia, referred to as the San Francisco System or the *hub-and-spokes* system, as the most serious obstacle to Chinese expansion in the future.[434] Other renowned researchers, such as Thomas Christensen,[435] Joseph Nye,[436] and John J. Mearsheimer, hold a similar position.[437] Mearsheimer argues that China will strive to dominate its immediate neighborhood in the coming years, much as the United States achieved in the Western Hemisphere in the 19th century. However, this scenario requires sustained high economic growth, which is the foundation of the country's material power. The dynamic growth of the Chinese economy has led to a proportional increase in military spending, which, according to official data, remains at 1.9% of GDP. According to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Chinese defense spending reached $250 billion in 2018—three and a half times more than Saudi Arabia ($67.55 billion), four times more than Russia ($61.4 billion), and more than five times more than Japan ($46.61 billion), second only to the United States ($648 billion).[438] A significant portion of the Chinese armed forces' resources are devoted to developing missile forces, air forces, and navies. In recent years, the latter has come to be seen as a vital instrument for challenging US supremacy in East Asia and ensuring China's dominance in the First and Second Island Chains.

For a very long time, the navy's limited capabilities and continental orientation meant that maritime strategy focused almost exclusively on securing the "near seas" comprising the so-called "first island chain." Admiral Liu Huaqing, considered the "founding father" and "key architect" of China's maritime strategy, defined it as encompassing "the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea,[439] the

[434] A.L. Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2011.
[435] T.J. Christensen, The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2015.
[436] J.S. Nye Jr., Is the American Century Over?, Cambridge–Malden 2015.
[437] J.J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York 2014.
[438] SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex.
[439] J.R. Holmes, T. Yoshihara, Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century: The Turn to Mahan, London–New York 2008, p. 27.

South China Sea, the Spratly Islands and Taiwan, the waters within and immediately beyond the Okinawa island chain, and the northern Pacific Ocean." Gaining control of the "first chain" area remains a priority, as it serves three fundamental purposes. First, control of this area significantly improves defense capabilities, creating additional strategic depth that can be leveraged to deploy defensive, reconnaissance, and offensive systems. Second, space and bases can also be used as a springboard for power projection and pressure on other regional actors, including through control of sea lanes of communication. Third, undisputed maritime dominance enables the economic exploitation of this area, rich in oil, gas, and fishing grounds. China's shift towards an oceanic strategy became particularly noticeable after 2015,[440] but the leading role of the fleet in securing regional interests was noticed by China much earlier.

The 2004 Security White Paper already indicated that priority "must be given to the Navy, Air Force and the Second Artillery Corps."[441] This idea was expressed more directly in the 2015 *Military Strategy*, whose authors declared that "the traditional mentality that land prevails over sea must be abandoned" and that "great importance must be attached to the management of the seas and oceans and the protection of maritime rights and interests." While increasing the Navy's capabilities has been a modernization priority since the early 21st century, the last few years have seen a shift in emphasis from defending coastal waters to fulfilling missions in the "far seas." The White Paper on Security states that the PLA Navy is "accelerating the process of transforming its mission from defending the near seas to protecting missions in the far seas."[442] However, the changes are not limited to the conceptual sphere. Since the beginning of the 21st century, China has been commissioning new naval vessels at an exceptionally rapid pace. The PLA Navy is already the largest naval formation in terms of number of vessels. China is also a world leader in the rate of fleet tonnage expansion. Between 2014 and 2018, it increased by approximately 678,000 tons, more than the combined tonnage of the entire fleets of Great Britain and Spain.[443] In 2015-2017, the tonnage of vessels launched in Chinese shipyards was almost twice as high as the tonnage of US Navy ships.[444] This dynamic is highly likely to continue into the future. A report prepared for the US Congress predicts that by 2030, the Chinese Navy will have 425 vessels.[445] It should be noted that a significant portion of the ships in service with the PLA are smaller (corvettes up to 2,000 tons

[440] P. Paszak, The Security Strategy of the People's Republic of China in the Light of the 2019 Defense White Paper, „The Bellona Quarterly" 2020, Vol. 700, no. 1, p. 58.
[441] Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, China's National Defense in 2004, Beijing, December 2004.
[442] The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, China's Military Strategy, Beijing, May 2015.
[443] China Power Team, How is China Modernizing its Navy?, China Power, December 17, 2018 (updated August 25, 2020).
[444] N. Childs, T. Waldwyn, China's naval shipbuilding: delivering on its ambition in a big way, London, 1 May 2018.
[445] *China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress*, Washington, 3 December 2020, p. 32.

displacement) and medium-sized (frigates around 4,000 tons displacement). The US Navy still has an advantage in tonnage, estimated at over 2 million tons. This is due to the specific nature of the US naval forces, which rely on destroyers and cruisers with displacements of 9,000-15,000 tons and 9,000-11,000 tons, respectively. Furthermore, there is a clear advantage in aircraft carrier battle groups. Currently, the balance of power is 11 to 2 in favor of the US, although in reality it is even greater, as all US vessels are equipped with nuclear propulsion and can accommodate more aircraft.

At the end of 2019, the first indigenously constructed aircraft carrier, the *Shandong* (Type 001A), modeled on the post-Soviet *Liaoning* (Type 001), was commissioned into service with the PLA Navy.[446] Unlike the *Nimitz*- and *Gerald Ford*-class aircraft carriers, the ship lacks nuclear propulsion, which allows for extended operations in open waters without refueling. The report predicts that China's third aircraft carrier (Type 002) will enter service in 2024, but like its predecessors, it will be equipped with conventional propulsion. However, a report by a congressional committee on security and economic relations between the two countries predicts that the carrier fleet will increase by two to six units by 2035.[447] At the same time, the number of the most advanced *Renhai*-class destroyers is expected to increase from 1 to 12 ships. The extent to which this quantitative change in the PLA Navy is also qualitative is debatable, but the fact remains that increasingly advanced vessels are being launched, posing a proportionally greater threat. This applies to both destroyers and *US Navy* guided missile cruiser aircraft carriers. By 2019, six *Renhai*-class destroyers (Type 055) and 23 *Luyang* III destroyers (Type 052D) had been launched in Chinese shipyards, which are to form the core of aircraft carrier battle groups. *Renhai*-class destroyers, equipped with advanced radar systems, *electronic warfare systems* (EWS), anti-ship missiles, and guided missiles, pose a threat to all *US Navy* units in service.[448] Also highly rated are the Type 052D ships, equipped with a 64-cell vertical missile launch system, which offers the ability to engage targets with precision missiles in the air, on the water and potentially also on land.[449]

The military threat posed by the PRC, however, stems not solely from its growing naval strength. China's missile program has made significant progress over the past two decades in terms of the number and sophistication of missiles and the platforms capable of delivering them. Among these, the DF-21, DF-26, and DF-17 medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles have attracted particular attention in the US military. They constitute one of the main assets of the Chinese

[446] P. Paszak, Shandong wchodzi do służby. Dlaczego nowy chiński lotniskowiec niewiele zmienia w równowadze sił USA-Chiny, INE, 30 grudnia 2019.
[447] 2020 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Washington, December 2020, p. 396.
[448] E. Wertheim, China's Luyang III/Type 052D Destroyer Is a Potent Adversary, „Proceedings" (US Naval Institute), October 2020.
[449] D. Caldwell, J. Freda, L.J. Goldstein, China Maritime Report: China's Dreadnought? The PLA Navy's Type 055 Cruiser and Its Implications for the Future Maritime Security Environment, Newport, 2020.

missile forces and a threat to US forces stationed in the region. The DF-26 has a range of up to 4,000 km, allowing it to engage aircraft carrier battle groups, the Guam base located in the so-called "second island chain," and the Diego Garcia base in the Indian Ocean. The DF-21 and DF-26 entered service between 2010 and 2020, making them one of the most modern weapons in the PLA's inventory. In addition, there is the DF-17 hypersonic missile (HGV) development program, with a range of 1,800-2,500 km and capable of carrying both conventional and thermonuclear payloads. Unlike conventional ballistic missiles, the DF-17's low flight trajectory makes it more difficult for enemy radar and defense systems to detect. The DF-17, DF-26, and 21-D missiles are part of a comprehensive missile development program, the progress of which prompted Washington to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty on August 2, 2020.

An important element of the global deterrence strategy is the DF-41 intercontinental ballistic missile, capable of delivering payloads to ranges of 10,000-15,000 km. In 2014, they entered the testing phase, and in April 2017, the first missile brigade equipped with 12 DF-41 missiles was established. The missiles' range allows them to effectively engage targets within the United States, significantly enhancing the PLA's deterrence and counterattack capabilities. These capabilities are complemented by the *Jin*-class (Type 094) nuclear-powered submarines equipped with JL-2 intercontinental ballistic missiles. These vessels constitute a significant tool in nuclear deterrence, as they can reach three-quarters of the United States territory when properly deployed. The Type 096, equipped with the new-generation JL-3 missile, is planned to enter service in the 2020-2030 decade. Forecasts indicate a greater range (by 5,000 km) and the ability to carry multiple independent warheads (MIRVs) on a single missile, allowing for simultaneous engagement of multiple targets.

The comprehensive modernization and development of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) poses one of the main security challenges in the region. At the same time, however, Beijing's more aggressive policies have provided a powerful impetus for strengthening cooperation within the Quad format and promoting the Indo-Pacific concept. From Beijing's perspective, these actions have a single goal: a policy of containment against the PRC.[450] For this reason, the Chinese authorities are critical of the concept itself, and the term itself is absent from key strategic documents. While official discourse lacks direct references to the concept, it remains a focus of Chinese decision-making. This is not without reason, as consolidating a coalition focused on limiting China's progress could prevent the realization of Xi's great-power ambitions and the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation. In practice, realizing Beijing's intentions would entail the forced incorporation of Taiwan and the South China Sea area delineated by the so-called "nine-dash line." The growing ambitions and power projection capabilities, coupled with China's more confrontational actions, will

[450] Kai He, Understanding the dynamics of the Indo-Pacific: US–China strategic competition, regional actors, and beyond, International Affairs, Volume 96, Issue 1, January 2020,

inevitably lead to increased tensions with other regional powers. Economic cooperation remains the main tool for disrupting attempts to consolidate the region's states. Beijing will not relinquish its territorial claims, which it describes as "vital interests." The CCP leadership's nationalist rhetoric and belief in the need to rebuild its sphere of influence in Asia make a real return to the idea of "peaceful development" unlikely. However, Communist China possesses an argument that could potentially disrupt American attempts to build a broader coalition.

The 2017 National Security Strategy identified China as a "revisionist power,"[451] and the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) stated: "Congress declares that, over the long term, the strategic competition with China is a top priority for the United States, requiring integration across the various elements of national power."[452] As the COVID-19 pandemic progressed and language on both sides hardened, China was even explicitly described as a threat, not just a challenge. This shift in language in the documents reflects the conviction among decision-makers that China poses the most serious, long-term strategic threat to U.S. security and interests. During Donald Trump's presidency (2017-2021), a perceptual shift occurred among American elites. The confrontational rhetoric of the 2016 campaign and the actions taken afterward complemented a broader process of evolving perception of China—from opportunity, to challenge, to threat.[453] Previous administrations also recognized the growing problems associated with China's growing power. However, even during the Obama era, more conciliatory and multilateral solutions to the growing tensions were sought. Assertive policies toward China also gained a growing number of supporters within the Democratic Party. However, it was Donald Trump who brought the China issue so prominently into the public debate, making a return to Obama's policies extremely difficult. Currently, there is a bipartisan consensus that China poses the most serious challenge to American hegemony, requiring an assertive US response.

The Donald Trump administration has undertaken extensive economic, diplomatic, and military actions to curb China's comprehensive rise. Compared to the 2014-2017 period, the defense budget has increased significantly, reaching $738 billion in 2020.[454] The Indo-Pacific has become a "priority theater" for the United States because it concentrates key opportunities, challenges, and threats. From a military perspective, the primary challenge for the US is its limited ability to project power, resulting from the dispersion of US forces across several bases in Japan, Korea, Australia, India, and the second island chain (Guam, Mariana Islands). While US forces still possess a military

[451] The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2017.
[452] US Congress, H.R.5515 – John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019.
[453] P. Paszak, Ewolucja percepcji Chin w strategiach bezpieczeństwa USA w latach 1987–2006, „Wiedza Obronna", vol. 266–267, nr 1–2, s. 57–76.
[454] US Congress, S.1790 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, 116th Congress (2019–2020).

advantage over China in absolute terms, the distance between the two powers and the fact that China operates from its mainland base puts it in a more favorable position. The United States still possesses greater military power in absolute terms, but when factors related to force dispersion and geography are taken into account, the results are significantly more negative. American authorities are well aware of this, as official strategic documents refer to the "tyranny of distance."[455] In this light, strengthening existing alliances and forging new partnerships in the region becomes imperative. This new "networked security architecture" is seen as a necessary instrument to prevent or slow down shifts in the balance of power that are detrimental to US interests.

One key element of the revised posture aimed at realizing the vision of a "free and open Indo-Pacific" is improving the logistics, basing, and defense infrastructure of the U.S. military and its allies. The idea of creating a dedicated fund focused on improving these attributes was embodied in the Indo-Pacific Deterrence Initiative (IPDI), which is slated to receive $1.4 billion in fiscal year 2021 and $4.5 billion in fiscal year 2022.[456] The IPDI aims to mitigate threats posed by increasingly sophisticated Chinese missile, naval, and air forces, which are considered a primary threat to U.S. bases and aircraft carrier groups in the region. The long-term goal is to "rebuild competitive advantage"[457] in the region through defense infrastructure investments, which are expected to reach $20 billion by 2026. The U.S. authorities have also initiated a reform of the Marine Corps, which aims to enhance capabilities in: "long-range precision fires; medium- and long-range anti-aircraft systems; long-range, high-endurance, unmanned systems with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); electronic warfare (EW); and lethal strikes." The *Marine Corps* reform aims to adapt the force to the challenges posed by China, geography, and a digitalized battlefield.

One of the key challenges for the United States will be to convince other regional actors that it remains committed and maintains sufficient capabilities to provide public goods and protect its allies and partners. IPDI is one of the measures taken to assure partners that Donald Trump and the incoming administration are taking the issues seriously. Others include increased activity by the US Navy and Air Force in the disputed waters of the South China Sea (*Freedom of Navigation Operations*), as well as joint military exercises, primarily with Japan, Australia, and India (Malabar, RIMPAC, and others). Maintaining a high level of operational readiness, force readiness, and interoperability with partner militaries is one of the pillars of the US strategic posture in the region. The US deterrence strategy is based on a nuclear triad comprising land, sea, and air platforms. In the

[455] U.S. Department of Defense, Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region, Washington 2019, p. 20; U.S. National Defense Strategy Commission (NDSC), Providing for the Common Defense: The Assessment and Recommendations of the National Defense Strategy Commission, Washington 2018, p. 34.
[456] US Congress, H.R.6613 – Indo-Pacific Deterrence Initiative, 116th Congress (2019–2020).
[457] Statement of Admiral Philip S. Davidson, U.S. Navy Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Posture.

maritime domain, the main deterrent tools are *Ohio*-class submarines, B-1, B-2, and B-52 strategic bombers, and land-based platforms will also be used to deter potential Chinese aggression. The current strategy is intended to prevent Beijing from mistakenly claiming it could secure an advantage through limited use of nuclear capabilities within the theater.[458] Given its limited resources, the US government will be forced to pay greater attention to its maritime balancing strategy by supporting the defense efforts of regional allies and partners and maintaining a stable military presence. Empowering partners entails assuming greater responsibility for ensuring security, with US intervention viewed as a last resort.

The United States may gradually reduce its military presence in Europe and the Middle East, placing greater emphasis on allocating resources to the Indo-Pacific region. Maintaining an independent Taiwan from the People's Republic of China is crucial to the success of the US Indo-Pacific strategy. Since the end of World War II, Taiwan has been viewed as a key strategic point in Asia, holding continental China in check. In 1950, General Douglas McArthur described the Formosa as an unsinkable aircraft carrier,[459] and Secretary Dean Acheson included it in the so-called defense parameter. The PLA's capture of the island would also open the door to further expansion in the Western Pacific and significantly increase the strategic depth separating China from a potential adversary. The loss of Taiwan would also be a serious blow to the US's comprehensive system of alliances worldwide. Although the United States is not formally obligated to defend Taiwan, the lack of a decisive and effective response would heighten doubts about Washington's ability to fulfill its allied obligations. The PRC seizes control of the island. The deepening crisis in relations with the US and the disruptions resulting from the pandemic have heightened concerns about PRC aggression against Taiwan. In July, Taiwan's Foreign Minister Joseph Wu stated that China is accelerating preparations to resolve the Taiwan issue. The threat is consistently growing.[460]

The scenario of a Sino-American conflict is increasingly being considered in military and expert circles[461] and in the press. Publicly published analyses unanimously indicate the growing chances of the PRC in a potential armed conflict over Taiwan.[462] The key to securing US interests globally remains a powerful navy and air force, reinforced by a comprehensive network of bases, alliances, and agreements. These elements constitute important elements of strategic thinking, as directly reflected in some strategic documents. In a December 2020 report by the US Department of

[458] U.S. Department of Defense, *Nuclear Posture Review*, Washington 2018, p. 32.
[459] *Memorandum on Formosa*, by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief, Far East, and Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, Tokyo, Japan, June 14, 1950.
[460] M. Coleman, *Chinese Military Threat on the Rise: Foreign Minister*, *Taipei Times*, July 23, 2020.
[461] James A. Winnefeld and Michael J. Morell, *Proceedings*, Vol. 146, No. 8/1, August 2020, p. 1410.
[462] RAND, *The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996–2017*, Santa Monica, 2017; U.S. National Defense Commission, *Providing for the Common Defense: The Assessment and Recommendations of the National Defense Strategy Commission*, 2018.

the Navy, the authors explicitly stated that: "The United States is a maritime power. Our security and prosperity depend on the seas."[463] In classical geopolitical thought, the United States is a prime example of a maritime power (thalassocracy) that owes its success to military control of key communication routes. The lack of threats in its immediate vicinity and access to two oceans, in the light of Alfred Mahan's theories, predestined the United States to the role of an ocean power. It would be difficult to name a more influential theorist of maritime strategy who contributed to shaping US policy to a similar extent to Mahan.

This strong maritime orientation means that the balance of power in the seas and oceans surrounding Asia will be one of the key dimensions of US-China rivalry. Preventing the PLA Navy from dominating the region's waters is one of the conditions for maintaining the current security architecture. US activity in the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca should also be viewed in these terms. The high frequency of maneuvers and free-navigation operations stems from two fundamental factors. First, extending sovereign control over areas it claims (the "nine-dash area" or "first island chain") would expand China's strategic depth and provide better opportunities to control trade flows. This change would have significant military and economic implications. Militarily, it would enhance the PLA's ability to defend Chinese territory through the installation of warning systems, defensive and offensive weapons, and the expansion of its logistics base. Economically, it would partially make maritime transport of goods dependent on Beijing's will. In the event of a conflict of interests and a diplomatic crisis, a likely scenario could be a blockade of goods by PLA units. Equally important is the second factor, which relates to the perception of the United States in Asia and globally and the stability of the order it has established since the end of the Cold War. The United States' inaction in the face of attempts to control the South China Sea or Taiwan would be a critical blow to its belief in its ability to guarantee the security of its allies and adhere to established principles. This belief in the US's ability to intervene in defense of its closest partners is the glue that holds together the San Francisco alliance system and the North Atlantic Alliance. If this belief were to be so profoundly undermined, it is expected that most Asian countries would undertake a far-reaching reorientation of their policies, abandoning their alliance with Washington. Effective competition with China in the region will require a comprehensive and well-thought-out strategy combining political, economic, and military instruments. Since the end of World War II, the foundation has remained unchanged – a network of alliances that serves as the basis for power projection in the region and control of allies. If Washington is to prevail in a long-term confrontation with China, it will be necessary not only to strengthen existing agreements but

[463] U.S. Department of the Navy, Advantage at Sea: Prevailing with Integrated All-Domain Naval Power, December 2020.

also to forge new partnerships with Asian countries.[464] However, strengthening cooperation should extend beyond bilateral US relations with individual countries in the region. A networked security architecture offers a better solution, as it relies less on a single state and more on cooperation between regional actors.

In the material dimension, it is necessary to maintain the offensive capabilities of the forces deployed in Asia.[465] It is important not only to maintain a high numerical strength but also to adapt forces to the changing theater of warfare. The evolution of military technology has led to a high level of computerization of combat operations and a partial redefinition of the role of geography. Technological advances within the PLA and changes in military doctrine mean that operations conducted in cyberspace and outer space must be integrated with operations in conventionally understood space. Attempts to reform the *US Navy* and *Marines* demonstrate that the US authorities are aware of these challenges and will take steps to introduce unmanned units and new types of weapons into service. The "tyranny of distance" will necessitate increased spending on logistics and defense infrastructure under the *Indo-Pacific Deterrence Initiative* (IPDI). Without improving its quality, it will be impossible to fully utilize the potential of even the most advanced weaponry. IPDI also provides opportunities to increase the frequency of exercises with the armed forces of key regional partners and to implement free navigation operations. One possible approach is to attempt to initially institutionalize the Quad format by establishing a permanent secretariat and establishing a budget. This would require the signing of a binding international agreement, which would clearly define the goals and principles of cooperation among the member states. A classic military alliance is a very distant scenario, but it is possible to pursue a "middle path" and establish intensive security cooperation without assuming obligations similar to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Initially, it could serve almost exclusively as a coordinator of joint exercises and contacts between the armed forces of each country.[466]

The sale of technologically advanced weapons to allies in Asia remains an important element of China's counterbalancing strategy. The proliferation of F-35 multi-role aircraft is an example of actions leading to increased defense capabilities and interoperability among allied armed forces. From a military strategic perspective, maintaining arms supplies to Taiwan is equally crucial, increasing the chances of effectively defending the island against a potential invasion. However, these supplies should extend beyond the traditional circle of allies. Agreements concluded over the past decade with the Narendra Modi government pave the way for increased arms transfers to India.

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[464] Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *G20 Principles for Quality Infrastructure Investment*.

[465] C. van de Wetering, Changing US Foreign Policy toward India, 2016, p. 191.

[466] H. V. Pant, The US-India-China 'Strategic Triangle': Theoretical, Historical and Contemporary Dimensions, India Review, Vol. 18, No. 4, 2019, pp. 343–347.

The country's existing arms cooperation with Russia constitutes a significant barrier, but the growing threats from China and the convergence of interests between India and the US have the potential to lead to a breakthrough. The sale of selected types of equipment to Southeast Asian countries will also be crucial in arms transfer policy. The enhancement of anti-access capabilities by ASEAN countries will limit the PLA's potential expansion capabilities, particularly in the South China Sea.

The US Indo-Pacific strategy must also encompass investment and development. One of the main arguments for cooperation with China is the broad scope for implementing and securing financing for infrastructure investments. For governments of developing countries in South and Southeast Asia, Beijing's offer is an attractive option. Massive infrastructure deficits and limited creditworthiness cause ASEAN countries to often agree to terms that, in the long run, may bring more harm than benefit. It is in the interest of the United States and its regional allies in Asia – primarily India, South Korea, and Japan – to coordinate efforts to provide these countries with appropriate counteroffers. A potential platform for such efforts is the *Blue Dot Network*,[467] a US initiative aimed at building "high-quality" infrastructure in accordance with the principles of the G20 and the principles of sustainable development.

The United States should make greater efforts to foster political dialogue with Southeast Asian countries. The last two ASEAN summits in Bangkok and Jakarta (2019 and 2020) lacked high-level American representation. Since the early 2000s, China's influence in the Indochina Peninsula has grown significantly. This trend requires an adequate response from Washington; otherwise, it risks further weakening its position.

### 4.2. Senkaku Islands Dispute

Contemporary international law doctrine distinguishes several paths to the legal acquisition of territorial sovereignty, although attempts to classify them raise numerous controversies.[468] The canon of commonly accepted methods of extending territorial sovereignty, giving not only the right to exercise state competences, but also the right to dispose of the acquired area with erga omnes effects,[469] includes: appropriation of no man's land (terra nullius), adverse possession, natural increase, cessions and plebiscites. In the presented analysis of the territorial dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Archipelago, only two of the above-mentioned methods of acquiring territory are applicable: appropriation of no man's land and adverse possession; the others can be ignored. It is believed that drawing a strict distinction between appropriation and adverse possession

[467] P. Paszak, *Resisting the Storm: India, US, China and the Future of Quad. Online Interview with Dr. Jagannath Panda*, INE, November 3, 2020, https://kopia.ine.org.pl/resisting-the-storm-india-us-china-and-the-future-of-quad-online-interview-with-dr-jagannath-panda/.
[468] R. Bierzanek, J. Symonides, *Prawo międzynarodowe publiczne*, Warsaw, 1999.
[469] *Encyklopedia prawa międzynarodowego i stosunków międzynarodowych*, Warsaw, 1976.

in international law is not an easy task. This is due to the fact that both concepts are based on the principle of effective control,[470] which has replaced the previously prevailing concepts of discovery and symbolic annexation as providing sufficient grounds for acquiring legal title. Effective occupation, despite its diminishing significance in recent decades due to its inconsistency with contemporary legal norms and the disappearance of areas that could be considered terra nullius, can still confer title to newly created islands or abandoned territories. This concept is also crucial when attempting to resolve territorial disputes, as it allows for the assessment of claims based on it. This analysis of the Sino-Japanese dispute also draws on this concept.

Official diplomatic relations between the People's Republic of China and Japan were established on September 29, 1972, with the announcement of the Joint Communique "ending the abnormal state of affairs" that had existed between the two countries until then. Relations between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Japan have been one of the most important factors shaping the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region for at least a dozen years.[471] An analysis of their 30-year relationship leads to the conclusion that the increasingly intense political and economic cooperation serves to stabilize both mutual relations and the international situation in the entire region. However, it is also noticeable that in the current post-Cold War era, as both countries seek their optimal international role,[472] their relations are still infused with a spirit of rivalry. This rivalry manifests itself in limited military contacts, recurring issues of "coming to terms with the past,"[473] and unresolved territorial issues, exemplified by the dispute over sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, which has been ongoing since the early 1970s. Taiwan is also interested in sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, with claims somewhat aligned with those of the PRC government. Furthermore, Japan is in dispute with South Korea over the Tok-do/Takeshima Islands and with Russia over the Kuril Islands/Northern Territories. The dispute concerns an archipelago located in the East China Sea, consisting of eight uninhabited, water-free islets with a total area of nearly 7 km². However, it should be noted that the size of the maritime area (territorial sea and potential exclusive economic zone) and the continental shelf over which sovereignty can be claimed under the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea in the event of an archipelago is at issue is approximately 40,000 km².[474] The archipelago is located approximately 170 km (120 nautical miles) northeast of Taiwan Island and approximately 410 km (200 nautical miles) southwest of

[470] M. N. Shaw, *Prawo międzynarodowe*, Warsaw, 2000, p. 262.
[471] S. Tsang, Japan's Role in the Asia Pacific: The Views from Greater China, Security Dialogue, 1999, Vol. 30, No. 4.
[472] Z. Suisheng, China's Periphery Policy and Its Asian Neighbors, Security Dialogue, 1999, Vol. 30, No. 3.
[473] This includes, among other issues, the Japanese occupation of China in the 1930s and 1940s, the issue of compensation for "comfort women," as well as the problem of chemical and biological weapons (remnants left behind by Japanese forces from the period of World War II).
[474] M. J. Valencia, Domestic Politics Fuels Northeast Asian Maritime Disputes, in: Asia Pacific: Analysis from the East-West Center, No. 43, April 2000.

Okinawa. All the islets lie in an area with a sea depth of up to 200 meters, on the edge of the Asian continental shelf. Geologically, the islands are separated from Japanese territory by the Ryukyu Trench, which reaches a depth of 7,500 meters. Currently, the islands are under Japanese sovereignty, although they are privately owned.[475]

The dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands emerged internationally in the autumn of 1970, following the report of the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, issued in late 1969. According to the report, the islands contained significant oil and gas deposits, possibly the largest in the East China Sea[476] and among the largest in the world.[477] At that time, in early December 1970, the People's Republic of China first announced its claims to the archipelago. However, the Chinese government's official position on the matter was not presented until a year later, on December 30, 1971, shortly after Japan and the United States signed a treaty returning Okinawa and some of the Ryukyu Islands to Tokyo's control. The Diaoyu/Senkaku Archipelago came under American administration under Article 3 of the Peace Treaty signed by Japan and the United States at the San Francisco Conference in 1951, in which neither the People's Republic of China nor the Republic of China participated. Article 2 of the same treaty, however, included a provision in which Japan renounced its rights and claims to Chinese territories such as Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands. This provision was subsequently reflected in the Japan–Taiwan Treaty of April 1952, which reiterated that Japan renounced all rights, titles, and claims to Taiwan, the Pescadores, the Spratly Islands, and the Paracel Islands. It was also stipulated that all treaties, conventions, and agreements concluded between China and Japan prior to December 9, 1941, were rendered null and void as a consequence of the end of the war. The Japan-US Agreement of June 17, 1971, which returned to Japan the right to administer the Ryukyu Archipelago (including Okinawa Island), included the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the Ryukyu Archipelago in the attached "Annex". At the same time, the US stressed that this did not indicate who was entitled to sovereignty over the islands, but merely restored the pre-World War II situation. The US has consistently maintained this neutral position to this day and believes that the dispute should be resolved by negotiations between the two countries concerned or by third-party arbitration.[478] The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated in a statement that "Tiaoyi Lietao and other islands have been Chinese territory for centuries" (as has Taiwan), therefore the inclusion of these islands by the US in the areas placed under Japanese sovereignty is a clear violation of China's territorial integrity.

[475] A. Mack, *Island Disputes in Northeast Asia*, Working Papers No. 1997/2, Department of International Relations, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, 1997.
[476] A. Halimarski, *Trzy kręgi polityki zagranicznej Chin*, Warsaw, 1982.
[477] F. Umbach, *The Future of the US-Japanese Security Alliance*, http://www.dgap.org/texte/usjapan.pdf.
[478] J. Kukułka, *Historia współczesna stosunków międzynarodowych 1945–1994*, Warsaw, 1995.

From now on, all Chinese cartographic documents describe the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands as belonging to the PRC.

In the first half of 1972, given the emerging prospect of normalization of relations with Japan, the People's Republic of China refrained from highlighting this dispute, which was ultimately neither resolved nor even discussed in detail. Premier Chou En-lai reportedly stated at the time that the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands were merely microscopic dots, difficult to locate on maps, and not worth arguing about at that point. The Joint Declaration signed in 1972 therefore somewhat enigmatically states that Japan complies with Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration. A similar approach was adopted in the first phase of negotiations on the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the two countries, postponing attempts to resolve the dispute until an indefinite future. Of course, this did not mean that either side had changed its position on the matter. In 1977, Japan announced the creation of a 12-mile exclusive fishing zone around the islands, which meant expelling Taiwanese fishermen who had been fishing in the area. In the spring of 1978, during negotiations to include the so-called anti-hegemonism clause in the draft treaty, China attempted to force concessions from Tokyo through a show of force in the waters surrounding the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.[479] The incident, condemned by Tokyo in a special note, was quickly "explained" by Beijing as "accidental," and the treaty talks continued. However, the dispute persisted, and nothing indicated its resolution. During an official visit to Japan in November 1978, Deng Xiaoping reportedly stated: "Perhaps our generation is not wise enough, perhaps future generations will be wiser and will finally be able to find a solution to this problem that will satisfy everyone." This approach, of course, did not resolve the matter; what's more, it did not even prevent further incidents, which occurred several times in the following years. It seems that in the 1980s and 1990s, Beijing preferred to maintain the unresolved status quo, which allowed it to apply pressure on the Japanese whenever it was to its advantage. Officially, however, both sides promised, and still do, to make every effort to ensure that the issue of the islands' affiliation did not affect current relations between the two countries. However, this is not always possible, as was confirmed several times in the 1990s.

In February 1992, Beijing included the disputed islands, as well as those in the South China Sea, in the list of maritime areas under its jurisdiction, declaring its readiness to use force to repel any attempts to violate its sovereignty over these areas. The Japanese Prime Minister criticized this move very negatively.[480] The dispute was renewed in June 1996, when both China and Taiwan strongly protested against Japan's establishment of a 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone

[479] A. Halimarski, Trzy kręgi polityki zagranicznej Chin, Warsaw, 1982.
[480] R. Li, China and Asia-Pacific Security in the Post-Cold War Era, Security Dialogue, 1995, Vol. 26, No. 3.

around the archipelago. This was a consequence of Japan's ratification of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea.[481]

In assessing the course of the dispute, however, it should be noted that it is a relatively low-intensity conflict. Many commentators believe that this is not simply a typical territorial dispute, but that the prestige and honor of the rival states are at stake. The PRC's claims to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands are based on the following arguments. First, the Chinese authorities believe that territorial sovereignty over the disputed islands belongs to the PRC based on their "prior discovery, development, and possession." To support this thesis, they present two historical events indicating that the islands were discovered by the Chinese centuries ago and, for centuries, were used by them, as part of the Chinese Empire's maritime defense zone.

The first is the mission of an envoy of the Chinese Emperor in 1372, who, during his voyage to the Ryukyu Islands, passed near the islands of the archipelago, which—as the Chinese emphasize today—were used by them as navigational markers as early as the Middle Ages. The second of the past events refers to a special Edict of the Empress of China from 1893, which handed over the Diaoyu Islands to the physician Sheng Xuan-hui, who was interested in using the rare shi congyong herb (statice arbuscula) growing on these islands for pharmaceutical purposes. The second argument presented by the Chinese side is evidence of Japan's direct and indirect recognition of its sovereign rights to the islands in the 19th and 20th centuries, which should essentially preclude subsequent Japanese claims. To support this claim, the Chinese point out that a Japanese-produced map was published in 1785, which marked the archipelago's islands in the same color as Chinese territory, while the Ryukyu Kingdom was marked in a different color. Similarly, maps of the Ryukyu Archipelago published in Japan in 1874 and the Okinawa Chronicles of 1877 did not include the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in Japanese territory. According to China, the Japanese authorities became interested in the islands only in the 1890s. In early 1894, the Japanese Ministry of the Interior received a request from Okinawa Prefecture to erect markers on Diaoyu Island, indicating that the area belonged to Japan. According to China, the request was rejected at the time, as it might have raised objections in China at the time, although such actions were not ruled out at a "more appropriate time." This time came after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1894, as in January 1895 the government in Tokyo issued a decree requiring markers to be erected on the islands. On April 17, 1895, a treaty ending the conflict was signed in Shimonoseki.[482] Following the loss of the war (July-December 1984), China finally recognized Korea's full and complete independence and autonomy and ceded to Japan the Liaotung Peninsula with Port Arthur and the port city of Talien,

[481] Rocznik strategiczny 1996/1997, Warsaw, 1997.
[482] W. Dobrzycki, Historia stosunków międzynarodowych w czasach nowożytnych 1815–1945, Warsaw, 1995.

the island of Formosa (Taiwan), and the Fishing Islands. Under this agreement, Japan also received "navigation rights in Chinese waters."[483]

Under Article 2(b), China agreed to transfer the Pescadores to Japan, as well as “Formosa and the islands appertaining or belonging to it.” According to the Chinese side, the latter wording also applies to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. During the subsequent occupation of Taiwan by Japan, a dispute arose between the Okinawa Prefecture and Taipei County regarding administrative sovereignty over the islands. In its ruling, the Tokyo Court recognized that the islands were historically linked to Taiwan. In the opinion of the Chinese authorities, this ruling constitutes Japan's recognition of Chinese sovereignty over the archipelago. The third argument presented by Beijing is based on the thesis that Japan formally ceded the disputed islands to China (although in reality it refers to Taiwan) following its surrender ending World War II in the Far East. Japan was obliged to take this step by the provisions of the Cairo Declaration of 1943,[484] the provisions of the Potsdam Conference of 1945 and, finally, the Peace Treaty signed in 1951. Moreover, Article 4 of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty of 1952 states that "all treaties, agreements and contracts concluded at any time before following the end of the war shall cease to have effect and become null and void." In light of the Chinese interpretation, this treaty obliged Japan to return and renounce its rights to all Chinese territories seized by it, including the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, as they were taken over by Japan under the Treaty of Shimonoseki. The above argument is also related to the observation that during World War II, American aircraft, wanting to bomb the islands, sought consent from the Taiwanese authorities. Also, the incident in 1955, when a firefight between Taiwanese troops (temporarily present on the islands) and Japanese ships, according to the Chinese authorities, indicates that Japan did not have and does not have any rights to sovereignty over the archipelago.

The Japanese authorities completely reject the PRC's (and Taiwan's) position, but present justifications for their continued sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Primarily, Japan believes that it legally acquired sovereignty over the archipelago in 1895, following two expeditions organized by the authorities in 1887 and 1892.[485] These expeditions found the islands uninhabited,

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[483] G. C. Allen, A Short Economic History of Modern Japan, London, 1962.

[484] In the declaration concluding the Cairo Conference, issued on November 26, 1943, it was stated that “the three Allies intend to deprive Japan of the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the First World War in 1914 and to restore to the Republic of China all the territories which Japan has stolen from the Chinese, in particular Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores.” *(Dobrzycki, 1995; Historia polityczna Dalekiego Wschodu..., 1981).*

[485] Japan’s expansion into the Ryukyu Islands began in the 1870s. The rulers of this archipelago, located between Taiwan and the Japanese island of Kyushu, had previously paid tribute to the emperors of both states. In the spring of 1874, a “punitive expedition” was launched against Taiwan in retaliation for the killing of Japanese castaways in 1871 and numerous pirate attacks. Although the expedition did not result in the permanent occupation of the island, Japan took control of the Ryukyu Archipelago. In 1879, it was incorporated into Japanese territory *(Dobrzycki, 1995; Kwiecień, 1998; Taiwan (Formosa)..., 1952; Hall, 1979).*

and furthermore, no traces were found indicating that they belonged to China. Based on this information, the Tokyo government issued a decree on January 14, 1895, ordering the erection of appropriate markers on the islands, thus, in accordance with the then-current international law, incorporating the areas considered terra nullius into Japanese territory. Since then, Japanese authorities have considered the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands to be part of the Ryukyu Archipelago, which constitutes Japanese territory. Thus, they disagree with China's argument that the disputed islands geographically belong to Taiwan, and therefore fell into Japanese hands under the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki. Following the legal takeover of the islands, Japan took steps to utilize them, in accordance with the principle of peaceful and uninterrupted occupation. In 1896, the authorities leased the islands to entrepreneur Tatsuhiro Kogo, who erected several farm buildings on them, later used by seasonal workers. After Tatsuhiro Kogo's death in 1918, the islands were managed by his son, who acquired ownership of the islands in 1926 after the lease expired and used them until the outbreak of World War II. After the war, as the islands—as well as the entire Ryukyu archipelago—came under American administration, he received fees for the occasional use of the islands by the United States. Other examples of active management of the archipelago's territory (uninterrupted exercise of sovereignty) before and during World War II included the official incorporation of the islands into regional and local government structures, research conducted by various government agencies, the investigation into the plane crash on the island, and the construction of a metrological station. In 1968, while the United States administered the Ryukyu Archipelago, the American authorities in Okinawa and local authorities took a keen interest in the islands, organizing periodic inspections of the islands and surrounding waters. Since 1972, when the United States returned sovereignty over the archipelago to the Japanese authorities, the latter have exercised their own rights and responsibilities related to their sovereignty over the islands. The Self-Defense Forces, for example, patrol the area around the islands, and lighthouses and a helicopter landing pad have been constructed on the islands. Another important argument raised by Japan is the fact that the Chinese authorities did not raise any objections to the research conducted in 1887 and 1892, nor did they protest the Japanese authorities' decision of January 1895. By doing so, they in a sense recognized Japan's territorial sovereignty over the archipelago. Moreover, in 1920, the Chinese consul in Nagasaki, in his official thanks for the rescue of Chinese fishermen near the islands, indirectly recognized Japan's right to sovereignty over the area. Even after Japan's surrender at the end of World War II, China did not raise any objections to the transfer of administration of the islands to the United States. In summary, the authorities in Tokyo were unaware of any Chinese claims to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands until the early 1970s, i.e., after the "revelations" contained in the UN Report in 1968 were announced.

The positions of the People's Republic of China and Japan presented above essentially aim to justify their asserted sovereignty over the disputed archipelago by identifying the time and circumstances of its acquisition, as well as demonstrating that it has been and continues to be an integral part of the state's territory, and that it has been used in one way or another. In assessing the validity of the claims put forward by both sides, particular attention should therefore be paid to these very issues. As noted in the introduction, contemporary international law distinguishes several methods of legally acquiring territorial sovereignty. However, when examining the dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Archipelago, two of them should be considered in particular: appropriation of no man's land and adverse possession. Both methods are based on the principle of exercising effective control. Appropriation is a means of acquiring territory that belongs to no one (terra nullius),[486] which, under certain circumstances, can be acquired by a state. The effect of appropriation is an effective claim to the state's sovereignty over a given area. In the interpretation given by the International Court of Justice in the Western Sahara case, appropriation is "the primary method of peacefully acquiring sovereignty over a given territory other than through cession or succession." The basis for obtaining legal title to a territory - apart from the fact of its discovery - is also the fulfillment of the requirement of effective appropriation of the territory within a reasonable period of time.[487] Adverse possession, on the other hand, is a method of establishing legal title to a territory that is not res nullius and was obtained unlawfully or in circumstances in which the legality of its acquisition cannot be proven.[488] This legitimization of a questionable legal title stems from the passage of time and—interestingly—the presumed consent of the state previously exercising sovereign power. In other words, adverse possession is "the acquisition of territorial sovereignty through the effective exercise of state powers in a manner that creates the international community's belief that the existing situation is consistent with international law."[489]

The fundamental difference between adverse possession and appropriation lies in the necessity of determining whether a given territory previously belonged to another state. What both concepts share is the requirement for a state to prove, through its actions within a specified period of time, that its sovereignty extends to a given area. The question of how long possession should last—a crucial one, especially in situations of adverse possession—remains unresolved, despite ongoing disputes in international law. It is believed that, in adverse possession, permanence denotes a situation existing continuously for a period of time necessary to develop a belief in its finality.

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[486] "Land territory may be *res nullius* in two cases: when it has never been subject to the sovereign authority of any state, or when it has been abandoned by its former sovereign" *(Bierzanek, Symonides, 1999).*
[487] M. N. Shaw, *Prawo międzynarodowe*, Warsaw, 2000, p. 262.
[488] The concept of prescription is one of the most debated issues in international law. Among the many criticisms, the principal objection is the question of why an unlawful or disputed act should produce legal effects *(see Symonides, 1971).*
[489] *Encyklopedia prawa międzynarodowego i stosunków międzynarodowych*, Warsaw, 1976.

Unfortunately, due to the lack of a positive norm and the diversity of cases, it is impossible to adopt a rigid *criterion* (see Simonides, 1971). The exercise of this sovereignty, i.e., effective occupation, in both cases should be characterized by the following characteristics: international transparency, permanence, and stability.[490] It should be remembered, however, that the exercise of effective authority is relative, not absolute. International case law highlights that manifestations of territorial sovereignty can take various forms, depending on place and time.[491] What is certain, however, is that actual, not nominal, possession is what matters. It must not be forgotten, however, that although the condition of effectiveness applies to both appropriation and adverse possession, in the former case, effective possession of a territory ipso facto provides title to it, while in the latter case, "establishing effective possession is only a necessary condition and the beginning of adverse possession, but does not immediately provide title" (Symonides, 1971). In the case of a situation of adverse possession, in addition to the criterion of effective occupation, there is also the issue of recognition (or consent) by the state – the previous sovereign – of the new situation. Recognition is a positive act of the state that accepts or presumes to accept the new situation. Consent, in turn, may occur in situations in which a protest would be expected, but it does not occur or is filed with a delay.

In attempting to determine the international legal burden of the claims presented in connection with the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute in light of the concepts presented above and the case law developed in similar cases, we should attempt to find answers to several questions — based on historical data and the positions presented by both sides—based on historical data. First, whether the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands constituted terra nullius in 1895. In answering this question, we should acknowledge China's arguments that the islands had belonged to China since at least the Middle Ages and were used in the only way possible at the time—as navigational points in the East China Sea. China's territorial sovereignty over the archipelago is also indirectly expressed by the act of gifting the islands to a Chinese subject in 1893. Recognizing these circumstances, it should be noted that the mere fact of discovering the islands, or even using them for navigational purposes, is unlikely to be sufficient under international law to recognize Chinese sovereignty over the islands. The lack of a clearly unambiguous assessment stems from the following doubts: Were there opportunities for more effective, permanent "management" of the islands? Is it possible that China abandoned the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands before 1894? Both objections relate to the award in the Clipperton Island case, which held that the absence of the actual exercise of state authority due to

[490] Continuity of possession should be understood as a situation existing continuously for a period of time sufficient to create the conviction of its finality. Stability, on the other hand, means the continuous, undisturbed, and peaceful exercise of state authority *(see Bierzanek, Symonides, 1999).*

[491] "The intensity of the exercise of state authority depends on two factors: the character of the occupied territory and the degree of interest in it shown by the international community" (see Symonides, 1971).

the particular nature of an island does not in itself constitute abandonment. Abandonment of territory occurs only when a state ceases to exercise its authority over a given area and this is accompanied by an intention to abandon it (animus derelinquendi), or at least by the loss of the intention to possess it (animus possidendi) (Symonides, 1971). It cannot be ruled out that this was the case with China and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. If so, the Japanese authorities' assessment that the archipelago, as terra nullius, was occupied in January 1895 would be decisive, since from that time onward—that is, for more than a century—the islands have constituted Japanese territory over which various forms of Japanese state authority have been exercised, while China raised no objections for nearly 80 years.[492] However, if we assume that in 1894 the islands belonged to China, we should consider whether they were seized by Japan independently of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894, or whether they became part of Japan following the Treaty of Shimonoseki of April 1895. The fact that the islands were incorporated into Japanese territory three months before the signing of the Treaty (although after the end of hostilities) and the fact that the Treaty does not mention them directly seems to favor Japan. Although the "seizure" of the islands was not protested by China, which may now be misunderstanding, it is not so surprising considering the international situation in the region at the time, as well as the practically negligible value and significance of the islets. In the case of Japan's seizure of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, we are dealing with a situation of adverse possession, which is difficult to challenge due to:

a) the absence of any protests from China (until 1970);

b) the effective (sustainable and peaceful) exercise of sovereignty, as clearly described in the Japanese position. Despite the lack of strict provisions regarding the duration of adverse possession guaranteeing the acquisition of title to the territory, in the case of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, a period of over a century is likely sufficient..

The problematic provision of the Treaty of Shimonoseki that Japan takes over "Taiwan and the islets surrounding it or belonging to it" from China, in the Chinese interpretation, leads to the conclusion that Japan should have returned the archipelago after the end of World War II, as stipulated in the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Declaration (both of which, incidentally, do not directly mention the Diaoyu/Senkaku). However, this interpretation, like all other arguments justifying Chinese sovereignty over the disputed islands, dates back to the 1970s. How then can we explain that since 1945 neither the People's Republic of China nor the Republic of Taiwan remembered the recovery

492 In J. Symonides's view, the position that allows prescription to be derived from the express or implied recognition or acquiescence of the state under whose authority the territory was previously situated may lead to the identification of prescription with recognition (see Symonides, 1971).

of the islands and in no way expressed their interest in this area, not to mention even an attempt to "restore" sovereignty?[493]

The answers to these questions, however, should be sought not in concepts of international law, but in the domestic and international policies of both countries. In summary, considering the theoretical requirements of international law related to the concept of effective occupation and the body of case law in resolving similar international disputes, the arguments presented by the Japanese side appear stronger and more persuasive than the Chinese position.

The recognition of the maintenance of Japanese sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands is further supported by the ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the dispute between Sweden and Norway in 1909, which recognised as a binding principle that a situation that has actually existed for a long time should be changed to the minimum extent possible (see Encyclopedia, 1976).

### 4.3. Japan's political relations with China and North Korea

In practice, North Korea's "defense self-sufficiency" is characterized primarily by offensive actions directed primarily at Japan and South Korea, the US's main allies in East Asia. The actions of North Korea, ruled by an unpredictable dictator, are a somewhat long-standing trend, but it is undeniable that the North's aggressive policy toward Japan (and South Korea) will likely intensify or remain at a similar level. Although this trend is independent of the ongoing war in Ukraine, it provides an ideal foil for North Korea's actions, which directly translates into an increased intensity of offensive actions. An additional factor influencing this aspect, which should be considered the most important, is the People's Republic of China's support for North Korea, which provides Kim Jong Un with a strong international base.[494] Thus, Japanese concerns about their own security in the region will continue to grow, despite the development of security cooperation with powers such as the United States and Great Britain, as well as with countries in the region, such as the Philippines,[495] and the attempt to reach an agreement with the seemingly most natural ally in the immediate vicinity, i.e. South Korea.[496]

493 Conquest was regarded as a legal, original mode of acquiring territory until the First World War. However, it could take place only under certain conditions, namely, “only when the existing factual situation—the conquest—was final: nothing indicated that it would change, and the defeated adversary had ceased to exist as a subject of international law” (see Bierzanek, Symonides, 1999).

494 Kim gratuluje Xi, liczy na „piękniejsze” stosunki Korei Północnej z Chinami, Rzeczpospolita, October 23, 2022, https://www.rp.pl/dyplomacja/art37283851-kim-gratuluje-xi-liczy-na-piekniejsze-stosunki-korei-polnocnej-z-chinami (accessed February 28, 2023).

495 Japan and Philippines Agree to Boost Military Ties, Deutsche Welle, February 9, 2023, https://www.dw.com/en/japan-and-philippines-agree-to-boost-military-ties/a-64657634 (accessed February 28, 2023).

496 M. Socha, Trudne negocjacje Japonii i Korei Południowej, Blog OSA, Ośrodek Spraw Azjatyckich, February 21, 2023, https://www.osa.uni.lodz.pl/publikacje/blog-osa/szczegoly/trudne-negocjacje-japonii-i-korei-poludniowej (accessed February 28, 2023).

Both Japan and China have a long history of interfering in the Korean Peninsula. Chinese involvement in Korean affairs began as early as the Han Dynasty (221 BCE–206 CE), when the Gojoseon Kingdom was conquered by Emperor Wudi in 108 BCE.[497] From that point on, China periodically influenced Korea's internal affairs. The first contacts between the inhabitants of the Japanese Islands and the Korean Peninsula began several hundred years later, in the 5th century. This is evidenced, among other things, by Chinese chronicles, which mention that in 478, a Japanese embassy visited the Chinese emperor to seek permission to intervene in Korea.[498] Other important moments in the history of Korean-Japanese relations include the Waegu (Japanese: Wakō) pirate raids and the Korean-Japanese War of the 16th century. The last major event that most seriously affected Korean-Japanese relations was the Japanese occupation of the Korean Peninsula from 1910 to 1945.[499] This resulted in numerous historical and territorial disputes, and the inability to resolve them harmed relations between the Korean states and their neighbors.

Unresolved territorial disputes seriously impact the Korean states' contemporary relations with China and Japan. In constructivism, the conflict manifests itself in identity (including nationalism, memory of history and traumatic past events, and strong emotions). Attachment to a disputed territory can be very significant indeed, regardless of how small or insignificant it may be from a material and rational perspective.[500] The parties realize that they have mutually exclusive goals and interests, attitudes such as hostility, distrust, jealousy, anger, contempt, etc., and behaviors - a dispute turns into a conflict when one or both parties take hostile actions.[501]

One of the disputed areas is Dokdo (Japanese: Takeshima), an archipelago of rocky islands and islets with a total area of 0.187 square kilometers. The archipelago is located less than 90 kilometers southeast of Ulleungdo Island, which belongs to South Korea, and about 157 kilometers northwest of the Japanese island of Dōgojima, which is part of the Oki Archipelago. Dokdo has been under South Korean control since 1953, but Japan asserts its own claims.[502] This is not just about territorial sovereignty over the islands, but also about the delimitation of exclusive economic zones in the Sea of Japan, fishing rights, and deposits of methane clathrates, among other things. The conflicting goals of both countries lie in the issue of the islands' nationality. Furthermore, this dispute is a zero-sum game, meaning that achieving South Korea's goals means Japan will not

497 J. Rurarz, Historia Korei, Warsaw, 2009, p. 46.
498 J. Tubielewicz, *Historia Japonii*, Wrocław, 1984, p. 47.
499 N. Horesh et al., *Is My Rival's Rival a Friend? Popular Third-Party Perceptions of Territorial Disputes in East Asia*, *Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies*, 2014, Vol. 32, No. 1, p. 9. https://doi.org/10.22439/cjas.v32i1.4594.
500 J. Choi, Y. Eun, *What Does International Relations Theory Tell Us About Territorial Disputes and Their Resolution?*, *International Politics*, 2018, Vol. 55, No. 3, p. 151. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-017-0074-4.
501 A. Cianciara, *Konflikt Międzynarodowy – ujęcie teoretyczne*, *Stosunki Międzynarodowe*, 2010, Vol. 42, No. 3–4, pp. 100–105.
502 M. Koo, *Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asia: Between a Rock and a Hard Place*, New York, 2010, p. 65.

achieve its goals regarding Dokdo, and vice versa. It is worth noting that in this dispute, North Korea clearly supports its southern neighbor.[503]

The first written mention of the archipelago dates back to the 6th century.[504] For centuries, the islands were uninhabited, but many Korean and Japanese fishermen ventured to the area in search of work. In the 15th century, the Korean King Sejong confirmed Dokdo's affiliation with Korea, incorporating the islands into Uljin County. The Japanese Onshū Shichō Gakki ("Records of Sightings in Oki Province") from the 17th century contains no mention of the archipelago being Japanese territory. Furthermore, in the late 19th century, the Japanese Grand Council of State (Japanese: Daijō-kan) confirmed Korean sovereignty over Dokdo. However, in 1905, the Japanese Ministry of the Navy, without notifying Korea or other countries, occupied the archipelago, later claiming that they considered Dokdo terra nullius.[505] This sparked protests from the Korean authorities, but given the political situation at the time, they had no chance of winning the dispute. Korea was a weak state at the time, politically, economically, and militarily. In 1905, Japan forced the Koreans to sign a treaty that stripped Korea of its diplomatic sovereignty and made it a Japanese protectorate. Five years later, Japan formally annexed Korea. The San Francisco Peace Treaty signed in 1951 made no mention of these islands, but on a map presented by the Japanese government to the United States House of Representatives, Dokdo lies beyond the line demarcating Japanese territory.[506]

In January 1952, South Korean President Rhee Syng-man announced the establishment of the so-called Peace Line, delineating Seoul's sphere of influence around the Korean Peninsula, which also included the Dokdo Islands. Furthermore, South Korean militia units began operating within these areas in April 1953.[507] The 1965 agreement to normalize relations between the two countries did not resolve the issue of island ownership. The ratification by both countries of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which regulated, among other things, territorial waters and exclusive economic zones, intensified the dispute over Dokdo. As an archipelago, under this convention, it not only creates territorial waters but also alters the boundaries of exclusive economic zones in the Sea of Japan. This is important for both South Korea and Japan, as this sea is one of the world's largest fishing grounds.

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[503] Central Intelligence Agency, *World Factbook 2016–17*, Washington, 2016, p. 406.

[504] J. Rurarz, *Historia Korei*, op. cit., p. 373.

[505] N. Matiaszczyk, *Divided by History: The Impact of Historical Events on Modern Japanese-South Korean Relations*, [in:] *Między Wschodem a Zachodem, między Północą a Południem 4*, ed. A. Lesiczka, Campidoglio, Warsaw 2020, p. 220.

[506] Research Institute, *The Truth Is... Dokdo is Korean Territory*, http://www.dokdohistory.com/eng/gnb02/sub01.do?mode=view&page=1&cid=47324 (accessed: May 10, 2021).

[507] O. Pietrewicz, *Japońsko-południowokoreański spór o wyspy Dokdo/Takeshima*, Centrum Studiów Polska-Azja, http://www.polska-azja.pl/japonsko-poludniowokoreanski-spor-o-wyspy-dokdotakeshima/ (accessed: May 11, 2021).

In 2009, the dispute over sovereignty over the archipelago escalated again. This was caused by hostile actions from the South Korean perspective by the Japanese Ministry of Education, which the previous year had decided to introduce new textbooks for high school teachers that questioned Dokdo's nationality.[508] In 2010, the Japanese government postponed the publication of its annual Defense White Paper, which is usually released in late July or early August. The official reason given was the lack of sufficient evidence collected regarding the sinking of the Cheonan corvette.[509] However, considering the fact that the report of the international commission on the matter, recognized by Japan, was published in May, casts doubt on this explanation. A more likely explanation seems to be the desire to avoid unnecessary tensions related to the fact that August 2010 marked two important anniversaries in Japanese-Korean relations: the 100th anniversary of the annexation of Korea and the 65th anniversary of liberation from Japanese occupation. However, the White Paper was finally published in September and included the statement, repeated since 2005, that "the territorial issue of Takeshima, a historical territory of Japan, remains unresolved," which sparked protests from South Korea. In June 2011, South Korea's largest airline, Korean Air, conducted a test flight of its new Airbus A380 from Incheon Airport to the Dokdo Islands. This provoked a strong reaction from Tokyo, as the Japanese government regarded the flight as a deliberate provocation by the Koreans. Moreover, the Japanese Foreign Ministry issued a statement urging its own diplomats not to use South Korean airlines. A year later, a significant event occurred that impacted Japanese-South Korean relations. In August, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak visited the disputed Dokdo Islands and demanded an apology from the Japanese Emperor for the occupation. Lee was the first South Korean leader since the end of World War II to visit Dokdo. This was an openly negative act toward Japan. Immediately after the visit, the Japanese government recalled its ambassador to Seoul.

In late August 2012, Japan officially proposed settling the dispute at the International Court of Justice, a proposal that was also officially rejected by South Korea a few days later. This also undermined South Korea's image in Japanese public opinion, resulting in a decline in the number of Japanese tourists visiting South Korea. Within a year, this number decreased by nearly 800,000. This is significant, as tourism plays a significant role in the economic relations between Japan and South Korea.[510] Moreover, there has been a marked increase in anti-Korean sentiment in Japan. Ultranationalist demonstrations have taken place and continue to take place, including those

[508] M.G. Koo, Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asia. Between a Rock and a Hard Place, op. cit., p. 65.
[509] The sinking of a South Korean warship after it was struck by a torpedo fired from a North Korean vessel occurred on March 26, 2010, in the Yellow Sea near the maritime border between the two Koreas. The sinking resulted in the deaths of 46 sailors.
[510] N. Matiaszczyk, Podzieleni przez historię – wpływ wydarzeń historycznych na współczesne relacje japońsko-południowokoreańskie, op. cit., p. 222.

organized by the far-right Zaitoku-kai,[511] during which not only racist and xenophobic slogans were frequently shouted, but also those inciting violence against Koreans.[512] On December 20, 2018, a serious incident involving a Japanese aircraft and a South Korean destroyer occurred approximately 100 kilometers northeast of the Dokdo Islands, after which both countries engaged in open hostility toward each other. Japan accused South Korea of radar targeting their aircraft, while South Korea accused Japan of dangerous behavior and flying too low. The dispute escalated to such an extent that the South Korean Minister of National Defense declared that his country would respond decisively to further Japanese provocations, even suggesting military solutions.[513] Steadily deteriorating relations, not least because of Dokdo, led to a trade war between the two countries, which began in the second half of 2019 and is still ongoing. The Koreans also conduct annual military exercises near Dokdo, aimed at defending the islands against a potential attack.

In June 2020, despite the COVID-19 pandemic, as many as 8 naval ships and 5 aircraft, including F-15K fighters, participated.[514] At the turn of May and June 2021, relations between South Korea and Japan deteriorated significantly over the disputed territory. The official Olympic website posted a map of the Olympic torch relay route, marking Dokdo as Japanese territory. This sparked a sharp protest from South Korean authorities, and the Korean Olympic Committee formally requested the International Olympic Committee to intervene.[515] Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga, in response to the Koreans' actions, canceled a planned meeting with South Korean President Moon Jae-in, which was to have taken place at the G-7 summit in Wales, where both leaders were invited as guests. Furthermore, the Japanese firm stance on the map resulted in nearly 70% of South Koreans supporting a boycott of the Olympics.[516] However, the Koreans ultimately decided not to adopt this solution and took part in the competition.

It's worth noting that both the South Korean and Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs publish information about the Dokdo Islands on their official websites. According to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Takeshima is undoubtedly an inseparable part of Japanese territory, based on

[511] Zaitokukai – the full name is *Zainichi Tokken o Yurusanai Shimin no Kai* (English: Association of Citizens against the Special Privileges of Zainichi). It is an ultranationalist and xenophobic Japanese organization that calls for an end to the alleged privileges of the Zainichi, i.e. the Korean minority in Japan.

[512] K. Ito, *Anti-Korean Sentiment and Hate Speech in the Current Japan: A Report from the Street*, "Procedia Environmental Sciences" 2014, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 434-435. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.proenv.2014.03.055

[513] J. Lee, *Strong response to provocations by Japan*, https://imnews.imbc.com/replay/2019/nwtoday/article/5136631_28983.html (accessed: May 13, 2021).

[514] The Korea Bizwire, *S. Korea Conducted Dokdo Defense Drill Earlier This Month*, http://koreabizwire.com/s-korea-conducted-dokdo-defense-drill-earlier-this-month/177823 (accessed: May 15, 2021).

[515] M. Houston, *South Korea calls for IOC action over Japan's disputed territories map for Olympics*, https://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1108513/japan-south-korea-dokdo-olympics-ioc (accessed: August 15, 2021).

[516] The survey was conducted by the Korean Institute of Social Opinion among a group of 1,009 adults. 67.6% of respondents said they supported the boycott ("strongly agree" – 50.6%; "somewhat agree" – 17%). J. Shin, *Calls Grow in S. Korea for Olympic Boycott over Dokdo*, http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20210609000827 (accessed: August 15, 2021).

historical facts and international law.[517] The Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in turn, states that "Dokdo is an integral part of the territory of Korea, historically, geographically, and in accordance with international law. There is no territorial dispute regarding Dokdo, therefore, it is not an issue that can be resolved through diplomatic negotiations or a judicial settlement."[518]

The South Korean government has prepared a film about the archipelago, which is publicly available on the Internet in several language versions.[519] The dispute over the Dokdo Islands between South Korea and Japan is also a classic example of conflict in constructivist theory. It rekindles South Korea's memory of colonialism, as Japan, Korea's former occupier, continues to assert sovereignty over what Koreans perceive as a symbol of national independence. For Koreans, these islands have become an integral part of their national identity, symbolizing the past colonial period and their regained sovereignty. Any Japanese claims to the islands are therefore interpreted as a direct threat to Korea's identity and territorial independence. Perceiving the disputed islands not only legally but also as an identity issue, Koreans become emotionally receptive and more accepting of risk, leading to a willingness to fight if an armed conflict breaks out over the small, uninhabited islands with the former occupier.

### 4.4. Boundaries of exclusive economic zones in the Yellow Sea

The dispute over the boundaries of the exclusive economic zones began in 1996, when both South Korea and China acceded to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,[520] although legally speaking, Ieodo, as an underwater rock, cannot be considered a territory by any state under this convention (Article 121). However, both parties consider the rock to be located within their exclusive economic zones. According to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, "the exclusive economic zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines" (Article 57). Where the exclusive economic zones of states with opposite or adjacent coasts are opposite, the delimitation of the boundaries of the exclusive economic zones should be established by agreement based on the principle of equity (Article 74).[521] The distances between the coasts of China and South Korea are much narrower than 400 nautical miles, so the exclusive economic zones overlap, and so far, the dispute over their boundaries has not been resolved, as neither side is willing to agree to the

[517] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Japan's Consistent Position on the Territorial Sovereignty over Takeshima*, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/takeshima/index.html (accessed: May 16, 2021).
[518] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, *The Korean Government's Basic Position on Dokdo*, http://dokdo.mofa.go.kr/eng/dokdo/government_position.jsp (accessed: May 15, 2021).
[519] 외교부 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Korea, *Dokdo, Beautiful Island of Korea*, https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=3&v=mEF9FDh4nZc&feature=emb_title (accessed: May 5, 2021).
[520] United Nations, *Chronological lists of ratifications of, accessions and successions to the Convention and the related Agreements*, https://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm (accessed: May 20, 2021).
[521] United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982.

other's proposals – this conflicts between the two countries' interests. In 2011, the dispute reignited when Chinese fishermen clashed with the South Korean Coast Guard. In one of these clashes, a South Korean officer was fatally wounded. President Lee Myung-bak stated in March 2012 that if an agreement on the delimitation of the exclusive economic zones between the two countries were ever reached, the areas around Ieodo should belong to South Korea. The following year, hostility from both countries was observed. China announced it was expanding its Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), which would also include areas above Ieodo. In response to such moves, South Korea decided to send a warship and two patrol aircraft to the vicinity of Ieodo,[522] also expanding its air defense identification zone.

In October 2014, another clash between Chinese fishermen and the South Korean Coast Guard occurred – this time, the captain of the Chinese vessel was killed. At the end of 2015, representatives of South Korea and China met for the first time in seven years to resolve the boundary of their exclusive economic zones. Ultimately, no agreement was reached. Seoul wanted the border to be drawn in the middle of the Yellow Sea, while Beijing opted for a solution based on population size. In January 2017, a squadron of Chinese military aircraft flew into the Korean Air Defense Identification Zone, prompting an immediate response from South Korea – the latter scrambled ten of its own aircraft.[523] China's provocation came several months after South Korea and the United States announced their intention to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-ballistic missile system in South Korea. In the following months, Chinese aircraft committed several more violations of the Korean Peninsula. In mid-January 2019, representatives of both countries held another meeting to discuss the delimitation of their exclusive economic zones, but this meeting also failed to produce any resolution. The dispute remains unresolved to this day.

A symbol of the territorial dispute between North Korea and China is Mount Baekdu (Chinese: Changbai) and Lake Cheonji (Chinese: Tiānchí).[524] In this case, as with Dokdo, the theory of constructivism applies. The mountain holds significant significance in the history, culture, and identity of both Koreas, and is considered almost sacred, which is why South Korea is also partially involved in this dispute. According to Korean mythology, the mountain is the birthplace of Dangun – the legendary founder of the Korean state of Gojoseon in 2333 BCE, a descendant of the son of the King of Heaven. In South Korea, October 3rd is National Foundation Day, commemorating the founding of Gojoseon. Meanwhile, according to North Korean propaganda, Kim Jong-il was

522 S. Fox, China, South Korea, and the Socotra Rock Dispute: A Submerged Rock and Its Destabilizing Potential, Palgrave Pivot, Singapore, 2019, p. 79.
523 Ibidem, p. 106
524 More precisely, the mountain is a stratovolcano, and Lake Cheonji is located within its crater.

born in a guerrilla camp on Mount Baekdu.[525] Furthermore, the mountain is mentioned in the national anthems of both countries.

The 1963 North Korea-China border agreement established the following division: 3/5 of the mountain and lake area was under Pyongyang's control, and 2/5 under Beijing's control.[526] However, there are some doubts about the validity of the agreement. First, some question whether it is a true border treaty. Second, the agreement was never published anywhere, and it is unclear whether both sides still accept it. Third, South Korea considers all agreements concluded by North Korea null and void. Baekdu is a significant location not only for Koreans but also for the Manchus (one of the largest ethnic minorities in China, estimated at around 10 million), which gives the Chinese government a strong argument against changing the border. In 2009, the Chinese city of Changchun intended to bid to host the 2018 Winter Olympics. Part of the competition was to be held at the foot of Mount Baekdu, which sparked dissatisfaction in both Koreas. Ultimately, the city was denied approval by the Chinese central government.

In December 2013, the Chinese military conducted exercises near and on Baekdu Mountain with the participation of about three thousand soldiers.[527] This action was perhaps intended to exert pressure on the North Korean authorities, following the escalation of the situation on the Korean Peninsula several months earlier due to Pyongyang's nuclear and missile tests and the breach of the 1953 armistice. Although the dispute over the mountain's ownership is currently not a significant element in China's relations with the Korean states, (although this seems unlikely) North Korea could instrumentally reactivate the dispute in the future, demanding a border revision so that the entire mountain area falls within its territory. In such a scenario, the South Koreans could support their northern neighbor, which would mean a deterioration in relations between Beijing and Seoul, which may be the North Korean authorities' goal. It can also be assumed that in the event of Korean reunification, the Baekdu issue will be revived.

Another border issue in bilateral relations between North Korea and China is the islands on the Yalu and Tumen rivers. Although North Korea and China agreed in 1949 that the common border would follow the course of both rivers, a contradiction also arose – both sides were unwilling to allow the border to run through the middle of the rivers, thus dividing some islands in two. Beijing recognized Pyongyang's sovereignty over approximately 80% of the islands in exchange for the right of free passage, but the main problem remained the uninhabited islands and Pidan Island (Chinese: Chouduandao). Although it was inhabited by Chinese, North Korea controlled it. During

525 Although, as is known, Kim Jong-il was born near Khabarovsk in Russia.

526 D. Gomà, *The Chinese-Korean Border Issue: An Analysis of a Contested Frontier*, "Asian Survey" 2006, vol. 46, no. 6, p. 872. https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2006.46.6.867.

527 The Chosun Ilbo, *China Stages Drills Near Korean Peninsula*, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/12/09/2013120901600.html (accessed: May 18, 2021).

negotiations before the signing of the border agreement in 1963, the North Korean authorities offered China the island as a token of gratitude for its assistance during the Korean War. Ultimately, no agreement was reached, and the Chinese authorities evacuated approximately 50 Chinese families from the island.[528] The island's strategic location at the mouth of the river on the Yellow Sea makes it a strategic location. Furthermore, it may contain oil deposits nearby that both China and North Korea would be interested in exploiting.

In 2011, China, fearing the influx of large groups of refugees from the DPRK, decided to build a four-meter fence along the coast of the Yalu River near the city of Dandong (located near the mouth).[529] Two years later, the two countries conducted a joint patrol of the river, and since then, the issues surrounding the Yalu have not affected relations between Beijing and Pyongyang, although it cannot be ruled out that the issue will be raised again by either country's authorities in the future. Besides the islands, the Tumen River issue has another root cause – the last 17 kilometers of the river before it flows into Peter the Great Bay constitute the Russian-North Korean border. For this reason, China has no access to the Sea of Japan. Since the 1990s, Beijing has attempted to build a port right at the tripoint, but both North Korea and Russia are unfavorable to this initiative.[530] There's a clear conflict of interests here: China is keen to expand its capabilities, while the North Koreans and Russians fear the PRC's growing position in the Peter the Great Gulf and Sea of Japan region. However, no incident related to this matter has occurred in many years, but that doesn't mean it won't happen in the future.

International relations in East Asia are among the most complex in the world. This is significantly influenced by the history of relations between China, Korea, and Japan. Unresolved issues from the past, including the territorial disputes presented in this study, seriously impact contemporary relations and foreign policy, often leading to significant tensions. Moreover, they are also frequently exploited in domestic politics. This is confirmed by, among others, the former Japanese prime minister and the current president of South Korea. Shinzo Abe rose to power in Japan on nationalist rhetoric. Moon Jae-in won the presidential election in South Korea with a clearly anti-Japanese message. Territorial disputes are crucial to the identity of the three nations, especially the Koreans, and have also become a part of the historical politics, primarily of Japan and South Korea. It is precisely because of these disputes that they periodically lead to escalation of tensions,

[528] D. Gomà, The Chinese-Korean Border Issue: An Analysis of a Contested Frontier, op. cit., p. 873; P. Foster, China builds higher fences over fears of instability in North Korea, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/8415490/China-builds-higher-fences-over-fears-of-instability-in-North-Korea.html (accessed: May 18, 2021).
[529] D. Gomà, The Chinese-Korean Border Issue: An Analysis of a Contested Frontier, op. cit., p. 874.
[530] P. Foster, China builds higher fences over fears of instability in North Korea, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/8415490/China-builds-higher-fences-over-fears-of-instability-in-North-Korea.html (accessed: May 18, 2021).

intensifying both political and economic rivalry in East Asia. And the inability to resolve them, due to conflicting interests, harms relations between the Korean states and their neighbors.

### 4.5. The Kuril Islands dispute between Russia and Japan

The Kuril Islands issue, which is crucial for the Asian peace order, should begin with understanding the Kuril territorial dispute: what do the Kurils mean to the Japanese and to the Russians? Etymologically, we learn that the word "kur" means "man," "people," or "people" in the language of the indigenous Ainu people who inhabit the area. Researching Russian sources reveals the term "Kuril Islands" as referring to all the islands located north of Hokkaido and as far as Kamchatka. Japanese sources, however, refer to only a few islands as "Kurils," starting with the fifth island, Urup Island (Japanese: Uruppu). For the Japanese, the remaining islands in the immediate vicinity are considered the "Northern Territories." This seemingly verbal skirmish between the Russians and the Japanese has serious consequences: different world maps and, above all, diametrically opposed interpretations of all sorts of agreements and high-ranking documents. One of the many consequences of this dispute is the still-unsigned peace treaty between Japan and Russia ending World War II. At this point, it's time to define the dispute. Some might say, "It's obvious: the disputed issue is the Kuril Islands archipelago." Nothing could be further from the truth. This is a simplification, reported by the world media and used in publications on the geopolitical situation in Asia. The essence of the dispute, which has shaped the foreign policy of the Russian Federation and Japan for decades, is the 8,577 km² area referred to by the Japanese as the "Northern Territories." It comprises Shikotan, Iturup, Kunashir, and the Habomai Archipelago.[531]

The beginning of tensions between Tokyo and Moscow can be traced back to the mid-17th century, the beginning of Russian territorial expansion towards the Pacific Ocean. The dispute over the Kuril Islands remains a significant element of mutual relations, despite the fact that the archipelago was discovered in 1643 by the Dutchman Martin de Vries. He, on the orders of the governor of the East Indies, mapped his discovery and claimed it as Dutch property. The Russians credit Vladimir Atlasov with discovering the islands (one of them was named after him). The 18th century was marked by the strengthening of trade influence in these areas. In 1754, the Japanese established the so-called basho[532] on Kunashir Island and on Sakhalin, to which the Russians responded by establishing a trading post on Urup in 1795. The early 19th century saw the first Japanese-Russian dispute over Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, after the Japanese administration established a presence in the entire Sakhalin Islands in 1807. The Basho Islands were attacked by

[531] The Habomai Archipelago is a group of several small islands. The largest of them are called by the Russians: Tanfileva, Anuchina, Yuri, Polonsky, and Zelyony, while in Japanese nomenclature they are known as: Suisho, Shibotsu, Yuri, Akiyuri, and Kaigara.

532 The Japanese name for the trading-post system of that period.

the then-Russian-American Trading Company. The mid-century saw increased interest in the Japanese islands by the United States, Great Britain, and Russia, resulting in the signing of the Treaty of Kaganawa[533] (today an integral part of the Yokohama metropolitan area) on March 31, 1854, sealing the establishment of Japanese-American trade and diplomatic relations, and the agreement signed by the Japanese and British authorities on October 14, 1854. These events and the outbreak of the Crimean War prompted the parties to the dispute to conclude the Treaty of Shimoda (Japan-Russia), which was signed at a Buddhist monastery as the Agreement on Trade, Navigation, and Delimitation of Boundaries on February 7, 1855. In light of the history of the Japanese-Russian territorial dispute, here is the passage concerning the delimitation of the borders: "From now on, the border between Russia and Japan will run between the islands of Etorofu and Uruppu. The entire island of Etorofu belongs to Japan, and the entire island of Uruppu and the other Kuril Islands to the north belong to Russia. As for the island of Karafuto (Sakhalin), it will remain undivided between Russia and Japan, as it has been until now."[534]

After another twenty years, preceded by numerous talks and negotiations, representatives of both countries decided to meet in St. Petersburg to conclude the next chapter of negotiations. This stemmed from the Japanese government's 1869 declaration of willingness to relinquish the southern part of Sakhalin upon the fulfillment of several conditions by the Russian side. Specifically, the Russian government recognized Japanese sovereignty over the entire Kuril Islands, up to the First Kuril Strait, which separates Shumshu Island from Kamchatka. These negotiations culminated in the signing of the Sakhalin-Kuril Islands Exchange Agreement on May 7, 1875. The cession of sovereignty over eighteen islands in the archipelago was specified in Article II of this agreement, leaving the issue of the four currently disputed islands unaddressed. In exchange for the cession to Russia of the rights to Sakhalin Island reserved/mentioned in the first article, His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russians, on behalf of Himself and His descendants, cedes to His Majesty the Emperor of Japan the Kuril Islands group, which are currently His property, along with all rights of sovereignty relating to these areas; henceforth, the said Islands shall belong to the Empire of Japan. The border between the Empires of Russia and Japan in this area shall run through the passage/isthmus between Cape Lopatka on the Kamchatka Peninsula and Shimushu Island.[535]

The beginning of the 20th century was marked by the Russo-Japanese War of 1904, which the Russian forces spectacularly lost. The peace treaty was signed in Portsmouth on September

[533] *Treaty of Kanagawa*, http://web.jjay.cuny.edu/~jobrien/reference/ob25.html (accessed: May 14, 2007).
[534] Art. 2 of the *Treaty for the Exchange of Sakhalin for the Kurile Islands* (1875), Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/territory/edition92/period1.html (accessed: May 14, 2007).
[535] Art. 2 of the *Treaty for the Exchange of Sakhalin for the Kurile Islands* (1875), Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

5, 1905. Under the treaty, Russia ceded southern Sakhalin to Japan.[536] There was no mention of the Kuril Islands or the "Northern Territories," which were considered Japanese possessions.

The Kuril status quo lasted until World War II. Despite a five-year neutrality pact signed by both countries on April 13, 1941, the treaty was unilaterally terminated by the USSR on April 5, 1945.[537] The Soviet authorities invoked the rebus sic stantibus clause, explaining in an official note that the agreement had been concluded before the outbreak of the USSR's war with the Third Reich and Japan's war with the United States. Therefore, the pact was no longer valid, as Japan Germany's ally—was fighting against the USSR and its American ally while aiding the Reich's forces. However, in reality, ceding the Kuril Islands to the Japanese would have allowed the authorities in Tokyo to unimpededly block the Soviet fleet from sailing. This argument enabled the USSR to enter the war on August 8, 1945, against the Empire, which was already significantly weakened by the American nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Within six days (August 20–26, 1945), Soviet forces from the Kamchatka Fortified Area under the command of General A. Gnechko and the Pacific Fleet occupied the Northern Kuril Islands against minimal enemy resistance, and in the last days of August launched a landing into the currently disputed territory. The fighting ended with Soviet success on September 1, 1945, one day before Japan's unconditional surrender.[538] Stalin's war plans also included an attack on Hokkaido and the occupation of at least part of it, a move strongly opposed by the United States. The American theme persists to this day, as some argue that the American command should have included not only Hokkaido in its occupation zone but also the "Northern Territories." After all, it was from there that the Japanese fleet set sail for Pearl Harbor.[539]

The legal recognition of sovereignty over the occupied territory took place on February 2, 1946, by a decision of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. It's arguable that this decree marked a new stage in the territorial dispute. Japan considers this a unilateral imposition of borders, reiterating that the "Northern Territories" are de facto under military occupation, which should end with the signing of a peace treaty. Moscow, however, maintains that the seizure of the Kurils was, simply put, the USSR's payment for entering the war against Japan. This condition was accepted during the meetings of the Three Great Powers in Yalta, as well as during the Potsdam Conference.[540] The Allied meeting in Yalta concluded with the signing of the Three Great Powers Agreement on the Far East on February 11, 1945. These included several criteria for the USSR's entry into the war against Japan. In light of the matter at hand, two provisions seem most important. The first was the restoration

[536] A. Czubiński, *Historia powszechna XX wieku*, Poznań 2003, p. 49.
[537] *Ibidem*, p. 445.
[538] *Ibidem*, p. 447.
[539] D. Cassey, *Attack of Pearl Harbor*, "Spokesman Magazine", Dec 2006, pp. 16–17.
[540] V. Mastny, *Stalin i zimna wojna. Sowieckie poczucie zagrożenia*, Warszawa 2006, p. 44.

of "Russia's ancient rights, violated by Japan's treacherous attack in 1904,"[541] namely the return of southern Sakhalin, the internationalization of the port of Dalian, and the reinstatement of the lease on Port Arthur. The second is the statement that the Kuril Islands would be ceded to the Soviet Union. These terms were sealed with a clause requiring unconditional fulfillment of the terms upon the defeat of Japan by Soviet forces. Moscow also cites other treaties. As an example, it cites the provisions of the Cairo Declaration (November 22–26, 1943), the content of which the USSR recognized, despite not participating in the conference, during the Potsdam talks in July 1945: "The terms of the Cairo Declaration should be upheld, and Japanese sovereignty should be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, and Shikoku, as well as other smaller islands designated by the contracting parties."[542] On board a US Navy ship on September 2, 1945, the Japanese government signed the act of surrender,[543] accepting the Potsdam Agreements without reservations, according to the USSR.

The resolution of the Soviet-Japanese territorial dispute could occur immediately after the war, as the need to regulate relations between the countries participating in World War II became increasingly urgent. The Japanese Peace Conference, convened in San Francisco from September 4 to 8, 1951, provided an excellent opportunity. It was preceded by bilateral negotiations between the interested countries. Under Article II(c), Japan renounces all right, title, and claim to the Kuril Islands and to that portion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent thereto over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905.[544] The treaty text did not specify the status of the territories seized from Japan, nor did it define what was meant by the term "Kuril Islands." Therefore, the Japanese delegation issued a unilateral declaration declaring that the islands of Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan, and the Habomai Archipelago were not part of the Kuril Islands. The Soviet delegation reacted swiftly, citing two facts: the interpretation of the term "Kuril Islands" and the conclusion of the US-Japan security agreement, which, according to Stalin, was intended solely to further US aggressive policy. This resulted in the USSR rejecting the entire treaty and refusing to sign it. As a result, the peace treaty with Japan was signed by 48 countries, in addition to Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the USSR.[545] The treaty entered into force on 28 April 1952. The Kuril issue reappeared during official Soviet-Japanese negotiations only in the mid-1950s. Analyzing the history of mutual relations, one can conclude that the resurgence of the dispute was

[541] *Yalta Agreement* (1945), Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/territory/edition92/period3.html (accessed: May 14, 2007).
[542] *Potsdam Declaration* (1945), Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/territory/edition92/period3.html (accessed: May 14, 2007).
[543] A. Czubiński, *op. cit.*, p. 453.
[544] Art. II (c) *San Francisco Peace Treaty* (1951), Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/territory/edition92/period4.html (accessed: May 14, 2007).
[545] A. Czubiński, *op. cit.*, p. 516.

linked to the change of government in both countries. The election of Ichiro Hatoyama as Japanese Prime Minister and the death of Stalin, who was replaced by Nikita Khrushchev, initiated a new phase of negotiations between Tokyo and Moscow. In a letter (September 11, 1956) addressed to Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, Prime Minister Hatoyama declared that the Japanese government was ready to begin the process of normalizing Japanese-Soviet relations, without raising the issue of the unsigned peace treaty at that time. The Japanese Prime Minister's response was not long in coming (September 13, 1956). The next step belonged to the Japanese Parliament, which sent the Soviet Foreign Minister an official letter approving the entire undertaking of restoring diplomatic relations.[546] A turning point came with the Japanese Prime Minister's visit to Moscow. He viewed the successful negotiations with the USSR as a sign of Japan's independence in the international arena.

On October 19, 1956, Hatoyama and Soviet Prime Minister Bulganin signed the Declaration on the Normalization of Relations between the USSR and Japan. This document cannot be considered a peace treaty, despite its provision for the end of the state of war and the immediate resumption of diplomatic and consular relations. The Kuril issue was addressed in point 9 of the Declaration: the USSR and Japan agreed to continue negotiations on concluding a peace treaty after the resumption of diplomatic relations. At the same time, the USSR, taking into account the interests and wishes of the Japanese state, agreed to the transfer of the Habomai and Shikotan islands to Japan, with the reservation, however, that their actual transfer would take place after the conclusion of the peace treaty.[547] The exchange of ratification documents completed the process of making the Declaration legally binding, which entered into force on December 11, 1956. The improvement in relations between Tokyo and Moscow was a welcome development, but it did not guarantee an immediate resolution of the dispute.

Another change in the Japanese government (February 1957) quickly complicated matters. Prime Minister Nabusuke Kishi, a proponent of close cooperation with the United States, signed the Treaty of Cooperation and Mutual Security with the Americans on January 19, 1960. Article 6, stating that to strengthen Japan's security and maintain peace in the Far East, U.S. forces had the right to use Japanese territory,[548] proved to be the pretext Khrushchev had been waiting for. As early

[546] Cf. Letter from the Plenipotentiary Representative of the Japanese Government, S. Matsumoto, to the USSR First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, A.A. Gromyko (1956); Letter from the USSR First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, A.A. Gromyko, to the Plenipotentiary Representative of the Government of Japan, S. Matsumoto (1956), Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/territory/edition92/period5.html (accessed: May 14, 2007).

[547] Paragraph 9 of the Joint Declaration of Japan and the USSR (1956), Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/territory/edition92/period5.html (accessed: May 14, 2007).

[548] http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/territory/edition92/period5.html (accessed: May 14, 2007); Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.html (accessed: May 14, 2007).

as January 27, 1960, the Soviet government sent Japan an aide memoire concerning the new Japan-USA Treaty, Shikotan Island, and the small Habomai Archipelago. Moscow, fearing the remilitarization of the Japanese islands and the restriction of their independence, rescinded point 9 of the 1956 Declaration. The Kremlin's justification for the decision was that, under the current circumstances, handing over the islands to Japan would only contribute to the expansion of territory used by foreign forces, which could undermine the USSR's internal security. The Soviet government also declared that it would only hand over the islands after the foreign forces had left Japan and a peace treaty had been signed. Japan, however, viewed this letter as a violation of the provisions of the 1956 Declaration – the USSR and Japan also pledged non-aggression and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. It also reiterated its demand for the return of the disputed islands.[549] The following years were marked by the unresolved issue of the peace treaty and the disputed islands. Activities focused primarily on declarations and statements. However, the situation allowed for the establishment of economic contacts. In October 1973, the then-Prime Minister of Japan visited the USSR. The talks between Brezhnev and Tanaka resulted in a joint communiqué: "Both sides recognize that in order to conclude a peace treaty, it is necessary to resolve the outstanding issues arising from World War II. This will make a significant contribution to establishing truly good relations between the two countries. It will also facilitate negotiations towards concluding a peace treaty. Both sides agree to continue these negotiations at an appropriate time in 1974."[550]

However, the hardening of the Soviet Union's position became apparent when a new Japan-US agreement was reached in 1977. Other sources indicate that Japan itself weakened its negotiating position upon signing the 1977 Anti-Hegemonism Treaty with China. Its main premise was that neither Japan nor China would seek to achieve a dominant position in the Far East. In this way, Tokyo presented the USSR with a significant negotiating argument: Japanese territory, expanded by the disputed territories, could become a regional dominion, and such a situation would violate the treaty's provisions.[551]

Leonid Brezhnev sought to exert military pressure and strengthen his position in the region by strengthening military bases on the islands. The early 1980s, accompanied by the intensification of the Cold War, resulted in a "freezing" of the dispute. The problematic islands remained within the borders of the USSR, and mutual relations between the Soviets and the Japanese were minimized.

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[549] Memorandum from the Soviet Government to the Government of Japan (1960); Memorandum from the Japanese Government to the Soviet Government (1960), Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/territory/edition92/period5.html (accessed: May 14, 2007).

[550] Japanese-Soviet Joint Communique (1973), Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/territory/edition92/period5.html (accessed: May 14, 2007).

[551] Cf. Diplomatic Bluebook 1977, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1977/1977-3-1.htm#Section%201.%20Promotion%20of%20Relations%20with%20Other%20Countries (accessed: May 14, 2007).

The communist regime of the Soviet Union, towards the end of its existence, tried to avoid discussions on the issue. It was Mikhail Gorbachev who initiated a new breath of fresh air in foreign policy. In his 1988 book, Reconstruction and New Thinking for Our Country and the Whole World,[552] he presented the basic principles of perestroika..

This reconstruction of the USSR resulted in working talks between the two countries, which took place in several rounds starting in 1988.[553] A year later, in September 1989, Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze informed the Japanese side that Gorbachev intended to make an official visit to Japan. Shevardnadze thus prepared the ground for negotiations during the Soviet leader's planned visit to Japan.[554] The April 1991 visit by the highest-ranking Soviet official failed to resolve the matter, despite a sensational official statement claiming a territorial dispute between Japan and the USSR. However, the talks ended in failure. It was clear that the Russians expected economic and financial aid from Japan and were willing to discuss the return of Shikotan and the small Habomai archipelago. However, Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu issued an ultimatum, tying financial aid to the restitution of the disputed islands, essentially cornering Gorbachev. As a result, only a compromise declaration was signed, paving the way for further border talks.[555] The Japanese authorities saw a way to resolve the Kuril issues in internationalizing the dispute. The opportunity presented itself at the summit of the world's seven most industrialized countries, held in Munich on July 7–8, 1992. The Japanese Prime Minister expected the remaining G-7 countries to take a firm stance that would influence decisions made in the Kremlin. This stance would entail sanctions and a suspension of aid to Russia until the territorial issue was resolved. However, instead of support, the remaining six showed only understanding. During the summit, the leaders recognized that the uncertain political situation in Moscow could be shaken. Russian diplomacy also appreciated the argument of internationalizing the dispute, when less than a month later, the media reported that the Kuril conflict was becoming a transnational issue in which the United States should become involved.

From the outset of his term, Russia's new president, Boris Yeltsin, emphasized his staunch support for good relations with Tokyo. He even presented a five-stage plan to resolve the dispute: first, signing a peace treaty, ceding Shikotan and the small Habomai archipelago, then demilitarization and a joint economic zone on Kunashir and Iturup, and finally, in the coming years, resolving the issue. This promising prospect for negotiations was marred by a so-called "minor

[552] M. Gorbachev, Przebudowa i nowe myślenie dla naszego kraju i dla całego świata, Warsaw 1989.
[553] Diplomatic Bluebook 1988: Exchange of VIP Visits (August 1988 – July 1989), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1989/1989-appendix-3.htm (accessed May 14, 2007).
[554] Diplomatic Bluebook 1990: Section 4: Soviet Union, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1990/1990-3-4.htm (accessed May 14, 2007).
[555] Japan-Soviet Joint Communique (1991), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/territory/edition92/period6.html (accessed May 14, 2007).

diplomatic scandal" sparked by the cancellation of Yeltsin's visit to the Japanese capital. The Russian president's political ambitions were quickly tempered by his opponents, who attempted to use the Kuril Islands issue as a tool for internal strife within the Kremlin.[556]

As a result, a special parliamentary commission was established to investigate. There were also voices suggesting that changing the borders of the Russian Federation could only occur with public participation. Yeltsin's plans were quickly deemed inappropriate in an era of democracy emerging in Russia. The then-head of state, it seems, had no choice, as the dispute became a bargaining chip in domestic politics. On the other hand, no one had the courage to admit that the islands should be returned. And so, both sides once again missed the opportunity to resolve the conflict, and it should be noted that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the most opportune moment in many years. The only change was the abolition of visa requirements for travelers between the Land of the Rising Sun and the Kuril Islands. In 1993, Yeltsin visited Tokyo, during which the Tokyo Declaration was signed.[557] During that summit, it was agreed only that the dispute would be resolved in the spirit of "law and justice." Yeltsin invoked this formula during subsequent meetings with Japanese politicians, who hoped the Kremlin would change its stance after the 1996 presidential elections. The Russian president's second term revealed the government's stance on the matter. During a January press conference, Yevgeny Primakov spoke "about the future," meaning that the dispute was unresolvable and needed to focus on economic cooperation. Japan said yes to economic aid provided Russia presented a "road map" with specific deadlines for resolving the territorial dispute.

The incidents occurring around the islands certainly aren't helping resolve the political stalemate. The area boasts a substantial economic zone, home to rich fishing grounds. This is a tempting target for Japanese poachers, who frequently fish around the disputed areas. A possible solution to the problem could be Primakov's proposal,[558] which involved a plan for joint investments on the islands in the areas of tourism, transport infrastructure, fishing and fish processing. Japan's stance on the dispute became more flexible with the announcement of changes in foreign policy made by Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto in July 1997. These changes concerned, among other things, Japanese-Russian cooperation in the utilization of natural resources located in the eastern part of the Federation. A tangible result of this tactic was the official visit of a Japanese Foreign

[556] *Diplomatic Bluebook 1992: Section 4: The Former Soviet Union*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1992/1992-3-4.htm (accessed May 14, 2007).

[557] The Tokyo Declaration recognized that bilateral agreements concluded between the USSR and Japan would be respected by the Russian Federation. The Japanese interpreted this as a commitment to fulfill the 1956 Declaration. The Russian side, on the other hand, claims that this declaration merely recognizes Russia "as the successor" to the USSR, which does not imply the implementation of the provisions of the 1956 Declaration, adopted, according to the Russians, despite the will of the people; Tokyo Declaration on Japan-Russia Relations – Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/territory/edition01/tokyo.html (accessed May 14, 2007).

[558] Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation from 1996 to 1998, later appointed Prime Minister.

Ministry envoy to the Kuril Islands in October 1997. This marked a significant moment in the history of the dispute, as such a high-ranking government official had not visited the islands since World War II. A month later, in early November, the so-called "no wives and no ties" meeting took place in Krasnoyarsk. During this unofficial meeting, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, in an uncharacteristic style for politics, fished together and relaxed at the government residence. This resulted in Japan's assurances of its support for Russia's membership in international organizations (including efforts to join the ranks of the world's most industrialized nations – the G-7) and the development of cooperation in economic matters. Most importantly, however, was the agreement that a peace treaty would be signed before the new millennium. The disputed islands were to be the subject of separate negotiations in the future.[559] On December 31, 1999, Boris Yeltsin announced that he was resigning from the office of president and designating Vladimir Putin as his successor in the next elections.[560] The Japanese hoped that this energetic successor, who enjoyed the support of the majority of Russians, would finally resolve the issue. These new hopes proved short-lived and were dashed in September 2000, during Putin's trip to Tokyo. Although the Russian President invoked the 1956 Declaration as a starting point for talks on a peace treaty, he also made it clear that Russia possessed no unnecessary territories. The Tokyo meeting (September 5–6, 2000) hardened the mutually negative stance on the disputed islands. However, by inviting Prime Minister Yosiro Mori to a return visit, Putin left the door ajar for another round of negotiations.[561] The Japanese Prime Minister accepted the invitation, arriving in Irkutsk on March 24, 2001. The two-day meeting concluded with a statement[562] that negotiations would continue based on the Tokyo Declaration. The change in Japan's prime minister contributed to the organization of another summit in Russia (January 9–12, 2003). Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Putin approved the Japan-Russia Action Plan. The second point of this action plan, among other things, called for accelerating peace negotiations and concluding an agreement on the terms of use of the waters surrounding the disputed islands.

Vladimir Putin's fourth year in power in the Kremlin and his foreign policy have received widespread media coverage. "Putin is so popular these days that he can afford controversial decisions. Prime Minister Koizumi is also in a strong position, so a compromise with the Japanese

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[559] *Diplomatic Bluebook 1998: Japan-Russia Relations*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1998/I-b.html#3 (accessed May 14, 2007).

[560] For a broader discussion on the presidency in the Russian Federation from the perspective of the contacts and relationship between its first president, Boris Yeltsin, and Vladimir Putin, who has ruled to this day, see the column by R.A. Medvedev, *Dziś*, 2004, no. 12, pp. 41–51.

[561] Cf. Statement by the Prime Minister of Japan and the President of the Russian Federation on the Issue of a Peace Treaty, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/territory/edition01/statement.html (accessed May 14, 2007).

[562] *Irkutsk Statement by the Prime Minister of Japan and the President of the Russian Federation on the Continuation of Future Negotiations on the Issue of a Peace Treaty*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/pmv0103/state.html (accessed May 14, 2007).

is entirely possible," said Sergei Markov.[563] Sergei Karaganov echoed this sentiment,[564] presenting examples of resolving the territorial dispute with Japan as a renowned expert: "Russia should return two islands in exchange for significant economic aid and Japanese investment in our economy." Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov addressed the Kurils in earnest in November 2004, announcing that the Russian Federation was ready to hand over the two disputed islands to Japan: "(...) such a solution would put the proverbial end to it."[565] In response to this statement, Tokyo announced that it wanted the return of all disputed territory, otherwise no agreement would be reached.

It might have seemed that the next opportunity to sign a peace treaty would be two anniversaries – the 150th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Russia and Japan and the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II. However, Prime Minister Koizumi, during his visit to Moscow (May 9-10, 2005), merely initiated talks about another round of top-level meetings. The conflicting positions of both governments on the islands contributed to Vladimir Putin's visit to Tokyo remaining in doubt until the end. Finally, the President of the Russian Federation flew to the capital of the Land of the Rising Sun in late November 2005. This meeting can be considered a gesture of goodwill and a gradual process of building trust. There are many differences of opinion and misunderstandings. However, we have decided to circumvent these disagreements and seek a solution to this important issue by expanding Japanese-Russian cooperation,[566] Koizumi said at a press conference after the meeting. The leaders of both countries, in keeping with the slogan "we must build bridges," are attempting to bridge the differences of opinion and controversy over the territorial dispute with issues of economic cooperation. Relations between the two countries are interspersed with ministerial visits. Only occasionally do media reports surface about incidents in the Northern Territories.[567]

Analyzing the history of this territorial conflict between Russia and Japan, it is necessary to consider the prospects and future scenarios for the disputed islands. This dispute involves not only politicians and the media, but also prominent observers of international relations and ordinary citizens. Japanese society celebrates Northern Territories Day on February 7 each year, reminding the international community of this issue. Prominent Russian citizens also weigh in, such as Alexander Solzhenitsyn, who writes in his book "Russia in Collapse": "And here we must mention

[563] Sergey Markov, Russian political scientist and adviser to Vladimir Putin.
[564] Sergey Karaganov, pro-Kremlin political scientist, chairman of the Kremlin's Council on Foreign and Defense Policy since 2006.
[565] *Gazeta.pl*, http://serwisy.gazeta.pl/swiat/1,34248,2390569.html (accessed May 14, 2007).
[566] *Portal Spraw Zagranicznych.pl*, http://www.psz.pl/content/view/1895/2/ (accessed May 14, 2007).
[567] Japanese fishing boats entered Russia's territorial waters near Kaigara Island (Japanese name). The firing on the boat resulted in a fatal accident. The last time such a harsh intervention by Russian officers took place was in 1956. *Gazeta.pl*, http://serwisy.gazeta.pl/swiat/1,34189,3552976.html (accessed May 14, 2007).

the unforgivable, stubborn obtuseness of our authorities when it comes to the southern Kurils. Having carelessly ceded dozens of vast Russian oblasts to Ukraine and Kazakhstan, and having sought to please America in international politics by every means since the late 1980s, they now, with unparalleled pseudo-patriotic stubbornness and hubris, refuse to return to Japan islands that never belonged to Russia and to which it never claimed before the revolution." (Captain Golovnin in the early 19th century and Admiral Putyatin in 1855 recognized the very borders Japan now insists on. Should we count the injustices suffered as a result of the Japanese attack in 1904 or the Japanese intervention during the civil war? And what about the fact that the USSR attacked Japan, breaking the five-year neutrality pact of 1941?) They clung to these islands as if Russia's entire future depended on them. For Japan—a country of small size—their return is a much more painful matter of national honor and prestige than of the associated fish wealth, about which some agreement could be reached. In the coming century, when Russia doesn't seem likely to have any friends in the west or south—we will rather be under increasing pressure—should we reject even this potential good neighborliness? Or perhaps even a closer relationship.[568]

Another interesting perspective is presented by Dimitrij Trenin of the Carnegie Moscow Center: Russia will one day have to reach an agreement with the Japanese regarding small islands in order to cooperate with Tokyo in the Far East, given China's rapid development. However, it's too early for such a compromise today.[569] In his book *The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border Between Geopolitics and Globalization*, the same author explores the reasons for the Russian government's actions. He explains that Russia's territorial integrity is the foundation of its security. Russia expands its territory as much as possible, but it does not relinquish the land it has conquered.[570] The disputed islands are considered crucial geostrategically by Russian military circles because: the Kuril Islands constitute Russia's easternmost defense perimeter and protect Russia's naval and air forces in the Sea of Okhotsk from attack; the loss of the Kuril Islands would split the Pacific Fleet in two, diminishing its strategic importance; the defense of Kamchatka would be more difficult and the Far Eastern air defense system would be weakened; if Japan seizes control of these islands, Russia's security would be threatened, as this would allow a potential enemy to conduct operations in the Sea of Okhotsk.[571] This military perspective conflicts with Russia's economic security requirements. Russia needs to rapidly develop its territories in the Far East and improve the living conditions of the population there to counteract depopulation.

[568] A. Solzhenitsyn, *Rosja w zapaści*, Warsaw 1999, pp. 31–32.
[569] D. Trenin, V. Mikheev, *Russia and Japan: As a Mutual Resource for Development: A Perspective from the Twenty-First Century on a Twentieth-Century Problem*, Washington 2005.
[570] D. Trenin, *The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border Between Geopolitics and Globalization*, Washington 2001, pp. 220–227.
[571] *Ibidem*,, pp. 220–227.

In 2006, the Russian government adopted the program for the Socio-Economic Development of the Kuril Islands in 2007–2015, which assumes investing 18 billion rubles in the archipelago.[572] Such actions only demonstrate that Vladimir Putin has no intention of bringing to an end the dispute over Shikotan, Iturup, Kunashir, and the Habomai archipelago, which has already lasted for more than 60 years. His second presidential term is drawing to a close, and a decision to return the disputed islands, which would be highly unpopular among Russia's political establishment, would only diminish his electoral support and negatively affect his considerable political popularity. One might argue that the dispute over the "Northern Territories" is a distinctive feature of Japan–Russia relations that is likely to remain the subject of tough negotiations and talks for many years to come. Russia's current increased military activity in the Far East poses a serious challenge for Japan, including the expansion of its forces in the disputed areas, joint patrols with China, and pressure on the country's northern border. Russia is expanding its military activity in the Sea of Okhotsk, located north of Hokkaido. According to Shingo Nagata of Kanazawa University, Moscow is transforming this basin into a base for nuclear-powered submarines. In the face of mounting tensions, Hokkaido undoubtedly became the most important point of Japan's national defense, alongside the southwestern region. Russia has also deployed Su-35 fighter jets and anti-ship missiles to what Japan calls the Northern Territories, which Russia administers as the Southern Kuril Islands. The dispute over these islands remains a major point of tension between Tokyo and Moscow. Japanese analysts point out that the defense of Hokkaido is linked to the situation in the south of the country, where Japan monitors Chinese activity around the Senkaku Islands, which Beijing claims. In recent years, China has regularly dispatched heavily armed warships to the area, increasing the risk of confrontation. According to Nagata, the Japan Ground Self-Defense Forces have been practicing rapid north-south troop redeployment to prepare for the possibility of a Russian operation around Hokkaido during a crisis with China in the south. Russia and China have also conducted joint bombing patrols and naval exercises near Japan. According to Yu Koizumi of the University of Tokyo, Chinese aircraft and ships appeared north of Japan in 2024 and 2025. By strengthening surveillance in the north, Japan is sending a signal not only to Russia but also to China. Last year, Japan recorded a significant number of fighter jet scrambles against foreign aircraft. According to the Joint Staff Office, from April 1 to December 31 of last year, the Japanese Air Force conducted 448 such attacks, primarily against Russian and Chinese aircraft. James Brown of Temple University's Tokyo campus assessed that Tokyo is particularly concerned about Russian reconnaissance flights and the demonstration of Kinzhal hypersonic missiles near Japan. These

[572] *Gazeta.pl*, http://serwisy.gazeta.pl/swiat/1,34189,3555515.html (accessed May 14, 2007).

weapons can alter their flight trajectory, making them difficult to intercept by existing air defense systems.

### 4.6. Hybrid warfare is a key threat of the 21st century

Contemporary conflict terminology, such as fourth- and fifth-generation warfare, post-industrial conflict, and global insurgency, is becoming increasingly important in describing contemporary conflict phenomena. Faced with the growing complexity of threats such as asymmetric attacks and hybrid strategies, as well as the ongoing blurring of the lines between war and peace, traditional approaches to analyzing and interpreting armed conflict are proving increasingly inadequate. Classical, exclusively military-based ways of thinking about conflict are becoming obsolete in the face of the changing realities of contemporary conflict. In his monumental work, The Art of War, Sun Tzu, the legendary strategist, emphasized the importance of flexibility and the ability to adapt to dynamic conflict conditions. Analyzing contemporary conflicts highlights the crucial role of understanding hybrid warfare as a new cognitive paradigm in the field of armed conflict studies and in the broader context of strategic studies. This is a significant step toward a more comprehensive understanding and more effective response to the complex challenges of the contemporary world of conflict.[573] Hybridity emerges from the blending of traditional forms of warfare with modern strategies. Contemporary conflicts are characterized by a wide spectrum of asymmetric and hybrid actions that transcend the boundaries of traditional warfare. These are not limited to battlefield combat but also encompass competition in digital, information, economic, and political domains. The struggle for control over information flow, economic manipulation, and the exploitation of global networks of connections are becoming as crucial as battlefield engagements. Unconventional weapons, including cyber weapons, are becoming increasingly important in such conflicts, often used not by traditional armed forces but by groups or special units. Control over information flows is becoming a key tool in warfare, supported by the processes of globalization and computerization, which transform local conflict into global competition. In this new reality, agents of influence are becoming a key element, contributing to the disintegration of societies and the shaping of opposition. At the same time, we are observing an intensification of activities by non-state actors with dispersed organizational structures, often employing terrorist or criminal methods, further complicating the landscape of contemporary conflicts. War, a phenomenon once limited to a specific space and time, is now transforming into something more complex. It is no longer simply an armed conflict taking place within a specific area and period, but permeates various spheres of life, sometimes reaching beyond the boundaries of space and time. Its goal is no longer limited to the acquisition of territory but to achieving dominance in many aspects of individual and societal

[573] E. Sadowska, *Zagrożenia asymetryczne – definicja, świadomość społeczna i rola we współczesnym świecie*, online: https://rocznikbezpieczenstwa.pl/ojs/index.php/rbm/article/view/426/393 (accessed March 10, 2024).

life. This new type of war often leads to the gradual destruction of state structures by influencing and manipulating public opinion. Analyzing contemporary hybrid conflicts becomes exceptionally complex because it is difficult to determine their beginning and end. They do not follow the predetermined patterns and dynamics characteristic of traditional armed conflicts. Many factors, such as technological development, globalization and socio-political changes, mean that modern wars take on diverse forms and are difficult to clearly define.

When we talk about hybrid warfare, we are faced with a strange mixture of premodern and postmodern conflict – a world of asymmetric and ethnopolitical warfare – where mosques and Microsoft programs mingle, and apocalyptic millenarians in Reeboks and Ray-Bans dream of acquiring weapons of mass destruction.[574] Therefore, contemporary conflicts, known as hybrid warfare, are not just a clash of traditional military forces but a complex mix of diverse elements. They combine technologies and combat methods, as well as cultures, ideologies, and worldviews. In today's world, where rapid technological advances intertwine with traditional conflict patterns, we are witnessing an extraordinary synergy of diverse factors. Hybrid warfare involves not only battlefield clashes but also the struggle for supremacy in the information space, the manipulation of public opinion, terrorist activities, and cyberattacks. We see this when religious symbols meet the tools of modern technology, when prayers in mosques intertwine with cyberspace manipulation and psychological strategies. Even in a world of apocalyptic visions, believers, dressed in the latest fashions and using cutting-edge technologies, become participants in these conflicts. Understanding contemporary conflicts requires moving beyond the traditional perception of war. The fight is moving into the spheres of human consciousness, where psychological actions, disinformation, and propaganda are as important as weapons and technology. Responding to these challenges requires not only adapting military strategies, but also developing new legal frameworks, analytical methods and tools that take into account the complex dynamics of today's conflicts.

The Indo-Pacific region is currently the scene of the most intense geopolitical rivalry, where Japan faces an unprecedented density of cyber and hybrid threats. Tokyo's traditional pacifist doctrine is giving way to a radical defense modernization, driven by coordinated actions by China, Russia, and North Korea. The purpose of this section is to present Japan's current cybersecurity level, taking into account the most significant threats, the ways in which they can be addressed locally and internationally, and the challenges the country faces in the coming years. For decades, Japan has been considered a technological leader and the cradle of the world's largest IT companies. Despite numerous achievements in this field, until recently the country remained largely unprepared for the challenges posed by the rise in cybercrime. The lack of legal regulations, institutions combating

[574] M. Evans, *From Kadesh to Kandahar: Military Theory and the Future War*, "Naval War College Review" 2003, no. 3, p. 137.

online threats, and a shortage of specialized personnel capable of protecting both the public and private sectors have plagued successive governments. The global market for broadly defined information technology (IT) services is characterized by dynamic growth, largely independent of prevailing economic trends. Its potential is difficult to precisely estimate, but the sector's approximate value could reach as much as $23 trillion by 2025 (Pawlak & Barmpaliou, 2017).[575] Only a fraction of this amount, i.e. approximately USD 170 billion, is expected to be the share of cybersecurity services.[576] This fact has not escaped the attention of criminal circles, whose development is taking place simultaneously with the further expansion of the industry, as evidenced by the fact that today more and more people use hacking[577] as a source and method of making money. The estimated amount of losses caused by cybercriminals has already exceeded the value of the global drug trafficking market and amounts to approximately USD 388 billion per year (Wasilewski, 2016).[578] At the end of the 20th century, the concept of a cyberattack was commonly associated with actions designed to evoke shock and interest in the perpetrator. The primary motivation often became the desire to prove superiority in software proficiency and crack data encryption systems. Currently, a broader typology is adopted, related to both the methods and motivations for conducting illegal online operations. Attacks include attacks aimed at causing physical damage, financial gain through the stock market or banking infrastructure, psychological harm to victims, and damage to the fabric of the network itself, which is difficult for those without specialized knowledge to detect[579] (Tsuchiya, 2011b).

Electronic espionage and sabotage activities targeting so-called critical infrastructure are simultaneously becoming dominant among non-military methods of waging covert wars between states. North Korea's hostile policy toward its southern neighbor remains a particularly blatant example of such practices. The situation on the Korean Peninsula indirectly determines the behavior of Japan, another highly developed East Asian economy, which, after years of neglect, is just beginning the path of full modernization in terms of institutional and legal responses to cyber threats. For the government and citizens, this is a race against time, the end of which is determined by the 2020 Summer Olympics in Tokyo. Japan has long been considered one of the global leaders in the IT sector, consistently remaining the largest market for IT and telecommunications products in the

[575] P. Pawlak, P.-N. Barmpaliou, *Politics of cybersecurity capacity building: conundrum and opportunity*, "Journal of Cyber Policy" 2017, vol. 2, no. 1.
[576] S. Morgan, *Cybersecurity Market Reaches $75 Billion In 2015; Expected To Reach $170 Billion By 2020* (retrieved July 10, 2017).
[577] Interpol defines hacking as crime directed against computer systems using various cyber tools and intrusion techniques.
[578] J. Wasilewski, *Przestępczość w cyberprzestrzeni – zagadnienia definicyjne*, "Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego" 2016, vol. 15.
[579] M. Tsuchiya, *Cybersecurity Preparedness in Japan: Rise of Threats in East Asia and Change of Administration*, paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association Annual Conference Global Governance: Political Authority in Transition, 2011.

world and the cradle of groundbreaking industry solutions, led by the introduction of mobile payments and access to internet services via mobile phones. According to data compiled in The Global Information Technology Report for 2016, over 97% of the population in Japan has access to the internet, and nowhere else on Earth do information and communication technologies play such a significant role in establishing business contacts and maintaining customer relationships. However, the local economy's connection to IT services does not go hand in hand with ensuring optimal levels of security and protection against cybercrime. The same report ranks Japan only 27th in terms of the development of legislation related to the high-tech industry and barely makes it into the top twenty countries with the highest number of trusted internet servers per million inhabitants. In this context, Japan's resources remain three times smaller than those of Iceland or Switzerland. It should be noted that these achievements are significantly above the global average, but given the increasing digitalization of the political and economic spheres, Japan requires significantly stronger preventive measures.

The presented statistics are reflected in practice. Over the past fifteen years, Japan has become one of the hotspots for hacker invasions, with the years 2003–2005 being considered a turning point, when the number of cybercrimes increased by 65% (Thomas, 2009). This period saw, among other things, a DDoS (distributed denial of service) attack that paralyzed over 400,000 private computers. Infectious bots and Trojans led to a blockage caused by the occupancy of all available resources, such as hardware memory or network bandwidth. In 2014, over 310 million attempts to take control of computers registered in Japan were detected,[580] and a decade later, the number of attacks exceeded 25 billion. This means that almost a thousand are carried out every second, but since the recorded activity usually comes from official police reports, it is important to be aware of the high percentage of undetected or unreported lawbreakings.[581] According to a report prepared by Tokyo-based company Trend Micro, Japan is the most susceptible to banking information leaks among all the countries evaluated.[582] Further analysis reveals that the banking sector loses the equivalent of $110 million annually through virtual channels, which equates to roughly 0.02% of the local budget. While this isn't a record figure for East and Southeast Asia, cybersecurity is still considered Japan's Achilles' heel, as, alongside South Korea and Singapore, the local economy is among the most vulnerable to cyberattacks on the entire continent. Studies conducted in this area have shown its vulnerability to cyberattacks to be over nine times higher than

[580] F.-S. Gady, *Japan Hit by Cyberattacks at an Unprecedented Level*, 2017, http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/japan-hit-by-cyberattacks-at-an-unprecedented-level/ (accessed 2017).
[581] Nippon Telegraph and Telephone, *Cybersecurity for Business Executives: An NTT Publication for Top Management*, 2015, http://www.ntt.co.jp/topics_e/CfBE/img/Cybersecurity_for_Business_Executives2.pdf (retrieved July 10, 2017).
[582] D. Aue, *Japan's banking malware surge pushes Australia out of top 10*, 2014, https://www.cso.com.au/article/552261/japan_banking_malware_surge_pushes_australia_top_10/ (retrieved July 10, 2017).

the global average. Existing under the shadow of constant threats hasn't prevented Japan from maintaining its position as a leading pioneer in information technology.

Using increasingly sophisticated methods of intercepting information, such as spoofing (impersonating other IP addresses), buffer overflow (overloading a system with data), and ping of death (disrupting server responsiveness), hackers are now targeting not only civilian assets but also attempting to attack what is known as critical infrastructure. This term encompasses the set of fundamental resources necessary for the proper functioning of the economy and society, including communications, transportation, healthcare, and food and energy supplies. For a country relying so heavily on modern technologies, where these areas are integrated with electronic management and control systems, the specter of a catastrophe involving disruptions to air traffic or loss of control over water flow through dams and reservoirs should be sufficient incentive to increase comprehensive response capabilities. In the recent past, relatively minor attacks – due to the use of simple algorithms – by unidentified perpetrators have occurred in this area, including those carried out as part of Operation Dust Storm. The victims of the attack were service providers associated with the mining, transport and energy sectors. The Ministry of Internal Affairs reported that attacks on critical infrastructure facilities reached 12.8 billion cases, accounting for approximately half of all cybercrimes recorded in the country. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI), a contracted supplier of weapons and military equipment to the Japanese government, suffered damage from an APT (advanced persistent threats) attack using malware-infected emails. Careless verification of incoming emails to employee accounts infected over eighty computers and half that number of servers. The prospect of information leaking regarding classified projects involving the production of long-range missiles, submarines, and nuclear facilities has raised serious concerns among observers.

Given the close security cooperation that has developed between Japan and the United States for over half a century, and the fact that much of the technology comes directly from American suppliers, the scandal at MHI headquarters posed a real threat to the stability of relations between the two countries. In a statement issued a few days after the incident, representatives of the defense giant denied rumors that sensitive data had fallen into unauthorized hands, but it was nevertheless the first such incident in Japan.[583] A few weeks after the turmoil surrounding MHI, another incident occurred involving the leak of confidential data from members of the Diet, the Japanese parliament. Private communications and documents of over 480 members were stolen and partially made public. Similar incidents continued throughout the rest of the year, this time affecting employees of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Japanese

[583] M. Lennon, *Japan's Largest Defense Contractor Hit by Cyber Attack*, 2017, http://www.securityweek.com/japans-largest-defense-contractor-hit-cyber-attack (retrieved July 10, 2017).

embassies and consulates located on various continents. According to experts, this confirmed widespread suspicions of Chinese involvement.

The series of incidents was thus intended to coincide with the anniversary of Japan's invasion of China in 1931. [584] The leakiness of Japan's archives also cast a shadow over negotiations on the implementation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership in 2013, and in May two years later, the country was rocked by the breach of the national social security and pension system. Over 1.25 million electronic profiles of registered users were exposed, provoking a broad debate on the need to develop new preventive mechanisms. The theft of personal records is particularly significant from a psychological perspective and evokes the strongest emotions among ordinary citizens. In Japan, the scale of this phenomenon is still higher than in most other countries. In 2016, 12.6 million people were affected, which means that one in ten citizens fell victim to cybercrime.

### 4.6.1. Cybersecurity prevention and management

Japan lagged behind in sectoral regulation for many years, lacking legislation that addressed the challenges it faces. It's difficult to pin this lag on any single factor. As recently as the early 21st century, relatively few people in Japan had access to a computer (around 20%), and even fewer had high-speed internet access.[585] This could undoubtedly have been a factor hindering progress, as could the centuries-old isolationist mentality and sense of invulnerability to the negative aspects of utilizing virtual world resources. Until 2010, the White Paper published by the Japanese Ministry of Defense contained no evidence of the Japanese elite's familiarity with the term cybersecurity, just as the guidelines constituting the national defense guidelines remained empty.[586] Given the technological proficiency of the country's inhabitants and their leading role in the IT industry, it was paradoxical that until mid-2010, the penal code did not mention the criminalization of acts such as creating and distributing malware. The Japanese took the first tentative steps in building an institutional and legal framework for cybersecurity in 1996, establishing the Network Security Violations Team. However, it was only four years later that the first legal acts, such as the Information Technology Basic Law and the e-Japan Strategy of 2001, appeared.[587] Critical infrastructure was also given limited attention, with the periodically updated Critical Information Infrastructure Action Plan being issued, despite a lack of agencies capable of implementing specific

[584] D. Ventre, *Cyberspace in Japan's New Defense Strategy*, [in:] D. Ventre (ed.), *Cyber Conflict: Competing National Perspectives*, London 2012.
[585] D. Ventre, Cyberspace in Japan's New Defense Strategy, [in:] D. Ventre (ed.), Cyber Conflict: Competing National Perspectives, London 2012.
[586] P. Kallender, W. Hughes, Japan's Emerging Trajectory as a 'Cyber Power': From Securitization to Militarization of Cyberspace, "The Journal of Strategic Studies" 2017, vol. 40, no. 1–2.
[587] BSA The Software Alliance, Asia-Pacific Cybersecurity Dashboard: Country: Japan, 2015, http://www.bsa.org/~/media/Files/Policy/Security/CyberSecure/study_apac_cybersecurity_en.pdf (retrieved July 10, 2017).

actions based on existing guidelines. In this regard, the establishment of the National Information Security Center (NISC) proved to be a breakthrough. As an office directly reporting to the Prime Minister, the NISC became the headquarters for cyber defense and a key authority in overseeing the increasingly rapidly evolving internet environment through its legal and technical mandates. Its officials were entrusted not only with legislative powers but also with the authority to act as liaisons between the government and the private sector, collect and process reports on offensive activities, and represent the country in international relations. These privileges were further derived from the documents adopted by the National Information Security Council: the First National Strategy on Information Security and the Second National Strategy on Information, the prototypes of the national strategy for combating cybercrime.

However, until 2009, when a wave of attacks on government organizations, the media, and the financial sector swept through East Asia, prevention and mitigation policies remained largely fragmented among the centers responsible for coordinating them. Only events in neighboring South Korea prompted a more decisive response from politicians. The Ministry of Defense published successive Defense White Papers, which for the first time broadly addressed the threats posed by the transformation of the Internet into a modern weapon. Attention was also drawn to the international dimension of the problem, citing American institutional and legal solutions as adaptable and worthy of emulation (including the need to establish an equivalent of the United States Cyber Command).[588] As a result, an additional division was created within the ministry, the Cybersecurity Unit (CDU). With a budget of over $140 million, the unit has achieved full operational capacity and is used by the Japanese army as the primary agency for thwarting attacks on all ministry systems (Kshetri, 2016). The NICS also prepared its most important document to date, titled Information Security Strategy to Protect the Nation. It revolves around three fundamental paradigms: strengthening countermeasures through political reforms, a more effective information policy, and a shift from a reactive to a proactive approach.[589]

In 2012, anticipating the publication of the long-awaited National Cybersecurity Strategy, the Ministry of Defense presented a program focused solely on cyberdefense, "Toward Stable and Effective Use of Cyberspace." This program summarized the most likely scenarios of a cyberattack on Japan, presented relevant policy recommendations (including participation in shaping global legislation and strengthening the position of the Ministry of Defense and the Japan Self-Defense Forces), and emphasized the need for cooperation with private entities and international allies. The program is updated annually by the Response Committee, which also serves as the executive

[588] P. Kallender, *Japan, The Ministry of Defense and Cyber-Security*, "The RUSI Journal" 2014, vol. 159, no. 1.
[589] M. Tsuchiya, *Cybersecurity in East Asia: Japan and the 2009 Attacks on South Korea and the United States*, [in:] J. A. Kim (ed.), *Cybersecurity: Public Sector Threats and Responses*, New York 2011.

body.[590] A more eclectic document is the Cybersecurity Basic Act, adopted in 2014. It is not limited to defense but contains a series of opinions and comments addressed to business representatives and local administrations at the prefectural level. Its basic postulates boil down to strengthening cooperation between individual government agencies and bodies, and the most important practical solutions include strengthening the Prime Minister's control over the National Cybersecurity Center (NICS) and establishing Strategic Cybersecurity Centers, whose plural name refers to the number and rank of entities involved in this initiative. The periodic conference facilitates a multi-stakeholder dialogue between key officials responsible for the entire spectrum of Japanese cybersecurity – the ministers of foreign affairs, defense, economy, and home affairs, as well as the head of the National Public Affairs Commission and the prime minister.[591]

When the National Cybersecurity Strategy finally came into effect in June 2013, the National Police Agency (NAP) formed a 140-person cybercrime unit with a mandate to intervene both domestically and internationally. The core of the unit's specialists is recruited from among the most capable private sector employees, and in addition to excellent networking skills, officers must be fluent in English, Chinese, or Korean to navigate internationally. The unit's members are dispersed across thirteen regional crisis centers, and their primary role is to exchange information with over 4,000 entities providing key services within critical infrastructure systems. A similar mobilization of resources occurred at the Ministry of the Interior, where they invested in the construction of a Cybersecurity Research Center, whose role is to develop defensive technologies in the fight against criminals and to establish research collaborations with institutions in Europe and the United States.

In 2015, the Strategy was revised, and since then it has remained, in its unchanged form, the principal document setting out Japan's cyber security doctrine. Reviewing the document, it is easy to see that the primary emphasis is on ensuring citizens' freedom of access to the internet, regardless of necessary steps taken to protect the interests of its users. Commentators often cite this point as a major weakness of the Strategy, as the intelligence services' surveillance powers are therefore significantly limited compared to those in the United States, for example. The free flow of information, compliance with the law, full openness, autonomy in the equal use of resources, and cooperation prioritized over authoritarian government oversight constitute the fundamental principles upon which Japanese cybersecurity policy is based. The assumptions identify four main spheres of influence: improving security measures for society and the economy, building a people-

[590] Ministry of Defense Japan, *Toward Stable and Effective Use of Cyberspace*, 2012, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/others/pdf/stable_and_effective_use_cyberspace.pdf (retrieved July 10, 2017).
[591] S. Umeda, *Japan: Cybersecurity Basic Act Adopted*, 2014, http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/japan-cybersecurity-basic-act-adopted (retrieved July 10, 2017).

friendly internet environment, contributing to increased peace and stability locally and internationally, and an emphasis on research and development.

Japan has a three-tiered structure for responding to cyberattacks. The first tier involves the police, which are authorized to detain and interrogate individuals suspected of violating regulations. If the act is classified as a threat to national security, the designated organization to counteract it is the armed forces, specifically the Japan Self-Defense Forces. Regardless of this vertical structure, intelligence also exists. Its role is to prevent and anticipate attacks before they materialize[592] (Tsuchiya, 2011b). The activities of these services are not strictly separated and intertwine, and the NAP, the Ministry of Defense, and the National Information Security Center (NISC) that oversee their work form a system of interconnected vessels. For example, police officers have continuous internet traffic monitoring points scattered across the country, sharing data with other agencies as needed. At the same time, a specific group of experts from the Ministry of Defense remains permanently assigned to the NISC and collaborates with local staff. When the jointly collected material requires thorough analysis, additional actors are involved, including a special task force known as the Cyber Clean Center, which reports to the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (Tsuchiya, 2011b).

Finally, it's worth mentioning other institutions that serve as minor regulatory ties. The second organization, after the NICS, responsible for information protection, monitoring, and analysis is the government's Information and Technology Promotion Agency, which collaborates in this regard with the still-active Network Security Breach Team. Its primary tasks, in a sense, duplicate the NICS's remit in promoting the Japanese IT sector abroad and acting as an intermediary between the government and entities participating in the rapidly developing public-private partnership (BSA, 2015). Its members, organized under the Japanese Business Federation known as Keidanren, established a special council in 2014 to protect the interests of industrialists in the field of IT security. Over 30 companies from the transportation, applied computing, communications, and finance sectors submitted their candidacies, which developed a series of recommendations for the government, demanding increased investment in this area (Kingston, 2016). The high priority placed on the security of private user data led the Minister of Economy to establish a Working Group on Personal Data. A similar team was established at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and its work resulted in the report by The Research Society (Kshetri, 2016). The National Institute of Information and Communication Technology, founded in the 19th century, is considered a breeding ground for talent and a leading research center, developing unique tools to combat cybercriminals. Its latest

[592] M. Tsuchiya, *Cybersecurity Preparedness in Japan: Rise of Threats in East Asia and Change of Administration*, paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association Annual Conference Global Governance: Political Authority in Transition, 2011.

achievement is the Daedalus program, which allows for real-time 3D tracking of attacks, helping to pinpoint the source of the disruption (*Nitta, 2014a*).

### 4.6.2. International cooperation in combating cybercrime

In 2014, the first ASEAN-Japan Cybercrime Dialogue was organized, focused on more effective implementation of the Budapest Convention, combating cybercrime, and building regional resilience. Politicians' initiatives are supported by business representatives, a prime example of which is the agreement signed in early 2017 between the governments of the Philippines, Indonesia, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam, and the Japanese IT giant NEC, which committed to providing technology and conducting cybersecurity training for the aforementioned signatories[593] *(Parameswaran, 2017).* Investments in ASEAN, both symbolic in political terms and economic, are a logical step that allows Japan to gain a strong ally against emerging threats. They also provide an opportunity to saturate ASEAN's developing markets with Japanese-origin products and establish a dominant position in the local environment. Beyond Southeast Asia, the United States remains the most important point of support for Japan's cybersecurity policy. For both countries, strengthening their defensive capabilities in this area is only a fragment of the broader alliance relationship that has existed since the signing of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security in 1960. The Japanese remain vitally interested in American support, a fact facilitated by their geographical location. The Center for Strategic and International Studies clearly stated in its latest report on bilateral relations that China, North Korea, and Russia are considered Japan's primary adversaries, yet Tokyo lacks the resources to address the threats emanating from these countries on its own[594] *(Lewis, 2015)*.

The first joint declaration by Japan and the United States on maintaining peace in cyberspace was issued in 2003, titled the United States-Japan Joint Statement on Promoting Global Cyber Security. The call was intended to draw the international community's attention to the upcoming challenges and suggested a number of solutions (including public-private sector partnerships, organizing multilateral discussion forums, creating early warning mechanisms, and strengthening government oversight of the IT sector) that should be adopted to comprehensively combat cybercrime (Department of Defense, 2003). It was not until eight years after the call was issued that the governments in Tokyo and Washington officially prioritized bilateral efforts to improve cybersecurity, which was facilitated by a meeting of the hybrid U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee in 2011.

[593] P. Parameswaran, *Japan-ASEAN Cyber Cooperation in the Spotlight*, 2017, http://thediplomat.com/2017/02/japan-asean-cyber-cooperation-in-the-spotlight/ (retrieved July 10, 2017).
[594] J.-A. Lewis, *U.S.-Japan Cooperation in Cybersecurity*, 2015, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/151105_Lewis_USJapanCyber_Web.pdf (retrieved July 10, 2017).

A year later, Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda and President Barack Obama reaffirmed these commitments for the first time at the highest diplomatic level[595] *(Matsubara, 2012).* The institutionalization of contacts took place in 2013, when the first meeting of the Japan-U.S. Cyber Dialogue took place in Tokyo, covering all the sensitive areas of particular interest to the Japanese delegation, including critical infrastructure, national security, building defense capabilities and the international approach (Nitta, 2014b).

Traditional criminal groups, collectively known in Japan as yakuza, are increasingly using cybernetic methods of extortion and money laundering to offset losses stemming from declining revenues from gambling and prostitution. However, their activities are not the main cause for concern when analyzing the data on the origins of these attacks. Studies conducted by the National Anti-Corruption Agency (NAP) estimate that over 97% of attacks on Japanese institutions originated from other countries[596] *(Nitta, 2014a).* This is not surprising, considering that cybercrime is in no way limited by geography or foreign jurisdiction. Its international spread is further fueled by the fact that the further away the command center is from the attack site, the more difficult it is to track down the perpetrators. Under increasing pressure from spies, hackers, and common fraudsters, the Japanese authorities cannot focus solely on developing domestic countermeasures but should also prioritize cooperation within regional and global agreements. Therefore, the country remains a signatory to key international treaties, such as the 2001 Budapest Convention against Cybercrime, has partnership agreements with NATO and the European Union, and actively participates in meetings of specialized bodies established within the United Nations (Gady, 2015a). The implementation of the First National Strategy on Information Security in 2006 contributed to Japan's expression of ambition and its attempt to emphasize its role in building an international order related to the cyberspace universe. The authorities planned not only to strengthen existing mechanisms but also openly assumed the development and application of a strictly Japanese model of conduct in relation to existing provisions (Information Security Policy Council, 2006). This model is characterized by high quality, effectiveness, and a special level of trust. The 2009 update of the doctrine deepened these assurances, simultaneously adding a provision regarding the country's readiness to assume a leadership role in information security in Asia (*National Information Security Policy Council, 2009*).

Both concepts clearly indicated that Japan had from the outset opted for a strong alliance, based on a triangle encompassing the United States, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the European Union (EU). Characteristically, however, South Korea and the People's

[595] M. Matsubara, *A Long and Winding Road for Cybersecurity Cooperation Between Japan and United States*, "Harvard Asia Quarterly" 2012, vol. 14, no. 1–2.
[596] Y. Nitta, National Cyber Security Strategy: Are We Making Progress? Japan's Efforts and Challenges, "Georgetown Journal of International Affairs" 2014, vol. 15, no. 1.

Republic of China were omitted as potential pillars of a regional partnership, even though the former's experience could prove particularly valuable. In the 2015 National Strategy, none of these countries was even mentioned by name, giving way to areas of marginal importance to Japan, such as South America, Africa, and the Caribbean (GoP, 2015). This chosen strategy forces Japan to automatically shift its focus to Southeast Asia, where, since 2009, cooperation with countries in the region has been strengthened through the annual ASEAN-Japan Information Security Meetings. The agenda for these meetings typically remains similar, with discussions typically focusing on three key dimensions: creating a secure business environment, building public awareness of IT solutions, and developing information management strategies for individual countries (National Center of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity, 2015). Dialogue is complemented by workshops, courses, and training sessions thematically linked to the conference panels.

In 2015, representatives of the Japanese Ministry of Defense and the U.S. Department of Defense issued a joint communiqué in which they committed to further strengthening defense capabilities through consultation mechanisms and information exchange between national data collection centers (U.S.-Japan Cyber Defense Policy Working Group, 2015). Beyond the strictly political dimension, it is worth noting that the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology has maintained close relations with the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry for over fifteen years, establishing joint development priorities in the field of cybersecurity and exchanging technical documentation. The Institute's publications addressed to Japanese audiences are translated and published in the local market. Business contacts have also developed since 2012, when the Japan Business Federation and the American Chamber of Commerce held the first conference on internet trade regulation. Both entities later issued appropriate recommendations to the state authorities, urging them to support the process of strengthening the relations between the private and public spheres[597] *(Matsubara, 2012)*.

Despite these promising signals from both camps, the issue of including cybersecurity in the treaty on mutual cooperation and security remains unresolved. The original text was written at a time when this concept had not yet been recognized in international law and requires amendments as soon as possible. The lack of a formal, separate treaty addressing this topic means that areas such as allied obligations, implementable strategies (defensive, offensive, counter-attack), and regulations regarding joint military exercises remain undefined. The lack of mutual agreement on what the term "use of force" actually means in countering cyberattacks and when such measures

[597] M. Matsubara, *A Long and Winding Road for Cybersecurity Cooperation Between Japan and United States*, "Harvard Asia Quarterly" 2012, vol. 14, no. 1–2.

can be applied effectively limits the room for maneuver in joint military operations, tracking down perpetrators, and taking appropriate retaliatory measures against aggressors. The pacifism inherent in the Japanese constitution is another impediment, as it indirectly determines the scale of financing and strengthening military capabilities, armaments, and defense, which also impacts the financial resources of the cybersecurity sector. Consequently, while the United States Cyber Command has over 4,000 trained officers divided into three separate sections, the Japanese CDU has struggled to find the resources to employ fewer than a hundred military personnel[598] *(Kshetri, 2016*).

In contrast to the well-established cooperation with the United States and the progressive development of partnerships with ASEAN countries, the lack of deeper dialogue with Japan's closest neighbors – China and South Korea – is disappointing. In China's case, relations are strained by historical factors related to Japanese atrocities committed on the Chinese mainland during World War II, ongoing tensions over the territorial affiliation of the Senkaku Islands, and suspicions directed through official channels at Beijing, suggesting the involvement of local hackers in compromising the security of Japan's network. In the 2000s, North Korean intelligence operations were considered a traditional threat, treating penetration of the Japanese internet as a testing ground for hacking attempts into South Korean systems. However, in 2013, the Japanese Ministry of Defense admitted for the first time that it had information about a secret unit subordinated to the People's Liberation Army (PLA) conducting technological espionage in Japan, and a year later, the National Defense Institute in Tokyo published a report placing China at the top of the list of countries using APT to steal confidential government information (National Institute for Defense Studies, 2014). Confirmation of these assumptions can be found, among other things, in events at the turn of 2010/2011, when the arrest of Chinese sailors by Japanese coastal defense forces led to protests in China and threats of hacking as a retaliatory measure[599] (*Tsuchiya, 2015*).

A few months later, corporations such as MHI, Toshiba, and Fujitsu, as well as government agencies and NPAs, fell victim to varying degrees of DDoS attacks. Since 2006, Japan has been trying to position itself as a regional leader in combating cybercrime, and, supported by the United States, it has achieved some success. To a limited extent, the initiative has even attracted Russians, with whom the Japanese have been developing closer economic ties in recent years, focusing on exploiting local gas resources and oil trade.

Cybersecurity is another possible area of cooperation, and justified hopes in this respect were raised by the resumption of bilateral talks in the 2+2 format in 2017, after a three-year break, related

[598] N. Kshetri, The Quest to Cyber Superiority: Cybersecurity Regulations, Frameworks and Strategies of Major Economies, New York 2016.
[599] M. Tsuchiya, Japan's Response to Cyber Threats in the Surveillance Age, "Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations" 2015, vol. 17, no. 1–2.

to the security of the Asia-Pacific region, where IT defense is a new key topic[600] *(Kazak, 2017)*. In China's case, there are currently no signs of a possible détente. The agreements are certainly not facilitated by events that are mutually antagonizing both the highest-ranking government officials and the public. As many as 71% of Japanese believe that bilateral relations between the countries are poor, with nearly 80% of Chinese respondents agreeing[601] *(Kudo, 2016)*. This shows how far from positive decisions the process of reaching common positions in the area of compatible cyber policy is.

Unlike Southeast Asia, where ASEAN remains a driving force for integration, East Asia lacks a similar organization that could further stimulate states in the field of cyberdefense. South Korea, the only natural partner for talks, possesses a more developed potential for countering cyberterror and pursues a rather isolated policy in this area. Focused on its northern neighbor's activities, it is not particularly interested in shifting its attention to other neighbors. The trilateral talks between China, Japan, and South Korea, held since 2014 and concerning countering North Korean hackers, remain a single forum for a united front, justifying the latter's presence in this group and confirming the aforementioned characteristics[602] *(Yonhap Agency, 2017).*

### 4.6.3. Barriers to counteracting cybercrime

The greatest challenges surrounding network security concern Japan's ability to overcome internal challenges. Prominent among these is the lack of specialized IT workers, who should constitute a vital human resource base in response to the ever-increasing market demands. Analysts emphasize that the country lacks at least 80,000 experts, and according to various projections, this number will increase to nearly 200,000 by 2020[603] *(Pollmann, 2016)*. At the same time, as many as 60% of currently employed staff require improvement of their previously acquired *skills (Department of Commerce, 2016a)*. This currently forces the Japanese to engage in costly collaboration with external partners to conduct specialized training, prepare reports, and conduct research. This will not replace the need to establish their own service responsible for protecting public and private systems, but progress will be impossible if Japan continues to experience negative trends, which include the reduction in IT research and development spending in recent years[604]

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[600] A. Kazak, Russia, Japan to revive '2+2' format talks, discuss Asia-Pacific security, 2017, https://www.rbth.com/international/2017/03/20/russia-japan-talks-asia-pacific-security-722806 (retrieved July 10, 2017).

[601] Y. Kudo, *Polls show Sino-Japan public sentiment worsens; direct interaction key to improvement*, 2016, http://www.genron-npo.net/en/opinion_polls/archives/5310.html (retrieved July 10, 2017).

[602] Yonhap Agency, *S. Korea, Japan, China to discuss N. Korea's cyber threats in Tokyo this week*, 2017, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2017/02/09/0200000000AEN20170209010100315.html (retrieved July 10, 2017).

[603] M. Pollmann, *Japan's Achilles Heel: Cybersecurity*, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/japans-achilles-heel-cybersecurity/ (retrieved July 10, 2017).

[604] N. Kshetri, *Japan's Changing Cybersecurity Landscape*, "Computer" 2014, vol. 47, no. 1.

*(Kshe-tri, 2014).* The working conditions afforded to professionals also raise concerns, as they differ from the optimal solutions found in Western countries. Compared to the United States, where over 75% of professionals have the option to work from home, the figure in Japan is quite different, with only 25% of employees having such freedom[605] *(Matsubara, Kriz, 2016*). Another serious obstacle to prevention is the lack of public awareness and widely shared knowledge among Japanese citizens about the risks associated with careless use of Internet resources.

The infantilization or lack of understanding of the problem stems from both demographic and cultural factors. For many years, the country has been grappling with an aging population, largely unfamiliar with basic online safety precautions, making it a potential target for scammers and malware. This distrust is further exacerbated by events such as the aforementioned attack on the national pension system in 2015, which generated negative attention and, instead of providing food for thought, further isolated older people from modern technologies. Furthermore, in government and business circles, an ethos of resourcefulness is cultivated, one who doesn't make mistakes and is able to solve any problem in the interests of superiors or the greater good. For this reason, the Japanese are reluctant to share their experiences or admit to being victims of cybercrime for fear of stigmatization from colleagues and competitors. The Japanese government's behavior and the issue of reporting the scale of cyberattacks to international institutions serve as a prime example. Reliable sources based on detailed surveys confirm that losses incurred by local companies are approximately half as high as those incurred by companies in the United States. However, assuming that the loss rate in this country remains similar to that in other highly developed countries (France, Germany, the USA), the reported losses appear to be underestimated by as much as 60% (CSIS, 2015). An additional barrier to shaping appropriate attitudes is the reluctant attitude of owners of medium-sized and small businesses, where this issue is traditionally not given much attention. For as many as 34% of them, cybersecurity is not considered a significant development challenge for their companies (*Matsubara, 2017*). Local business representatives are not interested in acquiring advanced IT services to protect their workplaces, a practice that contradicts the standards espoused in countries where the risk of attacks is equally high. Investments by Japanese commercial and industrial companies in antivirus software, certified cloud computing, and encryption tools are, on average, 30% lower than those of their American counterparts[606] *(Kshetri, 2016*). Providing this type of solution is not the easiest or cheapest, because Japan, paradoxically, does not have any

[605] M. Matsubara, D. Kriz, *Putting METI Cyberthreat Information Sharing Recommendation Into Action in Japan*, 2016, https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/07/csoputting-the-meti-cyberthreat-information-sharing-recommendation-into-action-in-japan/ (retrieved July 10, 2017).

[606] N. Kshetri, The Quest to Cyber Superiority: Cybersecurity Regulations, Frameworks and Strategies of Major Economies, New York 2016.

significant company producing antivirus software and is forced to use foreign licenses[607] *(Nitta, 2014a).*

The financial resources invested, legal regulations introduced, and the development of international cooperation with like-minded entities have allowed Japan to significantly enhance its cyberdefense capabilities. This qualitative leap is particularly evident when comparing today's security architecture with the situation before the regional attacks of 2009, which, while not directly affecting the country, served as the final wake-up call for the authorities before the dawn of a completely new era in identifying contemporary challenges to national security. Undoubtedly, the decisive impetus for the intensification of a proactive cyber policy was Tokyo's awarding of the right to host the 2020 Summer Olympics and Paralympics. It is no coincidence that the country's first-ever National Cybersecurity Strategy was published several months before the final vote by members of the International Olympic Committee, although due to the lack of guarantees of success, the document did not yet explicitly refer to the event itself. In the updated version two years later, the change in content was fundamental, and the entire strategy was subordinated to achieving full operational readiness in terms of preparations for the event *(GoJ, 2015).* The fact that the previous Olympics saw nearly 200 million attacks on sports facilities, logistics centers, and media outlets leaves the Japanese no time to waste. In March 2014, over 150 invited experts from around the world simulated a multi-level attack on 21 government ministries and agencies, as well as selected industrial centers. The operation was planned based on a similar exercise conducted in London in 2012. That same month, a special operational group composed of IT experts from individual ministries and the National Agency for Information Technology (NAP) was launched. Its goal is to create a list of recommendations and identify existing vulnerabilities in network firewalls[608] *(Information Management, 2015).* Regardless of the progress made in implementing the necessary countermeasures, one sector, namely human resources, remains significantly below optimal. It is worth noting that in the 2017 IT Action Program, the Ministry of the Interior primarily addressed the shortage of specialists. The National Institute of Information and Communication Technology responded positively by establishing the National Cybertraining Center. It not only provides comprehensive training for 40 of the most talented IT students in the country but also prepares pilot programs for government and local administration employees and coordinates the Cyber Colosseo training package[609] *(Matsubara, 2017*). Plans are also underway to increase the number of soldiers in the CDU to nearly 1,000. Subject to time pressure,

[607] N. Kshetri, Japan's Changing Cybersecurity Landscape, "Computer" 2014, vol. 47, no. 1.
[608] Information Security Policy Council, *The First National Strategy on Information Security*, https://www.nisc.go.jp/eng/pdf/national_strategy_001_eng.pdf (retrieved July 10, 2017).
[609] M. Matsubara, *How Japan Is Aiming to Close the Cybersecurity Skills Gap Before Tokyo 2020*, 2017, https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/05/cso-japan-aiming-close cybersecurity-skills-gap-tokyo-2020/ (retrieved July 10, 2017).

circumstances, and constitutional provisions that, among other things, prohibit the state from sending soldiers to foreign operations and prevent the production of offensive weapons, Japan is increasingly strengthening its IT resilience. Intensive efforts by the government and the private sector supporting them, in the form of major IT corporations like NEC, Sony, and Honda, should translate into a positive change of behavior in the coming years among the most skeptical and slowly modernizing groups – small and medium-sized enterprises and individual users. Foreign partners are also expressing interest in participating in this broad mobilization. A significant increase in activity is noticeable among American and Israeli ICT companies, led by Security Innovation, which provides training tools in the form of online courses for over forty local companies, and Cybereason, which provides analytical platform services. The signal coming from above is slowly starting to reach lower and lower, as evidenced by consumer behavior, among whom there is a growing interest in information security management programs, network vulnerability scanning technology, and encryption products.

In summary, the draft of Japan's cybersecurity policy is only just taking shape, and an assessment of the efforts undertaken so far is still pending. With adequate funding and a strong work culture within the bodies established for this purpose, the results of the implemented solutions should meet expectations. However, there are still areas that need to be filled with more content. Investments in human resources, social campaigns aimed at raising awareness of the need to pay greater attention to online threats, and efforts to strengthen dialogue with China and South Korea are three elements whose fulfillment will guarantee Japan joining the ranks of countries with the most comprehensive security strategy for the Internet and related systems in the world.

### 4.7. Directions of Japan's security policy during the Shinzo Abe government

The primary goal of Japan's security policy is to strengthen cooperation with the United States as its primary strategic partner. Japan recognizes that the United States is the only real guarantor of its security and sovereignty. Furthermore, to counterbalance the threat posed by the growing military might of the People's Republic of China, Japan has focused on security cooperation with other countries in the region, such as Vietnam, the Philippines, India, Thailand, and Australia. Japan's initiatives are primarily targeted at countries that, like Japan, share border issues with China.[610] Despite criticism from countries in the region, including the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Korea, regarding the abandonment of the pacifist principles of Article 9 of the

[610] Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2015*, p. 2–3, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2015.html (accessed April 10, 2016); *Constitution of Japan of November 3, 1946*.

Constitution,[611] Japan strives to maintain its image as a state engaged in peace initiatives by participating in UN peacekeeping missions and humanitarian aid and disaster relief operations.

After Junichirō Koizumi's term as Prime Minister of Japan ended in 2006, the government coalition consisting of the Liberal Democratic Party (Jiyū-minshu-tō, LDP) and the Komeito Party appointed Shinzō Abe, a close ally of the former Prime Minister, as the successor to the then-head of the Secretariat. The new Prime Minister pledged to continue his predecessor's vision of overhauling Japan's security system, implementing constitutional reform that would abolish the ban on the right to collective defense, and intensifying the role of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the UN. In his address to parliament, Shinzō Abe announced that, together with the newly appointed Advisory Panel, he would begin work on a new interpretation of the constitution regarding the right to collective defense.[612]

The beginning of Shinzō Abe's administration coincided with a prolonged crisis in Iraq. Public opinion was negative towards any changes in the interpretation of the constitution. This is exemplified by a multi-year poll conducted by the Yomiuri newspaper regarding public opinion on Japan's involvement in conflicts abroad, which could be a consequence of constitutional changes.[613] Declining support for the party in polls several months before the July 2007 parliamentary elections for the upper house, the House of Councillors, changed the approach of some in the ruling coalition to implementing reforms. Prime Minister Abe viewed the upcoming parliamentary vote as a vote of confidence in the government regarding changes to the planned constitutional reforms.[614] At the time, most citizens were interested in reforms in the social sphere, the education system, and combating corruption, which were more prominent in the platforms of opposition parties. Consequently, the LDP lost its parliamentary majority for the first time since 1955 to the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), leading to the resignation of the government.[615]

The years 2007–2012 were a turbulent period for Japan's domestic politics. Each year, due to political scandals or deep public dissatisfaction, the administration, headed by the prime minister, changed. To voters' disappointment, neither government managed to implement the changes promised during the election campaign, despite the numerous political disputes. Furthermore, the deepening economic recession did not improve the mood of the average Japanese. The government's inept handling of the 2011 earthquake and tsunami led to complete voter disillusionment. In the

[611] *Constitution of Japan of November 3, 1946*, adopted by the National Diet on October 7, 1946, promulgated by Emperor Hirohito on November 3, 1946, entered into force on May 3, 1947.
[612] T. Kambayashi, Japan Rethinks Military Role under New Head; Abe Seeks to Step Up U.S. Ties, "The Washington Times", September 9, 2006.
[613] P. Midford, Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion and Security: From Pacifism to Realism?, California 2011, p. 154.
[614] Ibidem, p. 158.
[615] T. Kambayashi, Could Japan's Abe Step Down?, "The Christian Science Monitor", July 3, 2007.

upcoming parliamentary elections, the LDP, led by Shinzō Abe, won decisively, promising deep economic reforms. With Abe's return to the prime ministership, the concept of security reforms also resurfaced. An additional impetus was the escalation of Sino-Japanese relations over the Senkaku Islands,[616] which the Japanese government had acquired in September 2012.[617]

### 4.7.1. Japan's National Security Strategy 2013

A milestone in the security policy process was the implementation of Japan's new National Security Strategy (NSS) in December 2013. The new strategy prioritized "actively promoting peace" based on international cooperation. The document clarified the threats and responsibilities facing Japan. Furthermore, the strategy identified diplomacy as the primary route to resolving national security issues. The new strategy is further informed by the consistent policy of Prime Minister Shinzō Abe's government, which aims for so-called "active pacifism." The Japanese government justified these changes by citing the need to adapt to changing regional and global security conditions. At the same time, it declared that Japan would maintain a peaceful foreign policy, asserting that a return to the militaristic path of the first half of the 20th century is impossible.

Japan's economic position, largely shaped by free trade utilizing open seas, is a key security policy priority. Furthermore, strengthening the alliance with the United States and supporting the stabilization, economic growth, and democratization of the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)[618] are expected to stabilize the Asia-Pacific region. To ensure national security, and consequently, the sovereignty and independence of the state and its citizens, Japan was forced to define its national needs in this regard. A key consideration was the creation of appropriate mechanisms to serve the deterrent function necessary to maintain peace and stability. Next came the need for closer cooperation and alliance with its strategic partner, the United States, in the Asia-Pacific region. The new National Security Council (NSC) was met with criticism from the People's Republic of China and, to some extent, the Republic of Korea. Opposition stemmed primarily from historical issues, but also from unresolved territorial disputes. The establishment of the National Security Council (NSC) became a pillar of Japan's security policy.[619] A month after its inauguration, on January 7, 2014, the Secretariat of National Security, an advisory body to the government,

[616] The Senkaku Islands are uninhabited, disputed islands between Japan and China, located in the East China Sea. Some media also use the Chinese name for these islands – Diaoyutai Islands.
[617] H. Katsumata, *How Senkaku Islands Became Part of Japan*, "The Daily Yomiuri", April 2, 2013.
[618] The ASEAN member states are: the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia. Cf. S. Zarychta, T. Usewicz, *Stowarzyszenie Narodów Azji Południowo-Wschodniej (ASEAN) i jego znaczenie w aspekcie rywalizacji wielkich mocarstw o dominację w regionie*, "Gdańskie Studia Azji Wschodniej" 2014, no. 6, p. 7 et seq.
[619] *National Security Strategy*, December 2013, document text: http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/security/ (accessed April 10, 2016).

officially began its work. Its establishment allows for the effective resolution of security issues and contact with foreign partners in this area. Establishing direct contact with counterparts in other countries, including the United States and the United Kingdom, also contributes to improving security.[620]





Fig. 1. Organizational structure of the National Security Council of Japan Source: National Security Bureau, National Security Strategy of Japan, https://www.bbn.gov.pl/download/1/15474/SBNJaponianotatka02.pdf (accessed: 15/04/2016).

The Advisory Panel on Reconstructing the Legal Framework for Security (PD), established during Abe's first term, was reactivated in February 2012. It consisted of 13 experienced politicians specializing in national security and foreign policy. The PD was chaired by Shunji Yanai, former Japanese ambassador to the United States. From the outset, its goal was to address national security issues within the framework of existing laws and the current geopolitical situation, with particular emphasis on the right to self-defense in the context of the Senkaku Islands dispute.[621]

On May 15, 2014, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe officially announced the government's initiation of work on amending the interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution,

[620] *Kyodo News*, January 8, 2014; *The Japan News*, January 9, 2014.
[621] *The Japan Times*, August 19, 2013.

which concerns the right to collective defense. Prime Minister Abe's announcement of the commencement of the interpretative change process followed the publication of the Advisory Panel's report. The proposals contained therein primarily concern the right to collective defense, proposing six conditions necessary for its implementation.

1. Supporting an attacked allied country.
2. Failure to react on the part of Japan may create significant danger for Japan.
3. The attacked country clearly demands that Japan join the collective defense.
4. The need to obtain the approval of non-allied countries for the introduction of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF).
5. The Prime Minister may decide to engage in collective defence only after an in-depth analysis supported by expert assessment.
6. Parliamentary consent is absolutely required.

The participation of the Japan Self-Defense Forces in peacekeeping operations occupies a prominent place among the panel's recommendations. According to the report's authors, the right to use weapons in defense of other cooperating units in peacekeeping operations should be interpreted as consistent with the constitution. The report concludes with a summary that emphasizes that Japan's aspirations for peace, stemming from its pacifist constitution, must not limit its right to defend its sovereignty and international cooperation in this regard.[622] The legislative initiative by Prime Minister Abe's government was made possible by a difficult agreement reached within the ruling LDP coalition with its pacifist coalition partner, the Komeito Party. The bills submitted to parliament concern expanding the SDF's powers in international peacekeeping operations, including expanding the right to provide logistical support to foreign troops participating in the operation, with the right to use force when necessary, and the right to collective defense. The most significant threat category is an armed attack on Japanese territory. The next most important scenario is a threat of attack on the country and the resulting actions under the SDF's authority. The new proposed legislation includes the SDF's powers in the event of an indirect threat to Japan's security. Such a threat could include an armed attack on an allied country, such as the United States, or another friendly country whose loss of sovereignty could threaten Japan's security. The two remaining cases in which the SDF could be deployed involve situations threatening Japan's vital interests and situations requiring international intervention to maintain global peace. The former could involve, among other things, protecting lines of communication that supply Japan with energy resources and allow for free trade with the world. The latter would involve international responsibility for maintaining peace, which

[622] *Report of the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security*, May 15, 2014, https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/anzenhosyou2/dai7/houkoku_en.pdf (accessed April 16, 2016).

does not directly impact Japan's security situation. A UN Security Council resolution will remain the basis for the SDF's deployment, although participation in peacekeeping operations within international coalitions without such a resolution is not ruled out. New laws regarding the SDF's powers will enable closer cooperation in the field of regional and global security, not only with its most important coalition partner, the United States, but also with other countries in Asia and Australia and Oceania. This cooperation could provide a decisive counterweight to China's growing territorial ambitions and North Korea's controversial policies. The SDF's increased powers within the framework of international cooperation between countries sharing similar democratic values will also serve as a warning to the Russian Federation's revisionist policies.

On September 19, 2015, the Upper House of the Japanese Parliament approved legislative changes for the SDF based on a new interpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. For the first time since the end of World War II, Japanese soldiers will have the right to use force outside Japan's borders under certain conditions. The new law was passed amid unprecedented protests by those opposed to the shift away from the pacifist tenets of the constitution. The main argument of those opposing the changes is the fear of Japan being drawn into US-led wars that have nothing to do with defending its territory. Reactions from neighboring countries to the legislative process were largely critical. The People's Republic of China accused Japan of disrupting the security balance in the region, while North Korea accused it of a "revisionist obsession" that threatens peaceful coexistence. South Korea also called on Japan to be transparent in implementing the new legal solutions for the SDF while maintaining the "pacifist spirit" of the Japanese constitution.[623]

### 4.7.2. Act on the Protection of State Secrets

A significant change in Japan's security policy resulting from current threats is the State Secrets Protection Act.[624] However, the bill's content has sparked considerable controversy, including among journalists, who accused it of violating the constitution's guarantees of freedom of speech, the press, and other forms of expression. Many political critics believe the bill is largely inspired by the 1980 counterintelligence bill passed by Yasuhiro Nakasone, one of Shinzō Abe's mentors, which was rejected by parliament.[625] Since World War II, Japan has had no anti-espionage laws, a fact that Kiyoshi Mori, one of the parliamentarians responsible for the bill, called "a joke."

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[623] C. Wallace, The Likely Contents of Abe's Collective Self-Defense Panel Report, "Japan Security Watch", May 10, 2014; Government skipped recording debate over constitutional reinterpretation, "The Japan Times", September 28, 2015; Abe's chances for constitutional revision may recede with passage of security bills, "Mainichi News", September 19, 2015.

[624] Act on the Protection of State Secrets, passed by parliament on December 13, 2013, and entered into force a year later. Text of the act: http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/lawdetail/?id=2543&vm=04&re=01 (accessed April 16, 2016).

[625] J. Adelstein, Japan's New Secrets Bill Threatens to Muzzle the Press and Whistleblowers, "The Daily Beast", November 29, 2013, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/11/29/japan-s-new-secretsbill-threatens-to-muzzle-the-press-and-whistleblowers.html (accessed April 16, 2016).

This can be seen in the 1980 case of General Yukihisa Miyanagi, who was convicted of passing classified documents to a Soviet attaché and was sentenced to one year in prison and fined $120.[626] A controversial issue, and the reason for parliament's rejection of the legislation, was the significantly harsher penalties. For example, anyone who obtained "diplomatic secrets" that potentially "seriously threaten" state security faced the death penalty. However, the government failed to specify what constituted a "diplomatic secret" or what constituted a "serious threat."[627] This, of course, contradicts the principle of nullum crimen sine lege stricta. Article 1 of the State Secrets Protection Act defines its objectives: "In light of the complex international situation, an increasingly important role is being assigned to information concerning the security of Japan and its citizens. (...) The priority is to establish a system for the protection of defense data (defense is understood to mean the protection of the State and its citizens from external forces that could undermine its existence), which should be securely collected, verified, and used. This act aims to: primarily prevent leaks of state secrets; limit the group of persons authorized to access state secrets; and regulate other necessary matters relating to the principles of state secret protection."[628] The annex to the Act identifies four main areas based on which the applicant claims information as a state secret. These are:

1) national defense, including, among other things, operations of the Japan Self-Defense Forces, matters concerning the type and quantity of weapons, ammunition, and vehicles used to defend the state;

2) diplomacy – laws or the content of negotiations and details regarding cooperation with other countries and international organizations, export and import policies that Japan may implement to protect the state;

3) prevention of specific threats – matters concerning the prevention of the spread of information caused by specific threats;

4) the threat of terrorism.

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[626] S. Solo, *Paradise for Spies, Espionage no crime in Japan*, "The Telegraph", August 29, 1985.

[627] C. Haberman, *A Proposed Antispying Law Produces an Outcry in Japan*, "The New York Times", June 22, 1985.

[628] Article 1 of the Act on the Protection of State Secrets: "In view of the fact that, under the situation where the increasingly complex international situation amplifies the significance of information related to securing the safety of Japan and its citizens and where the development of an advanced information and telecommunications network society gives rise to concern over the risk of unauthorized disclosure of such information, it is important to establish a system for properly protecting information, among information concerning Japan's national security (meaning ensuring that the State and its citizens are secure from outside aggression, etc. that could affect the nation's existence; the same shall apply hereinafter), which is particularly required to be kept secret, and then to collect, coordinate and utilize said information, this Act aims to prevent unauthorized disclosure of such information by providing for the designation of specially designated secrets, restrictions on the persons who handle them, and other necessary matters with regard to the protection of such information, and to thereby contribute to securing the safety of Japan and its citizens".

The period for which information is classified as a state secret is five years or less if the information no longer meets the criteria required by law. However, this period can be extended for another five years, even several times, up to a maximum of 30 years. After this period, if the applicant believes the information still poses a threat to state security, the document can be classified for another 30 years, subject to government approval. Unauthorized publication of a document classified as a state secret is punishable by up to 10 years in prison. A person who, without appropriate qualifications, acquires a classified document in a manner not specified by law also faces up to 10 years in prison. In response to these provisions, journalists feared that through their journalistic work, they might unknowingly acquire classified documents and, as a result, be charged and convicted of a criminal offense.[629]

The law on the protection of state secrets was passed in parliament in early December 2013, despite earlier public demonstrations, the disapproval of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, and opposition from the journalistic community. In one survey, 30% of respondents expressed support for the law. Politicians from the ruling coalition, speaking anonymously, make no secret of the fact that the law is primarily intended to discourage excessive inquisitiveness in matters sensitive to the government.[630] As an oversight body for the new law, the government committed to establishing an independent body to oversee compliance with the principles set forth therein. Furthermore, the Prime Minister is obligated to submit a report to a special parliamentary committee annually. The law entered into force on December 10, 2014, after a twelve-month vacatio legis.[631]

An Amnesty International report warned that provisions in the State Secrets Act could threaten freedom of speech. Criticism also extended to the possibility of the government classifying any information without any mention of its content or justification for such action. Furthermore, the law's oversight bodies were accused of being too subservient to the government and lacking independence.

The implementation of the above-described changes and Prime Minister Abe's statement demonstrate a desire to free himself from the constraints imposed by Article 9 of the Constitution. If the LDP-New Komeito coalition wins the elections to the Upper House of Parliament, further changes in the interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution, and even a change to the current Basic Law, are expected. However, amendments to the Japanese Constitution require, in addition to a qualified two-thirds majority vote of the National Assembly, i.e., the lower house (House of Representatives) and the upper house (House of Councilors), a 51% majority of the public

[629] Lower House Pushes through State Secret Protection Bill, "The Daily Yomiuri", November 27, 2013.
[630] J. Adelstein, Japan's New Secrets...
[631] S. Kuboniwa, Secrets Body Seen Balancing Security, Rights, "The Daily Yomiuri", January 19, 2014.

in a nationwide referendum. While such a change can be expected in parliament, a positive referendum result is questionable, as the vision for the success of economic reforms is crucial.

The Shinzō Abe administration has clearly signaled its willingness to play an active role in the international arena. This is a necessary step for Japan, as the world's third-largest economy, to be more open in terms of international security in order to remain a significant global player.

### 4.8. Directions of Japanese strategic policy towards Taiwan

Most would agree that the United States, which is helping Taiwan resist increasing Chinese pressure, is Taiwan's most important ally. Since 1949, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has maintained that "Taiwan was part of China in the past and should be part of China in the future," and it supports this claim of sovereignty over Taiwan through military threats, diplomatic pressure, and economic coercion against Taiwan and any country that challenges this claim. For the United States, Taiwan's affiliation with the free world is consistent with its global strategy. However, waging war with a nuclear-armed power over this autonomous island is not consistent with this strategy. Consequently, since 1949, leaders in Washington have viewed US-Taiwan relations within the broader Chinese framework.

Within this framework, the United States did not explicitly commit to defending Taiwan in the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, but it also did not explicitly support China's claim to sovereignty over Taiwan in the U.S.-China Joint Statement of 1979. These two shortcomings in commitment constitute significant elements shaping the strategic ambiguity of the United States' "One China" policy toward Taiwan, which has allowed the United States to flexibly manage any potential issues between Taiwan and China over the past decades. Although this framework does not provide for any formal diplomatic relations between Taiwan and the United States, Taiwan benefits from the United States's handling of the turbulent waters of the Taiwan Strait. The unofficial US-Taiwan relationship is, in fact, closer, stronger, and more substantive than the US's official relations with some other countries. Furthermore, the United States has consistently engaged in Taiwan's defense planning and military training to deter China, even though it is not legally obligated to defend the island from China in the event of a crisis. Therefore, Taiwan's security and its economic and democratic achievements over the past seven decades would be impossible without the United States. Like the United States, Japan views its relationship with Taiwan within the context of a broader Chinese framework and exploits a similar strategic ambiguity regarding Taiwan to navigate its relations with China and Taiwan. Taiwan's relationship with Japan is as important as its relationship with the United States; however, Taiwan's relationship with Japan has received relatively little scholarly attention. Driven primarily by business interests, Japan, before the United States, transferred its diplomatic recognition from the Republic of China (RCP) to Taiwan

in 1972. However, when China demanded that Japan recognize China's claim to sovereignty over Taiwan based on the so-called one-China principle, the Kakuei Tanaka administration did not explicitly accept this principle but used the phrase "fully understands and respects" in the 1972 Sino-Japanese Joint Communique to avoid accepting the claim[632] *(Seiichiro, 2006:).* Like the United States, based on this position regarding Taiwan's sovereignty, Japan maintains an unofficial but very close and strong relationship with Taiwan[633] *(Thomas i Williams, 2017).* Economically, Japan was Taiwan's third-largest trading partner in 2020, and Taiwan was Japan's fourth-largest trading partner in the same year. On the security front, although Japan does not have its own version of the Taiwan Relations Act to address Taiwan-related crises, it has joined the United States in discouraging China's military ambitions against Taiwan, never ruling out the possibility of Japan defending Taiwan. For example, during the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis in March 1996, Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro repeatedly expressed "very serious concern" about the rising tensions in the Taiwan Strait during Diet sessions. A month after the crisis, Japan revised the Guidelines on Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation to better address future situations "in the area surrounding Japan," which logically includes Taiwan. Although the United States and Japan are key partners for Taiwan, their roles in Sino-Taiwanese conflicts have differed. Strategic ambiguity between the United States and Japan regarding Taiwan has cemented Taiwan's de facto independence over the past seven decades, deterring China from using force against Taiwan and limiting the diplomatic and economic damage caused by Chinese actions in Taiwan. However, the United States has typically taken the lead in deterring and neutralizing Chinese pressure on Taiwan, while Japan has pursued it discreetly and indirectly to avoid undue anti-Japanese nationalism in Chinese society. For example, Japan prefers to allow the United States to use military bases and facilities in Japan to deal with Taiwanese threats, as stipulated in Article VI of the U.S.-Japan Security Pact, rather than sending military forces directly to Taiwan's aid. Japan's recent strong support for countering China's pressure on Taiwan, however, seems to suggest that Japan's Taiwan policy is moving away from its former strategic ambiguity toward a new strategic clarity. Some developments in Japan-Taiwan relations in recent years point to an interesting trend of Japan's increasing willingness to openly defend Taiwan's interests against China.[634] For example, while China attempted to block Taiwan's access to COVID-19 vaccines during the pandemic, Japan generously donated approximately four million doses of the AstraZeneca vaccine to Taiwan, despite Japan's internal struggle to combat the disease. Taiwan currently receives

[632] T. Seiichiro, The Taiwan Factor in Japan–China Relations, in: Japan's Relations With China: Facing A Rising Power, edited by P. E. Lam, Routledge, London 2006.
[633] N. Thomas, B. Williams, Taiwan's Sub-national Government Relations with Japan: Post 1979 Developments, "Journal of Contemporary Asia", Vol. 47, No. 1, 2017.
[634] The survey in here: https://www.koryu.or.jp/Portals/0/culture/%E4%B8%96%E8%AB%96/2018_seron_kani_CH.pdf (accessed October 12, 2021).

the largest number of vaccines in Japan's vaccination program, and Japan is the largest donor of vaccines to Taiwan.[635]

Furthermore, in February 2021, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Foreign Affairs Subcommittee established the Taiwan Policy Review Project Team, which aims to strengthen Japan's existing relations with Taiwan amid growing instability in the Taiwan Strait. Subcommittee Director Masahisa Sato has repeatedly publicly emphasized on social media the need to strengthen relations between the two sides.[636] Two months later, in a joint statement, Japanese Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide and U.S. President Joseph Biden expressed deep concern over China's recent actions in Asia, and Taiwan in particular: "We emphasize the importance of peace and stability on both sides of the Taiwan Strait and encourage a peaceful resolution of the issues in the region."[637] The US and Japanese leaders haven't addressed the Taiwan issue in a joint statement for decades. The last time was during a meeting between Eisaku Sato and Richard Nixon in 1969. Most strikingly, Japan has taken the lead in "normalizing" relations with Taiwan, instead of its previous approach of operating solely within the bounds of US precedent. Breaking a long-standing tradition of referring to Taiwan as a "region" at official events, Suga referred to Taiwan as a "country" in a parliamentary debate in June 2021, a diplomatic gesture not made by US presidents since the 1970s. It's hard to deny that this was simply an inadvertent slip-up, as Suga didn't later retract the reference. That same month, in an unannounced signal, all 245 members of the House of Councillors across party lines unanimously approved Taiwan's application for membership in the World Health Organization (WHO) for 2022. In August 2021, Masahisa Sato and Department of National Defense Chief Taku Otsuka held a Japanese version of a 2+2 meeting with their Taiwanese counterparts from the Democratic Progressive Party, while US officials continue to avoid such high-profile contacts with their counterparts in Taiwan to avoid angering Beijing. Japanese Deputy Defense Minister Yasuhide Nakayama has now called on the United States to take a firm stance on Taiwan.[638] This stunningly strong Japanese support for Taiwan in recent times suggests that Japanese policy toward Taiwan has significantly shifted away from long-standing strategic ambiguity. Why has Japan begun to actively and directly protect Taiwan in recent years? How can we explain the transformation of Japanese policy toward Taiwan from strategic ambiguity to strategic clarity?

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[635] Please see the survey in here: https://www.taiwanembassy.org/uploads/sites/43/2021/01/%E3%80%902020%E3%80%91%E5%8F%B0%E6%B9%BE%E3%81%AB%E5%AF%BE%E3%81%99%E3%82%8B%E6%84%8F%E8%AD%98%E8%AA%BF%E6%9F%BB_%E5%A0%B1%E5%91%8A%E6%9B%B8.pdf (accessed October 12, 2021).

[636] Sato's personal website: https://ameblo.jp/satomasahisa/entry-12677214986.html (accessed October 12, 2021).

[637] Please see the statement of the White House: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/ tatements-releases/2021/04/16/u-s-japan-joint-leaders-statement-u-s-japan-global-partnership-for-anew-era/ (accessed October 12, 2021).

[638] J. Park, *Japan Official, Calling Taiwan 'Red Line,' Urges Biden to 'Be Strong'*, "Reuters", December 25, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-usa-taiwan-china-idUSKBN-28Z0JR.

When it comes to the question of how to explain Japan's recent moves toward strategic clarity in its Taiwan policy, explanations can come primarily from three levels. In interpersonal relations, Japanese attitudes toward China and Taiwan are likely a significant factor in Tokyo's desire to strengthen ties with Taiwan. Although Japan and Taiwan occasionally experience diplomatic tensions over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and the comfort women issue, Japanese and Taiwanese attitudes toward each other are generally quite positive. According to a survey conducted by the Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association, Japan has been the country Taiwanese like most since 2009. Three million Taiwanese tourists choose Japan as one of their favorite destinations each year. Similarly, a survey conducted by the Taiwan Economic and Cultural Representative Office in Japan found that nearly 80% of Japanese citizens held positive attitudes toward Taiwan in 2020. It is not surprising that a majority of respondents in a Nikkei Shimbun poll supported the Suga administration's Taiwan Strait policy following the Biden-Suga summit in April 2021.[639] In contrast, numerous surveys conducted by various agencies have shown that the Japanese have a decidedly negative attitude towards China.[640] For example, a government survey conducted in Japan found that in 2018, only about 20% of Japanese people felt sympathy for China.[641] From this perspective, as a democratic government, Japan's policy towards Taiwan should reflect the general sentiment of the Japanese people there. At the leadership level, friendly personal relations between Taiwanese and Japanese leaders may provide another explanation. Given Taiwan's colonial history, some Taiwanese politicians received Japanese education and therefore have a strong understanding of Japanese culture and values. Former Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui is a good example. Knowing Japan well, Lee, thanks to his network of contacts and years of cultivating friendships in Japan, laid the foundation for close Japanese-Taiwanese relations for the next generation of leaders in Taipei and Tokyo. Shared democratic and human rights values further strengthen the friendship between the two sides. Currently, Japanese politicians with pro-Taiwan sympathies are as numerous, if not more numerous, than pro-China politicians. Yoshiro Mori, Shinzō Abe, and Nobuo Kishi are pro-Taiwan figures who exert some influence on Japanese politics. Because of this layer of personal relationships, it's common to see politicians from both sides interacting positively on social media, something not often seen between Japanese and Chinese leaders. Both of these explanations go some way to explaining Japan's recent strong support for Taiwan, but they share

[639] R. Miki, M. Kato, *Biden and Suga to Note Taiwan Strait in April Joint Statement*, "Nikkei Asia", March 30, 2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Biden-s-Asia-policy/Biden-and-Suga-to-note-Taiwan-Strait-in-April-joint-statement.

[640] B. Stokes, *Hostile Neighbors: China vs. Japan*, "Pew Research Center", September 13, 2016, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2016/09/13/hostile-neighbors-china-vs-japan/; The International Crisis Group, *Dangerous Waters: China-Japan Relations on the Rocks*, April 8, 2013.

[641] Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, *Overview of the Public Opinion Survey on Diplomacy* (2018), https://www.gov-online.go.jp/eng/pdf/summaryg18.pdf (accessed October 12, 2021).

a common weakness—both are obvious. Positive Japanese attitudes toward Taiwan and negative attitudes toward China have been two stable trends in Japanese society for years, if not decades. Similarly, friendships between Japanese and Taiwanese leaders may explain Tokyo's willingness to defend Taiwan from Chinese pressure, but this factor has also existed since Lee's time, if not earlier. In other words, to properly explain Tokyo's sudden, rapid strategic transformation in recent years, timing is key.

At the level of the international system, China's aggressive behavior in the world in general and in the East Asian region in particular during the Xi Jinping era is an explanation often cited by some China observers.[642] Since Xi took power, China has unscrupulously attempted to reshape the international order to its advantage on various fronts. Since 2012, it has challenged Japan's de facto administrative control over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands by sending Chinese ships and military aircraft to violate the waters and airspace around the islands. In 2016, it ignored the ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, which declared the nine-dash line illegal. Islands under Chinese control in the South China Sea are currently being militarized with missiles and strategic bombers. Regarding Taiwan, China has increased the pace and scale of its diplomatic isolation, economic restrictions, and military threats. Since 2016, China has secured seven diplomatic allies for Taiwan. As with the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, China's dispatch of military ships and aircraft to encircle Taiwan has become a regular occurrence. Xi Jinping also announced the so-called Taiwan's version of the "One Country, Two Systems" system in his 2019 speech to his fellow Taiwanese people, announcing to Taiwan the necessity of reunifying China and Taiwan.

Admiral Philip Davidson, then commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2021 that China could occupy Taiwan within the next six years[643] *(Shelbourne, 2021).* These Chinese actions left Japan feeling a weakening sense of security, especially if China were to seize Taiwan by force. Taiwan's geopolitical importance to Japan has been evident for centuries. When planning the annexation of Taiwan in the First Sino-Japanese War, General Katsura Taro believed that "Taiwan is not only the most ideal location for expanding (Japanese) power into southern China but also into the islands of Southeast Asia."[644] Japan, as the closest country to Taiwan (Yonaguni Island is only a hundred kilometers from Taiwan), certainly doesn't want Taiwan to fall into Chinese hands. First, Japan would inevitably be drawn into any armed conflict between Taiwan and China, given that military bases on Okinawa would be the primary bases for US forces to defend Taiwan if necessary. Second,

[642] A. P. Liff, Unambivalent Alignment: Japan's China Strategy, the US Alliance, and the 'Hedging' Fallacy, "International Relations of the Asia-Pacific", Vol. 19, No. 3, 2019.
[643] M. Shelbourne, Davidson: China Could Try to Take Control of Taiwan In 'Next Six Years', "USNI News", March 9, 2021, https://news.usni.org/2021/03/09/davidson-china-could-try-to-take-control-of-taiwan-in-next-six-years.
[644] S. Tsai, Maritime Taiwan: Historical Encounters with the East and the West, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, NY, 2009.

if Taiwan were to be occupied by China, China, with Taiwan as a naval base, could easily cut of Japan's communication lines in the South China Sea, from which Japan imports oil and other goods. Beijing would then be in a better position to assert sovereignty and exert military pressure on the Senkaku Islands. Therefore, as Masahisa Sato openly pointed out, "Taiwan's crisis is our own crisis,"[645] defending Taiwan is equivalent to defending Japan. However, the systemic explanation for China's aggression against Taiwan remains imperfect. It cannot adequately explain why, unlike in the past, Japan is not now following the United States' lead. Although the United States has sometimes ignored its allies under Donald Trump, it has empirically strengthened its security commitments to Taiwan in many respects. US engagement with Taiwan was one of the few issues on which both the US administration and Congress, and both parties in Congress, have reached agreement.

Since 2016, US military sales to Taiwan have been regulated. US freedom of navigation operations in the Taiwan Strait have also begun to take place regularly, once a month. Pro-Taiwan legislation has been passed one after another. On numerous public occasions, US leaders not only visited Taiwan but also repeatedly emphasized the need for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue to the leadership in Beijing. Therefore, it cannot be argued that the United States failed to respond to China's increasing pressure on Taiwan. Although US policy toward Taiwan may have encouraged Japanese leaders to engage with Taiwan, the speed and scale with which Japan increased its official ties and security commitments with Taiwan exceeded the speed and scale of US actions. There must be a missing factor that prevents us from understanding Japan's strategic transformation in Taiwan policy. Japan's shift in its operational concept is crucial to understanding Japan's strategic transformation in Taiwan policy, which resulted in its strong pro-Taiwan behavior. In social constructivist terminology, identity defines interests, and interests drive behavior.[646]

How a state defines its identity determines its perception and, consequently, its interactions with others. When a state, in its interactions with others, consistently practices the behavior dictated by the new identity over a long period, this identity becomes ingrained, and the behavioral pattern eventually becomes habitual. For many Japanese politicians and policymakers in today's government, the new state identity they envision for Japan is that of an "active peacemaker." This new identity, firstly, was shaped by the growing challenge from China, and secondly, was accelerated and hardened by the whims of the United States. It was this new identity and the normative expectations associated with it that led Japan to demonstrate a fundamentally different behavior toward foreign countries. For a long period after World War II, Japan was a "passive peacekeeper" on the international stage, avoiding excessive involvement in foreign missions or

[645] Sato's personal website: https://ameblo.jp/satomasahisa/entry-12677214986.html (accessed October 12, 2021 ).
[646] A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999.

playing a leading role in international affairs. Japan is an economically powerful global actor, but politically it has been passive and reactive. It lived comfortably within an international order built and maintained by the United States, in which democracy, the rule of law, human rights, free trade, an open South China Sea, and an independent Taiwan free from Chinese control were essential elements. Japan was involved in many international issues in the East Asian region, such as the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995–96 and the Six-Party Talks concerning North Korea's nuclear weapons, but it did not play a significant role. Japan's typical pattern of foreign behavior during crises was to follow the steps and pace of the United States. Japan's guilt over World War II and the benefits it could gain from the Yoshida Doctrine were two key factors that led it to maintain this pro-Japanese identity. A consensus on this issue permeated both the government and the public. Occasionally, both at home and abroad, voices were raised that Japan should play a greater leadership role in international affairs, commensurate with its global economic weight, especially after the 1990–91 Gulf War. But these voices did not fundamentally shake this consensus. Michael Green questioned Japanese foreign policy in 2003,[647] and a decade later Richard Armitage and Joseph Nye wondered whether Japan was becoming a second-class country.[648]

China's direct challenge to Japan in 2010 served as a wake-up call for Japan, alerting it to the rapidly deteriorating security situation. In 2010, China replaced Japan as the world's second-largest economy. That same year, a Chinese fishing boat deliberately rammed a Japanese coast guard vessel near the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, but the Naoto Kan administration ultimately fired the boat's captain due to extensive economic and diplomatic pressure from China. Many Japanese lamented that Japan had "significantly lost face" *(The International Crisis Group, 2013: 22).* More importantly, China has established a new norm regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands: every month, hundreds of Chinese civilian and military ships and aircraft regularly "patrol" the waters and airspace around the islands. In this way, China has achieved a fait accompli: dual administrative control over the islands. Japanese leaders have realized that Japan's security environment is rife with "gray zone conflicts," often involving low-level conflicts that can escalate into full-scale war. Given that China is gradually and consistently destabilizing the existing international order in the East Asian region, from which Japan has benefited immensely in recent decades, and that the United States appears hesitant to become more involved in the region to meet China's challenge, leaders in Tokyo have recognized that the time has come for Japan to actively safeguard the regional order. Japan now sees itself as an indispensable guardian of the international order, one that must maintain the current system to prevent China from completely changing the status quo. The Japanese leader who most

[647] M. Green, Japan's Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2003.
[648] R. Armitage, J. Nye, The U.S.–Japan Alliance: Anchoring Stability in Asia, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., 2012.

strove to redefine Japan's identity was Shinzo Abe. After Abe assumed his second term as Prime Minister in 2012, just months after his inauguration, he delivered a speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in which he outlined his vision for Japan's future identity: "Japan is not and will never be a second-class country... Japan must be a promoter of principles, a guardian of the commons, and an effective ally and partner to the United States and other democracies. In this era of Asian renaissance, it is high time for Japan to shoulder even greater responsibility for promoting our shared principles and values. For us, Japan and the United States, to work together to deliver more rule of law, more democracy, more security, and less poverty to the region and the world, Japan must remain strong."[649]

The new identity Abe envisioned for Japan materialized in Japan's first National Security Strategy in 2013, which called for Japan to actively engage in peacemaking: "Faced with increasingly serious threats to Japan's security, the country must identify its long-term national interests, determine its direction in the international community, and adopt a whole-of-government approach to national security policies and measures to continue developing a prosperous and peaceful society. Japan has contributed to the peace, stability, and prosperity of the region and the world. In a world of increasing globalization, Japan should play an even more proactive role as a major global player in the international community. The key to national security is the creation of a stable and predictable international environment and the prevention of emerging threats. It is therefore imperative that Japan realizes its desired international order and security environment by playing an even more proactive role in achieving peace, stability, and prosperity for the international community as a 'Proactive Contributor to Peace' based on the principle of international cooperation."[650]. Another factor that has accelerated Japan's identity transformation has been the evolution of the United States' commitments to the existing international order in the East Asian region over the past decade. Many Japanese leaders believe that Japan can no longer rely entirely on the United States to prevent China from destroying the international order.[651] *(Liff, 2019; Samuels i Wallace, 2018; Sahashi, 2017; Solís, 2020)*

While US power in East Asia may not be declining in absolute terms, its commitments to the region have become empirically unstable. The "pivot to Asia" strategy, vociferously promoted by the Barack Obama administration, has been hamstrung by domestic politics. In retrospect, the United States was unable to help its ally, the Philippines, assert sovereignty over Scarborough Shoal or prevent China from ignoring the Permanent Court of Arbitration's ruling in the South China Sea.

[649] Please see Abe's speech here: https://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/statement/201302/22speech_e.html (accessed October 12, 2021).
[650] Please see National Security Strategy of Japan here: https://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/docu-ments/2013/index.html (accessed October 12, 2021).
[651] A. P. Liff, *Unambivalent Alignment: Japan's China Strategy, the US Alliance, and the 'Hedging' Fallacy*, "International Relations of the Asia-Pacific", Vol. 19, No. 3, 2019.

Although the 2017 US National Security Strategy, which positioned China as a strategic competitor, came as a relief to Japanese defense planners, the network of alliances in East Asia weakened under the Trump administration. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) was initially intended to protect against Xi Jinping's grand "Belt and Road" initiative, but the United States ultimately withdrew from it. All these developments motivated Japanese leaders to reassess their relationship with the United States and, therefore, to decide to play a greater role in the international order for their own benefit. As a result, in a departure from tradition, Japan listed China, not North Korea, as the primary threat to its security in its 2019 defense white paper.[652] *(Japan Ministry of Defense, 2019)* It's important to note that many countries have experienced a wake-up call that shifts their international behavior from passive to proactive. China, Japan's geopolitical rival, is no exception. China's version of a wake-up call was the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, which Chinese leaders interpreted as a deliberate attempt by the Americans to curb China's rise. The Japanese are now beginning to think that China shouldn't passively absorb the shocks of international events but proactively shape a peaceful environment conducive to China's economic development.[653] Therefore, statements by Japanese politicians and government documents now frequently suggest that Japan should assume greater responsibility for maintaining the international order, suggesting that Japan's new identity has taken root in Japanese leadership. For example, the 2018 Japanese "Diplomatic Bluebook" stated: "In this period of transformation in the international order, Japan cannot be a 'follower.'" Together with the United States and other allies and friendly nations, Japan is committed to safeguarding peace and prosperity. Nobuo Kishi, Japanese Minister of Defense, in his opening speech of Japan's 2021 Defense White Paper, noted: "The Indo-Pacific region is the core of global vitality, yet it faces diverse security challenges. Faced with a shifting global balance of power, the region's importance continues to grow. To address these challenges in the security environment, it is essential not only to strengthen Japan's own defense capabilities and expand the role we can play, but also to cooperate closely with countries that share the same fundamental values. It was this profound identity transformation that led Japan to sign the TPP after the US withdrawal, reinterpret its constitution, champion the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Initiative, organize the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue,[654] and persuade the Biden administration to continue using the term 'Free and Open Indo-Pacific.'" All of these actions are aimed at preserving the current international order in this chaotic era.

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[652] Ministry of Defense, Japan, *Defense of Japan*, Tokyo, 2019.
[653] F. Zhang, *Rethinking China's Grand Strategy: Beijing's Evolving National Interests and Strategic Ideas in the Reform Era*, "International Politics", Vol. 49, No. 3, 2012.
[654] Abe's article on Project Syndicate: https://www.project-syndicate.org/onpoint/ a-strategic-alliance-for-japan-and-india-by-shinzo-abe.

Japan's new identity, therefore, provides the best framework for understanding Japan's pursuit of strategic clarity in its Taiwan policy. Like an amplifier, Japan's new identity has led it to sharpen its awareness and sensitivity to threats, paying greater attention to the day-to-day dynamics of its security environment. Taiwan, with its geographical proximity to Japan, is certainly a priority for Japan's policy, as a democratic and independent Taiwan free from Chinese control is directly linked to Japan's survival. As Sato noted on his social media account, "there is a missile threat from North Korea, but the priority is to prepare for a crisis in the Taiwan Strait."[655] Consequently, Japan has been increasingly threatened by China, which intensified military, diplomatic, and economic pressure on Taiwan after Tsai Ing-wen took office in 2016. Without this identity transformation, Japan's perceived threat level would have been very different. Therefore, Japanese leaders often use the idea that "Taiwan's fate and Japan's fate are closely linked" to explain their concerns about the Taiwan Strait. For example, Vice Prime Minister Taro Aso frankly stated in July 2021 that "if a serious incident were to occur [in Taiwan], it would not be surprising if it involved a survival situation. In such a case, Japan and the United States must jointly defend Taiwan."[656]

In a similar way to China describing its geopolitical relationship with North Korea as "mouth and teeth," Nakayama used the analogy of "nose and eyes" to describe the geopolitical relationship between Japan and Taiwan in a public address at the Hudson Institute: "Kishi-san and I are, in a sense, friends of Taiwan, but we are not friends of Taiwan. We are brothers. We are the Taiwanese family, closer to each other. So if something happens in Taiwan, it is directly related to Okinawa Prefecture. And in Okinawa Prefecture, there are US military forces. We have Kadena Air Base. We have a US Marine Corps base and other facilities, not just the Japan Self-Defense Forces and Japanese citizens living in Okinawa. So please, think about the geopolitical proximity of Taiwan and Okinawa. It's a bit like nose and eyes, so close."[657]

Moreover, Taiwan's existence is linked not only to Japan's security situation but also to the very foundation of Japan's new identity. Both Taiwan and Japan share the universal values of democracy, the rule of law, and human rights, which constitute the foundation of the post-Cold War international order.[658] Naturally, Japan, desiring to safeguard the international order, desires to defend a free and democratic Taiwan. Defending Taiwan is defending Japan's own identity. Japanese

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[655] Sato's twitter account here: https://twitter.com/SatoMasahisa/status/1445881122261385223?s=20&fbclid=IwAR0mgOBnrQYn15wC-Q_E_RqdvtOh52NL_tW2GYlQaAU3Fwzslvt-DznIwR4g (accessed October 12, 2021).

[656] Osawa K. (2021), Japan's No. 2 Raises Possibility of Joining US in Defending Taiwan, "Nikkei Asia", July 6, 2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Indo-Pacific/ Japan-s-No.- 2-raises-possibility-of-joining-US-in-defending-Taiwan.

[657] Please see Nakayama's speech here: https://www.hudson.org/research/17059-transcript-the- transformation-of-japan-s-security-strategy (accessed October 12, 2021).

[658] Nakayama's speech here: https://www.hudson.org/research/17059-transcript-the transformation-of-japan-s-security-strategy (accessed October 12, 2021).

diplomatic documents are one example of how these shared values bring Japan and Taiwan closer together in the eyes of Japan, which has adopted a new identity. In 2014, Japan viewed Japan-Taiwan relations primarily in economic terms: Taiwan was "an important partner and maintains close economic ties with Japan." Now, the phrase referring to Taiwan in the 2020 Diplomatic Blue Book describes it as "an extremely important partner and an important friend, with whom it shares fundamental values such as freedom, democracy, fundamental human rights, and the rule of law, and enjoys close economic relations and people-to-people exchanges." This isn't the first time Japan has proactively shaped its security environment through a shift in identity. Japan's identity also underwent a fundamental shift in the 19th century, when Japan attempted to replace the Qing dynasty, which had maintained the former international order in East Asia. Seeing the Qing dynasty too weak to effectively counter Russia's impending expansion into the Korean Peninsula from the north, Japan annexed Korea, perceived by Japan as a dagger aimed at Japan's heart, in order to create a better security environment.[659] A similar pattern was evident in Japan's justification for initiating the Second Sino-Japanese War in the 20th century. The above narrative is not intended to prove that Japan's new identity will lead to the militarization of its foreign policy, but rather to demonstrate that Japan can act proactively once it refocuses its identity and sets new goals. This identity transformation explains the pace and scale of Japan's recent strategic transformation of Taiwan policy.

Looking ahead, it is likely that Japan-Taiwanese relations will become closer and stronger in the coming years. From a social constructivist perspective, the state's new identity and associated behaviors will become increasingly internalized as the state utilizes this new identity in its daily interactions with others. Over time, the state will gradually develop habits based on the new identity, making it difficult to revert to its previous identity.[660] If this happens, and with positive feedback from Taiwan, the United States, and the international community, leaders in Tokyo will continue to embrace Japan's new identity in the future. Support for Taiwan could become the common parlance of "political correctness" in Japanese decision-making circles. Indeed, recent events in Japan seem to confirm this hypothesis.

[659] S. C. M. Paine, *The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895: Perceptions, Power, and Primacy*, New York, 2003.

[660] A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge, 1999.

# Chapter V

# Japan's 2022 Security Strategy

## 5.1. Assumptions of the National Security Strategy 2022

On December 16, 2022, the Japanese government published its first National Security Strategy (NSS) since 2013.[661] This strategy reflected the country's adaptation to the rapidly changing political situation both globally and in the Indo-Pacific. It introduced two significant changes: the need for a counterstrike in response to an attack on Japanese territory and the end of illusions regarding the possibility of cooperation with Moscow.

Japan's updated National Security Strategy from December 2022 envisions a historic shift in defense policy, led by: acquiring a counterstrike capability, doubling defense spending, and strengthening its alliance with the United States. Japan's new security strategy represents a breakthrough in the country's current defense policy, as it allows for counterstrikes on aggressor territory. However, this document was created at a critical time: the war between Russia and Ukraine continues, tensions have risen in the Taiwan Strait, and there's no end in sight to the systemic rivalry between Washington and Beijing. Instability is increasing, and in Asia: North Korea is increasingly developing its missile and nuclear programs, and above all, China's growing power and assertiveness, allied with Russia, are growing. This security strategy, the first in a decade, reflects this new reality, in which Tokyo must be ready to repel potential aggression or support its main ally, the United States, in a potential conflict in the Indo-Pacific.[662] The authors of Japan's National Security Strategy clearly state that "the international community is facing era-defining changes." Geopolitical rivalry in international relations is intensifying, and globalization and the interdependence of countries and regions alone cannot guarantee peace and development worldwide. This is made all the more difficult by the pressing challenges to global stability posed by climate change and the risks associated with the spread of infectious diseases, which the world is still experiencing with the Covid-19 pandemic.

Above all, however, the most destabilizing factor is Russia's invasion of Ukraine. This is the first time in post-Cold War Japan that such a strong assessment of the Kremlin's actions has been used. According to the authors of the strategy, Russia's aggression against Ukraine has violated the very foundations of the international order and poses the most significant and direct threat to security in Europe. However, it also poses a serious challenge to Japan itself, as Russia is active –

661 https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/221216anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf
662 https://csm.org.pl/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/ANALIZA-CSM-Surdel-luty-2023.pdf

including militarily – in the Indo-Pacific region, a region of key importance to Tokyo. The Japanese are particularly concerned about Russia's coordination of activities in the region with Beijing. This concerns the increasingly frequent joint military exercises in recent years, including those involving warships and bomber flights by both countries near Japan. Tokyo also notes that Russia is increasingly militarizing the Kuril Islands, known in Japanese nomenclature as the Northern Territories. Japan considers them part of its territory, which prevented peace with the Soviet Union after the end of World War II, and the matter continues to this day. The Sea of Okhotsk, located between the Kuril Islands, Sakhalin and the Japanese island of Hokkaido, is the area of operations of Russian nuclear submarines, which play a significant role in Russia's strategic nuclear forces.

In the Indo-Pacific region, Japan's declared goal is to achieve a "new balance in international relations," meaning that Tokyo intends to prevent situations in which a country "can easily and unilaterally change the status quo." This statement applies primarily to China, as Russia lacks the resources and interests to wage aggressive wars in the Indo-Pacific, such as the invasion of Ukraine. On the other hand, it could, in a sense, hold Japan and its allies in check in the event of a potential conflict between Tokyo and Beijing. For Japan, the alliance with the United States remains an indispensable guarantee of security, and it is also crucial for implementing the idea of a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific," put forward during Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's term. In this regard, the new strategy highlights the key role of the QUAD partnership, the Japan-US-Australia-India security dialogue format. Tokyo is clearly focusing on building a "multi-layered network among its allies and like-minded parties" to, among other things, strengthen deterrence against potential aggressors. In this regard, the Japanese point to cooperation not only with QUAD allies, but also with the Republic of Korea, ASEAN countries, and, beyond the region, with European countries, Canada, NATO, and the European Union.

As stated in the Strategy, Japan aims to build "constructive and stable relations" with China, primarily on economic matters and unspecified "global issues," which likely include climate and pandemic issues. However, Beijing is Tokyo's main rival,[663] not only in its neighborhood but also in the entire Indo-Pacific region. In the document, the Japanese authorities state that China's military activities and foreign policy "pose an unprecedented and greatest strategic challenge to ensuring Japan's peace and security and the peace and stability of the international community." Japan therefore declares that it will "resolutely oppose China's increasing attempts to unilaterally and forcibly change the status quo," noting "the rapid strengthening of China's military capabilities and the expansion of its military activities."

[663] Kai He, Mingjiang Li, *Understanding the Dynamics of the Indo-Pacific: US-China Strategic Competition, Regional Actors, and Beyond*, "International Affairs", Vol. 96, No. 1, 2020, pp. 1–7.

It's worth noting that regarding the Taiwan issue—a key issue in Beijing's own regional strategy—Tokyo has not officially changed its position, despite posing the issue. Japan's relations with Taipei are to remain "non-governmental working relations" based on the 1972 Japan-China Joint Communiqué, which settled the matter. The Japanese emphasize that Taiwan is an extremely important partner for Tokyo, with which Japan shares fundamental values, such as democracy, as well as close economic and personal ties. Japan is even more concerned by the fact—as clearly stated in the National Security Strategy—that "China does not deny the option of using military force. Furthermore, China is intensifying military activities at sea and in the airspace surrounding Taiwan, including by launching ballistic missiles into waters around Japan." This is the first explicit reference to the Taiwan issue in official Japanese government documents. In terms of security, Beijing-Taipei relations are of fundamental importance to Japan. Maintaining the status quo is crucial, as a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan could draw Japan into a war. Tokyo administers the Senkaku Islands (or Diaoyu in Chinese nomenclature) in the East China Sea, which are claimed by both Beijing and Taipei. Therefore, China could attempt to invade both Taiwan and the archipelago simultaneously, since Taipei recognizes it as its own.

Another major concern for Tokyo is North Korea's aggressive actions, particularly its development of missile and nuclear programs, which directly threaten Japan's national security. Tokyo remains steadfast in its stance, emphasizing the need for complete denuclearization based on the joint statement from the Six-Party Talks and UN Security Council resolutions, the full implementation of sanctions against Pyongyang, and diplomatic efforts in close cooperation with the United States and the Republic of Korea.

### 5.2. Reform of the defense system - strengthening Japan's defense capabilities

Russia's aggression against Ukraine has demonstrated that invasions of other countries are still possible in the 21st century. What is happening in Europe could also happen in East Asia. Therefore, the new Security Strategy envisages a significant strengthening of Japan's defense capabilities. Regular missile tests by North Korea, some of which have landed in the sea near Japanese territory, demonstrate that missile attacks pose a real threat. Beijing's assertiveness in the East and South China Seas and the rapid expansion of China's military potential are also prompting Tokyo to reassess its current strategy. According to the Japanese government, the key to deterring a potential invasion is the ability to strike back. This new approach in official defense doctrine stems from the realization that missile defense alone is no longer sufficient as a defensive tool. Japanese strategists believe that in the event of a missile attack, it is necessary to combine a network of defenses against incoming missiles with the ability to strike back to prevent further attacks. It's worth noting that a counterattack is being planned already within the attacker's territory.

A similar concept was put forward by the Japanese government in 1956. At that time, it was assessed that "striking guided missile bases is lawful and self-defense, and therefore permissible provided it is deemed that there are no other means of defense against them." The Japanese authorities emphasize that the option of a counterattack falls within the scope of the Japanese constitution and international law, and that it does not alter Japan's policy, which is solely focused on territorial defense. Therefore, a preemptive strike (one that occurs before an armed attack has yet occurred) remains unacceptable. The counterattacks in question will be coordinated with the United States, as is the case with ballistic missile defense.

In terms of more general planning for the development of the country's defense capabilities, the Japanese authorities announce their strengthening within five years to the point where Japan will be able to assume primary responsibility for coping with a potential invasion and defeating attacking forces. All of this, of course, requires a corresponding, sustained increase in the defense budget, and Tokyo intends to raise spending on this purpose to 2 percent of current GDP by 2027, comparable to NATO requirements, even though Japan is not a member of that bloc. In absolute terms, this would amount to defense spending of approximately USD 320 billion. Japan would thus become the country with the third-largest defense budget in the world.

While 60 percent of Japanese respondents believe it is essential for the country to have the ability to counterattack, the reactions of Japan's neighbors are mixed. On December 18th, two days after the publication of Japan's New Security Strategy, North Korea launched two ballistic missiles, which landed in the sea between the Korean Peninsula and Japan, but outside the country's exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Some international analysts saw this as Pyongyang's "response" to the Japanese document. This was especially true given the fact that on December 20th, North Korean authorities issued a statement stating that "Japan is creating a serious security crisis on the Korean Peninsula and the East Asia region by adopting a new security strategy that effectively confirms its ability to launch a preemptive strike against other countries." Beijing also condemned the document, accusing Tokyo of stoking regional tensions by designating China as the "greatest strategic challenge" to Japan's security. In India, commentators said the new Japanese strategy "indicates the country's growing confidence in dealing with neighbors who act against its interests. It could also serve as a model for other nations struggling with Chinese belligerence, coercion, and encroachment on their exclusive economic zones." Meanwhile, Washington, Tokyo's main ally, strongly supported Japan's new strategy. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan expressed confidence that Japan had taken a bold and historic step to strengthen and defend a free and open Indo-Pacific. U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin stated that the strategy would "strengthen regional deterrence."

The new British Prime Minister, Rishi Sunak, also welcomed the Japanese document. On January 11, 2023, the United Kingdom concluded a "Reciprocal Access Agreement" with Japan,

a de facto defense pact that simplifies, among other things, the procedures for conducting joint training between the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and the British military. Undoubtedly, and the authors of Japan's National Security Strategy make no secret of this, it was influenced by the deteriorating international situation, which is accumulating new threats, from the pandemic to climate change and aggressive actions by some states. Russia's invasion of Ukraine has upended the international order and increased the risk of new armed conflicts not only in Europe but also in East Asia. The Japanese government is determined to prepare the country and its Self-Defense Forces to meet all these threats and their potential consequences.

### 5.3. Japanese maritime defense strategy

Due to its geographical location, the Land of the Rising Sun is dependent on sea routes. Therefore, its maritime defense strategy encompasses the Indian and Pacific Oceans, encompassing the Bashi Channel, Taiwan, the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, the South China Sea, and the Mediterranean Sea. Through these sea routes, Japan imports raw materials from the Middle East, essential for its industrial and economic development. During the Cold War, the United States and Japan jointly secured these routes to minimize the influence of the Soviet Union.[664]

Japan has committed to protecting sea lanes within 100 nautical miles of its territories.[665] This approach was based on the assumption that the United States would assume the bulk of the burden of maritime security, as well as on the realities of Japan's post-World War II constitution, particularly Article 9, which prohibited Japan from using military force to implement its foreign policy. Article 9 limited Japan's ability to secure its maritime interests in the postwar period by utilizing traditional and arguably common means of national power, particularly military force. *Bradford (2018)* presents a more functional division of Japan's maritime strategy in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, dividing it into three distinct phases, focusing on Southeast Asia, arguably the most important aspect of Japan's maritime strategy.[666]

The first phase of Japan's maritime strategy lasted from 1969 to 1998, the second from 1999 to 2009, and the third from 2010 to the present. The first phase focused on the safety of navigation, the second expanded its activities to include civilian maritime law enforcement capabilities, and current activities include support for regional police forces by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF). The focus on Southeast Asia, as a link between the Pacific and Indian Oceans, was

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[664] Ministry of Defense, Japan, *The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation* (November 27, 1978), 2021, https://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/us/anpo/19781127.html (accessed December 14, 2021).
[665] D. Oberdorfer, *Suzuki Pledges Greater Effort in Pacific Defence*, "The Washington Post", May 9, 1981, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1981/05/09/suzuki-pledges-greater-effort-in-pacific-defense/44669c6a-03d8-43d5-967f-0d8bd364ffa0/ (accessed December 14, 2021).
[666] J. F. Bradford, *Understanding Fifty Years of Japanese Maritime Security Capacity Building Activities in Southeast Asia*, National Institute of Defense Studies, September 5, 2018, http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/backnumber/pdf/20180905.pdf (accessed December 14, 2021).

deliberate. While the South China Sea has been a hub for unique security challenges, from piracy to illegal fishing, the growing importance of territorial disputes in the South China Sea prompted Japanese strategists to consider the consequences of growing friction between claimants and trade.[667] Any disruption to the SLOCs would bring the Japanese economy to its knees.[668] While tactics for securing the SLOC continue to evolve, Japan's maritime defense strategy in the Indian and Pacific Oceans remains focused on ensuring unrestricted access to the SLOC.

The evolution of Japan's maritime strategy in the Indo-Pacific in the post-Cold War period, until around 2012, was characterized by both continuity and incremental change. In the former, Japan viewed the benefits of official development assistance (ODA) and resource diplomacy as successes to be continued.[669] In the latter case, the gradual changes were largely triggered by the seismic geopolitical shift that emerged with the new security realities following the collapse of the USSR, forcing Japan to readjust its tactical approach to achieve its strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific region. The end of the Cold War led to the dissolution of many unconventional partnerships that had served to contain the USSR. Primarily, this was the partnership between the United States, Japan, South Korea, China, and other East Asian states. As the raison d'être of this partnership evaporated, Northeast Asian states began to redirect their security efforts inward, invoking historical and territorial disputes and focusing their domestic and diplomatic efforts on nation-building, securing core interests, and unifying the Korean Peninsula. The collapse of the USSR meant that the United States had to reorganize its global military presence to reflect the fact that it was no longer one of the two main competitors in a bipolar world. This meant reducing military presence and budgets, reallocating, repositioning, and rationalizing force deployments, and demanding greater burden-sharing from allies and security partners around the world and particularly in East Asia, as outlined in the 1993 Bottom-Up Review Report by then-Secretary of Defense Les Aspin.[670]

A 1995 report titled "A Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region" by Joseph Nye further stated that U.S. priorities should focus on the Asia-Pacific region and that the alliance with Japan should be a priority because "there is no bilateral relationship more important than the one we have with Japan." Nye called it "fundamental to our security policy in the Pacific and our global strategic objectives."[671]

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[667] K. Jimbo, *Japan Should Build ASEAN's Security Capacity*, "AJISS Commentary", May 30, 2012, https://npi.or.jp/en/research/2012/05/30182837.html (accessed December 14, 2021).
[668] E. Graham, *Japan's Sea Lane Security 1940–2004: A Matter of Life or Death?*, Routledge, New York, 2006, pp. 8–31; R. Yamamoto, *The Securitization of Japan's ODA*, in: A. Asplund, M. Söderberg (eds.), *Japanese Development Cooperation*, Routledge, New York, 2016, p. 75.
[669] M. H. Moni, Book Review of: *The Political Economy of Japanese Trade Policy*, "Economic and Political Studies", Vol. 7, 2019, pp. 106–112.
[670] L. Aspin, *Report on the Bottom-Up Review*, October 1993, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA359953.pdf (accessed December 14, 2021).
[671] U.S. Department of Defense, *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, February 1995, https://worldjpn.grips.ac.jp/documents/texts/JPUS/19950227.O1E.html (accessed December 14, 2021).

At the same time that China turned its attention to the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea (ECS), cross-strait relations, and territorial claims in the South China Sea, Japan slowly began to realize that official development assistance (ODA) and resource diplomacy were no longer sufficient to secure its maritime interests, and the issue of SLOCs and how to secure them once again became the focus of maritime security planners in Tokyo. Other factors also forced policymakers to reconsider security threats in their region and how to respond to them. The Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, China's nuclear tests in 1994, and growing anti-Japanese propaganda prompted policymakers to reconsider whether Sino-Japanese relations were developing in a positive direction and what impact a negative spiral would have on Japan. These concerns deepened following the anti-Japanese riots in mainland China in the early 2000s and in 2010 and 2012.[672]

Developments on the Korean Peninsula also contributed to Japan's maritime security as part of its Indo-Pacific strategy. In particular, the launch of long-range Taepodong missiles in the mid-1990s triggered alarm in Tokyo.[673] The convergence of US demands that Japan bear a greater share of its security costs, both in terms of financial contributions and the scope and breadth of activities undertaken within the Japan-US alliance, along with growing concerns about China and North Korea, meant that Japan had to adapt to evolving security challenges in the region and to accommodate US demands, and as a result, Japan gradually increased its naval capabilities during this period.[674] For example, during this period we witnessed changes in the guidelines of the Japan-U.S. alliance that expanded the scope and reach of Japan's maritime self-defense from the areas immediately surrounding Japan to include operations in the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea, as well as in the Asia-Pacific region.[675] Areas of operation have also expanded, encompassing not only search and rescue but also maritime surveillance. Chinese and North Korean actions have prompted naval strategists to incorporate missile defense systems such as THAAD and naval AEGIS systems into their planning, as well as training for territorial recapture from anonymous attackers through the development of Maritime Self-Defense Forces trained in tactics for recapturing island territories from occupying forces. The domestic factors that contributed to the gradual shift in Japanese maritime security in the Indo-Pacific region have their roots in the post-World War II political divide between conservatives who believe that Japan's post-World War II constitution was imposed by the United States, and pacifists who see it as an integral and fundamental value of postwar Japan. The former sees the Constitution as a reflection of the victor's justice rather than

[672] S.R. Nagy, Territorial Disputes, Trade and Diplomacy: Examining the Reper-cussions of the Sino-Japanese Territorial Dispute on Bilateral Trade, "China Per-spectives" 2018, No. 4, pp. 46–57.
[673] D. A. Pinkston, *The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program*, US Army War College Press, Carlisle, 2008.
[674] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, *Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century*, April 17, 1996, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/security.html (accessed December 14, 2021).
[675] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, *The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation*, 2021, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/guideline2.html (accessed December 14, 2021).

the historical realities of war in Japan, while the latter sees the Constitution as an ideal that Japan should protect, promote, and embody in its foreign policy. A combination of factors led to a gradual expansion of the scope and reach of Japan's maritime security in the Indo-Pacific region through acquisitions, activities, and the scope of these activities. First, with the lifting of the Cold War shackles and the assertive, if not provocative, behavior of both China and North Korea, conservatives recognized that there was political space to advocate for a more robust and expanded scope of military activities by the Japan Self-Defense Forces. Second, these aspirations were partially supported by the United States, which wanted Japan to contribute more to the alliance, both in terms of financial support and a broader range of joint operations. Third, the geopolitical environment in Southeast and Northeast Asia after the end of the Cold War was no longer constrained by the strategic priorities of the Cold War. This meant that the tactical truces and cooperation that had allowed Japan to rely solely on three pillars—official development assistance (ODA), resource diplomacy, and the Japan–U.S. alliance—were no longer reliable means of securing the SLOCs.

The result of these changes was a gradual expansion of the maritime dimension of Japan's Indo-Pacific strategy, which is essential to the security of its SLOCs. The main areas of expansion during this period included expanding the scope and range of operations permitted under the Japan-U.S. Alliance guidelines, acquiring anti-ballistic missile systems, enhancing space surveillance and submarine capabilities, and conducting exercises simulating the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) reclaiming peripheral island territories from an anonymous attacker. Finally, Japan increased the quality and quantity of its strategic partnerships in Southeast Asia and with Australia and India, building partnerships and capabilities aligned with Japan's maritime strategic priorities.[676] While external factors have been significant elements in the gradual shifts in Japan's maritime strategy in the Indo-Pacific region, internal forces have also played a role in the gradual changes we have witnessed in Japan's maritime security strategy in the Indo-Pacific region from the end of the Cold War to 2012. These shifts reflect the adaptive, accommodative, and innovative aspects of Japan's Indo-Pacific strategy. Simply put, we are observing Japan developing capabilities for the Indo-Pacific region that are legally consistent with Article 9 of the Constitution, and at the same time, these capabilities are deliberately designed to mitigate some of the challenges in the Indo-Pacific region being implemented by revisionist states.

[676] S. R. Nagy, *The East Asia Perspective on the Security Partnership with Japan*, in: W. Vosse, P. Midford (eds.), *Japan's New Security Partnerships*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2018, pp. 112–129.

### 5.4. Modernization of the Japanese armed forces

The primary reason for Japan's military modernization in the context of competition in the Indo-Pacific region is the rapidly deteriorating security environment in East Asia, fueled by China's military expansion,[677] the missile threat from North Korea, and Russia's aggressive policies. In response to these challenges, Tokyo is shifting away from its post-war, restrictive pacifism and toward building a credible deterrent capability.[678]

**Key geopolitical and military reasons**

- **China's growing military power:** A key driver of reform. Beijing has steadily increased military spending, modernized its navy, and demonstrated increasing assertiveness around the Japanese-controlled Senkaku Islands and in the South China Sea.[679]
- **Vision of the conflict around Taiwan:** A potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan poses a direct threat to Japan's security. Japan's southwesternmost islands lie only a few dozen kilometers from Taiwan, which would draw Tokyo into the conflict.[680]
- **Nuclear and missile threats from North Korea:** The unpredictability of the regime in Pyongyang and the regular tests of ballistic missiles that fly over Japanese territory or fall into its exclusive economic zone necessitate the development of advanced anti-missile defenses.[681]
- **Russian-Chinese rapprochement:** Russia's aggressive policy and its territorial disputes with Japan over the Southern Kuril Islands mean that Tokyo must consider the risk of a simultaneous crisis on several fronts.
- **Concerns about the stability of the alliance with the US:** While the alliance with Washington remains the cornerstone of its security, there is a growing awareness in Japan of the need to achieve greater defense independence in the event of a potential return to American isolationism.

**Directions of modernization and activities of Japan**

To effectively counter these threats, Japan's strategic documents assume profound reforms of its defense structures:

- **Increasing the defense budget:** Raising military spending to **2% of GDP**, moving Japan to third place globally in terms of military expenditure.

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677 https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/japan-military-transformation/

678 https://storage.googleapis.com/jnl-sljo-j-kdujms-files/journals/1/articles/178/6885e55df1c9b.pdf

679 https://www.facebook.com/IndoPacificReportIPR/posts/japans-accelerating-military-transformation-represents-one-of-the-most-significa/987605297615850/

680 https://www.crisisgroup.org/vid/asia-pacific/japan/japan-asias-military-modernisation

681 https://www.researchgate.net/publication/394048803_JAPAN'S_MILITARY_MODERNIZATION_AND_REGIONAL_SECURITY_DYNAMICS

- **Counter-strike capabilities:** Purchasing American Tomahawk missiles[682] and developing its own long-range missiles capable of striking targets in enemy territory for deterrence purposes.
- **Removing export barriers:** Easing regulations prohibiting arms sales, allowing Japan to transfer military technology and strengthen cooperation with partners.
- **Building a coalition in the Indo-Pacific:** Active participation in structures such as the Quad (US, Japan, Australia, India) and strengthening military ties with NATO, the UK, and the Philippines to maintain a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific."

Increasing the military budget to 2% of GDP[683] – if this plan is implemented, Japan will rank third in global military spending after the US and China; increasing cooperation with the US, proposing a joint command modeled on South Korea and the US, and legal changes enabling the use of self-defense forces outside Japanese territory; establishing close allied ties within the QUAD framework or bilateral agreements with the UK (including participation in the sixth-generation Tempest fighter program) or with Australia to strengthen its capabilities. Cooperation with NATO, potentially also an opportunity for cooperation with Poland; China as Japan's main rival. Russia, after a period of improved relations, is also considered a potential threat. Readiness to respond to aggressive actions by North Korea, and discussions about acquiring nuclear weapons. The growing competition among global powers for global dominance compels countries seeking to play a significant role in the international arena to take steps to strengthen their potential. In Asia, this applies particularly to the reassessment of Japan's foreign and security policy. The growing importance of China, with its dynamically developing economy and increasing military expenditures, has prompted a response from Japan. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has initiated the process of strengthening Japan's military potential and amending legal regulations to pursue a more dynamic defense policy, especially as Japanese society, pacifist in its post-World War II stance, is changing its approach to defense.

In 2013, Japan's first-ever defense strategy was announced, and in 2022, the second document of this magnitude in Japan's post-war history was adopted. It identifies China as the greatest strategic challenge to Japan's security and the entire international community. Besides China, North Korea's nuclear program, with its repeated tests of nuclear-capable missiles, and Russia's aggressive policies were considered threats to Japan. Japan has still not signed a post-World War II peace treaty with Russia and remains in a territorial dispute over four Kuril Islands, referred to by Tokyo as the Northern Territories. Prime Minister Abe's actions were aimed at changing the

[682]https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/china-accuses-japan-of-pursuing-military-expansion-under-indo-pacific-strategy/3932343

[683] https://wei.org.pl/2023/aktualnosci/krzysztof-winkler/japonia-wobec-rywalizacji-mocarstw/

mandate of the Self-Defense Forces, which, according to Article 9 of the 1946 Constitution, was limited solely to the defense of Japanese territory.[684]

In 2015, a law was passed enabling Japanese forces to participate in military operations outside their home area. Defense spending also increased significantly. Due to rising tensions in the Asia-Pacific region caused by China's policy in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, the threat of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, and North Korea's nuclear program, the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, became a turning point in increasing Japanese military spending. The Japanese government responded to the war in Ukraine and the deteriorating security situation in the Indo-Pacific[685] by allocating $51.4 billion for defense in the 2023 budget, representing 1.19% of Japan's GDP. Plans were also announced to increase military spending to 2 percent of GDP by 2027. This would be the third-largest military budget in the world after the United States and China, reflecting Japan's global economic position. The Japanese have identified seven areas to enhance their defense capabilities. These include:

- achieving the capability to launch missile strikes against distant targets through the purchase of American Tomahawk missiles and increasing the range of our own Type 12 missiles;
- enhancing air and missile defense capabilities through the creation of an integrated system to counter these threats;
- expanding the potential of unmanned vehicles; developing the ability to operate simultaneously in multiple domains, such as space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic domain; expanding command, control, and intelligence gathering capabilities;
- acquiring additional maneuver and logistical capabilities to enable the efficient deployment of forces to selected areas of operation and strengthening the resilience and survivability of Japanese forces.[686]

The implementation of these changes will significantly increase the potential of the Japanese armed forces, which were underfunded prior to 2017. The additional funds will be allocated to programs developing new types of equipment, such as hypersonic missiles and a sixth-generation fighter, being developed in collaboration with the United Kingdom and Italy. Japan also intends to develop an air-to-air missile known as the *Joint New Air-to-Air Missile (JNAAM)* in cooperation with the British. The decision to cooperate with the United Kingdom and Italy on the next-generation fighter program was dictated by the similar requirements that all three countries have for the aircraft, in terms of entry into service time, risk reduction, cost sharing, and technical requirements. The ability to implement modifications tailored to the needs

684 https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/japan-military-transformation/
685 https://wei.org.pl/2023/aktualnosci/krzysztof-winkler/japonia-wobec-rywalizacji-mocarstw/
686 https://storage.googleapis.com/jnl-sljo-j-kdujms-files/journals/1/articles/178/6885e55df1c9b.pdf

of program participants will also be crucial. Japan has had negative experiences cooperating with the Americans, who are reluctant to grant consent to modifications to delivered equipment and rarely share source code. The collaboration could also result in increased aircraft exports, as the UK and Italy will sell them in the European market, while Japan will sell them in Asia. The spending plan calls for the purchase of another 16 F-35 Lightning II fighters in 2023 (the Japanese Air Force is expected to have a total of 147 of these aircraft: 105 F-35As and 42 F-35Bs). Japan operates two helicopter destroyers, the Izumo and the Kaga, which, after modernization, will become light aircraft carriers capable of accommodating F-35Bs and MV-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft. This will significantly increase the Japanese fleet's ability to operate in the open waters of the Pacific and around Taiwan. A key element of the defense strategy is the development of TSMC's production of advanced semiconductors, essential for the production of modern electronic devices.[687]

In addition to expanding its armed forces, Japan plans to strengthen cooperation with the United States, building on the alliance agreement signed in 1951, which forms the basis of the two countries' security relations. This alliance remains the foundation of Tokyo's defense policy. In January 2023, at a 2+2 meeting between the foreign and defense ministers of the United States and Japan, the decision was made to extend the alliance's scope to include space. The Japanese plan to establish a permanent joint headquarters to direct Japanese military operations, which will facilitate cooperation with American forces. The next step is to establish a joint Japanese-American command, modeled on the one operating in South Korea (the Korean-American Command). Plans include increasing the presence of US forces on Okinawa and restoring the permanent presence of US fighter jets at Kadena Air Force Base. The US Marines are to be reorganized into a new *Marine Littoral Regiment*, which, in line with the program to prepare the Marine Corps for new battlefield challenges, will have multi-domain capabilities, particularly in combating naval and air targets and carrying out missions in cyberspace. Japan's increased military spending and willingness to strengthen cooperation with US forces have been positively received by Americans. This is consistent with Donald Trump's insistence that American allies assume greater responsibility for their own defense.

Japan is also strengthening cooperation with its QUAD partners[688] (Australia and India) and AUKUS participant Great Britain. In 2020, Japan signed a logistics agreement with India, enabling the servicing and supply of the parties' forces at their military bases and ports. In January 2022, Japan and Australia signed the *Reciprocal Access Agreement*, a similar pact the

687 https://www.crisisgroup.org/vid/asia-pacific/japan/japan-asias-military-modernisation

688 https://wei.org.pl/2023/aktualnosci/krzysztof-winkler/japonia-wobec-rywalizacji-mocarstw/

Japanese concluded with the United Kingdom in January 2023. These agreements establish principles of cooperation between the armed forces of the participating countries and simplify activities related to joint exercises. The Japanese also expressed readiness to cooperate, among others, with Poland in cyberspace, the development of unmanned vehicles (especially considering the positive feedback received by Polish drones during the war in Ukraine), and Japan's plans to expand capabilities in this area. In February 2022, a memorandum of understanding on defense and security cooperation between Japan and Poland was signed. It provides a basis for further strengthening cooperation in this area, especially considering Japan's stance on Russian aggression in Ukraine and Poland's expressed support for the idea of an open and free Indo-Pacific.[689] To enhance Japan's ability to cooperate with its allies, a resolution to its dispute with South Korea over crimes committed by the Japanese is necessary. Past attempts to resolve historical issues in this area have failed. A particularly sensitive topic is the issue of so-called *comfort women*, or Korean women exploited in Japanese military brothels during World War II. Despite the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and South Korea and the 1965 Agreement on Property and Claims, as well as economic cooperation, the two countries remain locked in a dispute over these events, which intensified during the administrations of Shinzo Abe in Japan and President Moon Jiae-in in South Korea. At that time, restrictions were imposed on Japanese exports of chemicals needed for semiconductor production in South Korea. This was the result of a ruling by the Korean Supreme Court ordering reparations to former forced laborers. South Korea threatened to suspend intelligence cooperation with Japan, but due to American pressure, this form of cooperation was maintained. The current political leadership in both countries recognizes the need to resolve the disputes between Japan and South Korea. Finding a solution to the dispute is also in the United States' interest, as it weakens the allies' position vis-à-vis their main rival, China.

Increasing defense spending will enable Japan to take greater responsibility for security in East Asia.[690] At the same time, cooperation with NATO demonstrates Japan's ambition to play a significant role not only in Asia but also globally. The world's third-largest economy qualifies it for this role. However, implementing the proposed solutions to strengthen the Self-Defense Forces may be hampered by financing the planned expenditures, which are to be covered by tax increases, budget cuts, and the creation of an Armed Forces Strengthening Fund. Government bonds, previously earmarked for construction, will also be used. However, there is a clear discrepancy between Japanese public support for increasing the defense budget to 2% of GDP (which in April 2022 was only 55% of all respondents) and their willingness to bear the

689 https://www.pism.pl/publikacje/ewolucja-a-nie-rewolucja-zmiany-w-polityce-bezpieczenstwa-japonii
690 https://wei.org.pl/2023/aktualnosci/krzysztof-winkler/japonia-wobec-rywalizacji-mocarstw/

associated financial burden (only 22% of respondents indicated such willingness). Taking into account public sentiment, the government decided to postpone the decision on raising taxes until 2024 and call early parliamentary elections to obtain a mandate to introduce fiscal changes.

Asia has become the main arena of conflict in the current great-power conflict. Japan, due to its geographical location, has a special role to play as a crucial part of the so-called first Pacific island chain, hindering Chinese expansion, and as a base of support for Taiwan in a potential conflict with China.[691] At the same time, it could also discourage Russia from expanding in the Far East. Strengthening Japan's military capabilities would also allow it to take over some of the tasks related to defending the region from American forces. Combined with the expanding capabilities of South Korea, Australia, India, and European partners (such as the United Kingdom), this could lead to the formation of an effective coalition countering growing Chinese influence. Japan's economic strength is an additional asset, encouraging US economic engagement in Asia and America's re-entry into the Trans-Pacific Partnership. According to the Japanese government, this move will strengthen economic ties between Pacific Rim countries and the United States beyond the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF).[692] Japan, pursuing a consistent policy of strengthening its economic potential and, consequently, its military, has become America's main ally in the Far East. The largest US armed forces abroad are stationed there. Its geographic location and willingness to strengthen its defense capabilities are among the reasons why the US takes its alliance commitments to Japan very seriously. Taking a similar path, along with attracting significant American economic investment, is also a way to strengthen Poland's position and anchor it more deeply in the American alliance system, which is crucial given the conflicting interests of our country with some EU partners, such as Germany and France, revealed by the war in Ukraine. Poland also needs more room to maneuver given the developing (at least since 2018) Cold War, which is forcing a new approach to security and international cooperation.

691 https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/japan-military-transformation/

692 https://wei.org.pl/2023/aktualnosci/krzysztof-winkler/japonia-wobec-rywalizacji-mocarstw/

# Chapter VI

# Japan in the Indo-Pacific regional security architecture

## 6.1. Free and Open Indo-Pacific Concept

Since 2017, Japan's vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) has been at the forefront of Japanese foreign policy. However, it remains elusive as a concrete strategy, as the activities encompassed by FOIP are constantly evolving. This chapter examines critical junctures in the evolution of FOIP from 2005 to the present, as they mark a demarcation point for defining the use of the term "Indo-Pacific." Key questions include:

1. What junctures compelled the evolution of the FOIP vision and why?

2. Are these changes institutionalized?

The research findings suggest that the evolution of Japan's FOIP vision cannot be explained solely by neorealism or liberal institutionalism; rather, Japan's maritime strategy and its FOIP vision are sensitive to changes in the distribution of power associated with China's re-emergence as the dominant power in the region and the relative decline of the United States, and that they are adapting to these changes through a hybrid approach. This approach includes:

1) selectively adapting to China's economic rise;

2) deepening Japan's integration into the political economy and rule-making process of the Indo-Pacific;

3) strengthening the Japan-U.S. alliance and cementing the U.S. position in the region; and

4) diversifying and deepening strategic partnerships. Japan's Indo-Pacific strategy is increasingly being questioned because it promotes the so-called "Vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP).[693]

From Beijing's perspective, this vision is understood as a containment strategy that works synergistically with US foreign policy to maintain a hegemonic position in the region. Other countries, such as Australia, India, and the European Union, view this vision primarily through a series of policy initiatives aimed at strengthening the rules-based order by accommodating China's re-emergence as the dominant economy in the region and by securing it, primarily through the Japanese-US alliance. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's return to power in December 2012 allowed him to implement the Indo-Pacific vision he first expressed in his "Confluence of the Two Seas" speech

[693] H. Kai, M. Li, *Understanding the Dynamics of the Indo-Pacific: US-China Strategic Competition, Regional Actors, and Beyond*, "International Affairs", Vol. 96, No. 1, 2020, pp. 1–7.

delivered to the Parliament of the Republic of India in August 2007.[694] Initially linked to the Freedom and Democracy Arc,[695] Abe's initial formula, formulated by then-Foreign Minister Aso Taro, failed to gain acceptance from regional stakeholders due to its normative approach. As a result, Japan's initial vision for the Indo-Pacific declined in importance with the lukewarm reception of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) and Abe's resignation from power. Learning from this, upon his return to power, Abe shifted his vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) from its normative components, focusing on human rights and democracy, to the rule of law in the maritime sphere of Indo-Pacific littoral states. While not directly directed against China, the push for a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific was implicitly directed against China following Beijing's construction and militarization of artificial islands in the Southern South China Sea, its regular incursions into Japan's exclusive economic zone related to the Senkaku Islands, the rejection of the July 2016 decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration on Chinese claims in the Southern South China Sea, and a 10% year-on-year increase in China's military budgets. The FOIP, considered in parallel with the Quad, has raised many questions among stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific region. In the 2019 State of Southeast Asia Survey, 17.3% of Southeast Asian countries viewed the FOIP concept as undermining ASEAN's centrality, while 25.4% viewed the FOIP as a ploy to contain China.[696] Comparing Japan's Diplomatic Blue Books[697] from 2017 to 2020, we see that the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has incorporated the concerns of Indo-Pacific stakeholders into its evolving vision. For example, in the 2017 Diplomatic Blue Book, the FOIP is framed as a strategy and emphasizes that "Japan has a responsibility to promote the connection of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and Asia and Africa, in a place that values freedom, the rule of law, and a market economy free from force and coercion, and that ensures prosperity." The 2018 Diplomatic Blue Book, in turn, more explicitly articulates challenges such as "piracy, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, natural disasters, and illegal fishing. Japan promotes the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy" to make the Indo-Pacific region an "international public good" that will bring stability and prosperity. This strategy aims to maintain and strengthen a free and open maritime order based on the rule of law throughout the region by addressing these challenges and by improving

[694] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, *"Confluence of the Two Seas," Speech by Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan at the Parliament of the Republic of India*, August 22, 2007, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/speech-2.html (accessed December 14, 2021).
[695] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, *"Global Management and the Mission for Japanese Diplomacy," Speech by Taro Aso, Foreign Minister of Japan, for The 17th Asia Corporate Conference "Coming Together, Moving Ahead: Asian Economies Leading through Integration and Innovation" (Asia Society, May 16–18, 2007)*, May 18, 2007, https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm/aso/address0705.html (accessed December 14, 2021).
[696] S. Mun Tang, M. Thuzar, T. H. Hoang, T. Chalermpalanupap, T. P. Thao Pham, A. Q. Saelaow, *The State of Southeast Asia: 2019 Survey Report*, 2019, p. 25.
[697] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, *Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy*, in: *International Situation and Japan's Diplomacy in 2016*, *The 2017 Diplomatic Bluebook*, https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2017/html/chapter1/c0102.html#sf03 (accessed December 14, 2021).

connectivity in the region through the development of high-quality infrastructure in line with international standards."[698] We also see a shift toward non-security public goods that Japan and like-minded states are expected to provide to Indo-Pacific littoral states, including: (1) promoting and establishing fundamental principles such as the rule of law and freedom of navigation; (2) pursuing economic prosperity by increasing connectivity, including through the development of high-quality infrastructure in line with international standards; and (3) initiatives to ensure peace and stability, including assistance in building capacity for maritime law enforcement, disaster risk reduction, and non-proliferation. The FOIP vision evolved in subsequent years, with the 2019 Diplomatic Blue Book focusing on: promoting and strengthening the rule of law, freedom of navigation, free trade, etc.; pursuing economic prosperity by strengthening connectivity, including through the development of high-quality infrastructure in line with international standards; and a commitment to peace and stability, which includes assistance in building capacity in maritime law enforcement, cooperation in areas such as disaster risk reduction and nuclear non-proliferation.

This evolution of the FOIP continued to ensure that stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific region did not feel that the Indo-Pacific concept undermined ASEAN's centrality. For example, Japan's 2020 Diplomatic Blue Book[699] includes a special section on ASEAN titled "ASEAN Indo-Pacific Perspectives (AOIP): ASEAN's Indo-Pacific Vision, by ASEAN, for ASEAN." Hosoya (2019) calls this evolution FOIP 2.0,[700] representing the Japanese government's recognition that a security-focused FOIP will not gain support in the region and will therefore not be sustainable. The 2020 Diplomatic Blue Book demonstrates Japan's receptiveness to ASEAN as a stakeholder, which accepts Japan's version of the FOIP. Other scholars view the FOIP from different perspectives. Besides viewing the FOIP as an attempt to implant a liberal international order in the Indo-Pacific region, Satake (2020), for example, argues that the diversity of cooperative relationships Japan is establishing within the FOIP is part of a deliberate strategy to strengthen cooperation with countries other than the United States.[701] The commitment to sign a Defence Treaty with Australia,[702] the Joint Canada-Japan Priorities for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific of May 3, 2021,[703]

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[698] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy, in: International Situation and Japan's Diplomacy in 2017, The 2018 Diplomatic Bluebook.

[699] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP): the Indo-Pacific Vision of ASEAN, by ASEAN, for ASEAN, in: Japan's Foreign Policy that Takes a Panoramic Perspective of the World Map 2018, The 2020 Diplomatic Bluebook, https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2020/html/chapter2/c020107.html#sf03 (accessed December 14, 2021).

[700] Y. Hosoya, FOIP 2.0: The Evolution of Japan's Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy, "Asia-Pacific Review", Vol. 26, No. 1, 2019, pp. 18–28.

[701] T. Satake, *Japan: Initiatives for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific*, "East Asian Strategic Review", 2020, pp. 194–216.

[702] S. Nagy, *Japan-Australia Defence Treaty: US Allies Adapting to New Geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific*, "Geopolitical Monitor", November 24, 2020, https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/japan-australia-defense-treaty-us-allies-adapt-to-new-geopolitics-of-the-indo-pacific (accessed December 14, 2021).

[703] Global Affairs Canada (GAC), *Shared Canada-Japan Priorities Contributing to a Free and Open Indo-Pacific Region*, May 3, 2021, https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2021/05/shared-canada-japan-priorities-contributing-to-a-free-and-open-indopacific-region.html (accessed December 14, 2021).

the Resilient Supply Chain Initiative (RSCI), and Japan's accession to the CPTPP and RCEP demonstrate a commitment to diversifying partners in the region through various forms of engagement. Importantly, China has not been excluded from this trade diversification process, demonstrating Japan's ongoing commitment to balancing its relationship with its largest trading partner. While diversifying its cooperation partners remains a key element of Japan's broader efforts to penetrate the Indo-Pacific region through numerous partnerships, this should not be interpreted as distancing itself from the United States. On the contrary, Japan has for decades sought to bring the United States into the Indo-Pacific through institutional participation, investment in the alliance, strengthening the US security architecture in the region, through trade, technology, and, most importantly, through the FOIP and the Quad. At the institutional level, Japan has consistently advocated for US participation in the East Asia Summit to counterbalance China's influence within the organization. On the trade front, Japan has vigorously pursued the TPP with the United States and remains open to rejoining after the Trump administration's withdrawal from the massive trade agreement. In September 2019, it also signed a mini trade agreement covering market access for certain agricultural products and goods, as well as digital trade to strengthen ties.[704] Regarding the alliance and the US-led regional security architecture, the new Japan National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) of December 2018 clearly identify the United States as Japan's most comprehensive and indispensable partner.[705] The guidelines emphasize the role of the Japan-U.S. alliance and Japan's commitment to "enhancing the Alliance's ability to deter and counter threats, providing a strategic framework for promoting security cooperation in line with the vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific."

It is clear that even under the unpredictable Trump administration, Japan saw its vision for the FOIP as linked to the Japan-US alliance, trade relations with the United States, and the hope that the United States would reconsider and rejoin the CPTPP. Despite the deepening of the Japan-US alliance and its role as a cornerstone of Japan's vision for the FOIP strategy, the deterioration of US-China relations also influenced the evolution of the FOIP. The US-initiated trade war and potential restrictions on foreign direct investment (FDI), basic technologies, and the movement of people with China raised concerns about the negative impact of US policy toward China on Japan's largest trading partner. This, combined with the Trump administration's overly securitized approach to China and its Indo-Pacific Strategy, led Japan to intensify its efforts to join several multilateral trade agreements, including the CPTPP, the Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement, and RCEP. At

[704] United States Trade Representative, *Fact Sheet on U.S.-Japan Trade Agreement*, September 2019, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2019/september/fact-sheet-us-japan-trade-Agreement (accessed December 14, 2021).
[705] Ministry of Defence, Japan, *National Defence Program Guidelines for FY 2019 and Beyond*, December 18, 2018, https://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/11591426/www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2019/pdf/20181218_e.pdf (accessed December 14, 2021).

the same time, Japan has proactively refocused its FOIP efforts, focusing on infrastructure and connectivity, digital connectivity, and the economy.[706] The rebranding of FOIP-related activities has spawned several multilateral initiatives. First, the United States Trade and Development Agency (USTDA), the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to promote cooperation between Japanese, American, and Australian companies in the infrastructure, energy, and natural resources sectors in third countries, with a particular focus on the Indo-Pacific region, through collaborative financing.[707] Second, Japan, the United States, and India launched the Blue Dot Network (BDN) at the 35th ASEAN Summit in Thailand. The BDN is an international certification program that promotes the rapid implementation of high-quality infrastructure in low- and middle-income countries, emphasizing transparency and sustainability.[708] Both initiatives aimed to anchor the United States in the region, soften the overly secure US approach to the Indo-Pacific, and differentiate Japan's FOIP approach from the US by consistently emphasizing the importance of promoting a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific and stability and peace through development. Having successfully promoted infrastructure and connectivity in the region with the United States and other partners, Japan's FOIP vision shifted direction as the Trump administration began to pressure China's "Made in China 2025" national development strategy and its high-tech industry. In this case, Tokyo identified data free flow with trust (DFFT)[709] and the development of alternatives to 5G[710] as pillars of FOIP. To achieve this goal, Japan has begun offering tax incentives to encourage network service providers to invest in secure 5G infrastructure and mitigate supply chain risks. Abroad and in the Indo-Pacific region, Japan has leveraged the DFFT initiative to facilitate the synthesis of domestic and international legal frameworks through the use and reform of the World Trade Organization (WTO).[711] Both initiatives aimed to connect FOIP's "freedom" and "openness" principles to the digital sphere by emphasizing data privacy, a clear response to China's promotion of cyber sovereignty through data localization regulations and the National

[706] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, *Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy*, in: *International Situation and Japan's Diplomacy in 2016*, *The 2017 Diplomatic Bluebook*, https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2017/html/chapter1/c0102.html#sf03 (accessed December 14, 2021).
[707] The Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), JBIC Signs MOU with Overseas Private Investment Corporation of the U.S., Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and Export Finance and Insurance Corporation of Australia, November 12, 2018, https://www.jbic.go.jp/en/information/press/press-2018/1112-011585.html (accessed December 14, 2021).
[708] J. Panda, India, the Blue Dot Network, and the "Quad Plus" Calculus, "Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs", Vol. 3, No. 3, 2020, pp. 1–22.
[709] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, DFFT: Data Free Flow with Trust, June 7, 2019, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/100167362.pdf (accessed December 14, 2021).
[710] Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Japan, Beyond 5G Promoting Strategy (Overview), https://www.soumu.go.jp/main_sosiki/joho_tsusin/eng/presentation/pdf/200414_B5G_ENG_v01.pdf (accessed December 14, 2021).
[711] M. Matsubara, Japan's 5G Approach Sets a Model for Global Cooperation, "Lawfare", September 14, 2020, https://www.lawfareblog.com/japans-5gapproach-sets-model-global-cooperation (accessed December 14, 2021).

Intelligence Law,[712] which "strengthened the legal foundation of China's security efforts and required cooperation with Chinese and foreign citizens, enterprises, and organizations."[713]

### 6.2. Cooperation within QUAD

The Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) is an informal forum for cooperation between the **United States**, **Australia**, **India**, and **Japan**. Its main objective is to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific and to balance China's growing influence. The institutionalization of the Quad became an important element of Japan's vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), although it was not explicitly linked to the FOIP concept. As Ryosuke Hanada argues: "Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe initiated the idea of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue in 2007, building on gradually expanding mechanisms of regional cooperation, particularly the East Asia Summit (EAS), as well as the development of trilateral relations, especially trilateral security cooperation among Australia, Japan, and the United States. Both developments were, in different ways, driven by a growing perception of the threat posed by China, based on uncertainty surrounding the rise of its power. In this sense, the revival of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue in 2017 cannot be attributed solely to Shinzo Abe's leadership, but also to the fact that the four governments had cautiously and consistently shifted their foreign-policy priorities in the broader East Asian region, that is, the Asia-Pacific, and had developed bilateral and trilateral security cooperation mechanisms since 2007 in response to China's growing and increasingly assertive position. Abe recognized these changes and skillfully contributed to the revival of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue in 2017 by conceptualizing the Indo-Pacific as a regional framework and a pillar of Japanese foreign policy."[714] For Japan, the Quad serves multiple purposes, and its role is constantly evolving. First, it serves to further anchor the United States in the region's fledgling multilateral institutions, ensuring that the United States provides economic, diplomatic, and security resources to the region. Second, India's inclusion in the program signals to India and other developing countries that they are participating in the process of building a new institution aimed at providing public goods to the region. Third, the Quad provides an additional layer of institutional support for the Indo-Pacific region to help it cope with the challenges posed by China's re-emergence as the dominant economic power in the region. This last point is crucial. The Quad is not an Asian NATO, nor does it aim to replace existing institutions; rather, it is a complementary multilateral institution intended

[712] K. Koga, *Great Disruption: Uncertainty over The Indo-Pacific*, "Comparative Connections: A Triannual E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations", Vol. 22, No. 1, 2020, pp. 137–148.
[713] M. Scot Tanner, *Beijing's New National Intelligence Law: From Defense to Offense*, "Lawfare", July 20, 2017, https://www.lawfareblog.com/beijings-new-national-intelligence-law-defense-offense (accessed December 14, 2021).
[714] R. Hanada, *The Role of U.S.–Japan–Australia–India Cooperation, or the 'Quad' in FOIP: A Policy Coordination Mechanism for a Rules-based Order*, "Strategic Japan Working Papers", Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com (accessed December 14, 2021).

to contribute to the vision of the FOIP. Like the FOIP, the Quad has not been well-received by ASEAN members, particularly China. Both sides see the Quad as being rigged against China and therefore enjoys little support from stakeholders in Southeast Asia.[715] U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has linked the Quad to "countering the challenges the Chinese Communist Party poses to all of us" and "countering China's assertive behavior in and around the Senkaku Islands, in the South China Sea, and along the Indochina border, which only reinforces Southeast Asian countries' fears that the Quad will exacerbate tensions in the region and leave them in a difficult position of choosing between their economic benefactor, China, and the United States."[716] Tokyo, the Biden administration, and other Quad members recognize this. That's why the Quad Leaders' Summit in March 2021 issued a statement that focused on delivering public goods. Specifically, the Quad Leaders' Joint Statement: "The Spirit of the Quad" focused on four areas:

1) fostering a region that is free, open, inclusive, and healthy, rooted in democratic values, and unfettered by coercion;

2) promoting a free, open, rules-based order, rooted in international law, to promote security and prosperity and counter threats both in the Indo-Pacific and beyond;

3) committing to responding to the economic and health impacts of COVID-19, combating climate change, and addressing shared challenges, including in cyberspace, critical technologies, counterterrorism, investment in high-quality infrastructure, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and maritime domains;

4) joining forces to expand safe, affordable and effective vaccine production and ensure equitable access to them to accelerate economic recovery and benefit global health.[717]

Providing public goods through the Quad aims to gain the support of stakeholders in Southeast Asia and other countries that cannot afford to be associated with an institution clearly oriented towards China. At the same time, a new Quad format is emerging—the Quad-plus. Countries such as Canada and France have found ways to participate in naval exercises or include Quad members in their own naval exercises. In the case of Canada and France, Canada participated in the Sea Dragon 21 exercise[718] near Guam in January 2021. In the case of Canada and France, Quad members joined

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[715] P. Saha, *The Quad in the Indo-Pacific: Why ASEAN Remains Cautious*, Observer Research Foundation (ORF), February 26, 2018, https://www.orfonline.org/research/asean-quad/ (accessed December 14, 2021); R. Dermawan, *Is the Quad's Revival a Threat to ASEAN?*, "The Diplomat", March 18, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/03/is-the-quads-revival-a-threat-to-asean (accessed December 14, 2021).

[716] S. Nagy, *How to Build a Better 'Quad'*, "The Japan Times", October 9, 2020, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2020/10/09/commentary/world-commentary/build-better-quad (accessed December 14, 2021).

[717] The White House, *Quad Leaders' Joint Statement: "The Spirit of the Quad"*, March 12, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/12/quad-leaders-joint-statement-the-spirit-of-the-quad (accessed December 14, 2021).

[718] CTF 72 Public Affairs, *Sea Dragon 2021 Kicks Off Between US and Partner Nations*, January 11, 2021, https://www.c7f.navy.mil/Media/News/Display/Article/2468589/guam-hosts-partner-nations-in-exercise-sea-dragon-2021 (accessed December 14, 2021).

France in the La Perouse exercise[719] in April 2021. While this framework has not yet been institutionalized, Tokyo and other Quad members see its utility as an indispensable tool for Indo-Pacific countries to realize their economic and technological goals by providing new avenues for building bridges and opportunities for growth and development.[720] The Quad's relationship with the FOIP and Japan's security will ultimately be linked to China's behavior in the region. A more assertive China could bring Quad members closer together to constrain Chinese actions through proactive security cooperation and investing in and strengthening the development of Indo-Pacific littoral states. This could be achieved through Quad-plus agreements with stakeholders, strengthening the BDN, and alternatives to the Belt and Road Initiative. A less assertive or more cooperative China, on the other hand, might find opportunities to cooperate with a Quad member in a Quad-plus format. Possible candidates include climate change mitigation and addressing unique security challenges, such as piracy, illegal fishing, and sanctions evasion.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, intensified Japan's long-standing concerns about the Sino-Russian alliance.[721] These concerns have led Tokyo to redouble its commitment to the rules-based order outlined in the FOIP vision.[722] For example, Prime Minister Kishida Fumio clearly expressed this commitment to the rules-based order, as expressed in the FOIP Vision, during the ISS Shangri-La Dialogue on June 10, 2022. He emphasized the importance of "maintaining and strengthening the rules-based free and open international order; pioneering new solutions towards a free and open Indo-Pacific" and stated that "Ukraine today can be East Asia tomorrow."[723] These words were backed up by concrete political coordination with the United States, the European Union, and other like-minded countries and political associations, including military support for Ukrainian forces[724] and the freezing of the assets of four additional Russians, as well as cooperation with other countries in blocking Russia's access to the Worldwide Interbank

[719] K. Parpiani, *La Perouse – Quad Naval Exercise and India's Strategic Partnership with France*, Observer Research Foundation (ORF), April 4, 2021, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/la-perouse-quad-naval-exercise-and-indias-strategic-partnership-with-france (accessed December 14, 2021).

[720] J. Panda, *Quad-Plus: Form Versus Substance*, "The Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs", Vol. 3, No. 5, 2020, pp. 3–16.

[721] Japan's House of Representatives, *Resolution Condemning Russia's Aggression Against Ukraine*, March 1, 2022, https://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_english.nsf/html/statics/english/ketugi_e220301-1.htm (accessed December 14, 2021).

[722] Sh. Smith, *Japan Doubles Down on Defending the Post-War Order*, "The East Asia Forum", September 4, 2022, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/09/04/japan-doubles-down-on-defending-the-postwar-order (accessed December 14, 2021).

[723] Prime Minister Kishida Fumio, *Keynote Address at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue*, June 10, 2022, https://japan.kantei.go.jp/101_kishida/statement/202206/_00002.html (accessed December 14, 2021).

[724] Ministry of Defense, Japan, *Ukurainaheno zhuāgbei pīn děgno tigōgnitsuite / Provision of Equipment, etc. to Ukraine*, March 8, 2022, https://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/news/2022/03/08b.html (accessed December 14, 2021).

Financial Telecommunications Association.[725] We also witnessed Japan designate at least 25 individuals with ties to the Russian Federation as subject to the following sanctions:

1) Payment restrictions: A license is required to make payments to designated individuals;

2) Capital transaction restrictions: A license is required to make payments to designated individuals.[726]

Japan's participation in the NATO summit in Madrid in June 2022, alongside Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea, was significant. Japan and NATO drew a direct connection to Russia's invasion of Ukraine and its use of force to change the regional order, as well as to revanchist states in the Indo-Pacific region, such as China, attempting to change the regional order through force, gray zones, or legal tactics. We also saw much more pointed statements regarding key strategic areas and issues in the Indo-Pacific region, including Taiwan's place in Japan's security agenda. For example, at a breakfast meeting with a delegation led by US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and hosted by Prime Minister Kishida, both Japanese and American counterparts expressed their intention to continue close cooperation to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.[727] We also saw clear support for the status quo expressed in the joint statements by the leaders of former Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide in 2021 and Prime Minister Kishida and Biden following Russia's invasion of Ukraine and concerns about China's behavior towards Taiwan. In line with the broader vision of the FOIP and Japan's hybrid approach to foreign policy, Japan continues to invest in "multi-layered partnerships with allies and like-minded countries that share universal values in the Indo-Pacific region – such as Japan-US-Australia, Japan-US-ROK, NATO+AP4, and AUKUS – which have become more active. To further foster such security partnerships in the region, Japan has signed and is negotiating Reciprocal Access Agreements (RAAs) with Australia and the United Kingdom, respectively. Furthermore, Japan is deepening strategic discussions not only with these two countries but also with the Philippines, Germany, India, Indonesia, and France, through 2+2 ministerial meetings. Furthermore, we will develop an agreement on the transfer of defense equipment and technology with ASEAN countries," the Foreign Minister emphasized.

The basic tenets of the FOIP are based on Japan's need to ensure unimpeded, stable, and rules-based governance to protect the SLOC in the Indo-Pacific region. The critical junctures that compelled Japan to revise its FOIP vision were not solely due to emerging regional challenges, such

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[725] *Japan to Freeze Assets of 4 More Russian Banks to Align with EU*, "Kyodo News", March 3, 2022, https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2022/03/e2783c3e9bf4-japan-to-freeze-assets-of-4-more-russian-banks-to-keep-pace-with-eu.html (accessed December 14, 2021).

[726] J. Suetomi, *Japan Introduces Further Sanctions Against Russia*, "Sanctions & Export Controls Blog", March 29, 2022, https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/japan-introduces-further-sanctions-against-russia (accessed December 14, 2021).

[727] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, *Breakfast Meeting with a Delegation Led by U.S. House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi Hosted by Prime Minister Kishida*, August 5, 2022, https://www.mofa.go.jp/na/na1/us/page3e_001230.html (accessed December 14, 2021).

as North Korea's arms proliferation and China's assertive behavior. The United States, and particularly the Trump administration's approach to international relations and China, forced Japan to adapt its FOIP vision to address the tensions arising from deteriorating U.S.-China relations. Russia's invasion of Ukraine further reinforced Japan's FOIP-based approach and the broader trends it believes will shape the Indo-Pacific in the coming years.[728]

Today's FOIP vision is a broad framework aimed at creating a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific region by:

1) selectively addressing the rise of China;

2) deeply integrating Japan into the political economy and rule-making process of the Indo-Pacific region;

3) strengthening the Japan-U.S. alliance and strengthening the U.S. position in the region;

4) diversifying and deepening strategic partnerships.

Cooperation within the FOIP continues to be institutional in nature, as evidenced by the BDN, RSCI, Quad, infrastructure and connectivity cooperation in third countries, and Japan's participation in multilateral free trade agreements, which are not limited to China. Japan's approach to the Indo-Pacific region follows neither the logic of neorealism nor liberal institutionalism; rather, Japan pursues a hybrid approach of hedging and engaging to secure its interests in the Indo-Pacific.

### 6.3. Directions of Australia's security policy in the Indo-Pacific region

Recent years have accelerated a shift in the Australian government's perception of the international environment, primarily in terms of deteriorating relations with China and its assessment of the security environment, as reflected in recent documents *(Defense Strategic Review 2023, National Defence Strategy 2024, Whole of Nation Approach to International Policy 2024).*[729] From Australia's perspective, the trends observed in the second decade of the 21st century have rapidly accelerated, forcing changes to the country's existing security strategy and influencing its international actions. In this light, the Indo-Pacific region has become a point of reference for Australia, replacing the term "Asia-Pacific," which dominated just a decade ago.

[728] M. Iishi, The Lessons of the Ukraine War for the Indo-Pacific Region: A Preview of, Rather Than a Change in, What We Will Face in 10–15 Years, "AJISS-Commentary", August 31, 2022, https://www.jiia.or.jp/en/ajiss_commentary/the-lessons-ofthe-ukraine-war-for-the-indo-pacific-region.html (accessed December 14, 2021).

[729] Department of Defence, Australia, Defence Strategic Review 2023, https://www.defence.gov.au/about/reviews-inquiries/defence-strategic-review (accessed September 23, 2024); Department of Defence, Australia, National Defence Strategy 2024, https://www.defence.gov.au/about/strategic-planning/2024-national-defence-strategy-2024-integrated-investment-program (accessed September 23, 2024); Whole-of-Nation Approach to International Policy 2024, https://asiapacific4d.com/idea/whole-of-nation/ (accessed September 23, 2024).

This difference is not merely semantic; it represents a shift in the approach to Australia's position in the region.[730] The shift toward Asia and the Pacific began in the 1980s and underscored the importance of the then-ruling Labor Party's efforts to promote multilateralism and build regional institutions geared toward "Pacific" states, as well as its efforts to include mainland China in these regional processes. The development of economic interdependence with China was crucial, both for Australia's economy and for strengthening the economic transformation in the People's Republic of China. Furthermore, the end of the Cold War initially fostered the expansion of multilateral structures within the framework of open regionalism.[731] However, since the second half of the 1990s, new challenges and threats have emerged, forcing ad hoc adjustments to existing policies (e.g., illegal immigration, terrorism, changes in China's policy, and the instability of South Pacific states). Therefore, the current adoption of the term "Indo-Pacific" as the primary reference point can be viewed as a practical, but also symbolic, shift in approach to Australia's immediate and extended international environment. In Australia's case, the key to assessing the country's strategic situation lies in its history and geography. From this perspective, Australia remains somewhat isolated and distinct from its neighboring countries. In civilizational and cultural terms, Australia belongs to the West, with historically strong ties to Great Britain and later the United States.[732]

Its distinctness from countries such as Southeast Asia or the South Pacific generated a specific regional perception. During World War II, Australia faced the only real threat of direct military action from the Japanese Empire, which deepened the sense of threat emanating from the north. In the face of a potential adversary, the view that Australia needed support from a stronger ally persisted, as it lacked the resources to counteract military threats. In the case of the small island states of the South Pacific, Australia could pursue a "superpower" policy, possessing the necessary resources to play a leading role in the region: politically, economically, and militarily. This approach to its immediate surroundings (the so-called arc of instability) began to evolve in the 1980s, when efforts were made to reshape Australia's position as a stabilizing force in the regional order and to prioritize the development of regional cooperation as crucial to the expansion of the Australian economy, which was largely dependent on the export of natural and agricultural resources.[733] Here, China became one of the main export destinations. On the other hand, previous security experience reinforced the emphasis on cooperation and multilateralism, which was reflected in the acceptance

[730] K. He, H. Feng, The Institutionalization of the Indo-Pacific: Problems and Prospects, "International Affairs", Vol. 96, No. 1, 2020, pp. 149–168; D. Scott, Australia's Embrace of the 'Indo-Pacific': New Term, New Region, New Strategy?, "International Relations of the Asia-Pacific", Vol. 13, No. 3, 2013.
[731] Ł. Fijałkowski, Australia – Awans do statusu mocarstwa regionalnego, [in:] Region Azji i Pacyfiku w latach 1985–2015, ed. A. Jarczewska, J. Zajączkowski, Warszawa 2016, pp. 303–308.
[732] M.R. Watson, Australia and the Quad: A Watering Can or a Hammer?, The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR), https://www.nbr.org/publication/australia-and-the-quad-a-watering-can-or-a-hammer/ (accessed September 23, 2024).
[733] Ł. Fijałkowski, *Australia – Awans do statusu…*

of the position that "one cannot realistically expect to be able to defend the homeland alone and without allies against a great power." The expansion of multilateral institutions and bilateral agreements was consistent with these goals: it allowed for economic development and increased the level of national security.

As a regional "middle power," Australia is strongly linked to the global order that emerged after World War II, with the United States playing a central role. After the end of the Cold War, this approach intensified, leading to the country's role as a "deputy sheriff" in the region during the administration of Prime Minister John Howard, engaging in stabilization efforts in the face of the crisis in East Timor and the Pacific island states.[734] This aligns with the tradition of not only establishing close relations with the dominant Western power in the region (initially, of course, Great Britain), but also supporting its actions (from the Boer War to American actions in Afghanistan). In this respect, Australia aligns with the tradition of acting as a "dependent ally," supporting the actions of a stronger ally. On the other hand, benefiting economically and politically from the liberal order sustained by the dominant position of the United States, Australia's actions can also be considered in terms of the concept of a "middle power."[735] Hence, since the 1980s, Australia has been actively involved in the creation of regional institutions for economic cooperation (e.g., APEC) and security (ARF). It has also undertaken activities supporting democratization and human rights.[736] Nevertheless, there is a noticeable ambiguity in Australia's policy, as in areas where the protection of Australia's own interests and security is at stake, actions are taken that contradict its declared values. Examples include the policy against illegal immigration, which has generated much controversy, particularly among human rights organizations, and the readiness to use military force in the face of a crisis that could threaten Australia's security (e.g., the crisis in East Timor).[737] This kind of gap between “liberal” rhetoric and “realistic” actions may also result from existing “pragmatic” policies focused on immediate benefits and short-term goals.[738] Elements of this approach can be seen in policy towards China, where economic interests have so far prevailed over other concerns. The traditional commitment to cooperation with other countries and multilateralism is finally being reflected in deteriorating relations with China and threats to the "liberal regional order," which poses a significant challenge to Australia and its international position.

[734] W. Tow, Deputy sheriff or independent ally? Evolving Australian-American ties in an ambiguous world order, "The Pacific Review", Vol. 17, No. 2, 2004, pp. 271–290.
[735] S. Teo, Middle Power Identities of Australia and South Korea: Comparing the Kevin Rudd/Julia Gillard and Lee Myung-bak Administrations, "The Pacific Review", Vol. 31, No. 2, 2018, pp. 221–239; B. Taylor, Is Australia’s Indo-Pacific strategy an Illusion?, "International Affairs", Vol. 96, No. 1, 2020, pp. 96–99.
[736] Ł. Fijałkowski, Regionalny wymiar bezpieczeństwa w Azji Południowo-Wschodniej. Normy – instytucje – ład regionalny, Wrocław 2010.
[737] G. Abbondanza, Australia the ‘Good International Citizen’? The Limits of a Traditional Middle Power, "Australian Journal of International Relations", Vol. 75, No. 2, 2021, pp. 178–196.
[738] B. Taylor, Is Australia’s Indo-Pacific Strategy an Illusion?, "International Affairs", Vol. 96, No. 1, 2020, pp. 96–99.

Faced with the insufficient potential of multilateral institutions in the region (limitations related to ASEAN's central position, and, on the other hand, their weakening role due to Sino-American rivalry), Australia, in addition to maintaining and developing bilateral relations (traditionally with the US and the UK, but also with Japan), has moved towards minilateralism, i.e., fostering cooperation within a smaller group of states with limited goals compared to traditional multilateralism.[739] The Quad and Aukus are examples of such institutions, illustrating the growing challenges facing Australia's security policy. These challenges stem from the limitations encountered in implementing the current strategy based on multilateralism and the promotion of regional institutions, while China's policies, which undermine the existing regional and international order, favorable to Australia, emerge as a potentially major challenge.[740] In this situation, Canberra's perspective differs from that of many countries, such as those in Southeast Asia, which are not interested in a decisive policy aimed at containing or limiting China (of course, the interests of individual countries are decisive here, and, for example, Vietnam or the Philippines are in a less favorable position vis-à-vis China than, for example, Indonesia). In this situation, the shift toward a smaller format of cooperation and the problems associated with it can be illustrated by the history of the Quad to date. Australia was one of the countries behind the collapse of the original initiative, presented by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2007, only to actively engage in the so-called Quad 2.0 a decade later, seeing in it the potential to find partners against China's increasingly assertive policies.

This time, Australia actively joined in supporting the Indo-Pacific idea, promoted at the time by the US administration of Donald Trump. This idea was intended to encompass cooperation among democratic states aimed at containing China, although this was usually not explicitly stated. This very point was the keystone in the formation of a potentially new institution, while simultaneously highlighting the differences between states. In the new international configuration, India, in particular, was wary of reinforcing the impression that a "quasi" alliance aimed at China was forming. On the other hand, countries such as the US and Australia were keen to increase cooperation with India, undoubtedly the leading regional power in the Indian Ocean region.[741] The new format, even if not explicitly, had to implicitly address the challenge China posed to the existing regional order. This approach also addresses the hopes placed in it by the United States and, indirectly, Australia and Japan. Nevertheless, the Quad not only had to contend with the potential for antagonizing China (which, however, most states did not want), but also with the format's

[739] N. Bisley, The Quad, AUKUS and Australian Security Minilateralism: China's Rise and New Approaches to Security Cooperation, "Journal of Contemporary China", 2024.
[740] National Defence Strategy 2024.
[741] L.-H. Chan, P.K. Lee, Quad 2.0 in flux, how possible? A study of India's changing 'significant other', "Australian Journal of International Affairs", Vol. 77, No. 5, 2023, pp. 483–508.

positioning within the existing network of regional institutions, generally based on ASEAN's central position.[742] Since the 1990s, ASEAN, by bringing together the region's weaker states lacking the ambition (or capacity) to dominate, has served as an institutional anchor for various initiatives, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum. Hence, member states began to express concerns that the existing formula of cooperation, which declaratively emphasized principles such as sovereignty, non-interference in states' internal affairs, consensus (i.e., the so-called ASEAN way), and the importance of the organization's neutrality, would be undermined by the Quad and its "anti-China" character, further destabilizing the entire region.[743] Additionally, the events of the COVID-19 pandemic have redirected Quad countries' efforts toward activities such as vaccine distribution, reinforcing the format's trend toward cooperation around "soft" security issues. This can also be seen on the Australian side, where instead of referring to the Quad's expanded name as the "Quadrilateral Security Dialogue," the official emphasis has shifted to stating that the Quad is "a diplomatic partnership between Australia, India, Japan, and the United States, dedicated to supporting an open, stable, and developing Indo-Pacific that remains inclusive and resilient." This is further emphasizing that the partnership is formally known as the Quad, not the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, "emphasizing the diplomatic, rather than security-oriented, nature of the partnership."

Nevertheless, for Australia, the Quad was an important element of activities related to strengthening the common interests of the countries involved in the project, i.e., supporting and maintaining the so-called rules-based international order; maintaining the American presence in the region; deepening mutual relations between Australia and the two main Asian powers (Japan and India); and was also intended to be a signal to China about the possibilities of cooperation between countries that are not necessarily enthusiastic about Beijing's policies in the region.[744]

### 6.4. Historical conditions of Japanese-Australian political and trade relations

Australia had trade links with Japan as early as the 19th and early 20th centuries. However, Japanese aggression and World War II, particularly the raids on Darwin, ultimately dashed any prospects for mutual cooperation. After World War II, cooperation was gradually revived, but this was neither easy nor quick. The concept of J. Crawford's thinking was revived, as embodied in the 1938 papers of the Australian Institute of Political Science. The theme of Crawford's speech was

[742] K. Koga, *Institutional Dilemma: Quad and ASEAN in the Indo-Pacific*, "Asian Perspective", Vol. 47, No. 1, 2023, pp. 27–48.
[743] S. Seah, *ASEAN and the Quad Inch Closer Together*, "Foreign Policy", https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/05/24/quad-asean-southeast-asia-china-geopolitics-indo-pacific/ (accessed October 4, 2024).
[744] A. Milner, *A Less Muscular Quad is Evolving*, https://aei.um.edu.my/a-less-muscular-quad-is-evolving (accessed October 3, 2024).

titled "Economic Appeasement," and it called for industrialization and a return to the political direction of establishing cooperation with Japan.[745]

Following the American occupation and Japan's regaining of sovereignty at the San Francisco Peace Conference in 1951, Australian-Japanese relations gradually recovered, particularly for economic reasons.[746] The development of the Japanese economy forced an acceleration of political efforts to improve mutual relations. In the six years from World War II to 1951, Australia's attitude toward Japan changed radically. Immediately after the war, Japan became a country whose problems needed solving. Although Australia supported the American occupation of Japan and the sweeping changes in Japanese policy, demands were made for economic and military reforms. Parties in Australia disagreed on the solution to these problems. Despite the difficulties in resolving Japanese problems, within six years Australia shifted from a repressive policy toward Japan to a liberal one. It is worth noting that, diplomatically, the trilateral ANZUS Pacific Security Treaty of September 1, 1951, was the foundation and a greater guarantee of Australia's security than the peace treaty with Japan concluded on September 8, 1951.[747]

From 1945 to 1951, Australia refrained from exerting direct influence on Japan due to the American occupation. Only the 1951 ANZUS Pact and the peace treaty with Japan combined to offer greater value to Australians. For Australia, signing the ANZUS Pact marked the proper establishment of contacts with Japan. Japan was an important country in Asia, and the United States and Australia wanted to grant it sovereignty and freedom. The strategy was to align Japan with the Western world and tilt the balance of responsibility for world peace toward the "West." The effects of this concept were evident in the September 1951 peace treaty, economic aid, and industrial renewal. It should be concluded that Australia likely would not have placed such emphasis on the ANZUS Pact if it had turned out that Japan was the only threat in that region. The ANZUS Pact protected not only a potential threat from Japan, but also from communist states. However, the mere existence of a Soviet threat did not provide a sufficient explanation for Australia's policy towards Japan. If Australia were fully convinced that the Russians and Japanese posed a comparable threat in the Pacific, then actions would have been taken to simultaneously defend against both threats. However, this was a policy of reconciling relations with Japan. This change in attitude towards Japan, whose intentions had been aggressive in the past, cannot be explained solely by Japan's role as a pacifier against the emerging communist threat. When analyzing Australia's attitude toward Japan, it's important to consider the full context of events. Part of the shift in attitude toward Japan stems

[745] J. Crawford, S. Okita, *Australia and Japan Issues in the Economic Relationship*, Canberra–Tokyo 1979.

[746] C. Anderson, *Krótka historia Japonii*, Warszawa 2004, p. 108.

[747] J. Lencznarowicz, *Australia*, Warszawa 2005, p. 288.

from Australia's assessment of the future threat in the Pacific. Against this backdrop, the new approach to the Japanese can be understood. Another incentive for Australia to change its policy toward Japan came from the information that Japan was a devastated, underarmed country, whose economy did not allow for the introduction of new weapons.

Japan, therefore, did not emerge as a significant threat to Australia after World War II. The threat posed by Japan, compared to that posed by communist countries, was small. Security experts and academics noted that the potential threat from Japan was insignificant. Therefore, according to Professor Fitzgerald, a return to aggression was impossible in the postwar period. Of course, it must not be forgotten that with a union with the USSR, Japan could once again pose a threat. The development of Australian-Japanese trade relations would have been impossible without the creation of favorable political conditions. These were established after the signing of the peace treaty in 1951 and the subsequent official resumption of diplomatic relations between Australia and Japan. Australians understood that (as Crawford had argued in 1938) Japanese industry presented an opportunity for the development of the Australian economy. This perspective was particularly hampered by earlier Australian reactions to the effects of Japanese military actions, especially after the revelation of World War II crimes. The Japanese were well aware that the Australians would need more time to build new trade relations with the Japanese. This is confirmed in the memoirs of Australian Prime Minister R. Menzis.[748]

The signing of the peace treaty with Japan on September 8, 1951, Menzis recalls, was viewed in Australia as a guarantee of future peace in that region. Australia was one of the countries demanding a "hard peace" that would have prohibited Japanese rearmament and severely limited its production capacity in several important industries.[749] On the one hand, an agreement was signed to station American troops in Japan, and on the other, a developing Japan was no longer within the orbit of communist states. These two factors led to more secure peace guarantees with Japan. The pact of September 8, 1951, provided opportunities for building and developing future trade relations.[750] Senior Japanese officials were positive about restoring normal and friendly relations with other countries, but in the case of Australia, the question was constantly asked: "Are Australians afraid of the Japanese?" The government in Canberra was divided between those who saw Australians' reluctance to cooperate with Japan and those who saw the future of the Australian textile

[748] R. Menzies, *The Measure of the Years*, Sydney 1970, pp. 44–65.

[749] National Archives of Australia (NAA), A1838, 479/2/5, *Most-Favoured Nation Treatment for Japan (1948–1951)*; NAA, A1838, 536/3/1, *Comments of Other Departments on Draft Policy Papers*.

[750] R. Menzies, *op. cit.*, pp. 49–50.

industry in cooperation with Japan.[751] Although Australia had concluded a peace treaty that allowed for the expansion of trade, the Australian opposition did not yet intend to encourage the import of Japanese goods. Therefore, the Australian government still had to overcome difficult opposition pressures regarding trade with Japan. Gradually, however, the opposition allowed for an increase in Japanese imports, primarily in manufactured goods.

Despite the real danger posed by Japan's closer ties with China, the concept of adopting a more liberal policy towards Japan was reluctantly accepted in Australia. It was believed that more developed trade relations should be established with Great Britain and the United States. On the other hand, other parliamentary groups believed that closer cooperation with Japan through trade liberalization could ensure more lasting relations for the next few years. It was also noted that a potential reduction in Japanese demand for Australian wool could have negative consequences for the Australian economy. It was therefore suggested that Australia, following the example of Canada and New Zealand, should ensure the protection of Australian industry in bilateral agreements. Political and economic aspects were therefore taken into account, and these were incorporated into government decisions in August 1954. This did not yet constitute a commitment by Australia to initiate trade talks with Japan, but was intended to prevent the formation of an alliance between Japan and communist China. Australian policy took into account the possibility of Japan establishing trade links with China, especially since in 1952, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Trade and Industry, Takahashi Ryutaro, told the Americans that regaining Japan's traditional market in China was its natural goal. He therefore argued that such actions should not be feared unless the global situation changed drastically. The signing of the peace treaty with Japan did not immediately lead to an expansion of bilateral trade with Australia, as restrictions on Japanese imports continued. At the time, Australia faced a second problem: Japan’s military aggressiveness. The aim was to reduce Japan’s aggressiveness by granting it greater freedom of trade and enabling it to achieve a higher level of industrialization.

The peace agreement with Japan was delayed due to the Australian public's memory of World War II. Alan Watt recalls that after the war, in 1951, R. Casey, as Australia's external affairs representative, traveled with J. McEwen to Southeast Asia. During his tour of Japan and Korea, Casey heard a statement that Australia would forget the war if the Japanese demonstrated not only in words but in deeds that they had broken the imperialist tradition of Japanese military aggression. When this happened, Australia would appreciate it and "meet Japan halfway."[752]

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[751] *Facing North: A Century of Australian Engagement with Asia*, Vol. 1: *1901 to the 1970s*, ed. D. Goldsworthy, Melbourne 2001, p. 231.

[752] P. Robinson, *Australia-Japanese Relations*, in: *Japan and Australia in the Seventies*, ed. A.A. Stockwin, Sydney 1972, p. 162.

The reconstruction of economic relations began in 1954, when a more pragmatic relationship between Australia and Japan emerged. From 1955, the Australian government, for the national good, was determined to normalize relations with Japan. Australia helped Japan join the United Nations on December 18, 1956, and supported its entry into the UN Secretariat in October 1957. The Australian Ministry of External Affairs implemented these significant changes with public approval.[753] Immediately after World War II, Australia's relations with Japan were limited to trade contacts between the Australian government and the SCAP (Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan), specifically through the office responsible for liaison with the Allies. Transactions were limited to the sale of wool and the purchase of raw materials, silk fiber, and other fibers for textiles. After World War II, the Australian government discriminated against Japan in trade matters. The reasons for this discrimination were, first, antipathy toward Japan caused by wartime events; second, fear of Japanese economic competition with Australian manufacturers; and third, preference for trade with Great Britain. The Australian government feared competition for the established position of British goods, particularly textiles. Despite its declared policy of adhering to the existing principles of trade restrictions, in mid-1947 the possibility of trade cooperation with Japan was declared. The Australian government noted that other countries were already planning to establish trade relations with Japan. The United States and Great Britain, already heavily involved in the process, were particularly interested in this type of relationship. On August 15, 1947, Japan was formally open to trade between private entrepreneurs.

The Japanese side expressed a conviction expressed in the slogan "export or die." The motivation for establishing contacts was pragmatic, believing that Australian businessmen would suffer too much without these trade links. The Sterling Payments Agreement of 1947 and 1948, which addressed the method of payment settlement, practically opened the door to trade between the two countries. From the outset, trade was based on Australian staple agricultural products, which were exchanged for Japanese products. This was primarily wool exports, which increased significantly between 1948 and 1950. This period paved the way for trade with Japan, and Australia became a major exporter to that country. H. Evatt expressed the view that trade should not be developed at such an early stage due to the lack of a signed peace treaty.[754]

Before the peace treaty was signed, Australia was concerned with Japan's trading status and sought to ensure that Japan would not be subjected to excessive trade discrimination. British policy

[753] NAA, CRS, A 1838/278, file no. 3103/10/1 pt 4, Letter from Arthur Tange to Alan Watt, 10 April 1956.

[754] The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, *Japan's Economy: Implications for Australia* (Report 1 of the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee), Canberra 2000, p. 94.

on this issue was favorable. Some, however, such as F. Daly of the Australian Labor Party, opposed the resumption of trade with Japan, arguing that it would ruin Australian industry.[755]

Australia, with the support of the United States, secured its political security, which indirectly contributed to the delay in establishing closer economic relations with Japan. In today's assessment, it can be emphasized that Australian policy was unnecessarily entrenched in suspicion of Japan after World War II. Professor N. Viviani stated that two issues constantly weighed on Australia's foreign policy after World War II: first, maintaining positive relations with the United States, and second, maintaining Australia's positive diplomatic interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Although the global situation changed after World War II, the United States and Asia remained important to Australia. A characteristic feature of Australian diplomacy after the war was its monitoring and following the United States' actions. Australia's use of the "emergency exit" with Japan between 1952 and 1957 was too late, but understandable in the context of American conduct towards Japan. The formal establishment of diplomatic relations with Japan took place in February 1952. From that time on, broader trade relations with Japan also began. However, Australia's political intentions towards Japan were not clearly defined until August 1954.

### 6.5. Australian security policy – international conditions

The Indo-Pacific perspective is linked to the perception of changes occurring in Australia's immediate environment, which are undoubtedly perceived as negative and posing significant challenges. Here, China is emerging as the primary state whose actions are disrupting the existing international order. Australia is facing the most challenging strategic environment since World War II, and time to take action is running out.

The international environment is further exacerbated by the growing rivalry between the US and China. China impacts Australia militarily and non-militarily, including economically and diplomatically, and is accompanied by an unprecedented arms race in the region. This situation is reinforced by China's growing strategic and economic position, while simultaneously employing force-based tactics to pursue its objectives, including territorial disputes and incidents at sea and in the air.[756] In this regard, Australia's situation is paradoxical, as it must grapple with a growing sense of strategic uncertainty, while at the same time, it continues to face strong economic interdependence. Nevertheless, China's actions in the South Pacific and the agreement it signed with the Solomon Islands government in 2022 have become a wake-up call for Australia. While the situation in the South China Sea, for example, indirectly affects Australia—it officially supports a stance on freedom of navigation, bearing in mind its commercial interests—China's actions in the

[755] *Facing North – A Century...*, p. 226.

[756] Defence Strategic Review 2023.

South Pacific affect areas traditionally perceived by Canberra as its sphere of influence and security. Hence the government's nervous reaction and internal debate regarding the flaws in its current policy towards these countries, potentially leading to a loss of its role as a local hegemon and stabilizer.[757]

The crisis surrounding the Solomon Islands has also highlighted China's growing ambitions and its maritime potential, which has further impacted Australia's need to modernize its armed forces, particularly its crucial navy and air force, essential both for power projection in the region and for rescue operations in the face of natural disasters. Climate issues are a significant challenge, increasingly viewed through a security lens. From Australia's perspective, they are crucial given that the extraction and export of fossil fuels, as well as agriculture (cereal cultivation and livestock), are key components of the economy. Therefore, on the one hand, the need for changes in the current economic model is emphasized, as are the adaptation of individual sectors of the economy to the new situation. On the other hand, these changes are still slow, and the discussion surrounding them is periodically intensified by events such as the catastrophic bushfires in 2019 (the so-called Black Summer). This latest event, in particular, has reinforced the view that we must prepare for further catastrophic events resulting from the climate crisis. The fires that periodically affect certain regions of Australia have reached such a scale that it has been necessary to involve the military to evacuate the threatened population and have resulted in huge economic costs.[758]

Another noticeable thread emerging in the security debate is Australia's international position. This concerns both the role Australia is playing and will play in the region in the future, as well as the shift in its strategic perception, shifting from positioning itself as a country located in the Asia-Pacific region to that of an Indo-Pacific middle power. In this latter regard, there is a noticeable debate in Australia about what fulfilling the role of a "middle power" means for the country (it is also linked to the concept of a "rules-based international order"), as well as the recognition that Australia should utilize its geographical location more sustainably, both strategically and, above all, economically. It is emphasized here that Australia's policy to date has been dominated by the Pacific dimension, underutilizing its access to the Indian Ocean. This shift is also intended to translate into a greater appreciation of the western half of Australia, as previously the eastern, Pacific coast of the country has been dominated.[759]

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[757] A. Powles, "Geopolitical Duel in the Pacific: Solomon Islands Security at Risk as Australia and China Compete," The Interpreter, Lowy Institute, 5 October 2024, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/geopolitical-duel-pacific-solomon-islands-security-risk-australia-china-compete (accessed October 5 2024).

[758] T. Ide, "Climate Change and Australia's National Security," Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 77, no. 1, 2023, pp. 26–44; M. McDonald, "The Failed Securitization of Climate Change in Australia," Australian Journal of Political Science, vol. 47, no. 4, 2012, pp. 579–592.

[759] R. Medcalf, "In Defence of the Indo-Pacific: Australia's New Strategic Map," *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 68, no. 4, 2014, pp. 470–483.

At this point, it's noticeable that Australia's stance on the broader international environment has evolved significantly over recent decades: from perceiving it as a source of threats, through supporting the development of a Pacific community, to developing the Indo-Pacific region and a renewed awareness of growing instability and risk. Hence, alongside the traditional pursuit of closer cooperation with a strategic ally (the United States) and strengthening bilateral ties (e.g., Japan), there has been a shift toward "minilateralism." Here, alongside the Quad (which is increasingly perceived as an element of diplomatic cooperation), the AUKUS format, focused on strictly military cooperation, has gained importance. It brings together Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and is based on Australia's desire to acquire military capabilities in the area of nuclear submarines.[760] At the time of signing the agreement, Australia terminated the existing contract for the supply of submarines with France (which temporarily worsened the mutual relations between these countries),[761] emphasizing the role that relations with the two Anglo-Saxon powers play in Australian policy.

The rise of China remains the greatest security challenge for Australia, which remains torn between security concerns and economic interdependence. The perspective adopted and reflected in official documents is a rapidly deteriorating security situation in the region.[762] This feeling is reinforced by instances of Chinese interference in Australian domestic politics and economics. More broadly, tensions surrounding Taiwan negatively impact the entire region, and therefore Australia as well. Furthermore, the situation in the South China Sea is also escalating, with incidents in various waters affecting not only other countries (the USA, the Philippines) but also Australia itself (including incidents in the Yellow Sea and the South China Sea in May 2024, and the blinding of an Australian aircraft in the Arafura Sea by a Chinese warship in 2022).[763] The situation, in which important maritime transport routes run through the South China Sea, impacts not only Australia's security but also its economy. Furthermore, the aforementioned Chinese actions within the South Pacific island nations also contribute to a growing sense of insecurity. Ultimately, the deterioration in bilateral relations between the two countries led to Beijing imposing sanctions on Australia in 2020, directly demonstrating the problem of the Australian economy's excessive ties to this superpower.[764] All of this leads to a negative assessment of the direction of international developments and highlights the urgent need to adapt to them through appropriate changes in the

[760] B. O'Connor, L. Cox, D. Cooper, "Australia's AUKUS 'Bet' on the United States: Nuclear-Powered Submarines and the Future of American Democracy," *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 77, no. 1, 2023, pp. 45–64.
[761] E. Staunton, B. Day, "Australia-France Relations After AUKUS: Macron, Morrison and Trust in International Relations," *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 77, no. 1, 2023, pp. 11–18.
[762] A. Korolev, "Transition from Hedging to Balancing in Australia's China Policy: Theoretical and Empirical Explorations," *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 77, no. 5, 2023, pp. 548–568.
[763] J.F. Bradford, R. Emmers, "Why the Quad Is Not Squaring Off in the South China Sea: Evaluating Interests, Objectives and Capacity," *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 78, no. 1, 2024, pp. 1–21.
[764] A. Korolev, *op. cit.*

strategic approach. In response to these recent developments, the Labor government has adopted a plan for a comprehensive overhaul of the way security issues are addressed by state institutions, together with the engagement of society as a whole, reflected in the concept of a "whole-of-nation" approach.[765] This approach is to be based on the mass mobilization of national resources to achieve foreign policy goals and not be limited solely to increased cooperation within government agencies and institutions (whole-of-government). The need for a shift in the approach to defense was also highlighted, emphasizing that the current Defense of Australia doctrine, based on deterrence and responding to potential low-intensity threats from smaller states, no longer meets the current international environment. Therefore, National Defense is to focus on defending the state against potential threats in the region, taking into account the "whole-of-government" and "whole-of-nation" approach to security. This, however, requires a more active policy to maintain the regional balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, deepen diplomatic ties, and enhance defense capabilities aimed at deterrence and reducing the risk of conflict.[766] The adoption of this new approach comes amidst an ongoing debate on the seriousness of challenges and threats, not only politically (criticism from the opposition) but also among experts and academics specializing in international relations and security. The question at stake here is not so much whether the government is taking the right actions, but whether it is responding quickly enough to changing conditions, given that numerous investments, for example in the military sphere, will bear fruit over a period of decades. The scale of action and the fluidity and vagueness of concepts such as "whole-of-government" and "whole-of-nation" are also being discussed.[767] Recent years have seen a surge in popularity of the term "Indo-Pacific," signaling the depth and speed of change taking place in the region amidst growing US-China rivalry and the growing ambitions of other regional powers. A number of countries must adapt to new conditions, adapting their national strategies to the challenges emerging in their immediate environment. Australia is no exception, with the ongoing changes—as emphasized—characterized by high dynamism and speed. In this context, Australia has been modifying its strategic assessment in recent years, taking steps to adapt to the situation and maintain the current, favorable international order. China and its policies have emerged as a major strategic challenge, particularly given the complex nature of the interdependence between Canberra and Beijing. Nevertheless, Australia is supplementing its engagement in multilateral institutions in the region with new minilateral

[765] "Global Uncertainty Necessitates a Whole-of-Nation Approach to Foreign Policy," *Australian Outlook*, Australian Institute of International Affairs, October 5, 2024, https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/global-uncertainty-necessitates-a-whole-of-nation-approach-to-foreign-policy/ (accessed October 5, 2024).
[766] *Defence Strategic Review 2023.*
[767] M. Ryan, "Australia's New National Defence Strategy: Mostly Continuity but with Some Change," *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, May 3, 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/australias-new-national-defence-strategy-mostly-continuity-some-change (accessed October 6, 2024); "Australia's New Defense Strategy Already Behind the Times," *Asia Times*, April 2024, https://asiatimes.com/2024/04/australias-new-defense-strategy-already-behind-the-times/ (accessed October 6, 2024).

formats (Quad, Aukus) and expanding bilateral cooperation. However, China does not address all contemporary security challenges facing Australia, hence the shift in the country's current defense vision and security strategy to an approach that engages not only state institutions but also the entire society (whole-of-nation). The effectiveness of this approach, and its underlying content, will become clear in the coming years.

In Australian discourse on threats to national security, the issue of China has been a recurring theme in recent years, but not the only one. What seems to be becoming apparent now is the scale of the challenges facing Australia, its authorities and institutions, and society as a whole, related to the rapid pace of negative change.[768] Domestic issues are noticeably intertwined with international problems. In this respect, one of the more traditional themes is the issue of illegal migration, or more broadly, migration policy. Virtually all governments have supported efforts to discourage and hinder illegal entry into Australia, engaging in activities widely criticized by human rights organizations. Another issue that has become prominent, along with deteriorating relations with China, is the issue of industrial espionage.

### 6.6. Development of bilateral relations between Japan and India

India and Japan have elevated their cordial relations to the status of a Special Strategic Partnership. This deepening of these relations has been particularly evident since 2014, when Narendra Modi was sworn in as Prime Minister of India, prompting the country to embark on a new path of consolidating regional influence and establishing itself as a regional power in the face of China's rising power and the region's transformation. India has a strong interest in deepening its special partnership with Japan, one that not only allows India to participate in the regional strategic and security architecture but also does not restrict India's autonomy. This article, through an analysis of India's strategy towards Japan, security agreements, and infrastructure agreements, particularly since 2014, seeks to discuss how India's foreign policy towards Japan has evolved to allow for a greater role in Asia, and what factors led to these changes in India's policy towards Japan.[769] A realistic perspective on the balance of power in the context of China's rising power, as well as a constructivist perspective on India's principle of non-alignment (despite strategic friendships), formed the basis of India's policy towards Japan under the Modi government, aimed at pursuing and promoting a greater Indian presence in the geopolitical and geostrategic spheres.

India, the world's largest democracy, has actively maintained cordial relations with Japan, primarily since the early 2000s. Although their relationship was initially based primarily on official development assistance (ODA) and foreign direct investment (FDI), it evolved into a strategic

[768] A. Milner, "A Less Muscular Quad Is Evolving," https://aei.um.edu.my/a-less-muscular-quad-is-evolving (accessed October 3, 2024).
[769] Lynch, T.H., & Przystup, J.J. (2017). *India-Japan Strategic Cooperation and Implications for U.S. Strategy in the Indo-Asia-Pacific Region*. Institute for National Strategic Studies Strategic Perspectives, No. 24.

partnership extending beyond the realm of measurable indicators of economic progress. Currently, the dynamics and direction of India's policy toward Japan can be assessed through the triad of attractiveness of India's political values,[770] diplomatic ideals, and foreign policy initiatives toward Japan as a strategic partner.[771] This is clearly reflected in India's growing sympathy for Japan, expressed in numerous agreements and initiatives signed between the two countries, as well as in the increased commitment to the defense and security of these initiatives, reflecting the close relationship between Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Prime Minister Narendra Modi since 2014. Indian Prime Minister Modi chose to visit Japan first outside India's immediate neighborhood, due to his close relationship with his Japanese counterpart, Prime Minister Abe, since 2002, when Modi was Chief Minister of Gujarat. Japan became the largest donor of official development assistance (ODA) to India in 2017, reaching over $2 billion, with the majority of the funds allocated to social and economic infrastructure. One of the key factors driving the growing momentum of the India-Japan partnership is the strong bond between the leaders of both countries: Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who won a second term in 2019 with an even larger margin, and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe, who is actively aligning Japan's Indo-Pacific development strategy with India's "Look East" policy. A significant factor in assessing India's policy towards Japan is China's growing regional influence in the fields of defense, security, economics, and politics. Beijing has consistently strengthened its position in the Indian Ocean region, which is a matter of serious concern for New Delhi.[772] India responded to China's growing assertiveness by forging a deeper partnership with Japan, both within and beyond its borders. The second factor is India's long-standing nonalignment ideal, which has guided India's foreign policy for decades. However, regional transformations and security challenges near land and sea have led India to reconsider the ideals underlying its decision-making and diplomacy by strengthening its friendships with countries like Japan. It is interesting to see how India's foreign policy towards Japan has changed since 2014 under Prime Minister Modi, given China's growing influence, and how India has responded to these regional transformations by forging a partnership with Japan, given the constraints imposed by the nonalignment ideal in foreign policy. Analyzing India's Japanese diplomacy from an economic, political, and strategic perspective, along with India's diplomatic ideals as a factor, helps us assess the fundamental importance of the India-Japan relationship. India's policy towards Japan, a confluence of geoeconomic, geopolitical, and geostrategic factors, has been shaped by China's assertive stance on the Indian subcontinent and

[770] "Governance in the Asia-Pacific: Politics, Economics, Business, and Environment," November 30–December 1, 2019.
[771] P. Sahoo, A. Bishnoi, "Role of Japanese Official Development Assistance in Enhancing Infrastructure Development in India," *Contemporary South Asia*, vol. 24, no. 1, 2016, pp. 50–74, https://doi.org/10.1080/09584935.2015.1135307.
[772] S. Nune, "China's Cabbage Strategy in South China Sea & Implications for India," *Jagran Josh*, January 16, 2018, https://www.jagranjosh.com/current-affairs/chinas-cabbage-strategy-in-south-china-sea-implications-for-india-1516026682-1 (accessed November 29, 2018).

beyond. Japan offers India an unparalleled partnership that neither pushes for a firm, open stance toward any great power nor in any way undermines India's strategic autonomy. India's cooperation in parts of Africa, South Asia, and Iran opens up new diplomatic opportunities for India beyond its borders, allowing it to build a strong international presence and strengthen its bilateral partnership with a key country like Japan in the coming years. Rapid economic growth, resulting from political reforms, has highlighted India's importance in achieving peace and security in Asia. Indo-Japanese relations have been analyzed by scholars from various perspectives. One is the importance of Japan in India's "Look East" or "Act East" policy.[773]

It has been argued that India's leadership has sought to place Japan at the center of India's "Look East" policy through the successful conclusion of the "Special Strategic and Global Partnership" between India and Japan in September 2014. This is a result of the developing relationship between the two sides since the 2000s, rather than an independent result of India's proactive stance in the recent past in pursuing a partnership with Japan. Another aspect of previous research is the importance of the India-Japan relationship in supporting India's economic growth, security, and infrastructure over several decades.[774] Since India, Japan, and China constitute the majority of geopolitical challenges in Asia, India-Japan cooperation would not only raise India's profile as a potential economic power in the fight against China but also curb Chinese expansionist moves. India's foreign policy towards Japan has led to the launch of various infrastructure development projects, including the flagship Shinkansen project and Prime Minister Modi's industrial acceleration programs such as Make in India, Skill India, and Digital India. India's rigorous engagement with Japan and the US demonstrates the importance of the China factor in India's evolving foreign policy.[775] *(Ishibashi, 2018; Paul, 2012; Basu, 2016)* India's invitation to participate in Japan's security projects, such as those in the Andaman Islands and Northeast India, has elevated India-Japan relations to a new strategic level, going beyond the existing close economic ties.[776] (*Jain, 2018; Ahuja i in., 2018; Boon, 2016; Saint-Mézard, 2016; Chaudhuri, 2016)* The authors conclude that Modi's Indian Ocean policy is heavily dependent on Japanese support. Previous scholars have theoretically and empirically examined India-Japan relations from an Indian foreign policy perspective, primarily as a pressing need for economic development and the realization of India's security objectives. Although India has never come to the forefront in terms of its potential to become an Asian power

[773] C. Bajpaee, *Dephasing India's Look East / Act East Policy*, *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, vol. 39, no. 2, 2017, pp. 348–372, https://www.jstor.org/stable/44683773.

[774] P. Sahoo, A. Bishnoi, "Role of Japanese Official Development Assistance in Enhancing Infrastructure Development in India," *Contemporary South Asia*, vol. 24, no. 1, 2016, pp. 50–74, https://doi.org/10.1080/09584935.2015.1135307.

[775] J. M. Paul, "India–Japan Security Cooperation: A New Era of Partnership in Asia," *Maritime Affairs: Journal of the National Maritime Foundation of India*, vol. 8, no. 1, 2012, pp. 31–50, https://doi.org/10.1080/09733159.2012.690290.

[776] P. Jain, "Japan's Foreign Aid: Old and New Contests," *The Pacific Review*, vol. 29, no. 1, 2016, pp. 93–113, https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2015.1013495.

center, ongoing friction with arch-rival Pakistan, as well as the Chinese threat on land and sea, has prompted India to shift its foreign policy stance toward countries like Japan, seeking broader cooperation that goes beyond economic gains and encompasses security concerns. In this regard, there are three shortcomings in the approach and focus of the existing literature. First, existing studies have emphasized India's security needs based on the assumption that they are part of a broader framework of India-Japan bilateral economic ties, as in[777] *Jain (2018), Ahuja et al. (2016), Sahoo and Bishnoi (2016) and Garge (2016).* Fewer studies, such as Brewster's,[778] focus on India's policy toward Japan solely as an instrument for pursuing India's defense and geopolitical goals in the Asian region, given India's rise as a potential power in Asia. Second, from a theoretical perspective, existing research is relatively weak in identifying India's ideological approaches to foreign policy. The studies so far have focused on the realist and liberal perspective to analyze India's evolving foreign policy stance but not on the constructivist one,[779] *Ahuja et al. (2016), Garge (2016) and Chaudhuri (2016)* mainly focus on economic and security objectives and their arguments are more material and utilitarian in nature in their analytical approach which focuses on the material strength of the India-Japan strategic partnership. With India's growing international stature, its growing power, relative to China's growing influence in Asia, has not been addressed in the literature. Very few studies have explored how India could establish itself as a potential Asian power, leveraging the strength of Indo-Japanese ties to meet the needs of both economies and address contemporary security concerns. Realism, as a theory of international relations, views the nation-state as the center of all national decision-making. Within realist thought, the balance of power theory, which is essentially a theory of the balance between great powers, is based on the works of Thucydides, Hobbes, and Rousseau and was further developed into classical realist theory by Carr (1964) and Morgenthau (1963). This theory suggests that the possession and concentration of military and material capabilities among great powers is controlled and balanced by their efforts to survive and maintain their dominance in the international system, thereby restoring equilibrium. According to the theory, balance can be achieved by building internal military potential (when economic wealth is transformed into military power), creating balancing alliances, "shifting responsibility" for balancing to other states, etc.

India's shift toward Japan from economic progress to military-building demonstrates this realist aspect of foreign policy. This theory helps explain why China's potential competitor, India, seeks to assert its presence, particularly in the Indian Ocean region, through diplomatic actions such

[777] P. Jain, "Japan's Development Assistance to India: A Strategic Edge," *Japan Forum*, vol. 33, no. 1, 2021, pp. 1–21, https://doi.org/10.1080/09555803.2018.1530283.
[778] D. Brewster, "The India-Japan Security Relationship: An Enduring Security Partnership?," *Asian Security*, vol. 6, no. 2, 2010, pp. 95–120, https://doi.org/10.1080/14799851003756550.
[779] A. Ahuja, D. Kapur, "India's Geoeconomic Strategy," *India Review*, vol. 17, no. 1, 2018, pp. 76–99, https://doi.org/10.1080/14736489.2018.1415282.

as allying with Japan to protect its economy, security, and autonomy—all soft indicators of balancing. Moving away from the materialism underlying realism, constructivism argues that while ideas and processes define the social construction of identities and interests, these ideas and processes themselves create a structure that is ideational (not material) and influences international actors. Because identities represent an actor's understanding of who they are, which in turn signals their interests, identities constitute interests and actions. Norms are standards of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity.[780] *(Kratochwil, 1999)* These norms and principles help build the identity of the state because they become its defining feature.

India's policy is based on the principle of non-alignment, which has become a fundamental guide to India's policy towards the rest of the world and has given it the identity of a non-aligned state. Born out of the need to preserve national strategic autonomy and sovereignty during the Cold War, the principle of non-alignment as a compass of the country's foreign policy aimed to isolate the foreign policy of countries formerly affected by imperialism from two blocs: the capitalist West and the communist Soviet Union. Since then, non-alignment has become India's stance in relations with major and middle powers, aiming to maintain cordial relations with other countries without entering into formal "alliances." However, changing global power dynamics, involving the United States, middle powers like Japan and Australia, and new, emerging powers like China, have prompted India to reassess its strategy and engage more actively with countries like Japan, which face similar challenges and aspirations as a potential regional power. This theory will help examine whether India has retained its traditional ideal of non-alignment or has changed its foreign policy stance, seeking cooperation with several powers within the framework of multi-party politics.[781]

India faces a dilemma in the current active, assertive, and aggressive international political arena, which has forced India to adopt a more assertive foreign policy to assert its leadership while simultaneously securing its territory and seas. In this context, India feels compelled to cooperate with China for a number of reasons: both countries share land borders and strive to maintain their security and stability, both nations are developing rapidly, and are competing for a stronger economic and political position. Key policy actions undertaken by India with Japan's support have focused on economic development, strategic infrastructure, defense, and expanded cooperation with other countries. First, India signed the Indo-Japan Civil Nuclear Energy Agreement with Japan during Modi's visit to Japan in November 2016. India has already secured Japanese support for membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, as mentioned in the "India-Japan Vision 2025"

[780] F. V. Kratochwil, *Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs*, Cambridge, 1999.

[781] C. Bajpaee, "Dephasing India's Look East / Act East Policy," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, vol. 39, no. 2, 2017, pp. 348–372, https://www.jstor.org/stable/44683773 (accessed 13 April 2019).

statement. The agreement entered into force in July 2017, making India the first country to enter into such an agreement with Japan despite not being a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Furthermore, this came just after India was denied membership in the elite 48-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group, which controls the export of nuclear materials and technological expertise, due to China's opposition to India and support for Pakistan.[782] *(Press Trust of India, 2019)* India overcame this threat by signing a landmark agreement with Japan to secure its economic and energy needs. Second, in 2015, India opted for Japan to build its high-speed rail project, rather than China. The Japanese government was to finance 81% of the total cost through a $13.8 billion yen loan at 0.1% interest, effectively outbidding China for the same project. The project is important for Japan because it lost bids to China for similar projects in Indonesia and Thailand, so India's decision to choose Japan as a development partner was well-received in Japan. Hiroshi Hirabayashi, former Japanese ambassador to India and author of "India: The Last Superpower," stated that "India is not Indonesia or Thailand. It is a great country, completely autonomous... It does not have to succumb to Chinese pressure." India has been pushing for Japanese investment and cooperation in the geostrategic region of northeastern India, which also includes the disputed state of Arunachal Pradesh, which China claims as "Southern Tibet." Northeastern India comprises eight states, which constitute about eight percent of the country's land area. Relatively less developed economically than the rest of the country, this region holds immense geographic, political, and strategic importance for India due to its borders with Bangladesh, China, Myanmar, Nepal, and Tibet. The abundance of natural resources and the history of secessionist movements in northeastern India have made integrating and connecting the region not only with the rest of India but also with neighboring countries—Myanmar and Bangladesh—all the more important for India to spur economic development and achieve its security goals. Of the five loan agreements signed during Modi's visit to Japan in October 2018, three were for projects in the northeast region: ¥5.5 billion for the reconstruction and modernization of a hydropower plant. In Meghalaya, ¥25.5 billion was allocated for improved connectivity between Dhubri in Assam and Phulbari in Meghalaya through the construction of a 20-kilometer bridge, which will become the longest in India, and ¥12.3 billion for a sustainable forest management project in Trypur. India and Japan decided to establish the Act East Forum in September 2018 to spearhead development projects in the region and provide a platform for India-Japan cooperation under India's Act East policy and Japan's Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy. This project is part of a broader India-Japan corridor for the Indo-Pacific region, extending to East Africa as part of the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor. This is also significant given Japan's and

[782] T. H. Lynch, J. J. Przystup, "India-Japan Strategic Cooperation and Implications for U.S. Strategy in the Indo-Asia-Pacific Region," *Institute for National Strategic Studies Strategic Perspectives*, no. 24, 2017.

India's non-participation in China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Northeast India borders Bhutan, Nepal, China, Myanmar, and Bangladesh and holds significant geostrategic significance for India's connectivity with ASEAN. Another important collaboration between India and Japan is the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, an archipelago of 572 islands that constitute a key location for India in the Indian Ocean region due to its proximity to Myanmar (22 nautical miles) and Indonesia (90 nautical miles). India has partnered with Japan to build a 15-megawatt diesel power plant in South Andaman. This is one example of India's shifting foreign policy, as it rejects all offers of foreign aid to the strategic Andaman and Nicobar Islands. The meeting between Japanese Defense Ministers Itsunori Onodera and his Indian counterpart Nirmala Sitaraman, held in New Delhi on August 19-20, 2018, was crucial for two reasons. First, India agreed to begin negotiations on an ACSA (Access and Services Agreement) for its armed forces to enable the exchange of food, fuel, ammunition, and equipment. During this meeting, India also agreed to allow the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force to participate as an observer in subsequent joint U.S.-Indian air exercises aimed at curbing Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean region.[783] Internationally, India has been quick and eager to partner with Japan on key projects, such as those in Iran, Sri Lanka, and Africa (through the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor). The case of Sri Lanka is particularly interesting because it presents a competitive arena for India, as China has already taken an assertive stance on the island nation's takeover of the Hambantota port. In December 2017, Sri Lanka officially ceded its Hambantota port to China on a 99-year lease, due to the failure to repay a more than $1 billion Chinese loan for the port's construction, which proved unprofitable. This came just months after China officially opened a military base in Djibouti in August 2017. India considers Sri Lanka's strategic location to be its backyard and is concerned about China's growing influence in the region. As a result, India is seeking to counterbalance China's growing influence in Sri Lanka not only through the Trincomalee port but also through a subsequent joint development project with Japan, the Colombo port (announced on May 28, 2019), to which India allocates nearly 70% of its cargo handling business. India's recent policy towards Japan has been partly, if not largely, shaped by China's growing influence in the Indian Ocean region and abroad.[784] India has responded to subsequent disputes with China in mixed ways. A border dispute near India's northeastern borders escalated the confrontation between the two sides. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) was perceived as a real threat due to its proximity to disputed Kashmir, and India completely refused

[783] D. Jaishankar, "A Confluence of Two Strategies: The Japan–India Security Partnership in the Indo-Pacific," in: *India and Japan: Politics of South Asia*, Singapore, Springer, 2018, pp. 43–64, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-8309-9_3.

[784] V. Ayappan, "DefExpo 2018: Amphibious Aircraft US-2 to Be Made in India," *Times of India*, April 11, 2018, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/defexpo-2018-amphibious-aircraft-us-2-to-be-made-in-india/articleshow/63713866.cms (accessed April 13, 2019).

to participate in China's ambitious Belt and Road Initiative, fearing China's alleged "String of Pearls" strategy of building military bases in the Indian Ocean.[785] *(MacDonald, Donahue, Danyluk, & Hamilton, 2004)*. India's cautious response to this event was to strengthen its presence in the Indian Ocean region. A key observation regarding these events is India's foreign policy stance towards Japan, in which it found an ideal partner for economic development, a strategic partner for infrastructure projects in India and the broader Indian Ocean region and the African subcontinent, and a partner with consistent diplomatic ideals that advocate for a rules-based order in the broader Indo-Pacific region. The question that remains under scrutiny is how India has liberated or constrained itself through its non-aligned identity.

India has been wary of China's "anti-piracy" activities in the Indian Ocean since September-November 2014, when a Chinese Song-class submarine docked at the port of Colombo, Sri Lanka. Furthermore, around the same time, the number of Chinese warships approaching India's Andaman and Nicobar Islands increased—all signs that China's "String of Pearls" strategy was coming into effect. Indeed, Beijing's 2015 defense white paper emphasized that a significant presence on the "high seas" was a necessary step. In such a scenario, Japan is an ideal partner, not only for India's ambitions to expand its maritime capabilities but also for conducting joint defense and naval exercises. The 2015 Malabar exercises differed from all previous editions, which were limited solely to the US and Indian navies. Japan had just been granted observer status and was seeking full member status in the strategic naval exercises. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded, "Our position is very clear. We hope that the country in question will not provoke a confrontation and escalate tensions in the region," indicating that Beijing views the Malabar exercises as a military manifestation of a trilateral alliance between Washington, Tokyo, and New Delhi aimed at containing China. Just months before the 2015 Malabar exercises, a Chinese Yuan-class submarine was reported to have been in the Indian Ocean for a week in Karachi, Pakistan, raising concerns in India about a possible violation of its coastline. India agreed to hold the trilateral Malabar exercises from October 12-19, 2015, and for the first time included Japan as an official permanent member of the exercises. While India is not opposed to developing infrastructure in Asia for economic growth, it is certainly wary of the strategic implications of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), as it has trapped participating countries in a debt trap and disregards the territorial integrity of other countries. A policy priority of the Japan-India East Activities Forum (JIAEF) is ensuring infrastructure resilience in northeastern India through projects to improve connectivity, as well

[785] J. A. MacDonald, A. Donahue, B. Danyluk, B. A. Hamilton, *Energy Futures in Asia: Final Report*, McLean, 2004.

as technical cooperation under the "Capacity Development Project on Highways in Mountainous Regions (JIAEF, 2018)."[786]

The constant emphasis on the importance of the development and connectivity of Northeast India for India and Japan's role in this process was clearly evident in Prime Minister Modi's statement in November 2016: "The India-Japan partnership has immense substance and purpose, which rests on the strong pillars of India's Act East policy." Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar also stated that Japanese investments in the Northeast "will strengthen our Act East policy." This statement had as its backdrop India's geoeconomic and security move, when it twice refused to participate in or promote China's BRI due to increasing Chinese interference near its borders, such as the violation of Indian sovereignty due to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) passing through the disputed territory of Kashmir, as well as the growing Chinese presence in the Indian subcontinent, such as Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, etc., through infrastructure development. Another geostrategic and security-related issue was the 73-day standoff in the Doklam area between Indian and Chinese soldiers, which began in June 2017, which led the Indian Ministry of External Affairs to issue a warning: "Such construction would constitute a significant change to the status quo with serious implications for India's security." India's desire to shift India-Japan relations beyond the bilateral sphere, towards a more geostrategic, geopolitical, and geoeconomic dimension, became evident when India hosted the 12th India-Japan Summit in September 2017, just weeks after the end of the Doklam standoff, which lasted ten weeks and ended in armed conflict between India and China. In a comprehensive joint statement, India and Japan said deepening security ties was a priority and included research on unmanned ground vehicles and robotics, and the possibility of joint field exercises between their armies. Moreover, the joint infrastructure development of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands by India and Japan is not only a national economic development project financed by Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA), but also has various geostrategic objectives.[787] The Andaman and Nicobar Islands lie along the western end of the Strait of Malacca and form the entrance to the Indian Ocean. India is clearly concerned about Beijing's growing presence in the Indian Ocean region and perceives it as a threat, as illustrated by China's successful victory in internal disputes in the Maldives and its advantage in securing a 99-year lease on the Hambantota port in Sri Lanka. Furthermore, India is wary of China's discussed "string of pearls" strategy, in which ports such as those in Sri Lanka and the Maldives constitute the "pearls" surrounding the Indian Peninsula. Beyond Japan's infrastructure development on the

[786] N. Ishibashi, "Japan's Policy Toward India Since 2000: For the Sake of Maintaining US Leadership in East Asia," *The Pacific Review*, vol. 31, no. 4, 2018, pp. 515–532, https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2017.1396355.

[787] I. Saint-Mézard, "India's Act East Policy: Strategic Implications for the Indian Ocean," *Journal of the Indian Ocean Region*, vol. 12, no. 2, 2016, pp. 177–190, https://doi.org/10.1080/19480881.2016.1226753.

islands, including power, telecommunications, and fiber-optic cables in the Bay of Bengal, India-Japan cooperation on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands has significant symbolic significance. It provides a security guarantee for other ASEAN countries grappling with claims against China in the South China Sea. The strategic location of these islands in the Indian Ocean region provides India with an alternative military base, countering the "string of pearls" route being charted by China in the Indian Ocean region.[788]

The key is that India is finding a partner in Japan who can help it build borders and connect the country's isolated regions. The India-Japan bilateral summit in October 2018 was instrumental in laying the foundation for strategic and defense cooperation between the two countries on sharing military bases under the Acquisition and Cross-Service Agreement (ACSA), which would allow the Indian Navy to use the Japanese base in Djibouti and the Japanese Navy to access the Indian base in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. In a joint statement issued after the summit, both countries announced the start of negotiations on the ASCA.[789] *(Gady, 2018)* The agreement is important because India is concerned about increasing Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean, beyond its base in Djibouti, where China has a strong presence. The ASCA would ensure closer cooperation between the Indian Navy and the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force, which could share defense capabilities, fuel, and ammunition under the agreement.

An example of a geopolitical and geostrategic move in India-Japan relations is New Delhi's successful attempt to influence Bangladesh's decision to select Tokyo as the site for the Matarbari project. Bangladesh requested Chinese assistance in building a deepwater port in Sonadia in 2010 and was close to signing an agreement with the Chinese state-owned China Harbor Engineering Company Ltd. a few months after Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina's visit to Beijing in July 2014, but Bangladesh canceled the project and awarded the Matarbari port to Japan. Bangladesh's Planning Minister, A.H.M. Mustafa Kamal, said that "some countries, including India and the United States, oppose Chinese involvement" in the project.[790] In another geostrategic move, India developed the Chabahar port in Iran, as part of India's Indo-Pacific development strategy aimed at increasing connectivity in the region. Japan's interest in the Chabahar port provided a strategic advantage for India, which sought to prevent Pakistan or China from participating in the port's construction. Given

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[788] A. Ruff, "Increasing Geopolitical Rivalry: China, India and Japan Focus on Bangladesh," *Modern Diplomacy*, 19 June 2016, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/china-rules-out-indias-entry-into-nsg-without-consensus-on-allowing-non-npt-countries/articleshow/69893448.cms (accessed 8 May 2019).

[789] F.-S. Gady, "India, Japan Begin Negotiations Over Military Base Sharing Agreement," *The Diplomat*, October 30, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/10/india-japan-begin-negotiations-over-military-base-sharing-agreement/ (accessed July 24, 2019).

[790] H. Siddiqui, "Amphibious Wings for the Navy and Coast Guard: US-2i Back on Track," *Financial Express*, July 1, 2019, https://www.financialexpress.com/defence/amphibious-wings-for-the-navy-and-coast-guard-us-2i-back-on-track/1625052/ (accessed December 22, 2019).

that Japan potentially cannot participate in the Chabahar project in the event of US sanctions against Iran (such as in April 2019), India's involvement in this matter is crucial to ensuring India's partnership with Japan in Central Asia, which is the quintessence of India's energy, geopolitical, and geostrategic moves.

Another geoeconomic and geostrategic project is the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC), launched in India in May 2017 by Modi and Abe as an India-Japan venture for intercontinental connectivity between Asia and Africa. It symbolizes the synergy between India's Act East Policy and Japan's Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure program. Although the AAGC remains a work in progress and has often been described as an ambitious vision, it was jointly announced just after India refused to participate in China's international forum in Beijing on the Belt and Road Initiative, to which India had objected regarding CPEC. The AAGC thus represents a strong financing and growth alternative for underdeveloped and developing African countries, which have so far been dependent on Chinese development financing. The AAGC maritime corridor could also provide a legitimate India-Japan partnership to better integrate the economies of South, Southeast and East Asia with Oceania and Africa.

India-Japan cooperation extends beyond internal borders to include strategic regions of the Indian Ocean, as evidenced by the initiation of joint infrastructure projects between India and Japan in Sri Lanka, including the construction of the Eastern Container Terminal at the Port of Colombo and the Trincomalee Port in eastern Sri Lanka. India's interest in developing the Trincomalee Port in Sri Lanka, jointly built with Japan, has geostrategic implications not only because of the India-Japan partnership in developing ports in the Indian Ocean but also because of their joint counteraction to China's Belt and Road Initiative. In a statement by Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar on July 12, 2018, he stated that India would assist in the development of the Colombo and Trincomalee ports in Sri Lanka.[791] (Chaudhary, 2018). Unlike the previous regime of Mahinda Rajapaksa in Sri Lanka, the current government in Colombo has demonstrated a more balanced approach between India and China since 2015, granting India a stake in Hambantota Airport, the Colombo Port project, and a key expressway. India, in cooperation with Japan, subsequently announced infrastructure and communication projects in the island nation. The port of Trincomalee has held particular geostrategic significance since 99 years ago, when the Hambantota port in Sri Lanka was handed over to China after China defaulted on a debt. Given China's influence in the Indian Ocean region and its interest in ports in the Maldives, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Bangladesh,

[791] D. Chakraborty, A. Chakraborty, "Economic and Political Cooperation Between India and East Asia: The Emerging Perspective," *Journal of Economics and Political Economy*, vol. 4, no. 2, 2017, pp. 144–158, http://www.zbw.eu/econis-archiv/bitstream/handle/11159/885/1273-4458-1-PB.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed April 10, 2019).

retired Sri Lankan Admiral Jayanath Colombage stated: "We welcome everyone, but they should not come with the intention of harming anyone, especially India." The Trincomalee Port, considered one of the world's best deep-water natural ports, is also the gateway to the Bay of Bengal, which holds immense geostrategic and geoeconomic importance for South and East India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. In May 2019, a plan for the joint development of the Eastern Container Terminal at the Colombo Port in Sri Lanka was signed between India and Japan. Although India's involvement in the talks sparked unrest and internal political turmoil in Sri Lanka from the outset, leading to the resignation and reinstatement of the Prime Minister, the Indian and Japanese involvement in the project is seen as a major step forward in countering the growing influence of China, which has been pouring money into the South Asian island nation as part of its massive BRI plan.

India's policy towards Japan is increasingly vulnerable to Chinese influence, as it seeks to balance Chinese power with the threat posed by Chinese maritime expansion in the Indian Ocean region. Realistically, Chinese influence should prompt India to more proactively pursue a strategic security partnership with Japan. However, some cases contradict India's expected proactivity and constitute exceptions to this theory. Nonalignment is essentially a foreign policy ideal that focuses on autonomous and independent decision-making in international relations and national development, without allegiance to any foreign power at the expense of one's own sovereignty and territorial integrity.[792] Although India has continued to cooperate with Japan on various strategic, defense, and economic projects since 2014, there are instances where India ignores the strength of its friendship with Japan and halts or slows down initiatives to avoid being perceived as a Japanese ally against another power. The ideal of non-alignment is very evident in India's policy towards Japan in two main ways—either by refusing to openly ally with Japan through formal commitments, or by adopting a long period of caution to decide on a future course of action despite ongoing pressure from Japan. This is evidenced by the fact that, despite carefully building a security partnership with Japan to counter Chinese influence in Asian politics, India has been very cautious about omitting China, especially in verbal communications through ministers or in written documents, such as joint agreements or statements signed with Japan regarding infrastructure development in northeast India, port development in Indian Ocean countries, or the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor initiative. India's explicit refusal to mention China as an antagonist in any of its joint statements with Japan demonstrates that India is not an ally of any country to collude with

[792] L. Lee, "Abe's Democratic Security Diamond and New Quadrilateral Initiative: An Australian Perspective," *The Journal of East Asian Affairs*, vol. 30, no. 2, 2016, pp. 1–41, http://www.jstor.org/stable/44160973 (accessed 10 April 2019).

against another. This was also evident in India's long-standing policy towards Japan, when, despite Japan's consistent efforts to elevate the Indo-Japanese 2+2 dialogue to the ministerial level, India was reluctant to extend this dialogue beyond the deputy ministerial level. The dialogue, which began in 2010 at the vice-ministerial level, has since been proposed for upgrade by Japan, but India hesitated due to New Delhi's cautious stance on not threatening Beijing, and India cited obstacles in scheduling such meetings as the reason for the delay. It wasn't until April 2018, when the informal India-China summit in Wuhan was a success and India's softer stance toward China showed signs of improving relations, that India decided to reconsider its policy on the 2+2 dialogue with Japan. India's stance softened this year as its relations with China improved following the April leaders' summit. India values the principle of balanced diplomacy, hence India's reluctance to accept Japan's initiative to upgrade the 2+2 format was not surprising. Only during Modi's visit to Japan in 2018 did Modi agree to elevate the 2+2 format to the level of defense and foreign ministers. India will likely continue to avoid involvement in conflicts in the South China Sea involving China and Japan, given its policy of not forming alliances against China. The Japanese have complained that while the Indian Navy is always eager to engage in closer naval ties, it is slow to act or engages in activities that appear anti-Chinese[793]. *(Patranobis, 2014)* As a result, India is unlikely to repeatedly participate in patrols in the South China Sea with Japan to avoid angering China. India also did not comment on China's 2019 defense white paper, as it did not wish to comment on China's position on maritime affairs. A clear example of cautious and country-oriented decision-making, despite deepening bilateral relations with Japan, is India's slowdown in negotiations to purchase defense equipment from Japan in 2016 and again in 2018, before finally reaching an agreement in the second half of 2019. India's potential purchase of the Japanese Shinmaywa US-2i aircraft (a potential deal initiated in 2014) and Soryu-class submarines symbolized the next step in India-Japan defense relations. In April 2018, the Indian company Mahindra Group and the Japanese company ShinMaywa Industries Limited signed a memorandum of understanding to produce the U2 amphibious aircraft in India, but no agreement was reached during the bilateral India-Japan summit in October 2018.[794] *(Ayappan, 2018, April 11; Gady, 2018)* Soryu-class submarines are among the most advanced in naval defense technology, and Japan has been very cautious about sharing this technology, even with countries like Australia. However, despite this unique opportunity offered to New Delhi, both purchase agreements have failed to yield any results, even after several years

[793] S. Patranobis, "Ties With China Looming Over Indo-Japan Naval Relations," *Hindustan Times*, April 23, 2014, https://www.hindustantimes.com/world/ties-with-china-looming-over-indo-japan-naval-relations/story-oX1fHUqW28PRFC9rhh7D2O.html (accessed April 13, 2019).

[794] V. Ayappan, "DefExpo 2018: Amphibious Aircraft US-2 to Be Made in India," *Times of India*, April 11, 2018, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/defexpo-2018-amphibious-aircraft-us-2-to-be-made-in-india/articleshow/63713866.cms (accessed April 13, 2019).

of bilateral talks, primarily due to the high cost of advanced Japanese defense equipment and the failure to meet the "Make in India" clause, which required Japanese equipment to be manufactured in India to increase domestic defense production.[795] *(Singh, September 10, 2017)* The rejection of the first-of-its-kind defense agreement with Japan demonstrated India's reluctance to rush into too close Indo-Japanese defense ties, a move that has always attracted China's attention. It also reflects India's attitude toward Indo-Japanese relations, which are primarily based on India's growing economy, which finds Japan a good source of investment and foreign direct investment. Although no official statements were made on the agreement, it was finally alluded to in 2019 when Japan agreed not only to reduce the price of the aircraft but also committed to producing them in India through technology transfer, with a view to potential future exports to other countries.[796] *(Siddiqui, 2019)* During his first visit to Japan as Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi asserted that India's economic growth and development offer Japan enormous economic prospects, coupled with strengthening global democracy, regional stability and prosperity *(Modi, 2014).* This has become one of the ways in which India has, in the recent past, reinforced its identity as a multiparty rather than a non-partisan state. Modi has been very cautious and tactical in articulating the idea of multiparty cooperation through political discourse and cultural diplomacy. Cultural diplomacy includes a unique and first-of-its-kind series of symposia, initiated through cooperation between India and Japan, called "Samvad," which means dialogue in the ancient Indian language Sanskrit. The Samvad Symposium was launched in 2015 as part of a Modi-Abe initiative to facilitate discussion among Asians on conflict avoidance and the philosophical and cultural heritage of the major Asian religions: Buddhism and Hinduism. The India-Japan Special Strategic and Global Partnership, firmly rooted in history and based on shared values, is a driving force for achieving the shared strategic goals of both countries and achieving peace, prosperity, and progress, ensuring a better future for the people of both countries. As both Prime Ministers aptly explained in the SAMVAD dialogue series, the universal values of freedom, humanism, democracy, tolerance and non-violence that India and Japan share through a long history of academic, spiritual and scientific exchanges not only form the basis of the India-Japan bilateral relations but also underpin the principles of cooperation between the two countries for the good of the Indo-Pacific region and the world at large.[797]

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[795] A. Singh, "India-Japan Defense Ties Are Soaring But High-Profile Deals Unlikely," *Business Standard*, September 10, 2017, https://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/india-japan-defence-ties-are-soaring-but-high-profile-deals-unlikely-117092000307_1.html (accessed July 22, 2019).

[796] H. Siddiqui, "Amphibious Wings for the Navy and Coast Guard: US-2i Back on Track," *Financial Express*, July 1, 2019, https://www.financialexpress.com/defence/amphibious-wings-for-the-navy-and-coast-guard-us-2i-back-on-track/1625052/ (accessed December 22, 2019).

[797] H. Yoshimatsu, "The Indo-Pacific in Japan's Strategy Towards India," *Contemporary Politics*, vol. 25, no. 4, 2019, pp. 438–456, https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2018.1556769.

While India appears to continue to tread a cautious path of partnership with other countries outside the economic and trade spheres, its partnership with Japan has certainly significantly, though not entirely, transcended the principle of independence. Japan has been a convenient partner for India, and it is beginning to make more drastic decisions in the Indian Ocean region. Unlike during the Cold War, when India chose to be an independent state, defining its own foreign policy independent of the West or the Soviet Union, the goals of independence seem to have changed in India since 2014, under the Modi government, which has redefined the principle of independence as a tool for pursuing strategic autonomy and prudence, rather than its former meaning of distancing itself from great powers in the emerging global, multipolar political order.[798]

India's policy towards Japan can be analyzed in the context of this ideal to explain India's reluctance to ally with Japan, despite the promise of influence a special partnership could offer. New Delhi's reluctance to form any formal alliance with Japan in the face of the perceived threat posed by China's growing influence near its land and ocean territories is not a new policy, but rather a decision by the Modi government to continue its partnership with Japan as a mutually beneficial partnership aimed at realizing shared aspirations to address regional political and security challenges.[799] This is a strategy that India is likely to adopt not only towards Japan but also towards other middle powers, for strategic reasons, engaging in projects while waiting long enough to avoid any obvious signs of formalizing an "alliance" with one particular country to enhance its capabilities. This fresh breath of fresh air in India's foreign policy ideals more closely resembles the principle of multiparty cooperation and a prudent political stance. At the same time, India maintains a very cautious stance to avoid being accused of an economic or military bias towards China. Despite its multifaceted engagement with Japanese policy, India maintains a cautious foreign policy stance, as well as a symbolically benign "independence" until it enters into a full alliance with Japan and the United States to counter China.[800] In this respect, India's policy towards Japan can also be assessed as a bold partnership with a backdrop of non-alignment.

Despite the strong and dynamic economic partnership between India and Japan, the bilateral relationship is performing well below its potential in terms of eco-political security and defence initiatives.[801] More initiatives are needed to capitalize on the untapped potential of several decades of missed opportunities that the countries could leverage to collaborate and achieve progress. Indo-Japanese relations could deepen through strategic measures such as: first, leveraging Japan's Official

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[798] A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge, 1999.
[799] T. Wojczewski, "China's Rise as a Strategic Challenge and Opportunity: India's China Discourse and Strategy," *India Review*, vol. 15, no. 1, 2016, pp. 22–60, https://doi.org/10.1080/14736489.2015.1092748.
[800] K. N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, New York, 1979.
[801] H. Siddiqui, "Amphibious Wings for the Navy and Coast Guard: US-2i Back on Track," *Financial Express*, July 1, 2019, https://www.financialexpress.com/defence/amphibious-wings-for-the-navy-and-coast-guard-us-2i-back-on-track/1625052/ (accessed December 22, 2019).

Development Assistance (ODA) in northeast India, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and other strategic locations in the Indian Ocean region near India's land and maritime borders; second, more intensive engagement of both countries' defense forces—navies, air forces, and land forces; and third, greater mutual support on international issues that concern them. However, there is room for complications on the Indian foreign policy side.[802] First, India would have to relinquish strategic autonomy and sovereignty in its foreign policy rhetoric to engage more actively in defense sales and arms production and procurement. Second, India would face the challenge of securing Japanese support for adopting a pro-India stance on the Pakistani threat. Third, India's nonalignment strategy, though tenuous, would still prevent it from engaging strongly with the vision of greater Indian participation in joint security decisions, as India is unlikely to commit to any long-term military alliances. Nevertheless, the ever-expanding prospects for an India-Japan partnership in new areas, such as India's geostrategically important countries, the West African coast, and space exploration, have the potential to add a new dimension to the long-standing India-Japan ties. In this sense, India is taking very tactical steps to secure partnerships with Japan in areas where both countries have complementary strengths. These partnership opportunities will create a powerful counterweight to China. Moreover, this is a clear opportunity for India to grow and play a bigger role on the international stage.[803]

### 6.7. Japan's involvement in ASEAN

In 2023, ASEAN and Japan will celebrate the 50th anniversary of their official partnership, culminating in a special leaders' summit held in Tokyo from December 16 to 18. Over the past five decades, both ASEAN's and Japan's positions in the region have changed significantly, but so has the international environment in which Asian countries operate, primarily due to the challenge to US hegemony through the rise of China and the escalation of Sino-American strategic rivalry. Therefore, both Japan and the countries of Southeast Asia face similar challenges, and therefore, closer cooperation is in the interests of both sides, especially ASEAN.

While Japan became the world's second-largest economy in the late 1960s, surpassing all Southeast Asian countries in terms of their own potential, in 2022 ASEAN's cumulative GDP reached US$3.6 trillion, representing 85% of Japan's. In recent years, the gap in economic development has narrowed significantly, and given Southeast Asia's economic potential, this gap is expected to continue to narrow in the coming years. This suggests that Japan and ASEAN are becoming increasingly equal partners, which will foster deeper cooperation. The escalating Sino-

[802] C. Bajpaee, "Dephasing India's Look East / Act East Policy," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, vol. 39, no. 2, 2017, pp. 348–372, http://www.jstor.org/stable/44683773 (accessed 13 April 2019).
[803] A. Ruff, "Increasing Geopolitical Rivalry: China, India and Japan Focus on Bangladesh," *Modern Diplomacy*, 19 June 2016, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/china-rules-out-indias-entry-into-nsg-without-consensus-on-allowing-non-npt-countries/articleshow/69893448.cms (accessed 8 May 2019).

American rivalry is making the regional environment increasingly unstable and unpredictable, increasing the pressure to take a clear side. However, neither Japan nor the ASEAN member states can afford to make such a decision. For Japan, the alliance with the United States is the foundation of its foreign and security policy, and cooperation with the US was identified as one of the main priorities of the Japanese government's long-term strategy for maintaining peace and stability in the region in the National Security Strategy published a year ago.[804] Moreover, China poses a direct threat to Japanese interests due to the territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. On the other hand, China plays a crucial role for Japanese business. It is also Japan's main trading partner and the third-largest[805] recipient of Japanese direct investment in 2022. In the case of ASEAN, the United States also plays an important role as a major trading partner and the largest source of investment. However, American security support is fundamental for Southeast Asia, especially in the context of China's expansionist policy in the South China Sea, where four ASEAN member states are involved in disputes. The US armed forces operate military bases in the Philippines and Singapore, but also engage in numerous training and exercises with other Southeast Asian countries, such as SEACAT (Southeast Asia Cooperation and Training).

One of the main pillars of expanding bilateral relations is the commitment of both sides to promoting a free, open, and rules-based regional order by strengthening security cooperation, with particular emphasis on the maritime domain within the ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific (AOIP) and the Japanese Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP). In recent years, Japan has consistently supported efforts[806] (10 multi-role patrol vessels in 2013 and two patrol vessels in 2022) and Vietnam (six patrol vessels in service and six more by 2025) to enhance coast guard capabilities. Furthermore, the Japanese government has held two-plus-two meetings between the defense and foreign ministers with their Philippine and Indonesian counterparts and is transferring military equipment for defense purposes to some ASEAN countries, including the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, Thailand, and Indonesia. Economic development is also a significant second pillar. Japan has repeatedly shown that it is a reliable partner in this area, ready to support Southeast Asian countries.

In the late 1990s, the Japanese government provided over $40 million[807] in support in response to the Asian financial crisis. In the wake of the coronavirus pandemic, Tokyo provided $2.5 billion in loans[808] for financial support and the establishment of the ASEAN Centre for Public

804 https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/221216anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf

805 https://eastasiaforum.org/2023/09/03/japan-now-has-to-deal-with-asean-on-a-more-equal-footing/

806 https://fulcrum.sg/japans-responses-to-chinese-grey-zone-tactics-giving-southeast-asia-a-leg-up/

807 https://fulcrum.sg/aseanfocus/a-new-chapter-in-asean-japan-relations/

808 https://eastasiaforum.org/2023/09/03/japan-now-has-to-deal-with-asean-on-a-more-equal-footing/

Health Emergencies and Emerging Diseases. Japan's official development assistance to ASEAN countries should be added to this, totaling USD 4 billion annually between 2015 and 2021. Given that Japan is a member of the world's two largest free trade agreements – the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), both sides have far-reaching opportunities to strengthen supply chains and increase trade. Furthermore, many ASEAN countries have the right conditions to diversify production and relocate some Japanese factories from China, mitigating the risk of another escalation in the Sino-American trade war. It is worth noting that Japan holds key importance for ASEAN in the context of international forums such as the G7 and G20, where it can act as an advocate for Southeast Asian countries, expressing the region's concerns and supporting initiatives aimed at mobilizing resources to address ASEAN's most pressing needs. This is particularly important in the case of the G7, where no Southeast Asian representatives sit, yet it is precisely in this forum that decisions regarding financing climate, infrastructure, and development initiatives are frequently made. The importance of Japan's activity in international forums is best demonstrated by the G20 summit in Bali in November 2022, during which Japan, together with the United States, supported the establishment of a Just Energy Transition Partnership with Indonesia. Indonesia became only the second country to enter into such a partnership, raising USD 20 billion[809] to support its energy transition and carbon reduction program. The final pillar is based on strengthening mutual understanding and trust through cultural, intellectual, and tourism exchanges. Significant progress can also be noted in this area, given the Southeast Asian region's experiences during the Japanese occupation during World War II and the anti-Japanese protests and boycott of Japanese products in the 1970s.[810]

According to research conducted by the Singapore-based research center ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute between 2019 and 2023, Japan enjoys the highest level of trust among representatives of ASEAN member states. According to the latest research, Japan also leads the way as the most desirable tourist destination.[811] This is supported by data from the Japan National Tourism Organization in 2023, which showed that tourists from Southeast Asia accounted for a quarter of the 1.3 million tourists[812] who visited Japan since the coronavirus pandemic eased.

Following the establishment of the ASEAN–Japan Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in September 2023 at the 26th ASEAN–Japan Summit in Jakarta, the time had come to mark the culmination of the 50th-anniversary celebrations with a special summit attended by the leaders

809 https://eastasiaforum.org/2023/10/05/japan-as-a-diplomatic-asset-to-asean/
810 https://eastasiaforum.org/2023/09/16/japan-asean-relations-move-towards-co-creation/
811 https://www.iseas.edu.sg/centres/asean-studies-centre/state-of-southeast-asia-survey/the-state-of-southeast-asia-2023-survey-report-2/
812 https://eastasiaforum.org/2023/09/16/japan-asean-relations-move-towards-co-creation/

of both sides. The event, held on 17 December, demonstrated that after 50 years of building and developing bilateral relations, priorities were shifting from economic cooperation towards security, particularly maritime security.[813] This is clearly visible in the documents issued after the meeting, both the joint statement[814] and the implementation plan.[815] A number of other decisions were also made, demonstrating Japan's intention to assume greater responsibility for shaping the security architecture in the Indo-Pacific region as part of its "realism diplomacy." Just weeks after Japan upgraded its bilateral relations with Vietnam to a comprehensive strategic partnership,[816] the same decision was made regarding relations with Malaysia during a meeting between Prime Ministers Kishida Fumio and Anwar Ibrahim on the sidelines of the Tokyo summit. The joint statement emphasized that the upgrade of the relationship from a strategic partnership established in 2015 to a comprehensive strategic partnership symbolizes the beginning of a new chapter in bilateral relations. Additionally, representatives of both countries signed an agreement on a grant worth USD 2.8 million to Malaysia under Japan's Official Security Assistance (OSA) program. The funds will be used to strengthen Malaysia's maritime security through the acquisition of rescue vessels and surveillance equipment for intelligence purposes.[817] It's worth noting that, in addition to Malaysia, the Philippines is also a beneficiary of the OSA,[818] receiving $4 million during the Japanese Prime Minister's visit in November of this year. Japan and Malaysia have also committed to strengthening cooperation between their coast guards[819] and navies. The comprehensive plan to enhance Malaysia’s maritime domain awareness capabilities amid rising tensions in the South China Sea therefore fulfills the announcement made by Prime Minister Kishida Fumio during his November visit to Kuala Lumpur. Meanwhile, the rapid implementation of the declarations made contributes to consolidating the trust of the Southeast Asian region in Japan.

On the sidelines of the Tokyo summit, Indonesian President Joko Widodo and Prime Minister Kishida Fumio also met with their foreign ministers. During the meeting, memoranda of understanding were signed regarding the purchase of a large patrol vessel for the Indonesian Coast Guard (BAKAMLA), worth $63.7 million, to be built in Japan. At the meeting between President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. and the Prime Minister of Japan, not only was a memorandum of understanding on cooperation between the coast guards signed, but the leaders also emphasized

[813] https://www.thejakartapost.com/world/2023/12/16/japan-asean-summit-to-advance-security-cooperation
[814] https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100597142.pdf
[815] https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100597140.pdf
[816] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/vietnam-upgrades-ties-with-japan-highest-level-2023-11-27/
[817] https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2023/12/16/anwar-kishida-announce-malaysia-japan-comprehensive-strategic-partnership
[818] https://www.osa.uni.lodz.pl/publikacje/blog-osa/szczegoly/zlota-era-relacji-bilateralnych-filipiny-japonia
[819] https://www.kln.gov.my/web/guest/-/elevation-of-bilateral-relations-between-malaysia-and-japan-to-comprehensive-strategic-partnership-16-december-2023

their commitment to finalizing[820] negotiations on a Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) between the armed forces as soon as possible, which will be fundamental to the development of bilateral security relations.

The shift in priorities from economic cooperation to defense and security in ASEAN-Japan relations will likely consolidate in the coming years. This is a direct result of the increasingly unstable international environment and the current situation in the Indo-Pacific region, which is linked to Sino-American rivalry and Beijing's increasingly aggressive policies, particularly in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. The Japanese administration's recent months of activity clearly demonstrate that priority is being given to Southeast Asian countries involved in maritime and territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Adopting this approach is in Tokyo's interest, as Japan is also grappling with Chinese assertiveness in the East China Sea. Japan's increased activity in enhancing maritime security capabilities, along with the wide range of economic opportunities, also creates excellent conditions for ASEAN member states, which do not have to limit themselves to choosing between the United States and China. For them, Japan represents a "third way," which allows them to avert the specter of having to choose sides in the rivalry between great powers and facilitates balancing between the conflicting parties.

[820] https://pia.gov.ph/press-release/pbbm-says-ph-japan-agree-to-quickly-conclude-raa-talks/

**Verification of the main research thesis**

The analysis of the research material collected in this work allowed for a positive verification of the main research thesis, which assumed that:

*Japan's contemporary security strategy responds to the deteriorating security environment in the Indo-Pacific region and aims to enhance deterrence and strategic autonomy while maintaining the key role of the alliance with the United States.*

The Japanese government, led by Sanae Takaichi, is implementing changes that are consistent with a broader security strategy. The package of key strategic documents currently underpinning Japan's historic defense transformation, adopted by the Japanese parliament in December 2022, includes:

- **The National Security Strategy** (NSS), which identifies China as an unprecedented and currently greatest strategic challenge. Furthermore, this document highlights threats from Russia and North Korea;
- **The National Defense Strategy,** which introduces groundbreaking *counterstrike capabilities*, allowing Japan to attack potential adversary missile bases as part of its self-defense;
- **The Armed Forces Construction Plan** – its assumptions and directions of action are being developed, among others, in the latest defense white papers. The plan assumes a shift from the current post-war pacifism towards active deterrence. It assumes a sharp increase in defense spending to **2% of GDP** (modeled on NATO standards) and the development of modern technologies, including artificial intelligence (AI) **and** unmanned systems.

Due to tensions in relations with China, North Korea, and Russia, Japan is strengthening its defense industry, taking steps to diversify its alliances, and building a global arms supply chain among democratic countries. Tokyo's shift in policy is also a response to the growing unpredictability of the United States. Donald Trump has shifted some military forces from Asia to the Middle East, which has heightened concerns among countries in the Indo-Pacific region. Japan, fearing for its own security, is taking preemptive action and preparing for a situation where the Americans reduce their protective umbrella over Japan.

The results of analyses conducted based on research material collected during the work, including statistical, political, historical, economic, legal, sociological, psychological, and philosophical studies, indicate that Japan's new security strategy represents a decisive response to the deteriorating security environment in the Indo-Pacific region. The Japanese ruling party's National Security Strategy states that: *With a defense spending target of over 2% of GDP for NATO nations in mind, our country also strives to achieve a budget that, within five years, will meet the*

*level necessary to fundamentally strengthen defense capabilities*. This perhaps inconspicuous move will make Japan the world's third-largest military power in terms of military spending. Military spending will increase from $50 billion to over $100 billion annually by 2027. Japan already possesses over 900 combat aircraft, 48 destroyers, including eight Heidis anti-missile systems, and 20 submarines. Furthermore, Tokyo has purchased 145 F-35 fighter jets, including 42 F-35Bs, making Japan the largest user of American stealth fighters outside the United States, where 358 aircraft are to be deployed. These aircraft will be able to be stationed on two aircraft carriers, the Izumo and Kaga, Japan's first aircraft carriers since World War II. Japan will rely on American technology but will also develop its own missile technology.

Japan's new defense strategy is based on artificial intelligence and unmanned systems. According to the 2026 Defense White Paper, the use of artificial intelligence (AI) and unmanned systems is the *foundation of new ways of conducting warfare*, as stated in the document published by the Japanese government. The report describes China's growing military activity as an "unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge." Russia's aggression against Ukraine has prompted other countries to prepare for new warfare methods, such as the mass use of unmanned systems. The Japanese Ministry of Defense emphasizes dual-use technologies and the rapid processing of operational data using artificial intelligence. Faced with a rapidly evolving battlefield, building efficient logistics for ammunition supplies and relentlessly strengthening the production base of the Japanese defense industry is becoming a key goal. A 598-page document, the White Paper, issued by the Japanese government in 2026, reaffirmed last year's assessment of Beijing's actions and concluded that they constitute serious cause for concern, should not be downplayed, and should be countered with the maximum possible force the state can generate, supported by allies. Examples of escalation include Chinese aircraft carrier raids in the Pacific, as well as the dangerous air maneuvers Beijing has organized against the Japan Self-Defense Forces. It was also emphasized that the PRC's actions around Taiwan are aimed at exerting pressure through the permanent presence of Chinese military forces and creating the impression among independent observers that China manages this area and exercises constant supervision in the region to ensure order and security.

The actions of North Korea and the Kim Jong-un regime, as well as the development and refinement of their missile and nuclear programs, pose a very serious and real threat, not only to Japan itself but also to other countries in the region. The Japanese Ministry of Defense considers Russia's actions, particularly in its strategic partnership with China, a source of serious security concern. The report's publication confirms Japan's ongoing defense policy reform. In April 2026, the Japanese government eased restrictions, allowing the export of equipment with lethal capabilities.

It's worth recalling that 80 years after the end of World War II, the Japanese, still traumatized by those events, have become a fiercely pacifist nation. The 1% GDP spending limit for the Japan Self-Defense Forces, established in the 1970s, was intended by lawmakers as a concrete manifestation of this. The Japanese were satisfied with their own security status, based on the alliance with the United States signed after the end of World War II. In this treaty, the United States pledged to defend the territorial sovereignty of the Land of the Rising Sun in exchange for the aforementioned pacifist constitution. Under this treaty, the United States maintains over 80 military installations on Japanese territory, housing over 60,000 American troops—more than any other country. However, in recent years, the global security architecture has begun to change rapidly, primarily due to the unprecedented rise of China, Japan's neighbor and arch-rival in the region. Shinzo Abe, Japan's longtime prime minister in the 2010s, was aware of the threat China's rise posed to the Land of the Rising Sun. In response to these changes, Abe implemented an unprecedented series of security reforms and significantly modernized Japan's forces, aware of the relatively weakening power of the United States. He actively promoted the QUAD alliance, which includes Japan, the United States, Australia, and India. These countries are concerned about China's growing importance. The legislative change resulted in the Japan Self-Defense Forces participating in missions and international exercises outside Japan, a far-reaching reinterpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. Furthermore, Shinzo Abe initiated a discussion on nuclear weapons and the possibility of stationing American nuclear weapons on Japanese territory, analogous to NATO's nuclear-sharing program. Japanese society, still traumatized by the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, viewed these proposals as highly controversial. Of all the initiatives Abe undertook, the most important was doubling the defense budget, a plan currently underway. Japanese society is aware of the growing threats but wary of the transformation occurring too abruptly.

What do the Japanese fear most? One unpredictable source of threats is North Korea and its nuclear and missile programs. A 2025 survey by the Yomiuri Shimbun showed that 86% of Japanese fear a real threat from North Korea. Therefore, 64% of them support increasing military potential and expanding defense capabilities. The second, and more strategically serious, challenge is China. China's aggressive policies toward Taiwan and Hong Kong, including the militarization of artificial islands and oil drilling in disputed waters, as well as its support for the criminal invasion by the Russian Federation, have forced Japan to abandon its pacifist doctrine and assume responsibility for its own and regional security. Japan and the United States share a common interest in neutralizing the North Korean and, above all, Chinese threats. However, the nature of this threat differs for the United States and for Japan. Americans are primarily operating on a much broader scale, seeking to safeguard their existing prosperity and power, while the Japanese, similarly to Ukraine, face

an existential threat. This is not an issue for the immediate future, but the actions taken today will have consequences for Japan's future, particularly in a situation where China becomes the world's most powerful economic and industrial power, and the gap between Tokyo and Beijing continues to widen to Japan's disadvantage. Geographically, this rivalry centers on the Senkaku Islands, or Diaoyu Islands as the Chinese call them, located northwest of Taiwan. This is a perennial flashpoint between the two countries. The Trump administration has proposed that Japan's Senkaku Islands be included in Article 5 of the bilateral security treaty, which automatically allows for US military intervention if China uses force.

The Japanese are also watching the situation around Taiwan with great concern, as it is located just 110 km from the Japanese island of Yonaguni Jima, where Japanese Patriot systems are located, and 500 km from strategic Okinawa, home to a massive US military base of over 26,000 Marines. Because Japan is located so close to Taiwan, the island's security is also a Japanese concern. A Chinese attack on Taiwan would pose a direct threat to Japan and could draw Japan and the United States into war.

Japan is also engaged in a territorial dispute with the Russian Federation over its northern territories, better known by their Russian name, the Kuril Islands. Russia theoretically poses a third threat to Japan, less real than the threats posed by China and North Korea, but it should nevertheless be considered as a significant element in synchronizing its actions with China and Korea. Russia's armed aggression against Ukraine has also raised concerns in Japan, thousands of kilometers away. Both Ukrainian-Russian and Japanese-Chinese relations are distinct and have their own distinct characteristics. The Japanese's sensitivity is demonstrated by their reaction to the war in Ukraine. Japan was the first decisive country to take concrete action against Russia after the invasion of Ukraine. Tokyo froze the assets of the Russian Central Bank, banned the export of high-end technology, and revoked Russia's privileged-nation trade status, effectively abandoning any pretense of neutrality. Japanese Prime Minister Kishida was the first leader in history to attend a NATO summit. This forced the Japanese government to revise its defense doctrine.

## Verification of specific research hypotheses

***Hypothesis 1***

***The growth of China's military potential is the main factor behind changes in Japanese security policy.***

This hypothesis has been positively verified. Research and analysis of collected material, including Polish and English-language literature, monographs, scientific periodicals and journals, expert studies, bulletins, and statistical data, indicate that China is building the world's largest navy, modernizing its nuclear arsenal, and developing advanced hypersonic missiles and artificial

intelligence technology. This expansion in the Indo-Pacific region is systematically shifting the balance of power, raising tensions around Taiwan and forcing Japan, the United States, and other regional states to strengthen defense cooperation.

China's growing military power and rivalry in the Pacific have reached a climax, becoming a key driver of global security policy. Beijing consistently strives to break the United States' dominance in the Indo-Pacific region, leveraging a massive naval expansion, modern technologies, and strategic infrastructure investments. Despite the economic slowdown and the lowering of its GDP growth target (to 4.5-5%), defense remains a priority for the Xi Jinping government. China's official defense budget for 2026 is 1.91 trillion yuan (approximately $277 billion), a 7.3% increase compared to the previous year. However, Pentagon estimates indicate that actual expenditures could reach as much as $526 billion. The Chinese Navy (PLAN) is already the world's largest navy in terms of number of vessels. Beijing is implementing a plan to build as many as nine aircraft carriers by 2035, posing a direct challenge to the United States. Moreover, the Chinese army is rapidly implementing artificial intelligence and investing in the development of drones and autonomous systems. Chinese engineers are circumventing US sanctions by utilizing, among other things, techniques for distilling AI models for military purposes. Regarding its nuclear arsenal, the so-called nuclear triad is rapidly expanding. According to Pentagon reports, China already possesses approximately 600 operational nuclear warheads, a number expected to increase to 1,000 by 2030. The main flashpoints in the Pacific and the fierce rivalry between Japan and China, among others, are strategic maritime areas and the so-called First Island Chain (archipelagos stretching from Japan to the Philippines): China continues to exert pressure on Taiwan. The Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) systematically tests various scenarios for a naval and air blockade of the island (including during exercises such as "*Justice Mission*"). Beijing has set itself the goal of achieving full readiness for a possible forcible takeover of Taiwan by 2027. The dispute also extends to the South and East China Seas. China is militarizing artificial islands and seeking control of key trade routes. There are regular incidents involving the Chinese Coast Guard and Philippine and US vessels. China is also expanding its influence beyond East Asia. An example of the new geopolitics of the Pacific is the opening of the Chancay megaport in Peru, which is worrying the United States. It is important to emphasize that China's growing military importance has forced not only Japan but also other countries in the region to redefine their defense doctrines. Discussions regarding the Pacific Defense Pact are ongoing. The United States is strengthening cooperation in formations such as the AUKUS (US, UK, Australia) and the QUAD (US, Japan, Australia, India). Japan's official Defense White Paper warns against Chinese expansion. Tokyo is radically increasing its military spending and acquiring long-range cruise missiles. Expanding its military capabilities, China has developed powerful anti-access/area denial systems designed to prevent US forces from

approaching Chinese shores. The Pentagon, meanwhile, has adopted a tactic of dispersing its forces into smaller, mobile units—bases in the Pacific—and developing hypersonic weapons and unmanned systems. Despite the ongoing trade war and political tensions between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping, both powers are attempting to maintain crisis communication channels at the military level to avoid an accidental outbreak of open conflict.

To understand the mutual animosity, and even hostility, we must recall a cause that powerfully creates another dividing line between China and Japan: history. It concerns the Japanese invasion of China, which began in 1937 and lasted until 1945. Similar to their occupation of Korea, the Japanese also brutally treated the Chinese during their occupation of China. During the war, the Japanese killed approximately 20 million Chinese civilians. According to a BBC survey, the Chinese have the lowest opinion of the Japanese of any nation in the world, and 74 percent of Chinese citizens have a negative opinion of Japanese influence. This fuels fears in China and Korea of a return to Japanese imperialism.

Relations between China and Japan have been most heated in recent years over the dispute over the Senkaku Island chain (known as Diaoyu to the Chinese) in the East China Sea. Both countries claim ownership of the islands, which are controlled by Japan. South Korea is also involved in the dispute, stemming from Beijing's unilateral establishment of an airspace control zone, within which all aircraft are required to report to the Chinese. According to Tokyo and Seoul, this zone extends over their seas, so both countries boycott Chinese regulations. This leads to dangerous air encounters between aircraft of all three countries' militaries. Chinese and Japanese ships constantly "stumble" at sea.

It's important to remember that as recently as the 1990s, the Chinese fleet was underpowered, with most ships outdated and small. During the Cold War, the Chinese did not invest in a navy because in an open conflict, they would have had to contend with the powerful US fleet. The Chinese aimed to close the Taiwan Strait and enable an amphibious landing on Taiwan. Therefore, the Chinese fleet was referred to as brown-water, meaning one capable of operating within coastal waters. In the 1990s, when the Chinese economy began to grow rapidly and a potential conflict with the US over Taiwan receded into the background, China focused on developing a high-seas fleet. The goal was to dominate the waters and neighboring countries. Currently, Chinese shipyards produce dozens of modern ships annually, capable of operating far from coastal waters. Added to this are several hundred smaller patrol vessels, missile boats, and landing craft – this is the largest force in the region.

Summarizing China's military potential, available data confirms that China currently possesses the second-largest military force in the world, trailing mainly the United States, but is rapidly catching up technologically and quantitatively. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) has

approximately 2 million soldiers, the largest navy, an air force with fifth-generation fighters (e.g., the Chengdu J-20), and modern hypersonic missiles. Furthermore, it has a massive defense budget, ultimately estimated at nearly $300 billion annually. China has a large mobilization base and a powerful shipbuilding and arms industry. Its ocean-going fleet comprises the largest number of combat ships in the world, including modern aircraft carriers and destroyers. The Chinese Air Force has thousands of combat aircraft and is developing stealth fighters and unmanned systems. Rapid progress is being made in the use and development of artificial intelligence, drones, and advanced hypersonic weapons. China is strengthening its nuclear arsenal, expanding its inventory of nuclear warheads and their delivery systems (long-range ballistic missiles). China's increasing military potential aims to dominate the South China Sea region and prepare for a potential dispute with Japan over Taiwan.

***Hypothesis 2***

***Japan is moving away from a restrictive interpretation of constitutional pacifism.***

The second research hypothesis adopted in this work was also positively verified. For decades, Japan was a virtually ideal example of a pacifist state. However, today this picture is beginning to change significantly, as Japan begins to rapidly increase its military spending and increasingly speaks of the need to prepare for a potential conflict in Asia. Analyzing the provisions of the 1946 Japanese Constitution and drawing conclusions regarding the constitutional model and Japan's current security situation in the Pacific region, it is impossible to ignore that after World War II, this country assumed a pacifist obligation, namely, the renunciation of war. These provisions are reflected in the preamble and Article 9 of the Constitution. When drafting the new Japanese Constitution in 1946, General McArthur advocated for including a clause declaring renunciation of war and Japan's pacifism, believing it would guarantee both freedom and peaceful cooperation between Japan and other states. The general knew that the national honor of the Japanese was the highest value for them and that it would not allow them to break the established clause.

Beginning in 1950, however, the clause regarding Japan's pacifist nature was questioned, as evidenced by the creation of the National Police Reserve, which was later transformed into the National Self-Defense Forces. In 1954, they were renamed the Self-Defense Forces, a name resonating with the United States, as Japan had become its ally during the Cold War. Currently, US troops are deployed on Japanese territory to maintain peace and deter potential aggressors. This stems from an agreement signed between Japan and the United States and is intended to provide a safeguard against breaches of peace by China or North Korea. However, it is impossible to conclude that the Self-Defense Forces are armed forces maintained by Japan in violation

of the clause adopted in the Constitution. This situation perfectly illustrates the two attitudes prevalent in Japanese culture: *honne* and *tatemae*. Moreover, in 2016, Japan ranked 7th in terms of weaponry according to the Global Firepower rankings, yet, according to its constitution, the country has committed to not having its own army. Prime Minister Abe announced in 2014 that he would begin the process of revising the Constitution. It seems that his policy in this regard is currently being slowly but effectively implemented. We can see that the pacifist nature of post-war Japan has become quite entrenched in the Japanese mindset, perhaps a result of the centuries-long respect they have for their ancestors.

However, the current arms race poses new challenges for Japan in ensuring its country's security. The Land of the Rising Sun cannot rely solely on US protection, as Americans must grapple with its own problems and the many challenges facing the country. Analyzing the establishment of the Self-Defense Forces, one can conclude that it was not consistent with the spirit of the clause contained in the preamble to the Showa Constitution of 1946, nor with Article 9 itself. From the very beginning, after the adoption of the new Constitution, the Japanese government has attempted to skillfully navigate between the adopted clause and the actions taken in this area. It must nevertheless be acknowledged that, in the current geopolitical situation, ensuring adequate protection of the state without having its own military is no easy task, and Japan's Self-Defense Forces currently constitute its full-fledged equivalent.

In conclusion, we can state that the renunciation of war clause, despite many political opponents calling for its revision, remains a valid provision. Proponents of amending this clause argue that it is incompatible with Japan's current geopolitical situation. Threats from international terrorism and the arms race fueled by countries like China and North Korea are forcing the Land of the Rising Sun to reassess its stance and presenting new challenges for the country's defense. It is worth recalling that Japan strongly condemned the Russian attack and not only imposed economic sanctions on the Russian Federation but also expelled Russian diplomats from its territory and provided military support to Ukraine. The Japanese were not only concerned with defending Ukraine; they also saw similarities between Russia's imperialist policies in Europe and China's actions in the Indo-Pacific region. From a security perspective, Japan is in a very precarious position, bordered by China to the south, Russia to the north, and North Korea to the west. This has sparked an unprecedented defense debate in Japan following Russia's attack on Ukraine. And when you look at all these elements together, they begin to form something much larger. From the perspective of the United States and its allies, Japan is part of a system designed to contain Chinese expansion in the Pacific. And when viewed from this perspective, it's much easier to understand why Tokyo is now starting to talk about missiles, military buildup, and preparations for a possible crisis in the region. From their perspective, the problem isn't that tensions in Asia are rising. The problem is that

Japan is precisely where those tensions could explode first, and perhaps that's why the current shift there is so significant. However, to understand why modern Japan avoided militarization for so long and why today's shift is so historic, we have to go back to the end of World War II. Japan emerged from it a completely devastated country. Bombings reduced a vast portion of its cities to ruins, and millions of people lived in a country that, moments earlier, had attempted to subjugate much of Asia. Japan also became the only country in history against which nuclear weapons were used. And it is at this moment that a completely new model of Japan begins to emerge. Under American occupation, a new constitution was adopted, intended to ensure that the country would never again return to a policy of military expansion. The most symbolic element of this process was the famous Article 9. It was in this Article that Japan formally renounced war as a tool of state policy. For decades, this remained one of the most defining elements of Japanese policy after World War II. This is precisely why Japan, for a very long time, avoided even the language of military. Officially, the country lacked a traditional offensive army; instead, it created so-called Self-Defense Forces. The name itself was not accidental. The purpose was to emphasize that Japan was solely to defend itself, not to conduct offensive operations outside its own territory. And for a long time, this model worked relatively well, especially since Japan was under the American security umbrella. The United States guaranteed military protection for the region and maintained military bases on Japanese territory. This allowed Tokyo to focus primarily on the economy, technology, and industrial development. This is how Japan became one of the world's largest economies. The problem, however, is that this entire model was built in a completely different geopolitical reality, in a world where China was not yet a global superpower. And precisely because of this, Japan is beginning to do things that would have been politically unimaginable there just a dozen years ago. However, there is one very important problem. Japan is trying to prepare for the most dangerous moment in Asia in decades, at a time when it is increasingly weakening internally, because alongside all the geopolitics, the arms race, and the tensions surrounding Taiwan, there exists another Japan. A Japan with an aging society and an economy that has been grappling with its own problems for years.

Japan also faces other challenges, such as one of the world's largest demographic crises. Its society is aging rapidly, and the number of young people is steadily declining. In 2024, fewer than 700,000 children will be born in Japan,[821] the lowest number since statistics began. And this is no longer a problem of the future. It's happening now. And here a huge security problem arises, because a country that wants to increase military spending and prepare for a potential regional conflict needs not only money and technology; it also needs people. Meanwhile, Japan has

[821] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7JBLoSrAeYs

a decreasing working-age population, and a growing share of the population is made up of seniors. Today, almost 30% of Japan's population is over 65. Economic problems are also a factor. Japan has been struggling with relatively low economic growth for years. Some of its former technological advantages have eroded, and the country has one of the highest levels of public debt in the world. According to various estimates, Japan's debt now exceeds 230% of GDP. For years, this wasn't such a serious problem because Japan could borrow money very cheaply. However, this is beginning to change, and perhaps that's why there's a growing sense in Tokyo that time to prepare may be running out. The coming years could prove to be one of the greatest tests for Japan since the end of World War II. And all of this is happening practically right next to one of the biggest flashpoints in the modern world: Taiwan.

***Hypothesis 3***

***The Indo-Pacific Concept is a tool to strengthen Japan's position as a regional security leader.***

The third of the research hypotheses was also positively verified. For Japan, the Indo-Pacific is more than just a geographical concept – it is an active geopolitical tool, through which Tokyo has moved from being a passive observer to becoming the main architect of Asia's security architecture. The Indo-Pacific allows Japan to secure energy supplies, maintain its position as a global technological leader, and integrate the military potential of its allies to deter China's dominance. For Japan, the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) concept is a fundamental, overarching pillar of its foreign and security policy. Initiated in 2016 by Prime Minister Shinzō Abe and constantly updated (including by Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's cabinet), it unites the Indian and Pacific Oceans into a single strategic space. Its primary goal is to secure Japanese national interests by promoting the rule of law, freedom of navigation, and building a multilateral counterweight to China's rising power. The Indo-Pacific concept is crucial for Japan because it balances influence and deters China's expansion. FOIP is a direct, albeit diplomatically veiled, response to China's *Belt and Road* Initiative and Beijing's assertiveness in the East and South China Seas. Moreover, Japan offers developing countries so-called "high-quality infrastructure," protecting them from falling into China's "debt trap." Furthermore, the concept opposes unilateral attempts to change borders or spheres of influence by force. The Indo-Pacific Concept enhances the security of the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC). Japan is an island nation, poor in natural resources, and entirely dependent on maritime trade and energy imports (primarily from the Middle East). The Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea are crucial for Japan due to the freedom of navigation in these waters, as they are crucial to the survival of the Japanese economy. The FOIP also ensures that key transportation corridors remain an open public good. The traditional alliance with the United States

is no longer sufficient for Japanese elites in the face of global geopolitical changes. The FOIP has become a platform for building new security formats, so-called multi-layered alliances ("Minilateralism"). The QUAD format and strengthening cooperation within the Japan-USA-Australia-India alliance are also of great importance for Japan.

Japan's defense strategy also strives to build strategic partnerships. Tokyo is intensively engaging ASEAN countries (primarily Vietnam and the Philippines), Europe (including NATO), and countries of the Global South. Seeking to enhance economic and technological security, in the latest updates to the FOIP strategy (from 2026), Japan places great emphasis on the challenges of the digital age and economic resilience, including:

- diversifying supply chains and reducing dependence on China for critical raw materials, semiconductors, and energy;
- AI and data infrastructure, seeking to co-create secure telecommunications networks and standards for managing new technologies with regional partners;
- revising its defense doctrine (Military Normalization). Implementing the Indo-Pacific objectives forced Japan to abandon the post-war, strictly pacifist and defensive model of the Self-Defense Forces (JSDF);
- increase in military spending - financing of projects under the FOIP goes hand in hand with the historic rearmament of Japan itself with long-range missiles and anti-ballistic missile systems.

It is worth emphasizing that Japan has implemented a program of direct financing and transfer of military equipment – the so-called OSA (Official Security Assistance) – e.g., radars and patrol boats for the armies of partner countries, including the Philippines.

**Answers to research questions**

The analysis of the research material collected in this work made it possible to answer the research questions:

***1. What conditions caused Japan to change its approach to national security issues?***

Japan has changed its approach to national security, moving away from its previously meticulously observed and understood pacifism toward a resolute deterrence. This stance was necessitated by the rapid deterioration of the security environment in the Indo-Pacific region, as well as global geopolitical crises. This was reflected in the groundbreaking revision of strategic documents adopted on December 16, 2023, and in the stated goal of increasing defense spending to 2% of GDP. The main geopolitical and military factors that have led to this shift in Japan's approach to national security include:

- China's growing power and assertiveness: According to official reports in Japan's Defense White Paper, the actions taken by the PRC have been described as "unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge." Japan is deeply concerned about Beijing's military modernization, military pressure around the disputed Senkaku Islands, and the risk of a conflict breaking out in the Taiwan Strait, which would pose a direct threat to Japan's southwestern islands;
- potential nuclear threat from North Korea: Pyongyang's unpredictable and erratic behavior, as well as its intensive development of its missile program, including ballistic missiles that regularly fly over Japanese territory, pose a direct and real threat to the Japanese population;
- The Russian Federation's armed aggression against Ukraine in 2022 and Moscow's strategic alliance with Beijing raise significant concerns. Russia's invasion of Ukraine shattered any Japanese illusions about the certainty of maintaining international law and order based solely on the rule of law. Furthermore, the strengthening military cooperation between Russia and China near Japan's borders has forced the Land of the Rising Sun to reassess its relations with Moscow. It should be remembered that Japan is still in dispute with Russia over the Kuril Islands.

Internal, technological, and alliance factors

- an emphasis on a more dynamic development of the alliance with the United States, which, under the concept of "integrated deterrence," expects its Asian partners to demonstrate greater commitment and operational independence, and to assume significantly greater responsibility for regional security;
- technological and economic security. Both the US-China rivalry and the COVID-19 pandemic have exposed the fragility of global supply chains. Japan has become aware of the need to protect its high-tech, semiconductor, and artificial intelligence sectors from the theft of sensitive data by foreign intelligence services and from becoming dependent on authoritarian suppliers.
- a new, unprecedented course and nature of warfare in cyberspace. The emergence of new threats in the electromagnetic, space, and cyber domains has forced a shift in defense concepts. The traditional defense approach has become ineffective in combating hacker attacks and satellite threats.

The presented conditions have led to a shift in Japan's approach to national security and justify the Japanese government's decision to officially authorize the so-called counter-strike

capability and retaliatory strikes against aggressor bases in the event of an attack. This stance by Japan represents the most profound transformation of its defense strategy since the end of World War II.

The analysis of the research material collected in the work made it possible to answer the next research question:

***2. To what extent does Japan's new security strategy address potential external threats in the Indo-Pacific region?***

In December 2023, the Kishida Fumio government adopted three documents adapting Japan's security policy to the changing international situation. The national security and defense strategies outline challenges from China, North Korea, and Russia, as well as growing non-military threats. The third adopted document establishes an unprecedented increase in defense spending. Japan's desire to strengthen cooperation with the United States and European countries, along with a critical assessment of Russia's aggression against Ukraine, create conditions for developing contacts and relations with NATO, as well as Polish-Japanese dialogue on security issues.

The package of documents adopted on December 16, 2023, outlines the direction of Japan's security and defense policy for the coming years. Of fundamental importance is the **National Security Strategy** (NSS), which provides fundamental guidelines for state policy and actions aimed at ensuring national security. This document is a revision of the previous strategy from December 2013. The second adopted document, the **National Defense Strategy** (NDS), provides guidelines and expands on the NSS's assumptions regarding the security policy and tasks of the Japan Self-Defense Forces, which are the country's armed forces. **The Defense Buildup Program** (DBP), the third package of adopted documents, establishes the level of defense spending for the next five years. **Japan's National Security Strategy** responds to the diagnosis adopted in the Japanese national security and defense strategies. The strategy poses a threat to the pillars of order, peace, and international harmony in the contemporary world, upon which the Land of the Rising Sun, as well as other countries that prioritize peace, freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, have built their security and prosperity. The Japanese authorities assess the established security concept and adopted defense strategy as indicating that Japan's current security environment is the most challenging and complex since the end of World War II.

The cause and potential source of threats are the attitudes and behaviors of some countries that do not share common values, such as China, the Russian Federation, and North Korea. China poses the most serious challenge to Japan in the country's post-war history. It is worth noting that in the 2013 security strategy, China's policy only raised concerns. Currently, the Japanese authorities

agree that China's movements in the South and East China Seas, as well as in the Taiwan Strait, are particularly dangerous, representing an attempt to unilaterally change the status quo through the use of force. The security strategies adopted by the Japanese government devote significant attention to the Russian Federation, whose armed attack on Ukraine has disrupted the fundamental principles of international law and order and, crucially, increased the risk of conflict in the Indo-Pacific, especially in East Asia. The documents also indicate increased Russian military activity near Japan and the development of deeper alliances and agreements on Russian-Chinese cooperation. Another direct threat, according to Japan, is the development of the DPRK's nuclear and missile arsenal, which is part of a regional arms race. The documents also emphasize the importance of non-military issues, particularly economic ones, crucial to the country's national security. The Japanese authorities are also increasingly concerned with economic security. Attention is also drawn to activities below the threshold of war, such as cyberattacks on critical infrastructure and disinformation. To ensure security, the Japanese government is willing to utilize a variety of instruments—diplomatic, defense, economic, technological, and intelligence. Although diplomatic activity will remain the foundation, due to evolving challenges and threats, the Japanese government deems it necessary to develop military capabilities in line with the expanding potential of other countries, especially in the region.

The National Defense Strategy addresses seven areas defined to enhance the Self-Defense Forces' operational capabilities. The most significant change is the requirement to strengthen missile forces, designed to conduct counterstrikes against targets located in aggressor territory. To this end, Japan is seeking to increase the range of its Type 12 missiles (up to 1,500 km) and develop even longer-range missiles (up to 3,000 km). The Japanese government stipulates that counterstrikes would only be launched in response to an attack, to prevent any further attacks. Furthermore, the NDS envisages the development of an integrated air and missile defense system, as well as expanded cyber and space capabilities, an increase in the number of drones, and the development of the Self-Defense Forces' reserve capacity, including ammunition, fuel, and equipment. The tasks outlined above are being implemented through increased defense spending, which, according to the National Defense Strategy, is expected to amount to nearly $320 billion in 2023–2027, representing a 56% increase compared with military expenditure in 2019–2023. Ultimately, by 2027, Japan intends to allocate 2% of its GDP to defense, in line with the target set for NATO countries. Japan intends to improve its security by co-creating an international order with other countries based on the concept of a free and open Indo-Pacific. To this end, Japan is pursuing bilateral cooperation formats. The alliance with the United States and multilateral cooperation within the Quad, for example, are at the forefront, as are contacts with NATO and the EU.

The documents mention Australia, India, South Korea, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, the Czech Republic, Canada, New Zealand, and Southeast Asian countries. Cooperation will also extend beyond the defense dimension (exercise exercises, research and development cooperation) and will also encompass the co-creation of an open and stable economic order. Regional cooperation mechanisms, such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), will be utilized for this purpose. This partnership also includes regional cooperation with China.

The new strategic documents from 2023, in terms of perceiving new conditions and threats to the security environment, constitute a continuation of the 2013 strategy initiated by the Abe Shinzo government. Abe's diagnosis was confirmed by Russian aggression in Ukraine, Chinese actions in the Taiwan Strait, and the development of North Korea's missile capabilities. The evolution of Japan's security policy is also evidenced by the consistent increase in military spending over the past eleven years. The documents adopted in December 2023 initiate a process of change thanks to which, by 2027, Japan will be able to enhance its capabilities to be primarily responsible for its own security, including the ability to deter a potential aggressor and, if necessary, repel attacks. A modernized and enhanced capability will also increase Japan's contribution to the alliance with the United States, which supports strengthening the military capabilities of its allies to deter China. Like the United States, Japan views the People's Republic of China as a challenge. However, Japan does not completely reject relations with China and, in its adopted strategies, declares its readiness to cooperate with the country in the areas of economy and people-to-people contacts. The relatively positive reaction of the South Korean authorities to changes in Japan's security policy offers an opportunity to improve bilateral relations, marked by historical and territorial disputes, and to revitalize trilateral cooperation with the United States. China and Russia criticize Japan's security strategy, characterizing it as a step toward militarization, suggesting that Japan's relations with both countries will remain tense. The diagnosis of the international situation and the chosen security policy direction make Japan an increasingly promising partner for NATO countries. This is evident, among other things, in cooperation between the defense industries, exemplified by the Japanese-British-Italian project announced in December 2023 to develop a next-generation fighter aircraft by 2035. Changes in security policy are also creating a basis for deepening cooperation between Japan and Poland, which is identified in the NDS as a valuable partner in countering disinformation, hybrid activities, and cyber threats.

### *3. Is a revision of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution justified in the current geopolitical circumstances?*

When analyzing the provisions of the 1946 Constitution of Japan and drawing conclusions regarding its constitutional model and the current conditions in Japan's security environment, it is impossible to ignore the fact that after World War II, the Land of the Rising Sun committed itself to pacifism, or the renunciation of war. These provisions were reflected in the preamble and Article 9 of the Constitution. However, over time, differences began to emerge between the established law and the actual operation of this clause. It is also worth recalling that it was General McArthur, when creating the new Constitution of Japan in 1946, who enforced the inclusion of the renunciation of war clause and the obligation of pacifism, convinced that this would guarantee both freedom and peaceful cooperation between Japan and other countries. The general knew that the national honor of the Japanese people was their highest value and that this honor would not allow them to violate the established clause. From the early 1950s, Japan's pacifist clause was being questioned, as evidenced by the creation of the National Police Reserve, which was later renamed the National Self-Defense Forces, and in 1954, the Self-Defense Forces. This was in line with US expectations, as Japan was an ally in the ongoing Cold War. Currently, US troops are deployed on Japanese territory to maintain peace and deter potential aggressors. This is the result of an agreement between Japan and the US and serves as a deterrent against China or North Korea in the event of an attack on Japanese territory. However, the Japan Self-Defense Forces are an armed force and are maintained by Japan, which is perhaps debatable in the context of the pacifism clause in the Constitution. This situation perfectly illustrates the two attitudes prevalent in Japanese culture: *honne* and *tatemae*. Furthermore, in 2016, Japan ranked 7th in terms of military strength according to the Global Firepower ranking, even though, according to its constitutional provisions, the country has committed to not having its own army. It should be noted that in 2014, Prime Minister Abe announced the initiation of the process of revising the 1946 Japanese Constitution. The pacifist character of post-war Japan has been quite firmly established in the mentality of the Japanese people, perhaps as a result of the centuries-long respect they have had and continue to have for their ancestors.

However, the current arms race poses new challenges for Japan in ensuring its country's security. The Land of the Rising Sun cannot rely solely on the U.S. for protection, as the Americans have their own problems and challenges to address. Analyzing the establishment of the Self-Defense Forces, one can conclude that it was not consistent with the spirit of the clause contained in the preamble to the 1946 Showa Constitution, nor with Article 9 itself. From the very beginning, after the adoption of the new Constitution, the Japanese government has attempted to skillfully navigate between the adopted clause and the actions taken in this area. It must be acknowledged,

however, that in the current geopolitical situation, ensuring adequate state protection without a military of its own is no simple task, and the current Self-Defense Forces in Japan are its full-fledged equivalent.

The key domestic impetus for revising Article 9 of the 1946 Japanese Constitution was provided by the late Prime Minister Shinzō Abe, who initiated a reinterpretation of the pacifist Article 9 of that Constitution. This process was then continued by Fumio Kishida, and the current government, led by Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, is dynamically accelerating military modernization, taking steps to implement unmanned systems, and expanding arms exports to partner countries. It should be emphasized that the expansion of military capabilities does not alter the defensive nature of Japan's security policy and is consistent with the constitution (Article 9 of which stipulates the renunciation of war as a sovereign right of the nation) and international law. The internal debate on security policy focuses on adapting it to the international situation, not legal issues. The vast majority of the Japanese public supports strengthening the country's defense capabilities, but they are concerned about the increasing tax burden and the risk of further excessive growth in public debt. After all, the Japanese government must find additional funds to finance such massive military expenditures.

In conclusion, we can state that the war renunciation clause, despite many political opponents calling for its revision, remains valid. Proponents of amending this clause argue that it is incompatible with the current geopolitical situation Japan finds itself in. The contemporary catalogue of threats in the Pacific region, embodied by the arms race fueled by countries such as China and North Korea, is forcing the Land of the Rising Sun to reassess its stance and posing new challenges to national defense in the current security environment.

To sum up, we can state that the research hypotheses adopted in the work were positively verified with the proper application of the research methods mentioned in the introduction, and the analysis of the collected research material made it possible to answer the research questions posed.

## Conclusion

The presented dissertation, titled "***Contemporary Japan's Security Strategy in the Context of the Situation in the Pacific Region***," is based on research and analysis of the contemporary determinants of the processes and mechanisms affecting Japan's security environment in the Indo-Pacific region. This region should be interpreted not only as a political project aimed at shaping a reality that takes into account both contemporary threats to the security of the region's countries concerned about their own security, but also the scale of economic, financial, and strategic ties between the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

**The main objective of the presented work** was to provide a *comprehensive analysis of Japan's security strategy and an assessment of its effectiveness in the face of dynamic geopolitical changes in the Pacific region*. The specific objectives *of the study included*: *1) identifying threats to Japan's security; 2) analysis of Japan's National Security Strategy; 3) assessment of the military potential and defense policy of the state; 4) analysis of the importance of alliances and strategic partnerships.*

Based on the analyses of the collected research material, it can be concluded that the main objective of the work and its specific objectives were achieved. The structural and logical arrangement of this work allowed for a correct and reliable assessment of the effectiveness of the Japanese security strategy in the context of threats in the Pacific region, the fundamental assumptions of which pertain to the abandonment of post-war Japanese pacifism, the acceleration of rearmament, and the integration and strengthening of existing alliances and agreements, as well as the formation of new ones.

The Japanese government, led by Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, is increasingly focused on building a strong deterrent. It also increasingly emphasizes that Japan must stop behaving as if the world around it were still stable and predictable. This is precisely what is becoming one of the most important elements of this shift, as for decades Japan has operated within a rather unique model. On the one hand, it was one of the world's former technological and economic powers, and on the other, it was a country that approached military matters very cautiously. For a long time, Japan allocated relatively little to military spending, considering the scale of its economy. Furthermore, it refrained from using offensive language in foreign policy, basing its security largely on its alliance with the United States. However, in the current geopolitical environment, it is clear that this model is undergoing a significant shift. A few years ago, such changes would have been politically unacceptable in Japan. Although Japan has modern armed forces and modern military equipment, under the Constitution of Japan imposed by the Americans and adopted during the American occupation in 1946, the country could only defend itself and not conduct offensive operations.

For a long time, Japan also maintained an informal limit on military spending at around 1% of GDP, a relatively low level for the world's fourth-largest economy, especially compared to countries in a much more peaceful geopolitical environment. However, this pattern is rapidly changing. As recently as 2023, Japan was spending approximately 6.8% of 1 trillion yen on defense annually. Japan's security strategy is based on a law adopted in 2022 that envisages increased military spending over the next five years, reaching approximately 2% of GDP by 2027. Furthermore, Japan is investing in weapons that would have been unimaginable just recently, including long-range missiles. It is purchasing American-made tomaols while simultaneously

improving its own missile systems, which can reach targets located hundreds of kilometers from its territory. This is a significant strategic shift, as for decades the Land of the Rising Sun eschewed anything that might be associated with building offensive capabilities. Today, however, Japanese military strategists are embracing the possibility of counterattacks and preemptive strikes, as well as the ability to destroy enemy bases. Furthermore, the Japanese Navy is modernizing its equipment and strengthening its military capabilities by investing in modern ships, anti-missile systems, and air defense systems. Furthermore, and crucially, the country is once again possessing aircraft carriers for the first time since the end of World War II.

**Main research problem**: *how is Japan shaping and implementing its security strategy in response to contemporary geopolitical threats and challenges in the Indo-Pacific region?* has been realized. Studies and analyses of research material indicate that the Japanese government is not only investing in the military but also conducting diplomatic activities, strengthening relations with global partners. It is worth noting that efforts to forge various alliances began more than a decade ago under then-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who promoted the idea of creating an *arc of freedom and prosperity* that would connect the Indo-Pacific countries, and in the future, the United States and Australia. In 2007, he appealed to the then-Indian government to work with Japan to nurture and enrich the region. These actions initiated the creation of an organization called the Quad, which stands for Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. This informal strategic alliance, which continues to this day, is comprised of the United States, Japan, India, and Australia.

From a historical perspective, Abe's strategy and the efforts he undertook years ago were crucial, coinciding with the development of the Chinese economy and the beginning of China's dominance. This was a turning point; from that moment on, threats to Japan's security and China's pursuit of dominance in the Indo-Pacific began to grow. The emerging threat of China gaining control over the flow of goods through the South China Sea led Shinzo Abe to initiate the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Project (FOIP) to counteract this. Countries supporting this idea were expected to take action against emerging threats to free transport. And here, it's worth asking: why is the South China Sea so important and the subject of a struggle for dominance over this body of water? This sea is crucial primarily for international trade, and precisely because of this, China seeks to gain full control of it.

After the US joined the FOIP in 2017, new programs were launched and new partners were acquired. Japan assumed the primary leadership in the region, and, in line with US expectations, it is increasing its defense capabilities, realizing that it cannot rely solely on its alliance with the US for its security. Beijing closely monitors Japan's initiatives and immediately takes countermeasures, leading to steadily escalating tensions between the two countries.

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# SECURITY STRATEGY OF CONTEMPORARY JAPAN IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SITUATION IN THE PACIFIC REGION

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